THE GREAT WORLD WAR

FROM A PHOTOGRAPH

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Rt. Hon. Louis Botha. P.C., L.L.D.

South African Statesman and General.

THE·GREAT WORLD·WAR

A·HISTORY

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CONTENTS

VOLUME III

Chapter		Page
I.	The Dardanelles Campaign—First Phase (February–March, 1915)	1
II.	The Preliminary Offensive on the British Front (February–April, 1915)	12
III.	The Siege and Battles of Przemysl (March–June, 1915)	44
IV.	The Conquest of German South-West Africa (January–July, 1915)	67
V.	Progress of the Campaigns in East Africa and the Cameroons (January–May, 1915)	88
VI.	Ebb and Flow along the French Front (February–May, 1915)	98
VII.	The Campaign in Mesopotamia (January–June, 1915)	113
VIII.	The Navy in the Dardanelles—Second Phase	124
IX.	With Sir Ian Hamilton in Gallipoli (March–May, 1915)	139
X.	The Submarine Blockade and the "Lusitania" (April–June, 1915)	175
XI.	The Second Battle of Ypres (April–May, 1915)	186
XII.	From Ypres to Festubert (May–June, 1915)	225
XIII.	Italy and the War	272
XIV.	Zeppelin Raids on England: A Year's Record	282
XV.	Siege Warfare in Gallipoli (May–July, 1915)	291
XVI.	The Eastern Campaign to the Fall of Warsaw (June–August, 1915)	325

LIST OF PLATES

VOLUME III

PHOTOGRAVURES

Rt. Hon. Louis Botha, P.C., LL.D. - - - - - - *Frontispiece*

General Joffre - - - - - - - - - - - - - *Facing p.* 120

Admiral Sir John Rushworth Jellicoe, K.C.B., K.C.V.O. - - ,, 232

COLOURED MAPS

Page

German South-West Africa - - - - - - - - - *Facing p.* 72

East Africa - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 88

Asia Minor, The Caucasus Region and Mesopotamia - - - - - - 116

The Austro-Italian Frontier - - - - - - - - - - - 272

THE GREAT WORLD WAR

VOLUME III

CHAPTER I

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN—FIRST PHASE

(February–March, 1915)

The Purpose of the Dardanelles Campaign—The Scene of Naval Operations—The Turkish Forts in the Straits—Attacks of the Allies on February 25 and the Following Day—The Bad Weather—Operations from March 1 to 7—The Case of the *Amethyst*—The Grand Attack of March 18—The Moral of the Story.

THE reader will remember that after the declaration of war by Turkey the Russian Empire was all but wholly blockaded. Germany dominated the Baltic, and when Turkey became openly hostile, Russian trade to the Mediterranean by way of the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, or Dardanelles was necessarily suspended. There remained only Archangel in the extreme north of Europe on the White Sea, and, in the most remote east, the ports on the Sea of Japan and the North Pacific. Archangel is accessible only by one line of railway, and is closed by ice in winter. The eastern ports could be reached only along the Siberian Railway slowly, and at a prohibitive cost for transport. This interruption produced a great alteration in the rate of exchange, to the detriment of Russia, and it was known to all the world that unless the empire could find some means of placing its produce on the markets of the world, more rapid and less costly than the routes by Archangel and the Far East, great financial embarrassments would inevitably be felt in the spring of 1915. There was a peremptory necessity for Russia to find outlets, and her allies, whose interests were also concerned, were under an obligation of honour to give her effectual aid. The best way in which help could be given was by opening the trade route between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Other good results would follow the successful performance of this operation. The command of the route implied the

occupation of Constantinople, the severance of Turkey in Europe from Asia, the removal of the main reason which paralysed the activity of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece, and perhaps the complete elimination of Turkey as a factor in the World War.

A glance at a map will show that the naval enterprise to which the Allies stood committed by both interest and honour was varied, and presented considerable difficulty. We may take Constantinople as the centre in the administrative and political though not in the geographical sense. It lies on the European bank at the southern end of the Bosphorus. To the south of it is the Sea of Marmora, the classic Propontis, a landlocked sheet of water studded with islands, which stretches from east to west. At the western end of the Sea of Marmora lie the Dardanelles. The Bosphorus and Sea of Marmora need not be dealt with at present; they will be more properly left for the later stages of the campaign. But an accurate general idea of the Dardanelles must be obtained as an indispensable preliminary to any attempt to understand the story we have to tell.

The Dardanelles, known to the ancient world as the Hellespontus, form a strait 35 miles long, stretching with a general direction from north-east to south-west. The north-western or European side is formed by the Gallipoli Peninsula, which may be compared in shape to a broad, sharp-pointed carving-knife. The handle forms the north-eastern end, and is known as the Isthmus of Bulair (or Palayar). The edge—much dented and worn out of shape by the sea—is the northern or north-western coast of the peninsula. The back, itself much dented and twisted, is the shore of the Dardanelles on the European side. The Asiatic, southern, or south-eastern bank is formed by the mainland of Asia Minor. The Gallipoli Peninsula is full of hills rising to six or eight hundred, and at a few points to over a thousand, feet. The Asiatic bank is a plain from which the ground rises to Mount Ida. The different character of the two banks had a strong influence on the course of the operations. As the Gallipoli Peninsula is nowhere more than some ten miles wide, the range of modern guns made it possible for war-ships to lie on the outer coast in the sub-divisions of the Mediterranean, called the Ægean at the southern and the Gulf of Saros at the northern end. The solid mass of Asia Minor made this kind of attack impossible on the Asiatic side. Then, again, the Gallipoli Peninsula might be cut off from the continental possessions of Turkey by landing troops under cover of the fleet on the Bulair Isthmus. The Asiatic bank must be approached by landing troops in Asia Minor. There are good anchorages at several places. Before giving a more detailed account of the Hellespont, we must not forget to note that there is an overflow from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. The first receives several great rivers, the Danube and Volga being the most important; the second very few in proportion to its size. Evaporation lowers the level of the Mediterranean. The overplus of the water

The London Geographical Institute GEORGE PHILIP & SON, LTD 32 Fleet Street, E.C.

Bird's-eye View of the Dardanelles from the Entrance to the Straits to the Narrows

The letters marked against the forts are those referred to in the Admiralty dispatches and in the accompanying article. The figures represent height in feet.

of the Black Sea restores the level by flowing through the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, and Dardanelles at a rate of from 2 to 3 knots an hour. In view of the use of floating mines in modern naval warfare this direction of the current is a fact of considerable importance. In the Dardanelles the current is strongest on the European bank, where the water is deep—or, as the maritime phrase has it, the coast is "steep up".

When we approach the Dardanelles from the Ægean, the land on the Asiatic side projects at Kum Kale, the point which corresponds to Cape Helles on the extreme southern end of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The distance between them is about 2 miles. Inside the capes the strait widens to about 4 miles. It stretches to the north-east as far as Chanak, growing narrower as it goes. The width at Chanak is 1200 yards. Here the course of the Hellespont turns to the north for some 3 miles, and then curves round to the north-east. These twistings constitute the Narrows. We have no occasion to go farther at present, since the operations up to March 19, with which alone we are concerned in this chapter, did not go beyond the beginning of the Narrows. In all periods of their long and well-filled history the Dardanelles have been fortified, but it would be misleading to dwell too much on the fortifications which were in existence before the operations in March, 1915. From the time the war began the Turkish Government, or rather the German officers who acted in its name, had been busy, adding, improving, and strengthening, till the works which were to be attacked amounted to something much more powerful than the defences which had been known to exist before.

The first forts which a fleet endeavouring to force its way through the Dardanelles had to face were also the weakest. They were so open to attack from the sea by long-range modern guns that there would have been little sense in relying on them to stop the advance of a fleet. Therefore the forts and batteries, old and new, at Sedd el Bahr and Eski Hissarlik, on the Gallipoli Peninsula, or at Kum Kale and beyond it, on the Asiatic side, were to be considered as of the nature of outposts, which might delay, but could not be trusted to stop an enemy. The "body of the place", to borrow a military phrase, was at the Narrows. About three-fourths of the way up to them were the Baikrah Batteries on the European — marked I in the view on p. 3—and the Kephez Batteries on the Asiatic bank. New defences had been thrown up on both sides on the way up to them. At the entry to the Narrows, at Kilid Bahr (the Gate of the Sea) on the European side and at Chanak (the Potter's Castle) on the Asiatic, forts and batteries were thickly placed. They also lined both sides of the reach which runs from south to north between Kilid Bahr and Chanak below to Bokali Kalessi on the European and Nagara Kalessi above. These are the famous old castles which lie below the classic Sestos and Abydos respectively.

An ounce of map is worth a bushel of description, and the reader is asked to turn to the bird's-eye view on p. 3. He will see that not only do the fortifications on either side threaten a tremendous cross-fire on ships endeavouring to pass through, but that the whole reach is swept from end to end by the Cape Khelia forts below Bokali Kalessi. To the forts must be added the mines anchored in the reach. When Lieutenant Holbrook explored the Dardanelles in B 11 he found five rows of mines. After his recon-

naissance the number was no doubt increased and the position altered. Nor were the fixed mines all. The advantage of floating mines to be sent down on ships which had come inside the wide lower reach of the Dardanelles was too obvious to be overlooked by men so competent as the German officers who directed the

Photo. Abrahams, Devonport

The Pride of the Dardanelles Fleet: the mighty super-Dreadnought, *Queen Elizabeth*, the first of her class—of 27,000 tons, carrying 15-inch guns, and fitted to use oil fuel only

defence. Forts and mines worked together. The ships could not pass up till the mines were removed. The mines could be taken away only by dredging. Small vessels employed on this work could be rapidly destroyed by field-guns and howitzers placed in folds of the land, without calling on the fire of the forts. The dredgers must be covered by larger vessels, which then became subject to the fire of the forts. From this it followed that the great ships of the attacking force must beat down the fire of the 14-inch, 11-inch, and 9-inch Krupp guns in the forts. The work would have been simplified if great military forces had been landed to take the Turkish defences in the rear. But the military side of the work can be referred to in this chapter only in an incidental manner. The naval forces of the Allies were, as a matter of fact, called upon to clear the passage by their own exertions, at least up to March 19.

The work of reconnaissance begun by Submarine B 11 was continued, and preliminary skirmishes were reported. But the serious attack dated from February 25. The destruction of the German cruisers in the ocean and the establishment of a decided superiority in the North Sea had by this time permitted of the concentration of a strong force of battleships of the British fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. The French, too,

were able to spare four battleships from the Adriatic and from the protection of the communications with their African possessions. The twelve British battleships were mostly pre-Dreadnoughts, but they included the mighty *Queen Elizabeth*, the most advanced of Dreadnoughts, of 27,000 tons, carrying 15-inch guns, and fitted to use oil fuel only. The general command was exercised by Vice-Admiral S. H. Carden, and the French squadron was commanded by Rear-Admiral Guépratte.

Vice-Admiral S. H. Carden, in Command of the First Operations in the Dardanelles
(From a photograph by Symonds, Portsmouth)

The first task of the attacking fleet was to silence the Turkish forts under the two capes at the entrance. On the European side were the Fort Helles battery and the Fort Sedd el Bahr, and on the Asiatic the Fort Orkanieh Tabia and Fort Kum Kalessi Tabia—named in official reports, and for the sake of convenience, A, B, C, and D. The advance of the Allies had been hampered, and was suspended later on, by bad weather, but on the 25th, when operations could be resumed in favourable conditions, the first necessary success was gained. At 8 a.m. the fleet opened fire at long ranges. The *Queen Elizabeth* engaged Fort Helles, the *Agamemnon* the Sedd el Bahr, the *Irresistible* the Fort Orkanieh Tabia, and the French *Gaulois* the Fort Kum Kale. The *Queen Elizabeth* had silenced the guns at Fort Helles by 11.30 a.m., and the work begun by her was finished by the *Vengeance*, a pre-Dreadnought of 12,950 tons, carrying five 12-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, and the *Cornwallis*, of 14,000 tons, of the same armament. The *Irresistible*, of 15,000 tons, with the same armament as these two, and the *Gaulois* tackled the Asiatic forts, and then, when these were shattered, the *Suffren*, of 12,730 tons, four 50-centimetre guns and ten of 16 centimetres, and *Charlemagne*, of 11,300 tons, four 30-centimetre and ten 14-centimetre guns, closed to 2000 yards to complete the work, aided by the *Vengeance*, *Triumph*, and *Albion*. No loss was reported in these vessels, but the *Agamemnon*, of 15,000 tons, four 12-inch guns, and ten 9-inch guns, which supported the *Queen Elizabeth*, was struck at a distance of 11,000 yards by a shell from Fort Helles, which killed three men and seriously

wounded five. By 5.15 p.m. the forts were mastered.

These having been disposed of, the next step was to remove the mines which their fire could have covered. By next day the straits had been swept by dredgers for 4 miles. Battleships could advance as far as the water was cleared. The *Albion* and *Majestic*, ships similar to the *Vengeance*, assailed Fort Dardanus, and some new works on the Asiatic side about half-way to Kephez Bay on the Asiatic side, and the mine-sweeping went on with slight loss to the dredgers. On the 2nd the work continued, and on that day the *Canopus*, recalled home from the South Atlantic, took part with the *Swiftsure* and *Cornwallis*. It has been noted already that the Bulair Isthmus and the Gallipoli Peninsula can be assailed from the outside. During the operations of March 1 and 2 four French battleships shelled the isthmus from

The British and French Battle Fleet at the Entrance to the Dardanelles

the Narrows, with success and trifling resistance. Meanwhile landing-parties from the *Vengeance* and the *Irresistible* had demolished the forts at the entrance in spite of some feeble resistance from the Turks. The bad weather which had served the enemy well already now came to his help again. A north-easterly gale blew down the straits, with rain and mist, which obstructed all long-range fire and rendered aeroplane observation impossible.

It was not till March 1 that operations could begin again. On that day the *Triumph*, *Ocean*, and *Albion* assailed the forts at White Cliff, below Saros Bay, to molest the Turkish communications. This attack, commanded by Rear-Admiral Guépratte, achieved a marked success by destroying a bridge across the Kavak River. The *Suffren* bombarded Fort Sultan, and the *Gaulois*, a vessel of the same class as the *Charlemagne*, assailed Fort Napoleon. These are the defences nearest to Bulair, dating from the Crimean War. The Allies persevered in this double attack up the Dardanelles and across the peninsula. On March 4 the work of clearing away mines went on. On the 4th the weather was fine, and the work of sweeping and bombarding con-

tinued. And now the Marine Brigade of the Royal Naval Division came on the scene to do the work of the landing-parties by completing the destruction of the already silenced forts at Sedd el Bahr and Kum Kale at the entrance to the straits. The brigade found Turkish troops in force, and some smart skirmishing followed, entailing a loss of nineteen killed, three missing, and twenty-five wounded. On the 5th the double attack developed. The *Queen Elizabeth*, supported by the *Inflexible* and *Prince George*, attacked the Narrows by indirect fire, that is to say, across the peninsula, directing her blows, by the guidance given by aeroplanes, on the Medjidieh Tabia, and Hamidieh II Tabia, that is to say, the forts on the Asiatic side lettered X, V, and U; and also on Namizieh forts lettered L, J, and T, which are on the European side (see sketch-map on p. 3). On the 6th the work went on, favoured by fine weather. The *Queen Elizabeth*, *Agamemnon*, and *Ocean* maintained an indirect fire across the peninsula at a distance of 12 miles. They were fired at by howitzers and field-guns and repeatedly hit, but suffered no damage. Inside the straits the *Vengeance*, *Albion*, *Majestic*, *Prince George*, and the French battleship *Suffren* continued to assail the forts at the Narrows. March 7 was employed in the same way. The French battleships *Gaulois*, *Charlemagne*, *Bouvet*, and *Suffren* entered the straits to cover the direct bombardment of the defences of the Narrows by the *Agamemnon* and *Lord Nelson*. They silenced the Turkish forts, which were still firing on the Asiatic side at Mount Dardanos, and the British ships then bombarded the Narrows from a distance of 14,000 to 12,000 yards. Almost all the vessels engaged here were struck by shells of large size (12 inches), but they suffered no serious hurt. The forts were reported to have been "silenced", blown up, and so forth; but these expressions must be taken with reserve. The silencing of a fort may, and very often does, mean no more than the suspension of its fire by slight damage to fittings which can easily be repaired, or by the death or flight of the gunners, which entails the stoppage of fire till reinforcements are brought up. It is certain that some fire was returned by the Turks till the close of the operations of these days, and that at

Photo. Russell, Southsea

The British Light Cruiser *Amethyst*, struck by a howitzer shell in the Dardanelles, losing twenty lives

Rear-Admiral J. M. de Robeck, who succeeded to the Command in the Dardanelles Operations
(From a photograph by Abrahams, Devonport)

a later date they were found to be in an efficient state.

And now wind, rain, and mist settled down again, at least in a figurative sense, on the operations in the Dardanelles. After the publication of the British official report on the 8th, and a French *communiqué* of the 13th, there was an interval of silence, broken only by the voice of Rumour, speaking with even more than her usual impudence, from Athens. On her authority it was asserted that the light cruiser *Amethyst*, of 3000 tons and twelve 4-inch guns, had made a dash up the Narrows as far as Nagara Kalessi. What, unfortunately, had really happened to the *Amethyst* was that while she was covering the small vessels dredging for mines she was struck by a howitzer shell, which plunged into her and exploded in the stokehold, causing a loss of twenty killed and several wounded. The vessel, however, was not crippled.

The operations of the allied fleet between March 7 and 18 were stated in the Admiralty announcement of the 19th:

"Mine-sweeping having been in progress during the last ten days inside the Straits, a general attack was delivered by the British and French fleets yesterday morning upon the fortresses at the Narrows of the Dardanelles."

It is convenient to give the Admiralty view of the results of the attack at once, for our own guidance as we follow the story. On March 21 the Secretary of the Admiralty published a statement which contains these words:—

"Unfavourable weather has interrupted the operations in the Dardanelles, and as sea-plane reconnaissance has not been possible, the amount of damage done to the forts by the bombardment of the 18th cannot be ascertained. No great expectations should, however, be based on this, as, owing to the losses caused by drifting mines, the attack was not pressed to its conclusion on that day."

From the Turkish point of view what had happened was described as a repulse of the Allies with loss. There is no occasion to say that the public was misled. Every man naturally takes the point of view most favourable to himself, and gives his estimates of the meaning of events quite honestly. What to the assailant appears as a mere failure to obtain complete success is from the point of view of the defenders a repulse. On this as on other occasions, the Admiralty did not publish all it knew, but only

Photo. Symonds, Portsmouth

The French Battleship *Bouvet*, sunk in the Dardanelles by a floating mine on March 18, 1915, with the loss of nearly all her crew

what it thought fit to allow to be known.

We can now go on with the story of the action of March 18. On the 16th Vice-Admiral Carden, being incapacitated by ill health, gave up his command, and was succeeded by Rear-Admiral J. M. de Robeck, who held the local rank of Vice-Admiral. Under his immediate command the Allies opened the attack at 10.45 a.m. The *Queen Elizabeth*, *Inflexible*, *Agamemnon*, and *Lord Nelson* bombarded the forts at Kilid Bahr and Chanak, while the *Triumph* and *Prince George* opened on the forts about Kephez Point on the Asiatic side, below Chanak. At 12.22 the French squadron, consisting of the *Suffren*, *Gaulois*, *Charlemagne*, and *Bouvet*, advanced up the Dardanelles and engaged the forts at closer range. The Turkish batteries, at which, it will be observed, the most powerful ships in the allied fleets had been firing for some two hours, "replied strongly". But their fire was silenced, and at 1.25 p.m. they had ceased firing. The *Vengeance*, *Irresistible*, *Albion*, *Ocean*, *Swiftsure*, and *Majestic* then advanced to relieve these six. As the ships which had been relieved were going down the Dardanelles, and the *Bouvet* was just off Eren Keui, a village about half-way between Kephez Point and Kum Kale, the *Bouvet* was blown up by a floating mine, and sunk in three minutes with the loss of nearly all her crew. Then, so the official announcement tells us:

Photo. Cribb, Southsea

The British Battleship *Ocean*, sunk by a floating mine in the Dardanelles, March 18, 1915. (Most of the crew were removed safely under a hot fire.)

"At 2.36 p.m. the relief battleships renewed the attack on the forts, who again opened fire. The attack on the forts was maintained while the operations of the mine-sweepers continued. At 4.9 the *Irresistible* quitted the line, listing heavily, and at 5.50 she sank, having probably struck a drifting mine. At 6.5 the *Ocean* also having struck a mine, both vessels sank in mine-sweeping operations terminated when darkness fell." And if now we take another sentence from the report of the 19th we shall have the elements from which to form a judgment.

"The losses of ships were caused by mines drifting with the current, which were encountered in areas hitherto swept clear,

One of the three Battleships sunk in the Dardanelles on March 18, 1915: How H.M.S. *Irresistible* went to her doom
The above is reproduced from an instantaneous photograph taken from a neighbouring war-ship

deep water, practically the whole of the crews having been removed safely under a hot fire. The *Gaulois* was damaged by gun-fire. The *Inflexible* had her forward control position hit by a heavy shell, and requires repair."

The paragraph ends with a sentence which it is advisable to compare with the already-quoted words of the Secretary of the Admiralty. "The bombardment of the forts and the and this danger will require special treatment."

It is obvious that the fire which had silenced the Turkish forts by 1.25 p.m. had done them very little damage. If that were not the case they could not have opened fire with such effect on the second squadron which advanced to the attack. Nor could they have kept up fire till dark. The result of a long day's engagement goes to

show that modern ships had not obtained that mastery over forts with which some critics had rather hurriedly credited them after the first successful operations against the weak defences at the entry to the straits. In this case the fire of the forts was certainly not dominated. The danger from drifting mines was one which must have been foreseen, and we cannot suppose that precautions had been neglected. The total result of the action went to inspire doubts as to the wisdom of this purely naval attack. The reason why the Allied Army under Sir Ian Hamilton—already arrived in transports—did not co-operate, will be found in a later chapter.

While the battleships were thus trying to force the Dardanelles a subsidiary operation had been begun against Smyrna, but this may be better left till it had developed.

D. H.

CHAPTER II

THE PRELIMINARY OFFENSIVE ON THE BRITISH FRONT

(February–April, 1915)

End of the Struggle at Cuinchy—Belgian King's Visit to British Army—Vulnerable Parts of the Allies' Line—The 5th Corps at St. Eloi—Dashing Exploit of "Pat's Own"—Deaths of Lieut.-Colonel Farquhar and Brigadier-General Gough, V.C.—Cavalry in the Trenches—Neuve Chapelle—An Incomplete Victory—Sir John French's Reasons and Objects—Earlier Fights for Neuve Chapelle—The Road to Lille—Preliminaries of the British Attack—The Bombardment—Carrying the Trenches—Unbroken Entanglements—"Port Arthur"—Capture of the Village—Havoc of the Bombardment—The Delayed Advance from Neuve Chapelle—Deadly Struggles for Pietre and the Bois du Biez—Indian Prowess—British Cavalry in Readiness—Hope of Further Advance Abandoned—Both Sides Fought to a Standstill—Honours for Neuve Chapelle—British and German Losses—Munitions the Greatest Problem of the War—Secondary Operations of Sir H. Smith-Dorrien's Army—German Attack on St. Eloi—Won and Lost—High Praise for Plumer's Fifth Army—Bavarian Generals Cashiered for their Failure—The Battle of Hill 60—How the British Took and Held the Position—The First Territorial V.C.—"Murder Hill" and the Second Battle of Ypres.

THE stubborn struggle for the brickstacks at Cuinchy, described in Vol. I (pp. 240–3) marked the turning-point in the operations along the British front in the La Bassée area towards the close of the winter campaign of 1914–5. Prisoners subsequently captured admitted that the German troops engaged in this prolonged fight became demoralized after their reverse on February 6, abandoning their arms in a disorderly retreat. Extensive stores of German bombs and hand-grenades, which were also left behind, proved extremely useful in the British counter-attacks, the enemy's weapons being turned against himself with great effect. Two days after the Coldstreams and Irish Guards had inflicted this decisive defeat, the King of the Belgians paid a visit to the

British lines, and inspected some of the units in reserve behind the trenches. "During the last two months", wrote Sir John French in his dispatch of April 5, 1915, in recording this visit, "I have been much indebted to His Majesty and his gallant army for valuable assistance and co-operation in various ways."

Though soundly beaten at Cuinchy and Givenchy, the enemy, pursuing his traditional policy of the offensive-defensive, made other attempts to break through the British line before the close of the winter campaign, but was invariably repulsed with loss. Just as he had concentrated his efforts on the junction between the British and French troops in the La Bassée area, so he hammered almost unceasingly on the join at the other end of the British line, south-east of Ypres. If, however, he relied upon weakness and a fatal lack of co-ordination at these two points he miscalculated. In all his massed attacks by fair means in this stage of the war he never once succeeded in forcing a passage at either junction of the Allies' lines. It was only when he adopted the foul means of poisonous gases a few months later—and so confessed his failure—that he made any headway at all. These dastardly attacks played no part in the ebb and flow of battle during the remainder of February, 1915, when the advent of drier weather enabled the troops on both sides to effect great improvements in the trenches, and raised high hopes at the prospect of a real advance, away from the region which had become one vast cemetery, with the trenches of friend and foe often winding in disjointed confusion in every direction. Some of the hardest fighting during this period took place south-east of Ypres, in the neighbourhood of St. Eloi. Here, in a position which, as Sir John French pointed out, had always been a very vulnerable part of the line, the 5th Corps held its ground in the face of repeated onslaughts, sometimes losing a trench for a time, but always recapturing it. The ground in this neighbourhood being marshy, the trenches were not only difficult to construct but harder than most to maintain. The hardships of the winter campaign, too, had fallen with greater weight upon the 27th and 28th Divisions of the 5th Corps from the fact that this was their first experience of European warfare. A number of other units had only recently returned from service in tropical climates.

"Chiefly owing to these causes," to quote from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief's report of April 5, "the 5th Corps, up to the beginning of March, was constantly engaged in counter-attacks to retake trenches and ground which had been lost. In their difficult and arduous task, however, the troops displayed the utmost gallantry and devotion; and it is most creditable to the skill and energy of their leaders that I am able to report how well they have surmounted all their difficulties, that the ground first taken over by them is still intact, and held with little greater loss than is incurred by troops in all other parts of the line."

In one place the 82nd Brigade of the 27th Division, after losing its trenches on February 14, not only recaptured the whole of them on the

following morning, but inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, sixty German dead being counted in front of the position, while a number of prisoners were taken. One of many heroic stands along this front is recorded by "Eye-Witness". In the confused nature of the fighting, when Germans and Britons at times found themselves "sandwiched" in between one another, a trench had become isolated, with forty of our men holding it against heavy odds. Every one of the forty was killed or wounded, but even the wounded continued firing and kept the enemy at bay. At last only three remained who were capable of firing, but, nothing daunted, the gallant three continued to hold the post until seven men rushed up from the rear with as much ammunition as they could carry:

"These latter found the three wounded survivors still standing amid the bodies of their dead and disabled comrades and still firing steadily. The support, slender as it was, came in the nick of time, for at that moment the Germans launched another assault, which, like the previous ones, was beaten off, and the position was saved."

February was not allowed to pass by the Germans without another vigorous attempt against the trenches held by the Indian corps. This was made on the 17th, but was handsomely repulsed. The closing honours of the month fell to the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, which, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, was the first of the Canadian contingent to reach the firing-line, and had already earned high praise both from Lord Kitchener and Sir John French. On February 28 a dashing exploit was performed by "Pat's Own" which put all their native scoutcraft to the test. Their object was a night—or rather early-morning—attack on the enemy's trenches near St. Eloi. The storming-party was divided into three small groups, the whole under the command of Lieutenant Crabbe: No. 1 Group under Lieutenant Papineau, No. 2 Group under Sergeant Patterson, and No. 3 Group under Sergeant-Major Lloyd. It was shortly after 5 a.m. when they started, but still dark, and they crept along without rousing the least suspicion until within fifteen or twenty yards of the German trench. Then they charged. Eleven Germans were killed and five wounded, while a few prisoners were taken. "Lieutenant Crabbe, who showed the greatest dash and élan," wrote Sir John French, "took his party over

Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Farquhar, D.S.O., killed while commanding the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, March 20, 1915
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

Brigadier-General J. E. Gough, V.C., mortally wounded in April, 1915
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

everything in the trench until they had gone down it about 80 yards, when they were stopped by a barricade of sand-bags and timber." Meantime the supporting-parties had advanced up the communicating-trenches and blocked them, repelling all the enemy's efforts to interfere with the work of destruction. This the Canadians completed by pulling down the front face of the German parapet; having accomplished which the Happy Warriors returned with their captives. A few of the attacking-force had been hit, but the losses were trifling in comparison with the results achieved. The whole affair only lasted twenty minutes.

For his share in this brilliant little affair the Distinguished Service Order was won by Major Andrew H. Gault:

"For conspicuous gallantry at St. Eloi, on February 27, in reconnoitring quite close to the enemy's position and obtaining information of great value for our attack which was carried out next day. On February 28 Major Gault assisted in the rescue of the wounded under most difficult circumstances while exposed to heavy fire."

Two other officers of the same regiment were also awarded the Military Cross—Lieutenant T. M. Papineau (a grandson of the famous French-Canadian statesman who died in 1871) "for conspicuous gallantry when in charge of bomb-throwers during our attack on the enemy's trenches", and Lieutenant W. G. Colquhoun, for "conspicuous gallantry and resource on numerous occasions, especially at St. Eloi", where he was captured while carrying out by night, alone, a dangerous reconnaissance of the German position.

Unhappily, in paying a well-deserved tribute to the valuable services which this distinguished corps continued to render, the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief had to record the death of Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Farquhar, D.S.O., by whom it had been so ably organized, trained, and commanded. Colonel Farquhar, who won his D.S.O. in South Africa, and belonged to that regiment of the Brigade of Guards, the Coldstreams, the proudest title of which is that it is "Second to None", had made a host of friends since he went to Canada as Military Secretary to the Duke of Connaught in 1913, and his loss was deeply mourned in the Dominion as well as at home. He was killed while superintending some trench work on March 20, 1915.

Another serious loss in the trenches

occurred just a month previously, when Brigadier-General J. E. Gough, V.C., was mortally wounded. "I always regarded General Gough as one of our most promising military leaders of the future", wrote Sir John French in recording his death. His work as a Staff Officer throughout the campaign had been invaluable, and he had already been awarded the C.B. for his services. He was inspecting the trenches of the 4th Corps when he received his wound, and died two days later. One of the fighting Goughs, he belonged to a family which has left an indelible mark in the history of the Empire. Both his father, the late Sir Charles Gough, and his uncle, the late Sir Henry Gough, won the Victoria Cross in the Indian Mutiny—his own V.C. was gained in Somaliland—while his elder brother, Major-General Hugh Gough, who came prominently before the public during the Home Rule crisis on the eve of the Great War, when he commanded the cavalry at the Curragh, had also done splendid work with the Expeditionary Force in France and Flanders, being promoted for his splendid work in the field. In recognition of the "most distinguished service" of the late Brigadier-General Gough, V.C., the posthumous honour of a K.C.B. was conferred upon him by the King. Heavy and grievous as were these and countless other losses, each daily report, as Sir John French pointed out, showed clearly that they were being endured on at least an equal scale by all the combatants engaged throughout Europe, friends and foes alike.

Further proof of the *camaraderie* and close co-operation existing between the British force and its Allies—notwithstanding the ceaseless and insidious efforts of the Germans to

Field-Marshal Sir John French—a photograph taken at the Front

disseminate distrust among the French troops—was furnished during February, when Sir John French arranged with General Foch to render the 9th French Corps, holding the trenches on the British left, some much-needed

rest by relieving them with the three divisions of the British Cavalry Corps. It was not the first time that our cavalry had proved their mettle in a form of warfare quite outside their ordinary sphere. On the whole the time passed in the French trenches was uneventful, though the 2nd Cavalry Division had to beat off an attack against the right of the line on February 16; and five days later one of the trenches held by the 16th Lancers, with some adjoining French trenches, was blown up by an elaborate series of German mines. A new line was prepared a short distance in rear and immediately occupied. The Indian cavalry, at the request of the General Officer commanding the corps, were also given a turn in the trenches, thereby relieving other troops and gaining some useful experience.

The time was now at hand, had Sir John French's hopes been realized at Neuve Chapelle, when the cavalry would have found the opportunity they longed for in their legitimate rôle. No Briton can read the story of Neuve Chapelle without a thrill of pride for its countless deeds of heroism, deeds in which our soldiers from home—England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales—as well as from Canada and India, gave new lustre to our old renown in arms. But even Sir John French, though he states in his dispatch that the results of the action were "wide and far-reaching", and that the losses incurred were not great in proportion to those results, scarcely disguises his disappointment that the success achieved was not considerably greater. The measure of his disappointment may be gauged by the weeks of careful planning which preceded the action, the tremendous nature of the attack itself, and the cost of victory. It was an open secret that Neuve Chapelle was only regarded by the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief as a stepping-stone to Lille, the fortified capital of the French *Département du Nord*, which had been in the hands of the enemy since the middle of October, 1914, and that if he did not regard that town as his immediate objective, he hoped at least to secure the ground commanding it beyond Neuve Chapelle. Four and a half hours lost after the capture of the village on March 10, partly due to the inevitable mischances of war, but more particularly to the imperfect execution of orders and the delay in bringing up the reserve brigades, robbed him of this greater triumph just when the plan, elaborated with such infinite pains with his Headquarters Staff, gave promise of complete success. Nevertheless, the victory, limited though it was in territorial gain, inflicted heavier losses on the Germans than those sustained by the victors, and while it gave a great fillip to the spirits of our troops after four months' sedentary work in the trenches, it dealt a damaging blow to the enemy, who had regarded his entrenched position as impregnable. Incidentally it served to disillusionize those German "experts" who were fond of declaring that the British were only good for the defensive, and incapable of attack.

Other more vital considerations had induced Sir John French in February to decide upon a vigorous offensive movement by the forces under his

command at the earliest possible moment. Not the least of these was the situation on the eastern front, where the Russian army was then engaged in repelling the violent onslaughts of Marshal von Hindenburg. It was necessary to assist our Russian Allies by keeping the enemy fully occupied in the western theatre, the French meantime operating to the same end at Arras and in Champagne. The object, nature, and scope of the attack which began in the early morning of March 10, were communicated by Sir John to Sir Douglas Haig, commanding the First Army Corps, in a secret memorandum dated nearly three weeks before—February 19. It was arranged that the main attack should be delivered by units of the First Army, supported by heavy artillery, a division of cavalry, and some infantry of the general reserve, secondary and holding attacks and demonstrations being meantime made along the front of the Second Army under the direction of its commander, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

It speaks volumes for the work of the General Staff during those weeks of silent preparation, and through the critical period immediately before the attack while the troops and guns innumerable were mustering within striking distance of the enemy, that no warning whatsoever seems to have reached the German lines before the morning of the 10th.

Neuve Chapelle had already changed hands more than once since the enemy first took possession of it on October 26, 1914, and on each occasion, as was usually the case with village warfare, when the battle raged from house to house, it had been the scene of fighting of the most murderous description. It lay between the British lines held south of the Lys at the beginning of March, 1915, and the ridge which runs from a point 2 miles south-west of Lille to the village of Fournes, whence it forms into two spurs, one leading to the height known as Haut Pommereau, the other following the line of the main road to the village of Illies. In his dispatch on the battle Sir John French describes this ridge as "the main topographical feature of this part of the theatre". Clearly it was his intention to capture the ridge as a means of reaching Lille. For obvious reasons, however, the Field-Marshal made no reference to these plans in his dispatch of April 5, which gave the main object of the attack as "the capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle and the enemy's position at that point, and the establishment of our line as far forward as possible to the east of that place". In order to understand the nature of the operations it is necessary to follow the directions given by "Eye-Witness" regarding the British line south of the Lys immediately before the advance:

"Starting with the left, the line rests on the river north-west of Houplines. From this point it runs in a slight curve round Armentières to Bois Gernier. From here it runs, or rather did run, in a south-westerly direction almost straight to the cross-roads about 1000 yards due west of Neuve Chapelle. It then ran south to Richebourg-l'Avoué, passing east of this place, whence it continues southwards, passing west of La Quinque Rue and a little to the east of Festubert. From this point it curves eastwards again round Givenchy."

A glance at the map will show how near this brings us to the scene of the German onslaughts in the La Bassée district described in Vol. I, Chap. XVIII. It also shows that Neuve



The Battleground of Neuve Chapelle: Map showing the British positions on the eve of the attack, and the British line before and after the fighting of March 10–14, 1915

Chapelle lies in a network of roads forming an irregular diamond-shaped figure. Along the two roads forming the western side of the figure lay, at daybreak on March 10, the original British line, held since the enemy recaptured the village in the preceding November. The German line lay along the eastern side, at the apex of which stood the village itself, its unpretentious houses and small farms straggling over a considerable extent of ground, with a church in the centre. Guarding the village were the German front trenches, with their white and blue sand-bags and barbed-wire entanglements, while some of the houses had been turned into miniature fortresses, from which the approaches

could be swept by the deadly fire of machine-guns.

During the night of March 9–10 the last preliminaries of the attack were completed. British and Indian infantry in countless numbers were silently mustered in the assembly-trenches. Hundreds of guns and howitzers were collected for such a bombardment as the Germans had never experienced before. Two days previously the plan of attack had been revealed to the army corps commanders; otherwise it was kept a profound secret. Some inkling of the fact that the British trenches facing the village were full of troops seems to have reached the German lines at daybreak on March 10, but not until 7.30 a.m., when the guns had found their range, did the defenders of Neuve Chapelle fully realize their danger. Suddenly, at a given signal, "all the universe", as one soldier described it, "seemed to rock and shake to the roar of guns and explosion of shells". For thirty-five minutes the thunder of artillery continued unceasingly, while the infantry, waiting to assault, watched the bombardment with increasing excitement. The shelling was so rapid that it sounded like the deafening fire of one gigantic machine-gun. It was described by the men in the British trenches as the most tremendous, both in regard to noise and actual effect, that they had ever experienced.

"They could see our shells", wrote "Eye-Witness", "bursting in the thick veil of smoke and dust which hung over the German trenches, and as the minutes wore on, as our artillery-fire grew hotter and hotter, and the time drew nearer for them to rush forward, their excitement rose to fever pitch. In some places they were seen to jump up on the parapets brandishing their rifles towards the Germans and shouting remarks which were drowned in the roar of the guns."

Then, at last, at 8.5 a.m., came the order to charge. The curtain of fire was lifted from the trenches and carried to the village beyond, while cold steel completed the grim work in front. The 23rd and the 25th Brigades of the 8th Division (4th Corps), were meantime ordered to carry the battered trenches on the north-west of the village, while the Garhwal Brigade, which occupied the position to the south of Neuve Chapelle, was to lead Willcocks's Anglo-Indian Corps against the trenches in its front and then sweep on to the Bois du Biez. The 2nd Leicesters were among the four leading regiments of the Garhwal Brigade that broke the German line at this point. "They rose and charged like one man", wrote a general officer with the forces in describing the behaviour of the battalion at Neuve Chapelle. "Nothing could exceed their dash and gallantry." Capturing the first German breastworks, they swept on, carrying line after line of the enemy's trenches, and finally, according to their orders, swung round to the south of the village, entrenching the ground they had won in the direction of the River Des Layes, which formed the new line of the German defences. The 1st Battalion 39th Garhwalis, on their right, had not been so fortunate. By some mischance, or a fatal fold in the ground, the wire entanglements and other de-

fences of the German trenches facing them had escaped the British shells. Rifles and machine-guns swept the open ground in front with a withering fire which instantly killed all the British officers of the leading companies while charging at the head of their men. Inspired by their example the plucky hillmen, though they lost their direction, swept to the right, and with bayonet and knife stormed a section of the enemy's trench. Seeing that the second line of the Garhwalis had lost their British officers, Lieutenant Gerald A. Cammell, of the 44th Battery Royal Field Artillery, who was employed as observing-officer at the time, at once proceeded to lead the men; but he too fell wounded while advancing to the attack. For this brave act Lieutenant Cammell was awarded the D.S.O.

One of the riflemen of this battalion of the Garhwal Rifles, on the same heroic occasion, won the third Victoria Cross awarded to Indian troops since they became entitled to that distinction—Rifleman Gobar Sing Negi—"for most conspicuous bravery" during the attack on the German position, when "he was one of a bayonet-party with bombs who entered their main trench, and was the first man to go round each traverse, driving back the enemy until they were forced to surrender". Unfortunately the V.C. in this case was a posthumous honour, the gallant Indian being killed during the engagement.

Hour after hour the Germans clung tenaciously to their trenches and ruined houses at this point—an angle of the cross-roads south of the village which they had so strongly fortified that it came to be known as "Port Arthur". The 2nd Leicesters—whose "behaviour, courage, and endurance" throughout these operations, added the general officer already referred to, "were beyond all praise"—sent a bombing-party down a communication-trench to the rescue of the Garhwalis, and helped to force the Germans into the open. The Seaforths dashed forward to deliver a flank attack, while from the front a final charge was delivered in which the London Territorials, the 3rd Battalion Royal Fusiliers, covered themselves with glory under the eyes and amid the cheers of the hardened veterans of the British and Indian armies. The Londoners lost heavily, but they never wavered, and carried the last German trench with irresistible dash.

"No one hesitated for a second," wrote one of the officers present, in a letter quoted in the *Daily Telegraph*, "everyone went straight on across that awful open country with bayonets at the charge. It was appalling and it was splendid. No troops in the world could have done better. They reached the trench, and the Germans surrendered. . . . After the charge the colonel and I sat inside that breastwork and helped to tend the wounded as they were brought in. It was heartrending, but the dear lads were so splendid, and made so light of it. It made the tears run down my face to see them. One boy in great pain said to me, with a smile: 'They can't call us Saturday-night soldiers now, can they, sir?'"

"Port Arthur", round which the struggle had raged so fiercely all day, was thus finally carried at 5.30 p.m.

In the meantime the village itself

Drawn by D. Macpherson from first-hand information

With the "Die Hards" at Neuve Chapelle: the Storming of a Blockhouse by the 2nd Middlesex

had fallen completely into British hands. There had been comparatively little resistance elsewhere save at one point to the north-east, where the 23rd Brigade charged only to find that the barbed-wire entanglements, sheltered by a fold in the ground, had escaped our artillery-fire, and that men and machine-guns were strongly ensconced in the battered buildings

behind them. The Scottish Rifles —the old 90th Light Foot—and the 2nd Middlesex, attacking from the Rue Tilleloy, returned to the attack time after time, and those who survived the hail of bullets cut and hacked in vain at the impassable wire. Both regiments went through the ordeal with unflinching courage. The colonel of the Scottish Rifles, Lieutenant-Colonel Bliss, and all his officers save one subaltern attached from the 3rd Battalion, were killed or wounded. The men were mown down in heaps. The stronghold which held up the 2nd Middlesex was a ruined farmhouse, re-roofed by the Germans with a bomb-proof shelter of clay and sandbags. The roof was raised from the walls, giving a splendid field of fire for the machine-guns installed there. A formidable barrier of barbed wire completed the defences. The 2nd Middlesex attacked again and again, but were decimated by the fire from the machine-guns. Some engineers arrived and placed a mine, but were themselves caught by a mine exploded by the Germans. Eventually the blockhouse fell to the Middlesex, assisted by the Royal Irish Rifles with their machine-guns.

Elsewhere, as already stated, there had been less resistance in front of the village. The line of trenches had for the most part been blotted out by the terrific bombardment. What remained of them were half-filled with dead and dying, and the survivors for the most part had no heart left for further fighting. By 11 a.m. practically the whole of the elaborate series of trenches guarding the village, and then the village itself, were captured. Here the primary assault was delivered by the 2nd Lincolnshires and the 2nd Royal Berkshires, both of which greatly distinguished themselves. In this attack, and the days of fighting which followed, the Lincolns were to lose thirteen officers killed—including Lieutenant-Colonel G. B. M'Andrew —and wounded, and 298 non-commissioned officers and men; but they won all the ground they were ordered to take, "and a bit more besides", as one of their number proudly wrote at the time. The first of the Lincolns to reach the enemy's trenches was Captain Reginald Bastard, who, charging at the head of the second company, forced his way through the deadly entanglements which still barred his path, and entered the German trenches in advance of his men. For this act he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order. The first trenches having been carried, other regiments had swept on to capture the village itself. Flushed with victory, the troops at this point carried everything before them. For a time, amid the terrific din, the clouds of shell-smoke, the indescribable scenes of resistance and surrender, the heavy losses among the officers, and the inevitable confusion of house-to-house fighting in all directions, it was impossible to keep the men well in hand, and their failure to rally and re-form ranks immediately after the initial victory was one of the causes which delayed the subsequent advance. The lust of battle was hardly surprising after the men's dogged endurance of the months in the

trenches, and the bitter recollection of the ordeal which had been inflicted upon them in the early stages of the war, when the weight of artillery and superior numbers were all on the German side. They were paying the enemy back in his own coin, and they paid back with interest. Many famous regiments, British and Indian, shared the honours of that historic day, including the Rifle Brigade—credited with being the first regiment to enter Neuve Chapelle—the 1st King's (Liverpool) Regiment, who were held up by undamaged wire, but were afterwards praised for their gallant behaviour; the Black Watch, the Royal Irish Rifles, the 4th Suffolks, the Liverpool Scottish, who charged over four lines of trenches; the East Lancashires, the Sherwood Foresters, the Northants, the West Yorks, and others.

Neuve Chapelle itself was nothing but a mass of shattered ruins. "Eye-Witness" gives a graphic account of its condition after its capture:

"The appearance of the village", he writes, "suggests the havoc wrought by an earthquake, for the place is one huge rubbish-heap; it is almost impossible to distinguish the streets amongst the rubble and bricks which have been hurled across and obliterated them. Here and there portions of houses are still standing, but these are few and far between and are dangerous to enter on account of falling tiles and tottering walls. In the churchyard the very dead have been uprooted, only to be buried again under masonry which has fallen from the church, and crosses from the heads of the tombs lie scattered in all directions. The sole thing in the cemetery that has escaped damage

A Calvary that survived the Battle of Neuve Chapelle

"The sole thing in the cemetery that has escaped damage," wrote "Eye-Witness" at the time, "is a wooden crucifix still erect amid the medley of overturned graves."

is a wooden crucifix still erect amid the medley of overturned graves. There is another large crucifix still standing at the cross-roads at the north end of the village, and at the time our troops entered a dead German soldier was lying at its foot."[1]

Thus far, in spite of the serious losses in front of the enemy's wire entanglements, the plan of attack had made excellent headway. The artillery-fire had completely cut off the village and the surrounding country, preventing any German reinforcements from being thrown into the fight to restore the situation. Now, however, ensued the fatal delay of four and a half hours before the further advance was made towards the Aubers Ridge. The respite enabled the enemy to effect a recovery, and to bring up reinforcements to bar the passage of the victorious British. In all the impetuous attacks which followed, by day and night, until the 14th, these few precious hours were never made good. The Germans themselves evidently prepared for the worst, for it subsequently transpired that something uncommonly like panic prevailed in Lille when news was received of the fall of Neuve Chapelle, all the large hospitals being removed to Tournai, and many German officers billeting in Lille hurriedly shifting their quarters to Tournai. To a certain extent the delay was due to the cutting of the telephone wires by the enemy's fire, which rendered communication between front and rear most difficult, and to the disorganization of the infantry by the violence of their charge through the trenches and the confused nature of the fighting for certain portions of the village, fighting described as remarkable for the manner in which every part of the attacking-line afforded one another mutual support.

Obviously the first consideration after the capture of Neuve Chapelle, in order to establish the line "as far forward as possible to the east of that place", was to push on before the enemy could recover himself. Sir John French, whose plan of attack had collapsed as a result of the delay, after making due allowances for the difficulties of the situation, apportioned the blame as follows:—

"I am of opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed order of the General Officer Commanding First Army been more carefully observed. The difficulties above enumerated might have been overcome at an earlier period of the day if the General Officer Commanding 4th Corps had been able to bring his reserve brigades more speedily into action."

As it was, instead of these reserve or formed troops—the 21st, 22nd, and 24th Brigades—being ready to follow up the initial success at once, it was not until 3.30 p.m. that a further advance could be made. By that time the opportunity of a greater triumph had vanished. The 21st Brigade had been able to form up on the left in the open, without a shot being fired at it, thus showing how paralysed was the enemy's resistance at that time, but the subsequent advance was held at vital points by German reinforcements unshaken by the terrific bombardment which had unnerved the defenders of Neuve Chapelle.

When at length the advance was

[1] "*Eye-Witness's*" *Narrative of the War* (Arnold), 1915.

renewed at 3.30 p.m., on the extreme left of the 4th Corps, the 21st Brigade pushed forward in the direction of Moulin de Pietre, but after making good progress was held up by the machine-gun fire from the houses and from a defended work in the German trenches opposite the 22nd Brigade on its right. Farther south still the 24th Brigade of the same 4th Corps, which had been directed on Pietre, found its path impregnably blocked in similar manner, while the 25th Brigade on its right, now reorganized after its initial onslaught on the village, and ordered to advance in the same direction across the River Des Layes to the north of the Bois du Biez, was held up by a murderous fire of machine-guns from a bridge strongly held by the Germans on their new line of defences east of Neuve Chapelle. The Bois du Biez had to be captured before the ridge beyond could be attacked, and the Anglo-Indian Corps was directed to occupy the wood while the brigades of the 4th Corps were advancing towards Aubers. Two brigades of the Meerut Division established themselves on the new British line round Neuve Chapelle, while the Dehra Dun Brigade, supported by the Jullundur Brigade of the Lahore Division, advanced towards the Bois du Biez by way of the same fortified bridge-head, barring the passage of the River Des Layes, which had stopped the 25th Brigade of the 4th Corps. Enfiladed by the German guns at this point the Indians were also brought to a standstill. Sir Douglas Haig thereupon ordered the 1st Corps to send up one or more battalions of the 1st Brigade from Givenchy, where an attack had been delivered in the morning simultaneously with that against Neuve Chapelle. Little progress had then been made in these operations at Givenchy, the barbed wire of the enemy's defences having been insufficiently destroyed by the artillery-fire; but the troops had been able to hold the Germans at this point, and three battalions were now sent to Richebourg St. Vaast to assist in the attack on the Bois du Biez. Meantime, however, the Germans had also hurried up reinforcements, massing them in the wood for repeated counter-attacks; so that although the Gurkhas succeeded in penetrating this position they were unable to retain their advantage, being ordered to withdraw for tactical reasons. "I know full well that if you had not received these orders", said Sir John French after the action, in thanking the 2nd and 9th Gurkha Rifles of the Dehra Dun Brigade for their fine conduct on that occasion, "you would not have retired." Darkness fell on the sanguinary operations of March 10 before the help from Givenchy could arrive in time for further progress to be made, and the Indian and 4th Corps proceeded to consolidate their positions. The net result was that in addition to the village the British were in possession of all the enemy's trenches on a front of 4000 yards, their advance at the farthest point being some 1200 yards or more from their original trenches.

Although the attack was renewed on the following day (March 11), both by the 4th and Indian Corps, it was soon seen that further advance was

impossible without adequate artillery co-operation. Unfortunately a change in the weather, with mist and low-lying clouds, heavily handicapped aerial observation—a fatal drawback, with nearly all the telephone wires connecting our artillery observers with their guns destroyed by the enemy's fire. The gunners, though working with the utmost energy and skill—as testified by Sir John French in his warm tribute to their "invaluable support in the prosecution of the attack"—could not fire without the risk of inflicting loss on their own side. It is now common knowledge that these difficulties resulted in some of the most grievous casualties during the operations at Neuve Chapelle, as well as at Givenchy. Speaking of the Neuve Chapelle fighting on March 11, Sir John French says that "even when our troops which were pressing forward occupied a house here and there, it was not possible to stop our artillery-fire". The infantry accordingly had to be withdrawn. Increased efforts were made by the enemy, both on this day and on the 12th, to recover his lost ground, but for the most part with little success, and appalling losses. Fighting continued to rage most furiously round the two principal points which had barred the British advance from the first—the bridge over the River Des Layes to the south, above the Bois du Biez, and the fortified houses to the north, about the Moulin de Pietre (Pietre Mill). Many stories are told of the Indians' prowess in the south and south-east both in attack and defence. It was a positive joy to them to be fighting again after the months of slush and frost and snow of the trenches. Their dash at the taking of Neuve Chapelle itself is described

Reinforcements for the Fighting-line: Troops marching past Sir John French and Staff

as wonderful. One happy Gurkha was seen marching off five German prisoners at the point of his kukri. He had made his way into a house and captured them single-handed.

The most desperate counter-attacks by the Germans were delivered on the morning of the 12th from the Bois du Biez, when, after shelling the British line for hours, they poured from the wood in dense masses, only to fall, line after line, before the British and Indian rifles. "It was like cutting grain", declared some of our Sepoys.

The Guns at Neuve Chapelle: British Artillery in Action

Meantime an attack was proceeding against the German positions to the north, about the Moulin de Pietre, protecting the road to the Aubers ridge. Sir John French evidently had high hopes of its success, as he informed Sir Douglas Haig on the morning of the 12th that he could call on the 2nd Cavalry Division under General Gough to clinch matters in the event of the infantry breaking down the obstinate German defence. Gough's division and a brigade of the North Midland Division, temporarily attached to it, were accordingly moved forward, the 5th Cavalry Brigade, under Sir Philip Chetwode, reaching the Rue Bacquerot, ready for any emergency, at four o'clock. All, however, had not gone well with the attack against the German strongholds protecting the Aubers ridge. Every house manned and armed by the enemy was so situated that all the ground within range could be swept by the fire of machine-guns. Mist and broken communications still prevented adequate co-operation between the artillery and infantry. Gunners found it impossible at times to distinguish friends from foes. Reading between the lines of Sir John French's dispatch, one also suspects that the supplies of ammunition were running short. Yet the only hope of getting through was to take these buildings one by one. Knowing

this the gallant men of the 4th Corps—the 2nd Gordons, with their Territorial battalion, the 6th, whose Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel Maclean, fell in the thick of the fight; the 1st Grenadiers, the 2nd Scots Guards, the 2nd Borderers, and the Rifle Brigade among them—advanced to the attack with a courage and self-sacrifice worthy of the finest traditions of the army. The heroism and the sacrifice were in vain. Strong reinforcements of the enemy, taken from many units, had been arriving in a continuous stream since the loss of Neuve Chapelle on the 10th, and no living thing could now pass through the terrific and incessant fire which swept every approach to the German strongholds. Though the trenches in front were reached and held by the British at terrible cost, night fell with the enemy still in possession of his new line of defence. The cavalry reluctantly retired to Estaires, the General Officer Commanding 4th Corps having informed General Gough that, as the situation was not so favourable as he had hoped it would be, no further action by his troops was advisable. That night Sir John French directed Sir Douglas Haig to hold and consolidate the ground already won by the 4th and Indian Corps, and for the time being to suspend further operations. The 4th Corps fell back on the position from which the costly attack had been launched during the afternoon, and, having consolidated this during the night, stubbornly withstood all the enemy's efforts to recapture it on the following day. Both sides, in short, had been fought to a standstill. By Sunday, the 14th, our new line was firmly established, and no further attempt was made upon it by the enemy.

Away to the south, along the Anglo-Indian front, the German counter-attacks from the Bois du Biez had spent themselves in the unavailing fury of the 12th and 13th, when line after line of troops had been mown down like so much ripe corn. By nightfall on the 12th the slaughter had been so great that opposite one sector more than 2000 German bodies could be counted. Our guns and rifles played such havoc in the enemy's ranks that every attempt to debouch from the wood melted away. On more than one occasion the men of the attacking-force, who were now showing signs of great exhaustion, lay down and held up their hands when we opened fire. Near the cross-roads, in front of the stronghold known as Port Arthur, which had been captured on the 10th, seventy Germans were taken in a body from one communication-trench. Similar captures were made in the desperate fighting near the Moulin de Pietre, where in one instance eighty Germans were hauled from a trench rushed by a party of about fifty British armed with bombs.

"In some cases", writes "Eye-Witness", "entire companies surrendered. Many of the men were completely exhausted. They stated that their trenches were full of water, that all their officers had been killed, that whole battalions had been destroyed, and that they had been for days without food."

By the 14th the four days' battle was over. The Germans left the village to its fate, and Sir John

Wounded Heroes from the Front: Their Majesties visiting one of the Indian Hospital Camps

French had to be content with the ground thus gained, and the proof which it afforded — if proof were needed—of the indomitable spirit of the troops under his command. Obviously the sedentary work in the trenches during the trying winter months had in no way impaired their fighting quality. In the special order which the Field-Marshal addressed to Sir Douglas Haig at the conclusion of the battle he wrote:

"I am anxious to express to you personally my warmest appreciation of the skilful manner in which you have carried out your orders, and my fervent and heartfelt appreciation of the magnificent gallantry and devoted, tenacious courage displayed by all ranks whom you have ably led to success and victory."

The men themselves were in rare fettle after the fight. They had at last taken the offensive, paid back many old scores, and, though their own losses had been heavy, those of the Germans were heavier still. "Eye-Witness" tells us that after these days and nights of incessant fighting, during which they had often to be for hours exposed to heavy fire, and in spite of their terrible death-roll, they showed little signs of strain when they were relieved, swinging cheerily through the villages on the way back from the trenches, carrying *Pickelhauben* and other trophies; and after one night's rest were fit for anything again. The Indians were also elated by the result of the action, and con-

tinually asked when they were going to have another fight. This was war after their own hearts. They were deservedly praised by Sir John French in a special telegram to the Viceroy of India:

"I am glad to be able to inform your Excellency that the Indian troops under General Sir James Willcocks fought with great gallantry and marked success in the capture of Neuve Chapelle and subsequent fighting which took place on the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th of this month. The fighting was very severe and the losses heavy, but nothing daunted them. Their tenacity, courage, and endurance were admirable and worthy of the best traditions of the soldiers of India."

"Every man, whether Indian or British, deserves the V.C.," wrote one officer home in describing the heroism of all ranks at Neuve Chapelle. Many Victoria Crosses and other decorations were subsequently awarded, and if anyone doubts the glowing accounts which were published at the time let him turn to the bald statement of fact in the official records. One of the two Victoria Crosses awarded to the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards—no fewer than ten of whose officers were killed at Neuve Chapelle, including Lieutenant-Colonel L. R. Fisher-Rowe, and a proportionate number of non-commissioned officers and men—was awarded to Lance-Corporal W. Dolby Fuller "for most conspicuous bravery" under the following circumstances:

"Seeing a party of the enemy endeavouring to escape along a communication-trench he ran towards them and killed the leading man with a bomb; the remainder (nearly fifty) finding no means of evading his bombs, surrendered to him. Lance-Corporal Fuller was quite alone at the time."

Fifty Germans to one man was something like a "bag", but the Grenadiers swelled the list of German prisoners throughout the operations, thanks largely to the able handling of the hand-grenade company by Captain Wilfred Edward Nicol, whose daring and skill in this connection were rewarded with the D.S.O. Two V.C.s also went to the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade "for valour" on the part of Sergeant-Major Harry Daniels and Corporal Cecil Reginald Noble in the same battle:

"When their battalion was impeded in the advance to the attack, by wire entanglements, and subjected to a very severe machine-gun fire, these two men voluntarily rushed in front and succeeded in cutting the wires. They were both wounded at once, and Corporal Noble has since died."

Other V.C.s were won by Private Jacob Rivers, of the 1st Battalion Notts and Derby Regiment, who also, alas! was killed while earning it—after deeds of heroism which saved his battalion on more than one occasion; and Private William Buckingham, 2nd Battalion Leicestershire, "for conspicuous acts of bravery and devotion to duty in rescuing and rendering aid to the wounded while exposed to heavy fire". The Worcesters, who were singled out by Sir John French for their gallantry in the first great battle of Ypres, gained still further laurels by their heroism at Neuve Chapelle, where they lost fifteen officers killed and wounded, and a

proportionate number of their rank and file. Two of the surviving officers of the 1st Battalion received the D.S.O.—Major John F. Sartorius Winnington and Captain John H. Morris Arden; and another officer, Lieutenant E. B. Conybeare, the Military Cross.

The 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, who got farther forward than any battalion in their division, the 1st Staffordshires, and the 2nd Borderers, also had the honour of being thanked by Sir John French for services rendered both at Ypres and Neuve Chapelle.

"I know the part you took in this battle," he said, in addressing the Borderers after Neuve Chapelle: "you stormed a very strong redoubt of which the enemy were in possession; you came under a very heavy fire, and your losses were enormous; but you took the work and 300 prisoners. Not only am I, but your country is, grateful to you for the magnificent part you have played all through the war."

To the Royal Scots Fusiliers he subsequently said:

"You had already a great fighting reputation—in fact, you are justified in considering yourselves one of the most distinguished regiments in the army—but the glorious traditions of your regiment have been not only maintained but enhanced by your gallant conduct at Ypres and again at Neuve Chapelle. You have suffered heavily, and I greatly deplore these losses, but, believe me, they have not been in vain."

Perhaps it is invidious to single out individuals and regiments where all displayed invincible courage, but the following awards may be quoted as typical of British and Indian gallantry and devotion on the field of Neuve Chapelle. Major G. T. Campbell Carter-Campbell, of the 2nd Battalion Cameronians, received the D.S.O. for bravery and resource throughout the operations from March 10 to 12, when he took over the command of the battalion, with only one surviving officer to assist him, "and, although wounded, maintained with great determination the positions which had been gained". The other surviving officer of the Cameronians was Lieutenant W. F. Somervail, attached to the 2nd from the 3rd Battalion, who won the Military Cross, "for conspicuous gallantry, marked ability, and presence of mind" from the 10th to 14th, when he ably seconded his commanding officer and performed excellent work on his own initiative.

"On the evening of March 12," continues the official record, "he collected the men of his battalion and conducted them over unknown ground to a position for attack, with very good judgment. He brought his battalion out of action after the engagement on March 14."

When Lieutenant Somervail was the only officer of the 2nd Cameronians, his right-hand man in the firing-line was Sergeant-Major J. Chalmers, who also received the Military Cross "for conspicuous gallantry and ability" throughout those memorable days. It was for somewhat similar services that Subahdar Parbat Chand, of the 59th Sind Rifles (Frontier Force), was awarded the same decoration for "exceptionally good service at Neuve Chapelle on March 12, when he commanded his corps for five hours after the European officers had fallen",

subsequently taking command of the machine-gun section after the British officer had been killed. The official records tell the same story regarding all branches of the service engaged in the battle. Take the award of the Military Cross to Second-Lieutenant W. S. Morrison, of the Royal Field Artillery (Special Reserve):

"For conspicuous gallantry at Neuve Chapelle from March 10 to 14, 1915, when he accompanied the infantry in the attack, and kept up communication with his battery, although his wires were often cut. He was wounded and knocked down twice by shells bursting near him, but continued performing his duties."

Or this typical instance of the heroism of the R.A.M.C. under fire, for which the same decoration was conferred upon Lieutenant A. C. Hincks of the 26th Field Ambulance, Territorial Force (2nd Wessex):

"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at Neuve Chapelle from March 11 to 14, 1915, in collecting the wounded whilst under heavy fire. On the night of March 13–14, whilst he was attending on a wounded man, a shell struck the ambulance-wagon, killing the man and rendering Lieutenant Hincks unconscious. On recovering he at once proceeded to collect the wounded under fire, and continued doing so throughout the night."

German Prisoners from Neuve Chapelle: Captured Germans passing through Handforth (Lancashire) on their way to a Concentration Camp

All through the operations the work of the Royal Flying Corps was, as usual, of the greatest value. Unfavourable weather after the first day,

as already pointed out, sadly handicapped their close co-operation with the artillery, but continuous reconnaissance was made over the enemy's front, and daring raids carried out on the railway at Menin and Courtrai, both points of vital importance on the German communications.

The Berlin official bulletin put the German losses at Neuve Chapelle at 6000, but it was estimated by the British that the enemy lost that number in killed alone during the four days' fighting. Several thousand bodies were seen and counted on the battlefield, while large numbers lay buried among the ruins of Neuve Chapelle. As for their other casualties, "we have positive information", said Sir John French in his dispatch, "that upwards of 12,000 wounded were removed to the north-east and east by train," while the prisoners included 30 officers and 1657 other ranks. Our own losses numbered, all told, 12,811, made up as follows: 190 officers and 2337 other ranks killed; 359 officers and 8174 other ranks wounded; 23 officers and 1728 other ranks missing.

These are figures which make a total not very considerably less than those sustained by Wellington's army at Waterloo, and show how all the campaigns of history were dwarfed by this Great World War. Waterloo brought to a close the long struggle against Napoleon and France, and decided the fate of Europe; Neuve Chapelle was but an incident in the preliminary offensive of the Allies on the western front. Another striking fact — vouched for by the Chancellor of the Exchequer—was that in the fortnight's operations round Neuve Chapelle almost as much ammunition was spent by our artillery as during the whole of the Boer War. Hence the crying need for munitions which now became one of the greatest problems of the campaign.

"In war as it is to-day between civilized nations, armed to the teeth with the present deadly rifle and machine-gun," wrote Sir John French towards the close of his historic dispatch of April 5, 1915, "heavy casualties are absolutely unavoidable. For the slightest undue exposure the heaviest toll is exacted. The power of defence conferred by modern weapons is the main cause of the long duration of the battles of the present day, and it is this fact which mainly accounts for such loss and waste of life. Both one and the other can, however, be shortened and lessened if attacks can be supported by the most efficient and powerful force of artillery available; but an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is necessary, and a most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be given to the artillery commanders."

It was at Neuve Chapelle that the Canadian Division, which had followed "Pat's Own" to the front in the middle of February, and had taken its place in the trenches at the beginning of March, had its first real baptism of fire. During the battle they held a part of the line allotted to the First Army, and though not actually engaged in the main attack earned the warm commendation of Sir John French for the spirit and bravery with which they kept the enemy actively employed in front of their trenches. The Prince of Wales, who acted as Liaison Officer on Sir John's staff during the battle, also received mention in the Field-

Marshal's dispatch, which His Royal Highness had the further honour of bearing to the Secretary of State for War.

While the battle was raging in and about Neuve Chapelle, the secondary attacks and demonstrations along the front of the Second Army under the enemy escaped by means of communication-trenches while the British were cutting a way through the entanglements. This success represented an advance of about 300 yards on a front of half a mile. Counter-attacks were made by the Germans to recapture the place by parties of bomb-

Village Fighting in Flanders: a Maxim gun in action on the British Front

General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien had been instrumental not only in preventing the enemy from sending reinforcements to the main point of attack, but also in the capture to the east of Armentières of the village of L'Epinette and the adjacent farms. The village fell on March 12, two columns of infantry converging for the attack, and obtaining the first houses with little loss. The remainder of L'Epinette was so heavily wired that throwers, but all were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien had also planned for the morning of the 12th an attack on the German position to the east of Wytschaete, but a dense fog delayed the operation until four o'clock in the afternoon. The Wiltshire and Worcestershire Regiments, to whom the assault was entrusted, were then so hampered by the mist and the approaching darkness that the plan had

The Battlefield of St. Eloi: a corner of the village after the defeat of the Bavarians on March 14, 1915

to be abandoned, nothing more being effected than holding the enemy to his ground.

Seeing that our line was now firmly established round Neuve Chapelle the German efforts were directed, on Sunday, March 14, to a fresh quarter at the other end of the British line. This was the surprise attack against the 27th Division, holding the trenches east of St. Eloi, the village which lies at the junction of the two main roads from Ypres to Armentières and Warneton. The British trenches ran close round the village on the east, and, bending away westward on the south side of it, left the enemy, roughly speaking, facing the place on two sides. Under cover of a mist the Germans brought up a tremendous force of artillery, and at 5 p.m. on March 14 suddenly attacked the British trenches along the eastern and south-western sectors with a concentrated volume of fire. This was accompanied by two terrific mine explosions, which blew in the trenches of the south-western sector, rendering them untenable. Amid the ensuing din and confusion the Bavarians, advancing in overpowering numbers, succeeded for a time in capturing this position. To the east of the village, however, a most determined stand was made by the defenders. "Their fire was so steady and well-directed", wrote "Eye-Witness" in his account of the battle, "that the losses among the assailants were terrible, our men sticking to their posts to the last—in fact till they were overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers." The penetration of the first line of trenches at these points meant that the garrisons of other works still successfully resisting the assault were enfiladed, and just before darkness set in they were forced to retire. Following up this success the Germans

now carried the village itself, and prepared to consolidate their position. But Sir Herbert Plumer's Fifth Army had no intention of allowing the enemy to retain the ground and thus atone for his loss of Neuve Chapelle. The counter-attack which led to the recapture of St. Eloi during the night following its loss was a fine piece of work, well-directed and executed with the utmost dash and bravery. It was organized by the General Officer Commanding 82nd Brigade, under the orders of the General Officer Commanding 27th Division, who brought up a reserve brigade to support it. The first assault was launched by the 82nd Brigade at 2 a.m. on the 15th, when it was found that the enemy had already erected barricades across the village streets defended by machine-guns. Each of these formidable positions had to be stormed one by one, thus rendering the work of recapture a terribly costly business. Regardless of their losses the British, charging time after time, gradually forced the enemy back. What the first general assault left undone was completed by a second attack at 3 a.m., when the 80th Brigade in support recovered more trenches to the east and west of the village, driving the remnants of the enemy completely out of the place and recapturing all the lost ground of any material importance. It was of



Map of the Environs of Ypres, showing approx mately the German line after the battles of St. Eloi and Hill 60

Hill 60 is so called from its height in metres, all the hills on the Western Front being marked in this way on the military maps.

this fight that Sir John French wrote:

"It is satisfactory to be able to record that, though the troops occupying the first line of trenches were at first overwhelmed, they afterwards behaved very gallantly in the counter-attack for the recovery of the lost ground; and the following units earned and received the special commendation of the Army Commander: The 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers,[1] the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the 1st Leinster Regiment, the 4th Rifle Brigade,[2] and the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry."

Brigadier-General Longley also congratulated Colonel Copeman and the 1st Battalion Cambridgeshire Regiment for the part they took in the battle. The way the battalion had advanced towards St. Eloi under very heavy shell- and rifle-fire, he said, was splendid, and they had been of the greatest assistance in holding the village in the crisis of the attack.

When dawn broke on the 15th there was a two hours' truce to collect the wounded, Germans and British mingling freely in the search. "Rather quaint," remarks one of the British officers present, "when a few hours previously they had been fighting like fiends." Two days later the Germans made a vigorous effort to recapture the position by assault, but were repulsed with great loss. The only ground not recovered by the British was a mound which the Germans had blown up in the first attack; but this could now be subjected to so heavy a fire on either side that little use could be made of it. It was afterwards announced that the Bavarian generals responsible—the corps commander and both the divisional commanders—were placed on the retired list for their failure at St. Eloi.

The Germans apparently were now forced by developments on the eastern front to remain for a time inactive in the west. It was significant at all events that the fall of Przemysl on March 22, and Russia's continued progress in the Carpathians, coincided with a comparative lull on the German side in the western theatre of war. This lent colour to the report that the Kaiser had sent enormous reinforcements to the Carpathians and that German leaders had taken charge of the operations. More than a month elapsed after Neuve Chapelle and St. Eloi before the enemy attempted another attack in force on the British front, the British troops meantime establishing themselves securely on the ground won, and preparing for a further offensive movement south of Ypres, while the French captured the summit of Hartmannsweilerkopf in the Vosges, and recovered more ground in the region of the St. Mihiel salient. As an instance of the remarkable promptitude with which our losses were replaced, Sir John French was able to report that notwithstanding the heavy casualties incurred in the fighting between March 10 and 15 all deficiencies, both in officers and rank and file, were made good within the next few days.

It was on the evening of April 17 that the next outstanding event took place along the British front. Hill 60, a commanding position lying on

[1] Lieutenant G. D. G. Elton, of the 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's), won the Military Cross on this occasion.

[2] Lieutenant R. C. Hargreaves, 4th Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort's Own), was also awarded the Military Cross for conspicuous gallantry in this engagement.

Hill 60: a sketch of the German position just before its capture by the British on April 17, 1915

the north side of the Ypres-Comines railway, just west of Zwartelen, and between 2 and 3 miles south-east of Ypres, had frequently been the scene of heavy fighting, but hitherto the summit had remained in German hands. Though probably less than 200 feet high, it was a commanding height as heights go in Flanders, and it enabled the enemy to bombard Ypres from the south-east and constantly threaten the British lines about St. Eloi. The hill was seamed with countless trenches which had been a constant source of annoyance to the Allies, and it was towards these that British engineers had long been silently sapping. On April 17 the weeks of underground labour came to an end. The saps were complete, seven heavily-charged mines were placed in position, and just when daylight was beginning to fade they were all exploded. The earth seemed to quake, and the whole side of the hill to be blown into the air. Before the dense column of smoke and dust had died away the infantry leapt from the British trenches, and within a few minutes — for less than 100 yards separated them from the gaping craters ahead—the first line of the enemy's defences was in their hands. Those of the German soldiers who had not disappeared in the air with the trenches, parapets, and sand-bags, were stunned and panic-stricken.

"Cursing and shouting," wrote "Eye-Witness" in his account of the attack, "they were falling over one another and fighting in their hurry to gain the exits into the communication-trenches; and some of those in rear, maddened by terror, were driving their bayonets into the bodies of their comrades in front. Of all this our infantry had but a momentary glimpse before they fell upon the enemy with the bayonet, burst through the maze of trenches, poured into the craters, and pressed on down the communication-trenches until at last they were stopped by barricades defended by bomb-throwers."

It was then that the real struggle began, the artillery joining in on both sides. The whole hill became obscured in the smoke of the continuous bombardment. Our men held on until reinforcements arrived, and by nightfall the position was in our hands. Under cover of the guns, which maintained a terrific fire far into the night, the captors worked without ceasing to secure their hold, though shelled all the while by the enemy's batteries. Early the next morning—Sunday, April 18—came the expected counter-offensive in the shape of massed attacks by the German infantry. Though these were defeated with frightful loss —largely by means of motor machine-guns rushed up on side-cars—the enemy returned so persistently that after piling the hill-side with his dead he succeeded at length, late in the afternoon, in obtaining a foothold on the southern edge of the crest. It was, however, only a fleeting success. At 6 p.m. reinforcements reached our first line, and a brilliant bayonet charge swept the enemy back. The whole of the position was again in British hands, and after a night of comparative quiet was rendered more secure than ever. It was hardly likely that the German generals in command would thus accept defeat, especially after the

example that had been made of the Bavarians in command at St. Eloi, and in view of the second battle of Ypres about to develop to the north and north-east of the town; but it was not until the Tuesday (April 20) that they returned to the attack.

Now was unmasked a concentration of artillery which grew in intensity until it seemed as though the hill itself must be levelled to the ground. At 6.30 p.m. the bombardment ceased, and the German infantry sprang forward to complete the work of the guns. "If they thought, however, that the spirit of our men had been broken by high explosives," as "Eye-Witness" wrote, "they were soon to discover their mistake." In spite of their losses and the ceaseless storm of shot and shell, our men had never wavered, and when the rush came were ready to deal with it as they had dealt with the earlier attacks. The Germans were mown down by our machine-guns, and decimated in the confused hand-to-hand combats which ensued in the labyrinth of trenches and continued through the rest of the day. Only at one point was the enemy found in possession on the following morning (Wednesday the 21st), and from this he was dislodged by a counter-attack a few hours later, when the only Germans left on the hill were a few bomb-droppers clinging precariously to the north-eastern edge. A supreme effort was now made to shell the British from their trenches by field-guns brought up to within close range of the hill, while high explosives and projectiles filled with asphyxiating gases rained down upon the defenders from other directions. It was all in vain. Nothing could shake or move the men who had resisted the incessant cannonade and repeated onslaughts for days and nights together.

"What our troops withstood", reported "Eye-Witness", "can to some degree be realized if it be remembered that the space fought over on the four and a half days, between April 17 and 21, was only about 250 yards in length by about 200 in depth. On to that small area the enemy for hours on end hurled tons of metal and high explosives, and at times the hill-top was wreathed in clouds of poisonous fumes. And yet our gallant infantry did not give way. They stood firm under a fire which swept away whole sections at a time, filled the trenches with dead bodies, and so cumbered the approach to the front line that reinforcements could not reach it without having to climb over the prostrate forms of their fallen comrades."

The first Victoria Cross to be awarded to a member of the Territorial Force was won in this fight by Second-Lieutenant Geoffrey Harold Woolley of the 9th (County of London) Battalion, the London Regiment (Queen Victoria's Rifles), "for most conspicuous bravery" during the night of April 20–21:

"Although the only officer on the hill at the time", runs the official record, "and with very few men, he successfully resisted all attacks on his trench, and continued throwing bombs and encouraging his men till relieved. His trench during all this time was being heavily shelled and bombed, and was subjected to heavy machine-gun fire by the enemy."

"Without a doubt", wrote one of his brother-officers, "he saved the

hill on this occasion." When all his superior officers had fallen the force under him was gradually reduced from 150 men to 20, of whom 14 were Territorials and 6 Regulars. He was gazetted to a temporary captaincy a few weeks later.

This was not the only V.C. won for the defence of Hill 60 during the prolonged counter-attack of the Germans. The East Surreys, in one of the front trenches, held out no less gallantly than Woolley's heroic band, and received two Victoria Crosses for their courage. One was awarded to Lieutenant George R. Patrick Roupell, who commanded a company of the 1st Battalion in this trench throughout the severe bombardment of the 20th. Though wounded in several places he stuck to his post, and led his men in repelling a strong German assault. The official record describes how, during a lull in the bombardment, he had his wounds hurriedly dressed, and then insisted on returning to his trench, which was again being subjected to severe bombardment. Towards evening, his company being dangerously weakened, he went back to his battalion head-quarters, represented the situation to his Commanding Officer, and brought up reinforcements, passing backwards and forwards over ground swept by heavy fire. With these reinforcements Lieutenant Roupell held his position throughout the night, and until his battalion was relieved next morning.

The second of the Surrey's Victoria Crosses was awarded to Private Edward Dwyer of the same battalion —a Fulham lad not yet nineteen years

Second-Lieutenant G. H. Woolley, 9th (County of London) Battalion of the London Regiment, the first Territorial to win the Victoria Cross
(From a photograph by the Central Press)

of age, who thus enjoyed the additional distinction of being at the time the youngest V.C. in the army. He may not have been the youngest on record in both services, as a Victoria Cross was won by Midshipman Basil Guy in the summer of 1900, when he was only eighteen years and two months old.[1] The East Surreys, according to a letter from Sir Charles Fergusson, under whose supervision the operations—planned by Major-General Bulfin—were carried out, were among the heroes of a fight in which the conduct of all was magnificent.

As Wednesday (April 21) wore away, so the bombardment diminished, only to be renewed on subsequent days, when other unsuccessful attacks were

[1] By the summer of 1915 the middy V.C. had become a lieutenant-commander of a light cruiser.

made. Meanwhile the Germans had proceeded to put into execution their diabolical apparatus for emitting poisonous gases, first employed in the second battle of Ypres, which began that week. There is little doubt that Hill 60 was intended to play a part in this later struggle, and possibly it was because of the British grip on that important position that the new battle was confined to the north and east of the town. In any case the men who won and, through so many critical days, held Hill 60, or "Murder Hill" as Thomas Atkins significantly called it, fought a fight which ranks among the finest exploits of the war.

The late Lieutenant James Anson Otho Brooke, 2nd Battalion The Gordon Highlanders, who lost his life in winning the Victoria Cross

The late Lieutenant Brooke won the V.C. "for conspicuous bravery and great ability" near Gheluvelt, where, by his marked coolness and promptitude, he "prevented the enemy from breaking through our line at a time when a general counter-attack could not have been organized".

It was only by the adoption of asphyxiating methods, when Sir Herbert Plumer had safely withdrawn the British troops north-east of Ypres to the new line rendered necessary by the French retirement after the first great gas surprise, that the Germans at length drove the defenders from the hill. Here the initial attempt by this "most damnable means", as the Bishop of Pretoria expressed it, was made on May 1, when the dense volumes of asphyxiating gas caused nearly all the men along a front of some 400 yards to be immediately struck down. That attack failed, thanks to the splendid courage of the officers in rallying their men, and to the prompt arrival of reinforcements; but a second and more severe gas attempt succeeded on May 5. Only a few days later the British were able to put into practice counter-measures which, as Sir John French subsequently announced, rendered these fumes innocuous. "Had it been otherwise," added the commander-in-chief, "the enemy's attack on May 5 would most certainly have shared the fate of all the many previous attempts he had made." The success, however, was of little value to the enemy, as the hill by that time had practically disappeared. It was announced in the House of Commons on July 15 that since May 5 Hill 60 had not been occupied by either side.

F. A. M.

CHAPTER III

THE SIEGE AND BATTLES OF PRZEMYSL

(March–June, 1915)

The New Position after the German Check at Przasnysz—Russian Counter-campaign in the Carpathians—Position of Dimitrieff's Army on the Dunajec and Tarnow Front—Its Purpose as a Shield to Russian Movements in the Carpathians—Strategic Plan of an Attack on the Carpathian Passes—The Value of Przemysl—Investment by the Russians—Story of the Siege—Fall of Przemysl into Russian hands—Value of the Booty and the Positions—Russian Progress in the Carpathians—High-water Mark in April—The Great Austro-German Counter-thrust—Disposition of Austro-German Armies—General von Mackensen's Phalanx—The Great Drive towards Przemysl—The Russian Desperate Resistance—Second Fall of Przemysl.

PRZASNYSZ, the scene of the Russian victory at the beginning of March, 1915, spelt the end of the Hindenburg thrust at Warsaw from East Prussia, north of the Vistula. Its name was shortly to be succeeded by another, even more important in marking the stages of the Eastern campaign—Przemysl.

The distinction between them was that whereas Przasnysz was an insignificant town transformed into significance by the military importance of the check which the Russians administered to the German forces there, Przemysl was the most important fortress of Galicia, and its value, both as a place of arms and as a railway junction, was magnified by the sentimental and political regard in which Austria held it. It was to them, and it may also have appeared to some of the Balkan States, the symbol of Austria's hold on her province; its fall could be regarded as the sign that the hold had weakened or was altogether destroyed. It was, moreover, disproportionately garrisoned; and even the Russians, who were presumably well informed as to the strength and numbers of the defence, appear to have been surprised at their captures when the city fell.

Between the battle of Przasnysz and the fall of Przemysl the movements of the Germans on the Russian front in Poland, and of the Austrians along the Russian front in Galicia, had an appearance of relapsing into the defensive. It was an attitude of the offensive-defensive kind, in which attacks, feelers, were always going on, but there was nothing to suggest to the distant onlooker—whatever may have been the information possessed by the Russian Head-quarters Staff—that any new great movement on the part either of Russians or Austrians was being incubated. Such activity as was apparent had for area the region north of the Vistula, where the recent German advance from East Prussia had exhausted its momentum. Loath to admit defeat, it appeared, Hindenburg had brought up fresh reinforcements to Willenburg, and, dividing his troops into three columns, had made another bid for Warsaw during the second week in March by sending one column down the Omulew River, another down the Orzyec, and

a third against Przasnysz. Before these columns could debouch from the marshes which lie between the frontier of East Prussia and the Narew River the Russians attacked them; and this attempt also was held up.

This attempt and the fruitless bombardment of the comparatively unimportant Russian fortress of Ossowiec occupied the middle weeks of March. Ossowiec is in a flat marshy country, and the failure of the German siege-guns to reduce it was one of the minor surprises of the campaign. "The enemy," observed one Russian dispatch, "in view of the obvious ineffectiveness of his bombardment at longer ranges, has brought up some of his batteries close to the fortress." On March 21 the Germans, finding close range no more effective than distant, began to remove their batteries, leaving only four. Two of the "42-centimetre" howitzers (we accept the Russian description of them provisionally) were abandoned; one of them was damaged by the Russian fire; and the concrete masonry of the fortress was said to have been undamaged by them. Probably the immunity which Ossowiec enjoyed, for even its infantry was not dislodged, was due to its situation, surrounded by marshes. It was due also to the fact that the German attack was never pushed.

Guarding the Frontier: Germans awaiting a Russian attack among the Marshes of East Prussia

It is a plausible supposition that when once the attack on the Narew-Niemen line had fulfilled the purpose of driving the Russians towards the main and subsidiary fortresses and the

chief fortified positions in front of this line, the German Head-quarters Staff never intended to waste any great energy in pushing it farther. They had fulfilled their declared purpose, which was to clear East Prussia of the enemy; they had smashed a Russian division in the process; and they had brought to a standstill any dangerous Russian movement in this region.

With the Russians on the Eastern Front: Artillery in Action

The standstill lasted till June, except for a raid on Memel, which was a raid and no more; and though the Russian menace against East Prussia remained "in being", it was not a menace with which the Germans had immediately to reckon. Even if, as the Russian *communiqués* through March averred, the Russian counter-attack in this region had many successes, and if, furthermore, the failure of several energetic German thrusts between Calvaria, Suwalki, and Augustowo were both costly and disappointing to the Germans, it may yet be supposed that they were prepared to sacrifice men, ammunition, and effort in order to divert Russian attention here while their own preparations were made elsewhere.

The Russians made one rather curious effort to compel their enemy more completely to reveal his designs. They undertook what was, in the economical and concentrated strategy of the Grand Duke, a rather ornamental raid on Memel (March 17, 18, 19), the German shallow-water port on the Baltic. The Russian Head-quarters Staff hardly refer to this raid in their *communiqués*, but it provoked enormous annoyance in Prussia. "A cheap success was gained by Russian troops, who invaded North Prussia in the direction of Memel, plundering and burning villages and farms", ran the German *communiqué*, which went

on furiously to threaten reprisals. The Russians then related the facts, which were that the attack on Memel was a raid merely; that the people in Memel fired on the Russian troops from the houses (which had they been Belgians and their enemies Prussians would have brought massacre upon them); and that Memel was subjected in consequence to a short bombardment. The Germans had little difficulty in eventually driving the Russians back across the frontier, because naturally the raiders had no wish to prolong an unequal contest. But the characteristic German rejoinder took the form of shelling the Russian town of Libau from the sea, and killing, as usual, some civilians. Some two months later they advanced in greater force on Libau; but this incident and the others to which it was a pendant had no influence on the major operations of the campaign during the period under review.

For these operations the map of the Carpathians must be unrolled. At its longest the Russian line extended nearly 1000 miles, from the Baltic to the Bukovina and beyond. The middle front, strongly entrenched, ran like the straight line of a D inside the horseshoe curve of the Vistula, extending from the fortress of Novo Georgievsk through Skiernievice, Rawa, over the upper Pilica River, to Kielce. That position has been compared to the chest of a man whose two arms are widely extended. The Russian right arm, from Novo Georgievsk, had been bent back from the Baltic to the Niemen-Narew River line by the operations which ended at Przasnysz, and continued to fluctuate about the tributary rivers, Orzyec, Omulew, and Pissa. The Russian left arm, with fingers touching Bukovina, rested on the Carpathians, but such a definition requires a qualification. This left arm was connected to the body by a shoulder, the line of which, held by

General Radko Dimitrieff

General Radko Dimitrieff's army, stretched from Kielce to Tarnow and beyond. From Kielce to the Vistula it ran along the River Nida and a little to the west of it; from the Vistula past Tarnow it held the line of the Dunajec and Biala Rivers. The Biala falls into the Dunajec just before it reaches the Vistula. This army of the shoulder was designed to serve as a screen to the operations of other Russian armies acting in the Carpathians, especially

about the low western Carpathian passes, the Polianka, the Dukla, and the Jaliska, as well as to protect the forces with which the Russians were investing Przemysl.

The Russian counter-attack to the German advance on their right arm could take two forms. It might push westwards from the shoulder held by General Radko Dimitrieff's army towards Cracow; but that was impracticable for two reasons. The first was that the German strategic railways could reinforce that corner far more quickly and effectively than the Russians could bring up men and munitions to attack it. The second was that if the Russians concentrated at this point they would leave their own left flank along the Carpathians exposed. It was necessary to clear that flank as a preliminary to any offensive operations in the direction of Cracow. It was the more necessary because their left arm had by no means even a passive freedom of action. It was being held firmly at the wrist by the Austro-Hungarian forces, and its fingers had been compelled to loosen their insecure hold on the Bukovina by an army which was stiffened by German reinforcements. At the wrist the grip of the Austro-Hungarians continued to tighten, as Austria made increasingly fervent representations to Germany that unless she were succoured here it would be impossible to hold the Russians back. For it was along the Carpathians, which were regarded, despite the appalling topographical difficulties, as the weakest point in the enemy's defences, that Russia elected to strike.

The Carpathians rise in height and difficulty from west to east. The difficulty of crossing them might be compared to that which an army would find in crossing the Thames, from where it is a stream at Lechlade, to where it becomes an estuary at Southend. Between Lechlade and Oxford (to continue a comparison which must be qualified by the recognition that the distances and the difficulties are much greater in the Carpathians) it would be comparatively easy to cross. In the corresponding region of the Carpathian position the Russians succeeded in crossing by the three road passes. At Oxford or Reading the crossing would become more difficult, and the seizure of a bridge, comparable to the Lupkow railway and road pass, would be a more considerable achievement. In the neighbourhood of the Home Counties and of Greater London, where might be situated the Uszok (railway) Pass, the Mezo Laborcz Pass, the Tucholka Pass, the Vereczke Pass, and the Wisloka Pass, on to the Delatyn or Jablonitza Pass at Blackwall, the difficulties of crossing would progressively increase, and the value of success would be proportionally great. At Southend, which would be comparable to the junction of the Bukovina with Transylvania and the region of the Kirlibaba Pass, the task of getting a great army across while holding all the northern bank of the river would be immense; and, despite its advantages in turning the flank of the enemy on the south bank, could not be attempted while that enemy held both banks of the Thames at London in force. What the Russian

supreme command decided on was to cross the Carpathians first where they were easiest, and then, when on the southern side, to edge continually eastwards till they should be south of the bridges or passes in the Lupkow and Uszok regions. That would be comparable to crossing the Thames above Oxford, seizing Reading, and marching along the southern bank till they were within sight of London.

The Red Cross in the Carpathians: Russian Sleigh Ambulances for conveying wounded to the Base

This figurative statement of their strategy needs modification owing to other unique features in the position. Before the Carpathian campaign reached a stage when it seemed likely to dominate the whole situation in the eastern theatre of war it was evident that whichever side, Russian or Austro-Hungarian, could obtain command of the chief passes of the range by the time the snows were beginning to melt must possess a commanding initiative. If the Russians, for example, held the crests of the range, the mere defensive of the Austro-Hungarian armies could not hold them in check over 100 miles of broken mountainous front. Somewhere that front must be pierced, and once the Russian light cavalry had pierced it the foot-hills and the plains would furnish them with all the forage they could require, and the comparatively indefensible positions on the Hungarian plains would be continually turned by them. On the other hand, if the Austrian armies could hold the crests, they in their turn would be a menace to the Russian lateral communications through Stanislau, Lemberg, and the railways farther east. They could also threaten, as they continually did, the investing Russian forces about Przemysl.

The Carpathian campaign assumed from the beginning of March a re-

semblance on a smaller scale to the tactics employed along the whole eastern front. Thus, just as the Russians replied to the stroke of the Germans in the north by an attack on the Carpathians in the south, so the Russians, trying to force the Carpathians on the west, were counter-attacked by the Austrians on the east. The Russians first secured the western passes and advanced over them into Hungary in the direction of Bartfeld; while the Austrians, advancing on the other or eastern wing, through the Bukovina, attempted continually to strike at the Russian "communication-centre" at Stryj, and never ceased their fierce attacks on the Russian "inside left" in the neighbourhood of the Galician side of the Tucholka Pass and the heights of Koziowa.

The Russians were content to hold the Austrians on this, the Russian left wing, while pressing their own attack along that part of the Carpathians which the Austrians found less easy to defend. Continual reports were received from Russian Head-quarters of their success in repelling the easterly Austrian onslaught. Thus on Friday, March 5, it was announced that during the operations round Stanislau between February 21 and March 3 the Russians made 153 officers and 8522 rank and file prisoners, and captured 5 guns, 62 machine-guns, as well as railway rolling-stock. A semi-official statement placed the Austrian losses in this portion of eastern Galicia as more than 100,000 during March; but, setting aside this vague estimate, the aggregate losses must have been very great, as appears from the mere addition of the number of prisoners reported by the official communications of the Head-quarters Staff. Hardly a day in March passed without mention of the capture of 1000, or 2000, or 3000 prisoners.

The more directly offensive section of the Russian tactics prospered equally well during that month, and on Friday, April 9, the Petrograd report declared that the Russians held the main chain from a point north of Bartfeld (south of the Dukla) to the hills overlooking the railway on the Hungarian side of the Uszok Pass, excepting only a hill south of Wolo Michova, half-way between the Lupkow (railway) Pass and the Uszok (railway) Pass.

The streams which rise in the Carpathians and run down into the Hungarian Plain are all tributaries of the River Theiss. Each tributary is a tree of which the stem stands on the Theiss and the branches spread out into the Carpathians, each small river system being like a fan, the joint in the plain, the rays spreading out into the mountains. The Austrians held positions on the Carpathian crests along the outer rim of this great fan. Each position was at the head of a defile, between the defiles was an intervening ridge, and individually each was a stronghold. The system of strongholds had, however, a vulnerable point. If the Russians could force one defile (the Uszok, for example) and push down it towards the joint of the fan they would presently reach the part where several rays

met, and would find themselves behind the Austrians in the other defiles, which could then be blocked. The principle of the offensive in a region such as the Carpathians is not that of attacking strong positions but of turning them. Along so vast a range of mountains it was necessary that the Russian assailants should hold the crests for a long distance, so that they might have the choice of points for attempting to penetrate while keeping the Austrians alert at all the other points.

The Winter Siege of Przemysl, 1914–5: Russian guns trained on the fortifications of the town

Much earlier than the Russians attempted to put this plan in action it would have been practicable had other considerations favoured them. Early in February, 1915, they were in a more favourable position for crossing the Carpathians into Hungary than they afterwards achieved for many months, for at that early date their line ran from the junction of the Vistula and Dunajec, and along the Dunajec to Tarnow, thence to the crest of the Carpathians a little west of the Dukla Pass. It then followed roughly the line of the Carpathians, at first along the crests and then jutting eastwards (as the range curved southeast) before it reached the Vereczke or Beskid Pass, and so passing along the northern feet of the mountains to the Rumanian frontier. At that time the Russians held the whole outer rim of the fan and could hope to penetrate along one or some of the rays. But it was winter, and the fortress of Przemysl, still standing, added greatly to the difficulty of their communications, because it blocked the lateral railway and everything had to be carried widely round it.

While the Russians were condemned to wait, the Austro-Germans made their well-designed counter-attack. They pushed back the Russians from the passes east of the Dukla, and, themselves coming by the Delatyn and other passes, poured their forces against the Russian left wing, which had to fall back to the line of the Dniester as far as Stanislau. Thence the Russian line, a defensive



The Defences of Przemysl—and the Direction of the Last Sortie of the Austrians on March 21, 1915

one, ran along the northern plain to the hills near Turka, which is to the north of the Uszok Pass. This Austro-German army was aiming at the Russian line of communications, which on this section of their front ran by two railways stretching eastwards from Lemberg to Kieff. These communications the Austro-German counter-attack never succeeded in reaching. A second purpose was to reach and relieve Przemysl by this route. The first achievement would have implied the second.

Przemysl was therefore an objective sought by both sides. The town had first been invested by the Russians on September 20, 1914. A sortie was made and repulsed on September 27; and on October 6 one of the outer circle of defensive positions was stormed, but the advantage could not be pushed. After this first unsuccessful attempt to take it by assault, the Russian forces "contained" it, but did not invest it very closely, and during the first attack of the Austro-German armies on Warsaw, later in October, the cordon was relaxed still more. During this period further supplies and more troops were got into Przemysl, which actually possessed a much larger number of troops for its defence than it needed. The blockade was renewed by Russia in the middle of November, and was strictly maintained through the winter, though the garrison was able to communicate by means of an aeroplane post.

The second half of December was marked by a series of sorties, some made in considerable force; but these yielded nothing more useful than a reduction of the mouths to feed, as killed, wounded, or prisoners. The Russians made no further attempt to storm the fortress, and there was no mention in the *communiqués* of any bombardment by heavy guns. Had the Russians possessed these, and the ammunition for them, it is possible they might have found it worth while to assault Przemysl in order to save time. As it was, they waited, contenting themselves with repulsing sorties, the scale of which became larger as the Austro-German counter-attack in late February developed from the Car-

pathians. Towards the middle of March the Austro-German forces from the mountains forced their way along the line of the Dniester to within a distance from the fortress inconsiderable in miles though impassable in time. But the Przemysl garrison hoped for, if they did not expect, relief, and during March 15 and 16 expended ammunition on the Russian investing forces at the rate of 20,000 big-gun rounds daily. This expenditure of ammunition was probably intentionally wasteful. The Russian trenches, built with the knowledge gained during the war, were an effective protection even against the 13-inch and 14-inch guns of the nine large forts of Przemysl.

On March 18, when the Austro-Hungarian Carpathian army was fiercely attacking in the direction of Munkacs and Koziowa, the garrison attempted a sortie. This was renewed on the 21st under cover of a fierce artillery protection from the fortress, when a large body of the best Hungarian troops of the 23rd Honved Division attempted to cut their way out, not towards the south-east but towards the north-east, in the direction of Dunkowicski along the main road. It was repelled with heavy loss, and on the next day General Kus-

The First Defence of Przemysl: General Kusmanek, the Austrian Commandant, conducting Prince Charles Francis Joseph round the Fortifications

After the Russian Capture of Przemysl, March 22, 1915: Austrian prisoners preparing for their sixty-mile march to Lemberg

manek, the commandant of Przemysl, accepted unconditionally the Russian summons to surrender.

According to a return published by General Kusmanek, the garrison which surrendered consisted of 9 generals, 2500 subaltern officers and officials, and 117,000 rank and file. The Russians on entering the fortress found that this was an under-estimate, and that the numbers were nearer 140,000, of which not a very large number were sick. The rank and file were eating horse-flesh; the officers were not apparently in any danger of privation. A great deal of ammunition had been destroyed, but General Selivanoff, the Russian commander, reported that a great deal was left, and that many of the captured guns could be made fit for action. On the morning of March 22 General Kusmanek had ordered the destruction of the bridges —two passenger bridges, one railway bridge. Guns were demolished, 2000 horses belonging to officers were shot, and munitions and military stores were dumped in the river. The forts were systematically demolished. This was a fact which did not appear in the Russian *communiqués* at the time, but it became subsequently a very serious consideration. In short, the defence of Przemysl was not a very glorious episode of the war; its capture was of great if not of immediate value to the Russians in releasing a large number of troops of investment, and eventually of simplifying the communications between the Carpathians and the lateral railways.

These advantages were not at once

available. The knot of railway lines at Przemysl when it passed into Russian possession removed some of their difficulties, but could not for some time be made to yield an addition of supplies to the armies marching on the Carpathian ridges; nor could the released army of investment be simply added on to the other forces. The reorganization must be a matter of weeks, apart from the considerable task of clearing up Przemysl after the Austrians—a task requiring disinfectants and doctors as well as engineers. But if the advance on the passes was not immediately or apparently forwarded, the not less important necessity of pushing back the Austro-German army which had been marching on to the Russian communications through Lemberg became easier. The advance was stopped, and the Russians, resuming the offensive, pushed it back from the River Dniester to the line of the River Pruth—from the corner of Rumania to near Delatyn. (That part of the Austrian front was supplied by the railway crossing the Carpathians through the Delatyn or Jablonitza Pass.)

West of Delatyn the Austro-Germans were over the northern side of the Carpathians, holding a strip of plain at the foot. Their troops were supplied by the railway over the Vereczke Pass, and this force remained a permanent threat to the Russians. To adopt a phrase from football, it was "inside right" of the Austro-German Carpathian force, and early in April it was making continued attacks on the Russians along the line of the River Opor, which flows north-

The Fall of Przemysl, March 22, 1915: Russian supply column entering the captured town

wards from the Vereczke Pass to the town of Stryj, and also along the line of the Opor's westward tributary on which lie the villages of Tucholka and Koziowa.

While holding back the Austrians here the Russians proceeded systematically to develop their own line on the Carpathian crests. Their method was similar to that which a commander employs when he has succeeded in crossing a river at a given point and has established a position on the farther side—he endeavours to deploy his forces laterally. Similarly, the Russians, having seized and held the Dukla and the neighbouring passes, proceeded to edge eastwards towards the Lupkow (which they also masked from the northern side), and farther east towards the Uszok. At the same time they pushed farther south, down the more westerly valleys opposite those western passes which they held, thus moving towards Bartfeld, as well as threatening the valleys in which are Eperies and Kaschau and pressing against Austrian resistance down the Mezo Laborcz and Ondava River valleys. It seems on the whole probable that the advances named in the last sentence were merely tentative or exploratory, because it would have been unsafe for the Russians to have committed themselves to an invasion in force here with both their flanks open to attack—the one from the Cracow direction and the other from the direction of all the Austrian-held Carpathians on the east. It was preeminently necessary to occupy a long extent and even a predominating position in the eastern Carpathians as a preliminary to an advance southwards into Hungary.

The ideal way of making a Russian advance secure would have been to defeat decisively the Austrian armies in the plain of the Dniester and the Pruth, and to drive them back on to the Carpathians and through the passes, in this way pursuing the line of greatest resistance. The Russians were not strong enough to do this, and they elected for a middle way. They held up the Austrian forces in the Dniester plain, and crossed the Carpathians by the westerly passes they had secured, moving thence eastwards between the Theiss and the Carpathians while continually extending their "holding" along the crests. The possibility that they might adopt this plan had been pointed out by the Oxford Professor of Military History, Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, whose prediction demands special notice, because he said while making it that the Russians ought only to take this middle course if their right flank was secure from an attack from the direction of Tarnow-Jaslo-Bartfeld. That, as a matter of subsequent history, is the direction from which they were assailed, and on which the covering army of General Radko Dimitrieff was not strong enough to protect them.

But during March and the larger part of April the Russian plan went very well. The character of their successes is indicated by a *communiqué* published two days after the fall of Przemysl:

"In the Carpathians our offensive on the front between Bartfeld and Uszok is developing with complete success. Our troops,

Russia's Spoils of War: some of the Guns at Tiflis captured from the Enemy

operating under extremely difficult conditions, have gained a most decisive success in the region of the Lupkow Pass. . . ."

The gradual pushing movement eastwards was indicated day by day by similar telegrams. Other paragraphs of the *communiqués*, such as

The Austrian Archduke Eugene, commanding one of the Armies in the Carpathians

"In the direction of Baligrod and the left bank of the upper San we made progress, and took more than 600 prisoners and four machine-guns. . . .", and "near Koziowa we repulsed fresh German attacks" (March 28 and 29), indicated that the Austro-German forces were being held in eastern Galicia, on the plain of the Dniester, and along the eastern Carpathian foothills which they occupied. An official note published at the end of March declared that between March 20 and 29 the Russians in the Carpathians took prisoners 202 officers, 8 surgeons, 16,207 rank and file, 62 machine-guns, and 10 guns.

It is only fair to add that the Austrian *communiqués* of nearly identical dates paint the reverse picture: "North of the Uszok Pass Russian attacks failed, with heavy losses to the enemy. We captured a further 1900 prisoners" (March 30). And another: "Since March 18 we have captured altogether 183 officers and 39,942 men and 68 machine-guns." It is certain, that even with necessary discount made, both sides suffered severely in this bloody struggle, though man for man the Russian proved himself the better fighter by the progress which he made against an enemy that was better equipped and had the superior use of railways. Positions cannot lie. On Wednesday, April 7, the Russians announced that they held in their hands the whole of the principal chain, extending for more than 110 versts, from Reghetovo (to the west of the Dukla Pass) to Wolosate, with the exception of Hill 909, south of Voliamikhova (or Wola Michowa). To the debit account was the capture by the Austrians of Hill 992, near Koziowa, a fact which is to be noted not because of the importance of the capture, but because it indicates that the Russians at no time entirely succeeded in quenching the enemy's activity in that strip of territory north of the Carpathians which the Austrians continually strove to enlarge, and from which they always had enough men

and munitions to launch counter-attacks. There is no mention to be found in the April or May *communiqués* of any subsequent change of hands in the possession of Hill 992. Hill 909, however, became Russian about March 10.

A German *communiqué* of April 4, 1915, asserted that it had been ascertained that all the Russian forces posted before Przemysl had been moved to the Carpathian front. The Austrians had also been heavily reinforced and German troops and cavalry were fighting side by side to hold back the fast-developing Russian movement, the principal attack in which was now revealed as being pushed directly forward from the direction of Baligrod, enveloping the Austrian positions west of the Lupkow and east of the point where the River San springs from the Carpathians. This prolonged attack culminated about the middle of April. The Russian Head-quarters Staff summed up the results attained between March 19 and April 12 as having captured 70 miles of crest of the Carpathians, and as having inflicted on the enemy enormous losses —"in prisoners alone 70,000 men, including 900 officers; in guns, 30 field-pieces and 200 machine-guns". But these results, great as they were, stopped short of the chief and most necessary thing for the Russians to capture, namely the Uszok Pass with its railway, and after that the Vereczke Pass. On April 24 and 25, and again

The Close of the Winter Campaign in the Carpathians: Typical Austrian Trenches

on April 28, 29, 30, the Russians were not making, but were sustaining, attacks in the neighbourhood of the Uszok Pass; and it was clear, even without the admissions of the Russians, that the Austrians in this region had been strongly reinforced and stiffened, and that the Russian attack was making no headway.

Meanwhile the German Head-quarters Staff, under the direction of General von Falkenhayn, was beginning to put into operation the great counter-stroke for which they had long been preparing, and which was to be directed from that vulnerable sector on the Russian right, Bartfeld-Tarnow-Jaslo, which had always seemed to offer itself as a joint in their armour. The Russian 800-mile line, which in its middle section cut across the great horseshoe of the Vistula, and ran roughly north and south, sloped away at the bottom so as to run from west to east along the Carpathians. This west-to-east line has been compared to the left arm of a man. The shoulder-joint rested on the Dunajec and Biala Rivers, and the shoulder-cap was the protective screen of General Dimitrieff's army. It had always been obvious that if the Russians should be pressing the Austro-German forces too hard at the fore-arm or wrist of this left arm, they might be compelled to let go by hammering at the shoulder. That possibility the Russians anticipated. A semi-official dispatch from Petrograd towards the middle of April (April 12) actually described the position of the various German and Austrian armies which encircled the shoulder and the Carpathian left arm. General Voirosch was designated as commanding a German army which faced eastwards, north of Tarnow, on the line of the Nida. Below that point, in a great sector of a circle, five German or Austrian armies were named, with an aggregate of a million and a quarter men, as entrusted with the task of fighting for the possession of the Carpathians. Taking them in order they were:

The Archduke Eugene's army on the upper Dunajec, in the region of Kantfeld. (The Archduke Eugene in some subsequent operations was named as being in East Galicia.)

General Barievitch's army, opposite the Mezo Laborcz and the Lupkow Passes, with detachments spreading to the Rostok road Pass, which the Russians had captured, along their 70-mile front.

General Bermerolli's army, chiefly about the Uszok Pass.

General Linzinger's army, over the Tucholka Pass and in the neighbourhood of Koziowa.

General Pflanzer's army, at the Vereczke Pass and beyond, in eastern Galicia.

It was added that the Kaiser was in supreme command, with his head-quarters somewhere behind the chief front. That was certainly the case; but though this semi-official communication was no doubt intended to show that the Russian Head-quarters Staff knew a good deal of the concentrations and plans of their opponents, we are bound to suppose either that they were incompletely informed or else that they held on to their own

attack in the eastern Carpathians too long.

When the German blow at the shoulder fell, it was a much heavier one than the Russians were prepared to meet; and it aimed at something more than hitting the shoulder so hard as to paralyse the arm. Its purpose was quickly resolved into an attempt to cut right through the shoulder and

With the Austrians in the Carpathians: a Cautious Advance among the Passes

to sever the left-arm Russian armies of the Carpathians from the Russian main body, which reposed on the Vistula and was fed from Petrograd. Thus the Russian line would be pierced, and the Russian army as a whole would be cut into two—the one linked by railway to Petrograd and the north—the other joined through Przemysl and Lemberg to Kieff and the eastern bases of supply. If that cutting off at the shoulders could be performed, then the German armies coming from the west and the Austrian armies, also heavily reinforced, coming from the south, would be able to deal heavily with the severed Russians of the southern and the south-eastern fronts.

It is impossible at the time of writing to say how much the Russians knew, but to observers in the west the blow seemed to have been prepared with admirable secrecy by the Germans, and to have been launched with extreme efficiency. It was marked by feint attacks all along their line in mid Poland, north Poland, and the Niemen-Narew front, as well as by a raid towards Libau and Riga.

Some particulars of the preparation for the great German blow were furnished by a Budapest correspondent about a week after the attack had been launched, and they are interesting as showing the kind of organization demanded by an attack on such a scale. New depots, bureaux, and telephone and telegraph stations had to be estab-

lished. On a line parallel with the front, new hospital stations had to be prepared, new food depots, new munition depots. Even new commanders had to be appointed. A great number of heavy guns and other artillery were placed in position a fortnight before the offensive began. Train after train brought guns of every calibre from all directions to the Dunajec and Carpathian fronts, including long-range Skoda guns and steel mortars, and an immense number of new Krupp guns. Meanwhile troop trains brought up the men, and baggage-trains bridge materials, pontoons, and engineering materials. A new force of engineers was at the front by the end of April, in order to reconstruct and lay light-railway lines, and aviation and motor stations were established.

On the southern section, which was to advance between Tarnow and Gorlice (or Gorlitz), more than a thousand guns were brought up. Thousands of wagons of provisions and herds of cattle were driven up in the greatest secrecy and at night—in preparation for "the day".

That day was roughly April 29–30, 1915, when the Russian attacks were beginning to slacken. On or about that date the Austro-German offensive began along some 250 miles of front. But the chief attack, at that shoulder of the Dunajec and Biala Rivers, was delivered by a massed German force which has been described as a phalanx. This phalanx was of so heavily armed and gunned a character that it could advance only astride a railway. The railway runs through Gorlice-Jaslo-Rzeszoff, so that the line of its advance can be easily made out on a map. Its numbers were variously estimated.

Semi-official information from Petrograd put the whole Austro-German forces of their five Dunajec and Carpathian armies at about a million and a half, with half a million reserves. The hammer-headed phalanx striking through the line at the Dunajec perhaps comprised in all a third of this number, say half a million men. It was reinforced by divisions drawn from other parts of the front, and consisted chiefly of German troops, including Prussian Guards, the Tenth Army Corps, and several special formations of crack regiments, all of which had been withdrawn for the purpose from the western front. The total corps were ten, of which half, largely drawn from Flanders, were the striking head. In artillery the phalanx had 4000 pieces, 2000 of them heavy guns of various kinds, and these as the phalanx advanced were arranged in a kind of tier formation, so as to secure a continuous rain of projectiles on the positions in front of them. This gigantic German thunderbolt was the apotheosis of the colossal in the German method of warfare, and was designed to blast its way through anything.

It very easily clove through the Russian screen provided by General Dimitrieff's army, which gave way before it, and Berlin was beflagged and rejoicing five days after the movement had begun at the news of another overwhelming German victory, the seal on which was set by a congratulatory message from the Kaiser, accompanied by the Order of the Black Eagle to his chief of staff, General

von Falkenhayn. The claims of victory began with the capture of 21,000 prisoners, and mounted eventually to 150,000. These figures the Russians declare to have been very much exaggerated, and their version of the fighting was that their covering army of the Dunajec retreated fighting rear-battered its way through a great stretch of country. Its onset along a narrow front could not be resisted by the Russians, who had not the heavy artillery to compete with the enemy's, nor ammunition enough of any kind to hold their own against the overwhelming German expenditure of

On the Road to Lemberg: an Austrian Outpost

Note the crosses marking the graves of fallen comrades.

guard actions, and inflicting losses in its retreat, while their armies at the Dukla and their western Carpathian armies fell back conformably with the retreat of Dimitrieff's screen. They had to fight desperately, but their cohesion was never destroyed.

The positions are the most trustworthy guide to the character of the fighting, and by an observation of them a balance can be struck between the claims of either side. The phalanx it, and consequently the Russian centre (to employ a figurative rather than an exact expression) was thrust back from the Dunajec and the Biala to the Wisloka, and then to the Wislok, and finally to the San at Jaroslav. The phalanx got astride the San, and then endeavoured to deploy, but at the end of May, the operations having then lasted a month, was held up for some time. The rate of progress continually slackened during the month.



The Galician Campaign: Map showing Przemysl in relation to Lemberg—continued on opposite page

In the first ten days the German phalanx moved 80 miles, in the next twenty days not more than a quarter of that number. Meanwhile, however, the Russians had been obliged to utilize nearly all their forces for the purpose of resistance. Their line, which had in April run from the junction of the Vistula and the Biala in a north-to-south line, had been first swung back some two-thirds of a right angle till it was nearly on to Przemysl; and at the same time they had been obliged to relinquish their hard-won Carpathian crests in order to draw in their forces in a great horse-shoe round Przemysl, so as the better to resist the attack from the south and east which the Austro-German armies from the east Carpathians and from the plain of the Dniester were making in co-operation with

From Przemysl to Lemberg: continuation of the map illustrating the campaign in Galicia

the German phalanx drive from the west.

The position might better be regarded from an Austro-German standpoint by comparing their attack to that of a giant who with thumb and forefinger outstretched should try to squeeze Przemysl in the crook between them. If he could push the wrist and hand far enough forward he would hold Przemysl. He could do it also by squeezing the thumb down on to it, and the thumb in this simile was the phalanx. He could also do it by closing up with the forefinger the Austrian forces from the Carpathians and the Dniester plain. To all these efforts the Russians opposed two forms of resistance. The first was that of holding the enemy back on both fronts. The second was by counter-attacking. The first counter-

attack was made at the tip of the forefinger, when, on May 9 to 14 and on subsequent days, the Russians broke the Austrian army in East Galicia, between Kolomea and Saniatyn, and drove it back to the line of the Pruth. The second counter-attack was on the tip of the thumb, when, on May 27, the Third Caucasian Corps drove in the German left flank on the Lower San at Siniawa, capturing guns and 6000 prisoners.

Meantime, the Germans succeeded by May 3 (in five days from the beginning of the movement) in breaking through the Russian Dunajec position; by May 8 they had Krasno, and by May 9 the Wisloka; by May 14 they had reached Jaroslav.

By that date also the Austrians had advanced considerably north of the Carpathians. General Linsingen was just south-west of Dolina, and a German *communiqué* stated rather vaguely that the Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps was standing before the gates of its native town—Przemysl. Great as was the pressure on the Russians at these points, and greatest where the hammer-headed phalanx had crossed the San, the last day of May, 1915, arrived, and Przemysl was still in Russian hands.

So determined was the resistance of the Russians that it was hoped by many observers who followed the operations that the town might be held permanently by them, and the German advance arrested in front of the position. No hint appeared in any Russian *communiqué* that it would become in any circumstances necessary to evacuate Przemysl, and this reticence, though extremely prudent, led to the expectation that the town was in a position to stand a siege. It was not. It was merely a death-trap for any troops which should attempt to hold it against the superior German artillery, field and siege, and the still superior mass of German and Austrian numbers. With General von Mackensen's army still strong enough to push past it or level with it on the north-west, and the Austrian forces thrusting at it from the south, the Russian lines about Przemysl stood out like a door-knob from their general contour. In more military language Przemysl was a salient, and, for its defenders, a very awkward one, since if the Germans on the north-west or the Austrians from the south and south-east should ever break through the neck of the knob, all the troops and supplies within the bulbous part, which was Przemysl itself, would fall into their hands.

This fact the Russians recognized, and, despite the sentimental advantages of holding this symbol of victory, determined to relinquish it as a strategic necessity. Having held on as long as they could, or as long as they felt it advisable, and having removed the last of their batteries and the bulk of their material of war, they yielded up the husk of Przemysl to the enemy, and retired astride the railway to a straightened position farther east. The Germans and Austrians entered the town at daybreak on June 3.

E. S. G.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONQUEST OF GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

(January–July, 1915)

General Botha's New Campaign—Magnitude of the Task in German South-West Africa—German *v.* British Rule—The Herero Rebellion—Botha's Military Genius—The Rival Forces—A Triumph of Organization—The Plan of Campaign—Advance of the Northern and Southern Forces—Botha's Victory at Jakalswater—M'Kenzie's Advance from Swakopmund—Aus and its Explosive Traps—M'Kenzie's Fight at Gibeon—General Smuts takes Command of the Southern Army—The Fight at Trekkopjes—Botha's Final Dash for Windhuk—How the Capital was entered—Botha's Proclamation—The Poisoning of Wells—Botha threatens Reprisals—Congratulations on the Fall of Windhuk—Death of Sir George Farrar—Total Casualties—The Final Surrender—Botha's Crowning Victory—A South African Contingent Offered for Europe.

IT would be difficult to find a parallel since the beginning of history for the part played by South Africa in the Great World War. Fifteen years before the outbreak of that struggle in the heart of Europe, Lord Kitchener had stepped ashore at Cape Town to find a foeman worthy of his steel in General Botha. In 1914 Germany, with Alsace-Lorraine as her Imperial object-lesson, still relied on the Boers to seize the golden opportunity to throw off the yoke when Britain picked up the gage thrown down by her; but therein she reckoned without Botha—now Prime Minister of a united people—and the healing influences of self-government under the British flag. We have already shown how promptly and completely the incipient rebellion—largely the result of German intrigues in a few districts of the Union—was crushed by Botha and his right-hand man, General Smuts, in the early stages of the Great War. It was fully anticipated, how-

The Campaign in South-West Africa: an Inspection of the Union Troops by General Botha (marked by a ×) at one of the stations on the enemy's line

ever, that the months of delay thus wasted would have afforded the enemy in the neighbouring German colony ample time to prepare for a stubborn defence in the campaign which Botha had undertaken against it on behalf of the King. The British War Office, it will be remembered, had intimated that the occupation of such parts of German South-West Africa as would give them command of the powerful wireless station at Windhuk—completed only just before the war, and kept as far as possible a profound secret—would be a great Imperial service.[1] So swift and dramatic had been the developments in South Africa, and so grave the possibilities, that not a few people doubted the power of the Union to carry this undertaking to a successful issue.

Photo. R. Watson, Pretoria

General Botha in Campaigning Kit: the Commander-in-Chief of the Union Forces on his White Charger

Britons at home had little idea of the magnitude of the task. South Africa was herself open to attack along a frontier line of many hundreds of miles, extending from the Orange River in the south to the Zambesi River in the north. On the other side of the Union line the Bechuanaland border had to be defended, while away to the north marched Rhodesia, also with the enemy on her frontier. And in addition there was everywhere the increasing colour problem, with a native population exceeding that of the whites several times over. Yet, in spite of these potential dangers, South Africa, with a white population of not much more than a million and a quarter—a mere fraction of the population of London—had set herself the task of conquering for the King and Empire a region larger than the whole of Germany herself, and with the reputation of being the model of the Kaiser's overseas militarism. It was little wonder that some people doubted, especially when rebellion broke out after the advance troops of the Expeditionary

[1] In making this known to the Union Ministry on August 7, 1914, the Secretary of State for the Colonies added: "You will, however, realize that any territory now occupied must be at the disposal of the Imperial Government for purposes of an ultimate settlement at the conclusion of the war. Other Dominions are acting in a similar way on the same understanding."—*Correspondence on the Subject of the Proposed Expedition against German South-West Africa.*

Force had sailed for Lüderitzbucht. A British officer who took part in this, as well as in the last Boer war, gives a vivid description of the situation in those critical days in a letter quoted in the *Times*:—

"Botha had sent most of the trained English volunteers to German South-West Africa. Some of the rebels and semi-rebels quoted this—his support of England—as a reason for rebellion. Others openly said that the dispatch of the only organized troops out of the way was a preliminary to openly joining the rebels. We did not know whom to trust nor whom to believe, and then came the news that Botha, the whitest man in the Empire, was true to his oath and was willing to fight his own people to uphold his promise. The issue was doubtful, there were thousands waiting to see 'which way the cat would jump'. Can you wonder that I joined him? If I know nothing of him personally, I know the risks he ran, and my admiration for him is such that I would follow him from here to Cairo if necessary. I am a squadron captain or veld kornet in the 15th Mounted Brigade, Brand's Vry Staat Schutters, so named after our Colonel George Brand, a former general, into whom incidentally I put a bullet during the last war."

Even Botha, however, would not have succeeded in this romance of Empire but for the far-seeing wisdom of Britain after the Boer war in allowing the people to govern themselves. "South Africa," as the Hon. W. P. Schreiner, her High Commissioner in London, said in addressing the Imperial patriotic meeting at the Guildhall on May 19, 1915, "stood solidly by the Empire very largely because of the great gift of self-government given to her." Nor must the loyalty and devotion of the natives be forgotten. The whole development of affairs, indeed, when the rival systems were put to the crucial test, was an object-lesson which Germany was to learn to her cost in South-West Africa, where the harsh rule of militarism had failed to win the true spirit of loyalty among the blacks, and filled most of the Boer settlers with disgust.

With characteristic arrogance an organ of the German colonial policy had long ago declared that "Germany had nothing to learn from England or any other colonizing nation, having a method of handling social problems peculiar to the German spirit".[1] The peculiarity of the German method was the smashing of tribal life and the governing of the natives by harsh, inflexible rules, with the result that the native population had fallen from some 300,000 in 1898 to a little over 100,000 in 1912. It was this ruthless treatment which led to the uprising of the Hereros in 1904, when for two years South-West Africa was the scene of a devastating and horrible war, "during which", to quote from Mr. Lewin's authoritative work on *The Germans in Africa*, "many colonists and their families were cruelly murdered by the Hereros, while the latter were practically exterminated, or driven into the fastnesses of the Kalahari Desert, there to eke out a miserable existence until many finally succumbed to hunger and thirst". This was the campaign in which General von Trotha, on taking command, had issued the proclamation to the Herero nation which is still remembered in South Africa as

[1] *The Germans in Africa*, by Evans Lewin. (Cassell, 1915.)

a glaring example of German methods of warfare:—

"I, the Great General of the German nation," he began, "send this letter to the Herero nation;" and then, after referring to their atrocities in the war, and offering large sums for the capture of the chieftains, he continued: "The Herero nation must now leave the country. If the people do it not I will compel them with the big tube. Within the German frontier every Herero, with or without a rifle, with or without cattle, will be shot. I will not take over any more women and children, but I will either drive them back to your people or have them fired on. These are my words to the nation of the Hereros. The great General of the Mighty Emperor, Von Trotha."

It cost the Fatherland nearly £30,000,000 and many lives before the Herero rebellion was finally crushed; but Germany probably found sufficient compensation in the fact that she now had good excuse for retaining a formidable garrison at a spot eminently suitable for the invasion of South Africa when the time came to snatch the sceptre of empire from Britain's hand. There is no doubt that the series of military railways in the colony was constructed chiefly with this object in view. Nemesis, as well as sound strategy, decided that it was along this system that the main British advance under Botha should take place at the beginning of 1915.

General Botha proved his genius for leadership in the field in the Boer war. He was now to reveal his gifts as an organizer of victory in an Imperial campaign involving the co-operation of the navy and the fighting of Boer and Briton side by side. As in the case of the short-lived rebellion, he did not make the fatal mistake in his new campaign of underestimating its possible dangers. He knew that German South-West Africa, with its fine system of strategical railways, its immense accumulation of stores and munitions, and its military strongholds, which had been in preparation for years, would need for their capture all the strength that he could put into the field. The enemy's fighting force, including regulars and armed civilians, was variously estimated at from 10,000 to 14,000 officers and men, assisted by the remnants of South African rebels who had escaped over the border. Dark rumours were circulated of hundreds of big guns in the vast deserts of the German colony, and the enemy's positions at Windhuk, his capital, and elsewhere were said to be impregnable. Whether Botha believed all these rumours or not, he left nothing to chance in the strength of his invading armies. The plan of campaign which the traitor Beyers helped to draw up had of course to be cancelled, and the preparations for the new plan were carried out with the secrecy of the greater war in Europe. For months lines of transports under naval escort passed silently to and from Cape Town to the coast of German South-West Africa, where two new ports for the expedition had practically to be created — at Lüderitzbucht, where troops of the Union Defence Force had been sent in September, 1914, before the rebellion, little dreaming that they would have to wait there so long before the real campaign began; and Walfish Bay, the isolated stretch

of British territory just to the south of Swakopmund. The formidable nature of the whole undertaking was disclosed by the Governor-General, Lord Buxton, in the telegram which he sent to the memorable meeting at the Guildhall, referred to on p. 69. A force of about 30,000 men, rather more than half of whom were mounted, with guns, horses, medical stores, ambulance, and transport, had, he announced, been conveyed oversea 500 and 700 miles, in addition to the land force destined to operate on the German-Union border. All supplies, every pound of provisions for the men, much of the water for their consumption, and every ton of forage for the horses and mules had to be brought from Cape Town. The same applied to all the railway material for rapid construction inland and along the coast. The whole of these men, horses, guns, supplies, and materials had to be landed at Lüderitzbucht and Walfish, neither of which ports possessed disembarkation appliances at all adequate for such a purpose. It speaks volumes for South African efficiency and the driving force of General Smuts, who superintended the organization of the entire expedition before taking command of the army of the south, that the whole of the operations were carried out without the aid of Imperial troops by the Defence Forces and Defence Department, which was only created two years before.

Owing to the interruption of the Boer rising it was not until the beginning of 1915 that the campaign could be effectively resumed. Walfish Bay had been occupied by the Germans early in the war, but presumably it was too near the coast to be healthy, for they evacuated the territory not long afterwards, and retired over the desert to the hills to the east. The territory itself—the strip with which the British Government contented itself when it might have had the whole of Damaraland—extends only some 40 miles along the coast and 20 miles inland, but it includes the finest harbour in South-West Africa. When the northern force, which Botha was presently to join in supreme command, effected its landing in this harbour on December 25, 1914, there was not a soul to oppose it. The sleepy bay, which for years has scarcely known what it was to shelter a single steamer, was now thronged with crowded transports and the miscellaneous craft of a great landing-force, while Walfish itself, hitherto consisting chiefly of the British residency—a shabby construction of corrugated iron—was transformed almost in a night into a mighty military base. Inland, and along the coast as far as the eye could reach, nothing could be seen but sand dunes and desolate wastes of desert. The first thing to be done in this dreary theatre of war was to entrench the base and then build a railway along the sandy beach to Swakopmund, which was destined to be the real starting-point of Botha's army to Windhuk. Swakopmund itself was a port, but a hopeless place at which to land all the stores and impedimenta of an army in war-time. A new line, therefore, was at once started by the South African Engineers, connecting it with Walfish, troops guard-

ing its construction as it pushed its rapid way along the seashore, while sand-bag blockhouses sprang up at short intervals along its course.

The Germans, apparently, had abandoned all hope of retaining the coast. To the surprise and disappointment of the ardent South Africans now became a vast military base in preparation for the advance along the railway to the German capital.

General Botha landed at Lüderitzbucht early in February, and reviewed the troops under Sir Duncan M'Kenzie before proceeding to his own head-quarters. His plan of campaign

By courtesy of the *Illustrated War News*

To Advance against the Germans on their Own Lines: "Pontooning" a Union railway engine over the Orange River at Upington

they made no attempt to oppose this advance or interfere with the work of railway construction; and when Swakopmund — a fine town, which, with its many admirable public buildings, must have cost millions to build — was reached and occupied on January 14, the whole place was deserted. Evidently regarding the British occupation as merely a temporary inconvenience, the town had been left entirely undamaged. Swakopmund was roughly as follows. The northern army, under the Commander-in-Chief himself, was to advance along the line to Windhuk, while three separate columns, afterwards to form the southern army and converge on the capital under General Smuts, were to round up the Germans in the south. The three southern columns were under the command of General Sir Duncan M'Kenzie, operating along the railway from Lüderitzbucht into the heart of

GERMAN
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
English Miles
0 50 100 150
Railways thus
ANGOLA
AMBOLAND
OVAMPO
OVAMBO
OVAMPUKUSHI
OVANGARI BUNYA
KAOKOVELD
DAMARALAND
GREAT NAMAQUA LAND
Little Namaqua Land
Little Bushman Land
BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE
Kalahari Desert
BRITISH BECHUANALAND
GORDONIA
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
BASUBIA
MAIYE
CONTINUATION ON SAME SCALE
Andara (Libebe)
Windhuk
Walfish Bay
Tropic of Capricorn
Longitude East of Greenwich
John Bartholomew & Co. Edinr.

the colony; Colonel Berrangé, starting from Kimberley, and, after crossing the Kalahari Desert by way of Kuruman, entering German territory at Hasuur, on the opposite side of the colony to Lüderitzbucht; and Colonel Dirk Van de Venter, operating from the Orange River in the south-east. A glance at the map facing p. 70 will show the obvious routes for effecting a junction at Keetmanshoop, with the object of driving the Germans towards the capital, and, if possible, into the arms of General Botha.

Fighting had already taken place on the southern position, where Maritz and Kemp, with German aid, made their last treacherous attack on Cape Colony, only to be decisively defeated at Upington, on the banks of the Orange River, on January 24, 1915. The Germans continued the half-hearted offensive by an attack on Kakamas, somewhat farther south, on February 3, but were heavily repulsed, and soon found urgent reasons for a hurried retreat within their own borders. It was in this fighting that Lieutenant Jack Neethling was mortally wounded, dying in the presence of his father, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Murray Neethling, M.L.A., who was acting as Senior Medical Officer with the Forces.

The new line from Prieska to Upington,[1] constructed in the early months of the war with a rapidity which formed a record in railway construction in South Africa, proved of great service to the column under Colonel Van de Venter, which began its advance from the south-east in March by way of Schuit Drift and Ukamas. A leaf had thus been taken out of the enemy's book, who in the earlier stages of the war had invaded British territory by both these routes. Union troops had already captured the German blockhouse near Raman's Drift, farther to the west along the Orange River, and occupied the enemy's country in that district. Van de Venter's force occupied Warmbad on April 3, and two days later captured Kalkfontein, the southern terminus of the railway which joined the trunk line of the interior at Seeheim.

The long-delayed South African advance, once begun, was invincible. Attacked in the north by an army advancing irresistibly against their capital, and in the south by columns threatening them apparently from all points of the compass, they decided that discretion after all was the better part of valour, and that they could not hope to beat the South Africans in a fair, stand-up fight. Their first trial of strength with Botha's army in the north was sufficiently discouraging. This was the fight at Jakalswater on March 20, where the Germans held a strongly-fortified position along a front extending from 12 to 15 miles, barring the South Africans' progress along the road from Swakopmund. Two long night marches had

[1] Afterwards to bridge the Orange River and extend thence over the German border, there to link up with the existing railway terminus at Kalkfontein. The flooding of the river delayed the progress of the line from this point at the end of 1914, but work was begun again as soon as possible in the new year, an engine being taken across by pont at Upington on March 14, as shown in the photograph now reproduced. This was the first time in South African history that an engine had been transported across a river by pont. The subsequent advance was greatly facilitated by the German lines being of the same gauge as the Union system.

carried the invaders practically across the desert and among the kopjes where the enemy had been waiting for them for months. Reuter's special correspondent described these operations as "a brilliant swoop through country which, for its utter desolation, is surely without parallel in any part of the world", with the dry course of the Swakop River wandering through gorges of a most awe-inspiring character. General Botha—with his son, Lieutenant Jantjie Botha, who, only seventeen years of age, and attached to his father's staff, was said to be the youngest staff-officer in the world—accompanied Colonel (afterwards Brigadier-General) Brits' first brigade in the advance against the German position on this occasion, when the day was largely won by the excellent shooting of the South African Artillery. To the right of Brits' force the attack was delivered by Colonel Alberts's brigade of burghers, divided into three columns, each about 1000 strong, one under Commandant Piet Botha of Heidelberg, another under Colonel Collins, and a third under Colonel Classens. The last of these columns, on approaching the kopjes, where the Germans opened fire on the burghers with shrapnel, made a dash for the shelter of the nek, which the enemy, unfortunately for himself, had strangely left unoccupied. All the burghers got through safely, whereupon Colonel Classens led them to the rear of the German position. Here they reached a sheltering ridge and established themselves behind stones just as the German guns reached the kopjes occupied by their infantry.

"Here", to quote from an account by one of the South Africans present, printed in the *Pretoria News*, "they unlimbered and opened fire on us. The range was only about 1200 yards, but their firing was very bad, and they could not get us for some time. They eventually found our

Photo. R. Watson, Pretoria

Lieutenant Jantjie Botha, son of the Commander-in-Chief, and "the youngest staff officer in the world"

range and got one shell in that frightened the horses and wounded one man. The next shot we felt would be right in amongst us, but there was not any next shot, for then our battery came into action at 4800 yards. The first shot was good, the next was right in amongst them, and from then they never missed. They smashed up guns and wagons and men alike, and then turned their attention to the men on the hill, but the latter had had enough. Botha, with

the Standerton Second Commando and the Heidelberg and Ermelo Commandos, had come up on the other side, while Collins was attacking them farther off. We had their retreat cut off, so up went the white flag and we mounted and made a rush for the guns. It was a beastly sight. Rifle-fire had done a certain amount of damage, but our guns had smashed everything to bits. We found that the other commando had stormed the other side of the kopjes, and thus the Germans, with their retreat cut off by us, were forced to surrender. About 140 prisoners were captured here. The guns were again brought into action, and another body of Germans on a farther ridge, after a few well-directed shots, put up the white flag also. This brought our prisoners up to quite 200."

By sundown the fight was practically over all along the line, a terrific explosion in the main German camp, subsequently announcing the destruction of the rolling-stock on the railway to prevent it from falling into the victors' hands. Under cover of nightfall the place was evacuated in haste and confusion. The enemy maintained a hot fire, however, until dark, and as the burghers had now to retire some miles, in order to water their horses, the German position was not occupied until the following morning, where several undamaged guns and a whole wagon-load of ammunition were counted among the spoils. That day the railway station at Jakalswater was seized, and a train captured, among other useful things, the enemy meantime having retreated far inland. It was a brilliant opening to Botha's new campaign, marking, in addition to the capture of prisoners, guns, and other booty with inconsiderable loss, the acquisition of 70 miles of German territory on the road to Windhuk. An incident is related in *South Africa* illustrating the confused nature of some of the fighting which took place at Jakalswater. Commandant Piet Botha, accidentally stumbling into a party of Germans, determined to "bluff":

"Keeping his head, he called upon the officer in command to surrender. The officer laughingly replied that that ruse really would not do—the Herr Burgher must consider himself a prisoner. Commandant Botha quietly but firmly assured the German that he really had come to take his surrender, 'and,' said he, turning round to see another straying burgher, who luckily just then made his appearance, 'here is one of my men coming on to find out why you are detaining me.' The Germans wavered before this delightful piece of audacity, but were unconvinced. At that moment, however, one of our shells burst over the position. In the confusion that followed, Commandant Botha and his companion rejoined their comrades and eventually captured their would-be captors."

Weeks before Botha and his northern army had marched out of Swakopmund, General M'Kenzie, with his gallant force from Lüderitzbucht, including the 1st Battalion of the Transvaal Scottish, had already begun his advance along the central line, having occupied Garub, 70 miles inland across the desert, on February 22. A more important stage was reached on April 1, when Aus, 15 miles farther on, and beyond the region of the desert, was captured without opposition —to the surprise as well as disappointment of the Union troops, who were spoiling for a fight, and knew that the position had been strongly fortified by the enemy. Perhaps it was as well

that M'Kenzie's force, acting of course in concert with the northern army under General Botha, had bided its time and moved with caution after its peaceful occupation of Garub. Had the Germans held out at Aus the place could only have been taken with heavy sacrifice. Elaborate entrenchments, barbed-wire entanglements, gun emplacements, aeroplane sheds, all bore witness to an original intention to offer a desperate resistance. Knowing this, when the time came for M'Kenzie to attack, a strong force of infantry, flanked by mounted troops, and supported by field-guns, prepared the way by searching the extensive mountainous flanks of the stronghold and seizing an important ridge commanding the town. It was arduous work, especially for the infantry, with vast stretches of sand to plough through, then mountainous ridges to climb, and the barest allowance of food and water to sustain them the while. When the water gave out it was impossible to replace it locally, the Germans having filled in all the boreholes and poisoned the wells. Fortunately the troops were only left waterless just long enough to know what a desperate thirst really meant, daybreak finding them in Aus Nek, eagerly surveying the enemy's posi-

The Desert Phase of the South-West African Campaign: Union Troops plodding forward under fire

The photograph gives a good idea of the wide desert-belt along the coast of South-West Africa which had to be crossed before the Union troops could get within striking distance of the enemy. The man in the foreground has been hit, German bullets sending up sand spurts behind him.

tion and ready for the attack. Their disgust may be imagined when it was discovered that all their dispositions had been unnecessary. The enemy had flown, leaving without a struggle the defence works which must have cost him months to construct. Not a single German opposed their entry. The only danger was from mines and other explosive traps, the first of which was exploded in Aus Nek by a mule of the South African force, blowing four mules to fragments. General M'Kenzie and his staff had not long passed over the same ground. Through the shock another mine was discovered close by, consisting of 100 sticks of gelatine and 30 pom-pom shells. It was coolly taken to pieces by a subaltern of the artillery. A third mine was exploded in a stable at Aus by a horse, which, with the stable, was blown to pieces. Other mines blew up later in the month, causing a number of casualties among the men. That the Germans had not long evacuated the place was obvious from the still-smouldering embers of their fires. Evidently the advance of Botha's army towards Windhuk, and the danger of finding their communications threatened by Van de Venter's column, rapidly pushing up from the south, had convinced the Germans that they had stayed at Aus long enough.

"Aus itself", wrote a corporal of the Imperial Light Horse in a letter home, quoted by the *Rochdale Times*, "is a delightfully pretty little place. Good, picturesque, and well-built houses, built on the kopje sides, and on the slopes of the nek. We marched straight through, the place being in the hands of the infantry, who were 'some' pleased to get to green grass and habitation after their long seven months of life under canvas, in the sweltering heat and dust of the desert. They are a wild-looking lot now, with beards, and wrapped for warmth in sacking, &c. Two native scouts have just gone through to camp, who report no Germans for 25 miles—possibly for 60 or 70 miles. They're on the run, and, as there are no less than four large columns converging on them, I don't think we shall have much of a fight after all."

General M'Kenzie, however, was not to be balked of his prey without an effort. Pushing on with his mounted troops, he learnt that the advance of Van de Venter's column from the south, together with that of Berrangé's from the east, where it had entered German territory at Hasuur, had forced the enemy to evacuate both Seeheim, the most important railway junction in that part of the colony, and Keetmanshoop, generally regarded as the business capital of German Namaqualand, whence the railway runs north to Windhuk. After what must have been a magnificent march, from Bethany by way of Beersheba, General M'Kenzie dispatched a small force to destroy the line north of Gibeon, where he learnt that the Germans were entraining.[1] Then he sent the 9th Mounted Brigade to engage the enemy, while he waited with the main body ready to attack south of Gibeon station. The 9th Mounted Brigade became heavily engaged, and had to withdraw to the east flank with serious losses, including seventy prisoners.

[1] The profusion of Biblical names on the map of German South-West Africa is due to the fact that these were all originally given by members of the Rhenish Mission Society, who also named Keetmanshoop after their president, Commissioner Keetman.

With the Southern Army in South-West Africa: Union troops entering German territory near Raman's Drift
A skirmish followed, during which the enemy was driven from his positions.

At dawn M'Kenzie delivered his main attack with the 7th and 8th Mounted Brigades, and not only scattered the enemy and captured seven officers and 200 men, with both their field-guns and several Maxims, but also recovered all the prisoners lost by the 9th Brigade. M'Kenzie pursued the battered enemy along the road for 20 miles, and but for the rocky and difficult nature of the ground, which prevented a successful enveloping movement, the whole force, some 800 strong, would probably have been accounted for. A complete train, in good order, and a great quantity of live stock were among the spoils taken on this occasion. When it is realized that Bethany is about 80 miles from Garub, where M'Kenzie's mounted troops began their advance, and that Gibeon is approximately 120 miles from Bethany, over most difficult and arid country, with little or no transport facilities, it will be agreed that the whole performance of this flying column constituted, in the words of the official statement issued at Cape Town, "a most brilliant feat of arms and endurance". The Union casualties amounted to three officers and twenty other ranks killed, and eight officers and forty-seven other ranks wounded.

Meanwhile General Smuts, having been relieved of his responsibilities as Minister of Finance by Sir David de Villiers Graaff, while retaining his portfolio as Minister of Defence, had arrived on the field of war to take

command of the combined operations in the southern theatre, including M'Kenzie's, Van de Venter's, and Berrangé's columns, while General Botha continued to control the northern army, with supreme control over the whole. Arriving on April 11 at Van de Venter's head-quarters, at Kalkfontein, the southern terminus of the German railway—the Union troops having previously occupied all the German positions between the railway and the frontier of Cape Colony—General Smuts had discussed and settled with the principal officers the plan of operations, which resulted, as we have seen, in the evacuation by the enemy of Seeheim and Keetmanshoop. Upon the occupation of Keetmanshoop, on April 20, General Smuts issued a general order thanking the troops of the southern command and summarizing their brilliant work. If they had not seen such serious fighting as their comrades in the north, under General Botha, he explained, it was entirely due to the policy of the enemy in his efforts to hamper and delay the advance of the Union forces while refusing to accept battle. This order, it should be added, was issued about a week before M'Kenzie's stiff fight at Gibeon, to which the Germans had retreated before the converging South Africans. The Union forces, pointed out General Smuts, now occupied all the southernmost provinces of South-West Africa, from the Orange River on the south, Lüderitzbucht in the west, and Hasuur in the east. Then, after referring to M'Kenzie's vigorous advance, and the victorious march of Berrangé's column—fighting its way through the enemy's country from Hasuur to link up with Van de Venter's force on the slopes of the Karas Mountains, after hundreds of miles of most arduous trekking from Kimberley through the Kalahari, via Kuruman—General Smuts concluded:

"A special word of recognition is due to Colonel Van de Venter and the officers and men of the southern force, who, after trekking through the enemy's advanced lines of defences on the border and after the surrender of the rebel Kemp, pushed northward from the Orange River over 300 miles of the most difficult, mountainous, and sandy country, which the enemy had converted into a desert by the removal of stock and the wholesale poisoning of the waters along the routes of the advance. Colonel Van de Venter moved with large mounted columns through and round both flanks of the Karas Mountains to Seeheim and Keetmanshoop. As a mark of recognition of his services Colonel Van de Venter has been promoted Brigadier-General.

"The points now reached by the central, eastern, and southern forces, which have hitherto been operating separately, render closer co-operation and united action for the future necessary. They will, in fact, become the southern army as distinguished from the northern army based on Walfish. General Smuts is sure that officers and men will continue to prosecute the campaign with the same zeal and energy which have distinguished the operations hitherto."

While the southern force was thus pursuing a retreating enemy from point to point in the direction of Windhuk, capturing prisoners, live stock, and material in all directions, General Botha, in the north, was preparing his final dash for the same objective from Jakalswater. On April 26 the enemy, showing signs for the first time of taking the offensive, with

a force at first stated to be 700, but afterwards estimated at 1500, strongly supported by artillery, delivered a determined flank attack on Colonel Skinner's force guarding the railhead at Trekkopjes, about 50 miles north-east of Swakopmund. Opening fire at dawn at a range of 5000 yards, the attack lasted four hours, when it was repulsed by a vigorous counter-attack, the enemy retiring with a loss of two officers and five men killed, and many wounded, all these last being captured, together with a number of unwounded Germans. Among the Union troops three officers and six men were killed, and two officers and thirty men wounded. The brunt of the fighting was borne by the Kimberley Regiment, the armoured cars, which formed a feature of Botha's splendidly-equipped expedition, and the 2nd Transvaal Scottish, as well as the Imperial Light Horse, also doing excellent work. The prisoners stated that another German force should have attacked from the east, but that it failed to put in an appearance.

There were no mistakes in Botha's final dash for the German headquarters at Windhuk. This crowning achievement of a campaign which throughout was a triumph of patience and endurance, as much as of efficiency and pluck, was as swift as dramatic. While Botha's main column was dispatched along the railway, occupying Kubas on May 1, and pushing on until Karibib, Johann Albrechtshohe, and Wilhelmstal had all been seized by May 5, another force struck out across country towards Windhuk by way of Otjimbingwe, reaching that town—a place of some strategical importance, and the first capital of the German colony—on May 2. Otjimbingwe was occupied without serious opposition, though Botha's troops lost two killed and three wounded, and one German officer and twenty-seven other ranks were captured. Three men and two natives were also killed by a mine during the advance up the Swakop River. Karibib, in the other direction, was occupied after a forced march of 35 miles. As the official *communiqué* issued at Cape Town put it, these rapid movements involved a test of endurance and mobility reflecting the highest credit on the troops engaged, being performed under conditions of discomfort, heat, thirst, and hunger, calling for great resolution and grit. In five days' actual marching not less than 190 miles were covered by any of the troops, some brigades doing substantially more. Reuter's correspondent with Botha's army described how the advance, although trekking through tropical heat over a seemingly never-ending trail, with the occasional waterholes carefully destroyed by the enemy, outdistanced the supplies, both men and animals for some days being limited to the irreducible minimum. Although there had been practically no fighting, all the available water had been polluted and all the roads to Windhuk sown with mines in "fiendish profusion". The same authority reported that round Kubas, where miles of entrenchments and many gun emplacements had been hastily evacuated, more than a hundred contact mines were discovered and removed.

Having in their possession both Otjimbingwe and Karibib—the most important railway junction in the northern provinces, where a great quantity of rolling-stock fell to the invaders, including seven locomotives—and with General Smuts's army scattering the enemy before it from the south, the capture of the capital was now a foregone conclusion. The enemy, indeed, made no serious attempt at resistance, retiring farther to the north, and transferring what remained of the seat of German government to Grootfontein, a place of small importance, lying at one of the ends of the bifurcation of the northern railway. Windhuk itself fell to Botha's army on May 12, 1915. The Burgomaster and the Assistant-Burgomaster, meeting the Commander-in-Chief as he approached from Karibib, announced that the town would be handed over without resistance. Thereupon various brigades, composed for the most part of Transvaal and Free State burghers, formed a junction with Head-quarters, and, with the motor column, entered Windhuk in a long and imposing cavalcade. The Union Jack was then hoisted at the Rathaus, and a proclamation read declaring martial law to be in force throughout the conquered territory. With General Botha on the day of occupation were Brigadier-General Myburgh and Colonels Mentz and Alberts—all Dutch members of the South African Parliament who fought against the British in the South African War. Thus did the Dutch wipe out the stain of the rebellion.

Some 3000 Europeans and 12,000 natives were found in the town, all apparently relieved that the inevitable had happened without a struggle. A representative deputation of the male residents, headed by the Burgomaster, was received during the day by General Botha, who, in his proclamation, had given an assurance that those who complied with the martial-law regulations could rely upon the protection of the British troops, but at the same time plainly indicated that he might remove all the civilians if he found that their presence proved an advantage to the enemy. General Botha's address to the troops who, under Colonel Mentz, were to remain in occupation of the capital, was a noble commentary on the deliberate policy of frightfulness adopted by Germany in the conquered provinces of France and Belgium. Botha told his troops that the German women and children were to be entrusted to their care, and he relied upon their honour to perform well and faithfully this and their other responsible work of occupation. In paying a tribute to the splendid spirit and endurance of all the forces taking part in the operations, he declared that the result of their exertions meant practically the complete possession of German South-West Africa, and was of the utmost importance to the Empire and the Union.

Though his main force still remained unbeaten, the enemy's prospects were practically hopeless against the overwhelming strength of the Union forces, now in possession of most of his railway system — the damage to which had already been

largely made good by the magnificent work of the South African Engineers —as well as of his ports, his principal towns, and his great wireless station at Windhuk, which had been constructed to communicate, with only one relay—in Togoland—with Berlin. The wireless station included a powerful electric plant and a series of masts, 360 feet high, disposed over acres of ground. Not only this, but an enormous quantity of rolling-stock in good order, both in the capital and elsewhere, had fallen into the hands of the invaders practically intact.

The truth was that the Germans in South-West Africa had proved unworthy foemen in every respect. Instead of putting up the stiff fight which had been anticipated from their boasted strength, and the long months which they had spent in elaborating their defences, they had relied on the safer policy of retreat, leaving the offensive for the most part to hidden explosives and poisoned wells. This last crime —through all history accepted as the lowest depths to which cowardice and treachery could descend—was acknowledged by Lieutenant-Colonel Franke, the commander of the German forces, in reply to General Botha's letter of protest that such an act was contrary to Article No. 23 (*a*) of the Hague Convention, and that he should hold the officers concerned responsible. The correspondence on the subject was published by the Secretary of State for the Colonies at the beginning of May, 1915. Colonel Franke, in his attempt at justification, claimed that, in order to prevent "inflicting injury to the health of the enemy", instructions had been given that the wells so treated should be marked by warning notices, and stated that he had sent one of his eldest Staff-officers to Swakopmund to inspect what had been done, six of the wells there having been found by Botha poisoned by arsenical cattle-dip. General Botha

Lieutenant-Colonel Franke, commanding the German Forces in South-West Africa

replied that this offence against the customs of civilized warfare was in no degree lessened by the exhibition of warning notices, even if displayed, adding that, as a matter of fact, no such notices had been found when Swakopmund was occupied. All protests, however, were in vain, the Germans consistently poisoning all the wells along the railway line in their retirement. To what depths of infamy they could descend in this con-

nection was shown in an intercepted message, dated March 10, from a Captain Kruger, of the German Protectorate troops, to an outpost at Pforte, on the northern line between Jakalswater and Swakop, which read as follows:—

"The patrol at Gabib has been instructed thoroughly to infect with disease the Ida Mine. Approach Swakop and Ida Mine with extreme caution, and do not water there any more."

This and other evidence amply justified General Botha in warning his troops against drinking unfiltered water, which he suspected had been poisoned with cholera germs. No wonder, when the Commander-in-Chief drew up the proclamation which he himself read at the occupation of the German capital, he plainly stated that he reserved the right to exact what reprisals he might deem fitting for such infamous deeds, but that such reprisals would be solely attributable to the commander of the German forces.

The conquest of German South-West Africa was not, of course, complete with the fall of Windhuk, but the final submission was now merely a question of time. The Germans had been not only outnumbered but outmanœuvred and outfought from the first. Congratulations on the capture of the capital poured in upon General Botha from the King downwards, including Lord Buxton, the Governor-General, who had recently visited the troops in the field, inspecting practically all the advanced camps at the actual front.

"You, General," said Lord Buxton, in a subsequent letter to the Commander-in-Chief, "must be proud to command such a splendid body of men—Boers and British, alike patriotic and loyal. This force—entirely South African—has enabled the Union and Rhodesia to undertake an allotted and effective part in the great struggle forced upon the Empire and the world by the militarism and overweening ambition of Germany."

Probably no words filled General Botha with greater pride than the tribute paid by his past enemy and present friend, Lord Kitchener, in the House of Lords, upon the occupation of Windhuk. "The ability displayed by Lord Botha", said the British Minister of War, "has been of a very high order, and has confirmed the admiration felt for him as a commander and leader of men."

Windhuk itself, beautifully situated on a high plateau, is described by Miss Cameron in *A Woman's Winter in Africa*, as surrounded by a circular chain of mountains whose different peaks and valleys gather the sunshine into cradles of light and shadow which produce most charming effects. Its leading street, then called Kaiserstrasse, is 2 miles long, very broad in parts, and with banks, hotels, and some good shops among its principal buildings. Windhuk also boasts a museum, a library, a park, and several clubs and churches, in addition to substantial Government buildings, a fort, barracks, and magazines.

The rejoicings over the occupation of Windhuk were unfortunately clouded by the death a few days later of Colonel Sir George Farrar, D.S.O.,

who, as assistant Quartermaster-General to Sir Duncan M'Kenzie's forces, landing with the first expedition at Lüderitzbucht eight months before, had been chiefly responsible for the solution of the transport problem for the central army, and the maintenance of supplies, including the vital factor of water. Sir George had been a member of the famous Reform Committee at Johannesburg at the time of the Jameson Raid, when, with the late Colonel Rhodes, Sir Lionel Phillips, and Mr. J. H. Hammond, he shared the distinction of being condemned to death, a sentence afterwards commuted on payment of a fine of £25,000. In the South African War he distinguished himself with the Colonial Division, winning the D.S.O., and at the close of the campaign receiving the honour of knighthood. His subsequent services in the political, public, and mining affairs of South Africa brought him his baronetcy in 1912, and his close association with the social life of the country, as well as his fearless, engaging personality, made him one of the most popular South Africans of his day. He was fatally injured in a collision on the railway at Kuibus, about midway between Lüderitzbucht and Keetmanshoop, on May 19, dying the next morning.

The total casualties of the United Forces in the operations against German South-West Africa up to June 14, 1915—apart from deaths from disease and accident—were officially put at 1045. These included 660 prisoners, the actual total in killed and wounded amounting to 385. For the rebellion the official figures, published at the same time, were given as 414 in killed and wounded, those of the rebels themselves probably amounting to between 500 and 600. It may here be mentioned that for his share in this misguided revolt General de Wet was in June, 1915, sentenced to six years imprisonment and a fine of £2000.

The late Colonel Sir George Farrar, D.S.O.
(From a photograph by H. Walter Barnett, Knightsbridge)

The number of German prisoners interned in the Union up to the same month amounted to 39 officers and 859 rank and file.

There only remains to record the crowning triumph of the complete and unconditional surrender of all the German forces on July 9, 1915. It was some weeks before General Botha could replenish sufficient supplies at Windhuk for his final advance, the enemy meantime retiring up the rail-

way to Otawi, at the junction of the line leading on the one hand to the newly-established "capital" at Grootfontein, and on the other to Tsumeb. But, once resumed, the advance swept everything before it. The stations along the northern line fell one by one with little or no opposition—Omaruru on June 21; Kalkfeld on June 24; Otjiwarongo, where 250 civilian prisoners were released, on June 26; and Otawi on July 1, after the enemy's trains and troops had been bombarded by British aeroplanes two days previously. The advance can easily be followed on the coloured map facing p. 70. The fall of Otawi left the Germans with only the two extremities of the line leading to Grootfontein, 55 miles farther on, and Tsumeb, 40 miles. Everywhere else the whole railway system of the Protectorate had been cleared of them.

The capture of Otawi was a dashing piece of work which nearly succeeded in forcing the Germans to put up a fight worthy of South African steel. Sending General Manie Botha in advance with the Fifth Mounted Brigade, consisting of Free State Volunteers and a battery, General Botha, with the Head-quarters Staff, followed, having the Sixth Mounted Brigade, composed of the South African Mounted Rifles and two batteries, in reserve, under Brigadier-General Lukin. The whole force marched through the night, General Manie Botha coming up with the enemy the next morning in the difficult thick bush country leading to Otawi. Failing to take advantage of the natural defences the Germans were

The Occupation of the Capital of German South-West Africa: General Botha arranging the Surrender of Windhuk with the Burgomaster

pushed farther and farther back by General Manie Botha, who, in the words of the official account, acted with great promptitude and initiative, pressed the attack continuously, and succeeded in taking Otawi, where an excellent and abundant water supply solved one of the main problems of the campaign. The Commander-in-Chief gave the credit due to his namesake and the Free State burghers for their dash and spirit:

"Their march of 42 miles in 16 hours without resting or stopping must be regarded", he says, "as an exceptionally fine performance. That of General Lukin's force, which, in support, covered 48 miles in 20 hours under the same conditions, was also highly creditable. Our casualties were four killed and seven wounded, which, in view of the dangerous and difficult nature of the country, must be considered exceptionally light. The enemy's losses included three killed and eight wounded, and 27 unwounded prisoners. A machine-gun was also taken."

Meantime flanking columns on the right and left were rounding up the enemy in all directions. Brigadier-General Myburgh, marching across country from the Otawi-Grootfontein line at Guchab, encountered the Germans under von Kleis at Gaub, 16 miles south of the terminus at Tsumeb, and captured between 500 and 600 prisoners and some field-guns with the loss of no more than one killed and three wounded; while Brigadier-General Brits executed a sweeping drive on the left, marching as far as Namutoni, on the eastern extremity of the great Etosha Pan by way of Outio, covering in all nearly 200 miles, and making about 150 prisoners. One result of these operations by the mounted brigades on both flanks of Botha's main column—forced marches extending over a fortnight through the most difficult country—was that all the British prisoners in the hands of the enemy were released. The most decisive effect, however, was that the Germans, hemmed in on all sides by an ever-narrowing encircling movement, bewildering and entangling by its amazing rapidity, realized that the Day had come and that escape was now impossible. They were like rats in a trap. They sought in vain to make terms. All their conditions were brushed aside by General Botha, who presented an ultimatum to the German commander to surrender by five o'clock on July 8; otherwise his troops would at that hour begin the general attack in force. After further pourparlers the ultimatum was accepted at 2 a.m. the next morning on terms which, while insisting on unconditional surrender, were conceived in an extremely generous spirit. Briefly put the terms, signed by General Botha and Colonel Franke, were as follow:—

"The officers of the active troops to retain their arms, give their parole, and choose their place of abode, subject to restrictions. Other ranks of the active troops to be interned in such place in the Protectorate as the Union should decide, each retaining his rifle, but no ammunition. All reservists of all ranks, upon surrendering, to give up their arms, and on signing the form of parole to be allowed to return to their homes and resume their civil occupations. The officers to be allowed to retain their horses. The police to be treated like the troops. Civil officials to be allowed to

remain in their homes on signing the parole, but without exercising their functions of appointment, or claiming emoluments therefor from the Union. With the exception of the arms mentioned, all war material to be surrendered to the Union."

The form of parole pledged the signatory not to re-engage in hostilities during the present war between Great Britain and Germany. These terms were signed on the railway north of Otawi at a spot known as Kilometre 500, the taking of the surrender being entrusted by the Commander-in-Chief to Brigadier Lukin.

High praise was deservedly accorded by General Botha to the mounted brigades, principally drawn from the Transvaal and Orange Free State, for their share of this final coup; as well as to the infantry, "which, after splendid marches, arrived in time to complete the encircling movement"; adding:—

"The marches performed by one and all deserve to rank highly as military achievements, while the spirit and endurance of the men who have done the work should cause the Union justifiable pride in its soldiers."

When the end came thus swiftly and dramatically the German force had dwindled to 204 officers and 3166 men. Of these 82 officers and 1262 other ranks belonged to the regular military force of the Protectorate, the remainder being reservists and police. Besides this considerable haul of officers and men the spoils of victory included all the remaining war material, including 37 field-guns and 22 machine-guns, and the whole of the property of the Protectorate Government. Arrangements were at once made to transport all the prisoners to the Union, there to be interned until the end of the war, an exception being made in the case of the officers, who were released on parole within certain prescribed areas. One officer was permitted to be interned with the other ranks of the artillery, one with the other ranks of the remainder of the active troops, and one with the other ranks of the police.

Not the least valuable result of this triumphant conclusion of the campaign was that it released a South African force for the greater war on the European front—at the very moment, too, when every available man was needed for the fighting line; and Lord Kitchener, at the meeting in the Guildhall on July 9, 1915, was making his supreme demand on the voluntary resources of British manhood. Some days before the final surrender in South-West Africa General Smuts announced that the Union had already made an offer to the Imperial Government to organize and equip a South African contingent of volunteers for Europe, as well as a force of heavy artillery. "We shall warmly welcome you and the South Africans who can come over to join us", said Lord Kitchener in his telegram of congratulation to General Botha on his brilliant victory. Thus was the last nail driven into the coffin of German intrigue in South Africa by the youngest among the sister nations of the British Empire. F. A. M.

CHAPTER V

PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGNS IN EAST AFRICA AND THE CAMEROONS

(January–May, 1915)

The Campaign in East Africa—New Commander-in-Chief—The Disaster at Jassin—Naval Operations and Blockade—War on Lake Victoria Nyanza—"German Barbarism beyond Belief"—Fighting on Lake Nyasa—The Nyasaland Revolt—The Sultan of Zanzibar's Warning—Progress of the Cameroon Campaign—An Heroic Stand on the Nigerian Frontier—Rhodesia's Gallant Share.

WHILE German resistance was collapsing in South-West Africa a different tale was being told on the other side of the continent. The conquest of German East Africa, where the northern "front" extended along a line of some 1000 miles—starting south of Mombasa and stretching right up to Lake Victoria Nyanza, then across the lake towards the Belgian Congo, and forming there the southern boundary of the Uganda Protectorate—proved the hardest task of all the wars on the outposts of empire. "The Germans are simply bristling with Maxims, and use them like artists," wrote a British officer with the fighting force, who, like everyone engaged in the operations, freely admitted that they were facing a powerful and determined enemy. Further proof of this was furnished two months after the failure of the British attack against the seaport town of Tanga, described in our last chapter on the Colonial Campaign in Africa (Vol. II, pp. 88–102), when the operations were carried down to the end of 1914. Leaving Tanga and its impregnable defences on that occasion the defeated force from India, composed of British and Indian troops under the command of Major-General A. E. Aitken, re-embarked and proceeded to Mombasa, where it became a part of the British forces engaged in the defence of the colony. The campaign was now conducted by Brigadier-General M. I. Tighe, C.B., D.S.O., Indian army, who had been appointed Major-General to command the troops in British East Africa. Here, although the Germans had been forced back towards their own frontier after their repulse at Gazi in October, the close of the year found them still maintaining themselves within British territory north of the Umba River. This was the scene of the next serious fighting, a column of about 1800 men, composed of Indian and King's African Rifles, with artillery, being dispatched for the purpose of driving the enemy within his own border. By January 2, 1915, this had been accomplished with only slight casualties, and the British column, with the help of the naval forces, had established itself along the Umba valley. The coast town of Vanga, close to the frontier, which the Germans had occupied since the beginning of the war, was now recaptured by the British troops, who, pursuing

EAST AFRICA
English Miles
0 100 200
Railways open
BRITISH EAST AFRICA
EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE
UGANDA PROTECTORATE
GERMAN EAST AFRICA
BELGIAN CONGO
PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA
NORTHERN RHODESIA
SOUTHERN RHODESIA
INDIAN OCEAN
Victoria Nyanza
Lake Tanganyika
Lake Nyasa
Lake Rudolph or Basso Narok
Lake Albert
Lake Kivu
Lake Kioga
Lake Bangweolo
Lake Mweru
Lake Kamalondo
Lake Kisale
Lake Kabele
Lake Kalomba
Lake Dilol

the enemy with the aid of the naval forces into his own territory, also occupied his advance post at Jassin, some twenty miles over the German border.

This success, unfortunately, had a disastrous sequel. Scarcely had the Indian garrison—consisting of three companies of infantry, in all about

Brigadier-General M. I. Tighe, C.B., D.S.O., appointed Major-General to Command the Troops in British East Africa

(From a photograph by Langfier)

300 men—settled down to the occupation of Jassin than the enemy counter-attacked in force. This was on January 12, and though the first attack was repulsed with heavy loss the Germans concentrated a larger force, amounting to some 2000 troops, with six field-guns and about sixteen machine-guns, and delivered another onslaught six days later, cutting off the post and surrounding it. Every effort had been made by the Germans to keep this concentration secret, but news had reached British Headquarters on the 17th, and orders had been sent for the withdrawal of the Indian camp. It was then, however, too late to save the situation. The orders did not reach Jassin in time, and on the following day the camp was isolated by the overwhelming force of Germans. Every possible effort was made to relieve the garrison by the troops in the Umba valley, but it needed far more powerful reinforcements than were then available to force a way in time through the villainous country and the ring of German machine-guns with which the post was surrounded. The coast country in which the fighting was taking place is mostly low-lying, with miles and miles of mangrove swamp, full of poisonous insects. Where the country rises a little it is all thick bush, through which it is impossible for the most part to see twenty yards ahead. It must be remembered, as the official *communiqué* published in the *East-African Standard* on 23 January pointed out, that in this coast area health conditions are so bad that no troops can remain there long under service conditions. As it happened, certain reliefs were taking place at the time of the attack on Jassin, and the Umba force had been reduced by nearly 500 men and a number of machine-guns. Hence it was impossible to send immediately a relieving-force sufficiently strong to cope with the enemy's unexpected reinforcements. The garrison itself held out all day on the 18th, inflicting heavy

losses on the enemy, but on the following morning, having expended all its ammunition and lost its commander, Colonel Ragbir Singh, it was compelled to surrender. Both in the defence of Jassin and in the operations undertaken for its relief General Tighe reported that the Indian and African troops engaged fought with the utmost gallantry. The official *communiqué* added that the ammunition was used up sooner than it should have been, owing to the incessant fire from the enemy's guns, which rendered the words of command inaudible within the post, with the result that fire-control became impossible. About forty of the garrison were killed and wounded, most of the remainder being made prisoners.

"During the action", to quote from the *communiqué* already referred to, "a party of 40 Kashmir Rifles, holding the Jassin sisal factory, after expending all their ammunition, broke out, and, cutting their way through the enemy, reached our main camp on the Umba, sustaining 19 casualties. After the surrender of Jassin the two British officers were brought before the German commander, who congratulated them on their gallant defence and released them on parole after returning them their swords. In this small affair the enemy's casualties are known to have been very severe. They lost 57 whites killed and wounded and a large number of their Askaris, and had three machine-guns smashed up by our mountain artillery with direct hits at 300 yards range."

Mention has been made of the gallantry of the natives in the relief operations. The story is told in this connection of a stalwart member of the King's African Rifles who distinguished himself in one of the relief columns which were nearly outflanked by the Germans. When forced to retire, he succeeded in bringing away the machine-gun to which he was attached, and, reporting this with some trepidation on arrival at the base camp, apologized profusely for having left the tripod behind.

After their recapture of Jassin the Germans retired to a position more to the south, while the British column, with the advent of the rainy season, withdrew from the unhealthy district of the Umba River to the more salubrious country about Mombasa. Meantime, on January 8, an expedition had been sent from Mombasa to occupy Mafia, the island first captured some months previously when the British cruisers were hunting for the *Königsberg* — eventually to discover and destroy her some half a dozen miles up the Rufiji River, on the German East African coast, immediately opposite Mafia Island. The expedition in January was completely successful, the island being occupied with little loss, and the small German garrison unconditionally surrendering on the 12th. Mafia was then formally placed under British rule.

Preparations were now made to blockade the whole German coast-line. It was obvious, not only that the German colony had accumulated vast stores of ammunition and guns before the war, but also that supplies were reaching her more or less regularly from German and other manufacturers in America. These, for the most part, must have arrived by the seaboard, seeing that all the land frontiers of the colony were British, Belgian, or

Portuguese, though it was probably not beyond the enemy's gifts of organization to overcome some of these difficulties, especially on the Portuguese border. However, it was imperative to declare a formal blockade of the coast, and to take ample steps to make that blockade effective. This was begun on March 1, 1915, the blockade extending along the whole coast of German East Africa, a total distance of over 300 miles. No very formidable naval force was necessary to make the blockade effective, in spite of the length of seaboard involved, for there are few available ports, and long stretches of the coast are practically out of the question for blockade-running. The principal port, Dar-es-Salaam, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, had already been twice bombarded by British ships. It was here, too, after the second bombardment, that Commander H. P. Ritchie, of the *Goliath*—one of the battleships subsequently lost in the Dardanelles campaign—won the Victoria Cross for conspicuous gallantry while leading boats' parties from the ship in searching and demolition work.

Map illustrating the Blockade of the German East African Coast—the shaded area—and the Military Operations early in 1915

The war was also extended to the waters of Lake Victoria Nyanza, where steps were taken to arm the British trading-steamers, with the result that on March 5, 1915, the *Winifred* drove ashore and totally disabled the *Muanza*, the only German armed steamer on the lake. Five days later three of our steamers bombarded the German port at Musoma in Mara Bay, succeeding in silencing the enemy's

guns and in destroying some of the public buildings. About the same date a German raiding-party of about 300 men, including 50 Europeans, with two machine-guns, was attacked near Karungu, a port on the lake about 8 miles north of the enemy's frontier, by a force of British mounted infantry and King's African Rifles, and driven over the German border. The enemy fought desperately before retiring, and left eight Europeans and many Askaris dead. The British losses included three British officers attached to the King's African Rifles — Lieutenants Reid, Thompson, and Sale. Several other encounters took place with hostile patrols, but owing to the rainy season no operations of any magnitude were undertaken for the next month or so. Stories reached home to the effect that the enemy was pursuing the same barbarous and desperate methods of warfare in East Africa as elsewhere.

"The German barbarism is beyond belief", wrote one of the British volunteers in a letter home, quoted in the *Nottingham Guardian*. "All our fellows were killed by soft-nosed bullets except one, and some of them were actually using .450 soft-nosed, which blow a hole big enough to put your fist in. Three times in the main attack they put up the white flag; then advanced when our fellows ceased fire, and suddenly opened fire again."

With regard to Nyasaland—separated from the south-west corner of German East Africa by Lake Nyasa, just as Uganda was separated from the north-west corner of the same colony by the Victoria Nyanza—little land fighting had taken place between the British and German troops since the decisive defeat of the enemy in the Karonga district, described in Vol. II, p. 98. The principal operations on this front were confined to water, where, as on the Victoria Nyanza, steps had been taken to obtain command of the lake—a vast expanse some 350 miles in length. At the very beginning of the war the Nyasaland Government armed steamer *Gwendolen* had surprised and disabled the German Government steamer *Herman von Wissmann* at Sphinxhaven, a German port on the eastern shore of Lake Nyasa. Further operations were carried out against Sphinxhaven on May 30, 1915, when the place was attacked by a naval force under Lieutenant-Commander G. H. Dennistoun, R.N., supported by a landing-party under Captain H. G. Collins, Royal Field Artillery, and 1st Battalion King's African Rifles. This little engagement was a brilliant success, a charge by the attacking troops after a naval bombardment clearing the enemy out of the town, and leading to the capture of rifles, ammunition, and military stores, while the disabled *Herman von Wissmann* was shelled and completely destroyed. This done, the landing-party was as successfully re-embarked, the whole affair having been completed practically without loss on the British side. Earlier than this the Germans had succeeded in stirring up trouble among the natives, a small rebellion breaking out on January 23, 1915. This, however, after a certain number of lives had been lost, was completely suppressed. It owed its origin probably as much to the teaching of Ethiopianism as to the

Minor Difficulties of the East African Campaign: British Army Transport Section on the road to the Front

intrigues of the Germans, the chief culprits being highly-educated natives who had passed through the American mission, and afterwards, in some cases, sent to the United States to take a University course. The ringleader had been ordained in this way, and sent back to Nyasaland in charge of his old mission station, where he built a large church, with "three-brick" walls, obviously intending to use it as a military stronghold when the time came to exterminate the white and wrest Nyasaland for the natives. Fortunately the rising was nipped in the bud. The ring-leader, the "Rev." John Chelembwe, was killed in action on February 3, and with his disappearance and the summary execution of the other leaders the rebellion came to an end.

The Sultan of Zanzibar published a timely warning against German intrigues in a letter addressed to the Liwali of Mombasa and Mohammedans living in the British East African Protectorate.

"Let no consideration or promises from Germans", he wrote, "prevail upon you to change your allegiance from the mighty Empire of England. Remember that England has ever been a true friend and protector of our interests and religion, and I commend to you and all Arabs that your attitude now be of unswerving loyalty to Great Britain. Let me warn you against believing lies coming from Germans. Remember how the Germans behaved during the reigns of Seyyid Majid and Seyyid Bargash respectively—the amount of outrages and violation of the local Government's rights and forced intervention in our religious concern committed by them at that time, even entering the mosques with their shoes on, not even regarding the sacred rights of the mosques. . . . The German Government is harsh and cruel, and they have ever shown themselves scornful, and despising Mohammedans. Do not believe their words, for they lie to gain your confidence, and then they will crush and ill-treat you and our religionists."

German intrigues among the natives had been assiduous in all the British colonies. We referred in an earlier chapter to some of the methods employed in the Cameroons to poison and deceive the native mind. Here is another example—the translation of an extract from a letter found on January 3, 1915, in the mosque at Yola, in Nigeria, on the German Cameroon frontier, and printed in the *Times*. The letter, obviously intended for native consumption, was smeared with "medicine" stain, to ensure its being believed by whoever read it.

"May God help all!

"This letter comes from Hauptmann Kariyesimu. It is sent to all who can read it. I tell all those who see this letter the true news, good news. This news has come from Germany. They told me German soldiers had got up and gone to England, to fight the English. They fought for one day. They killed the English, ten thousand of them, inside the English town, and those who fled were thirty thousand. They were frightened at the German soldiers and fled, but the German soldiers captured them and put them in prison with chains round their necks and then took them back to Germany. The Germans captured four English towns and three French towns. This is the news that has just come from Germany to us."

The Germans in the Cameroons needed all the support they could steal in this way, though it stood them in

ill stead when the British and French drove them farther and farther back, and so disabused the native mind. "Why the Germans do not give in is a mystery," wrote an officer with the Nigerian Field Force on the Cameroon border after the fall of Bare, beyond the railway terminus, where the British captures had included sixty white prisoners and two aeroplanes. As stated in our last reference to the campaign dealing with the operations to the end of 1914 (Vol. II, p. 100) the whole of the northern railway had fallen into our hands and the enemy had been driven back into the interior. Some of the Germans retired north of the line towards their big strongholds in the Mandara Hills and on the Benue River, where operations against them were conducted by combined British and French forces from northern Nigeria and the Chad military territory. Progress, however, owing to the difficult nature of the country, was necessarily slow, and the minor encounters which took place on the remainder of the Nigeria-Cameroon frontier were indecisive. One British column, not previously noticed, had advanced along the Cross River from Calabar, and after reaching Nsarum, on the Cameroon frontier, had struck across German territory as far as Tinto, which it occupied in the closing days of 1914. This, however, was subsequently abandoned, owing to the discovery that the enemy was concentrating for an overwhelming attack on the town.

In the meantime a blockade of the coast was established, so that, completely surrounded as was their colony by French and British territory, the Germans were now cut off from supplies both by land and sea. No doubt they were buoyed by the hopes raised by exaggerated reports received from the Fatherland, confident that they had only to hold out long enough to regain complete possession of the country. As everywhere throughout the German fighting front they were well equipped — especially with machine-guns—and adepts at laying traps for unwary troops. At Sanckang a small British force was badly cut up, the Germans dominating the position with a Maxim and sweeping the British line from end to end with its fire. This, however, was earlier in the campaign. For the most part the British and French had by far the best of the encounters.

"While we were up country", wrote a British officer with one of the Nigerian columns, in giving an instance of this, in a letter quoted by the *Times*, "200 Germans attacked one of our posts, defended by two blockhouses and held by 1 officer and 50 men. We killed 2 German officers and 10 men—wounded unknown—and had not a single casualty — jolly good work, especially as our fellows had to let a convoy of our wounded through while the fight was going on."

This was probably the glorious little fight at Takum, near the Nigerian frontier between Ikom and Yola, both Major A. E. Churcher and Lieutenant Basil Waters, R.N., receiving the thanks of the Secretary of State and the Governor-General, Sir Frederick Lugard, for an achievement the fame of which in normal times would have resounded through the length and

breadth of the Empire. Major Churcher was in charge of the important town of Ibi, on the Benue River, and learning of the enemy's intention to rush the British post at Takum with a strong force of native troops—as a preliminary to an advance on Ibi—took steps to defend the place. The enemy's chief object, after capturing Takum, was to destroy the telegraph junction at Ibi, and so isolate the British columns operating against the Germans in the north. Takum was accordingly garrisoned with a force of fifty Nigerian police under Lieutenant Waters. This handful of police had never been under rifle-fire before, but under British leadership awaited the German onslaught with the steadiness of seasoned European veterans. The ranks of the enemy, advancing in a series of rushes in close formation, were decimated by the defenders' bullets. One well-placed shot killed the German officer working a Maxim gun which had been brought into action. So keen were the Nigerians that one of their corporals expressed his anxiety to charge the enemy by himself.

Map of the Cameroons, showing the boundary of the German colony at the beginning of the war, and the scene of the Allies' operations under General Dobell, D.S.O.

"A very hot engagement ensued," says Reuter, who rescued these stirring facts from oblivion, "and firing was continuous for six hours, the hands of officers and men being burnt by the overheated rifles. The enemy, who outnumbered the British by about five to one, made a series of rushes, but never got nearer to the blockhouses than 300 yards. At sunset they retreated, abandoning their Maxim. . . . The enemy suffered heavily in killed and wounded, but not one of the defending force was hit. As it was feared that the enemy would be reinforced, the little British force retired on the river in order to defend Ibi. This they accomplished in pitch darkness in single file through swamps and rivers, often immersed to their necks. The Germans made no attempt to follow, and it was learnt that the enemy natives had been thoroughly demoralized by their defeat. The pluck of the handful of British had a great effect, as for three months not a single German took the offensive in this part of the country, or attempted to cross the frontier."

While this war of outposts was pro-

ceeding along the Nigeria-Cameroon frontier the main Expeditionary Force of the Allies, under General Dobell, continued operating along the two main lines of railway—the northern line, from Bonaberi to Nkongsamba, and the midland line, from Duala to Eseka. For months practically no official information was published as to the fortunes of this force after the excellent progress described in our last chapter on the subject, darkness as impenetrable as the African forest itself enshrouding these minor theatres of war. In the House of Lords on April 20, 1915, however, Lord Lucas threw a gleam of light on the situation by the vague but satisfactory statement that "very considerable losses had been inflicted upon the enemy at comparatively small cost of life to the Allied forces". On the following day it was reported from Paris that a French force under Colonel Meyer had started from Edea and forced the passage of the Nkele, on which river stands the town of Yaunde, to which the Germans had withdrawn their colonial seat of government. A British column, marching more to the north, was known to be acting in conjunction with the French. The operations of these forces must be reserved for a later chapter. In April Lord Lucas also mentioned that French columns had penetrated into the German Cameroons from the Ubangi-Shari, Middle Congo, and Gabun territories of the French Equatorial. That was all. Small wonder that amid so much mystery and secrecy this war in West Africa was at the time in danger of being overlooked altogether by the general public at home.

Rhodesia's gallant share in the African campaigns was also apt to be missed amid the welter of the Great World War. Linking German East Africa on the north-east with German South-West Africa on the south-west, she was liable to invasion from the very beginning of the struggle; yet she played her part not only in defending her own frontier but also in the European campaign and the little wars around her, besides contributing £20,000 to the various war funds within the first eight months. About 500 men left to join various units in the Imperial forces at home. A contingent of another 500 picked men, the 1st Rhodesia Regiment, accompanied General Botha to South-West Africa. A further contingent of the same strength, the 2nd Rhodesians, joined the Imperial troops in East Africa, sailing in the *Umzumbi* from Beira, where they were paraded on board and inspected by the Governor of the Portuguese Province. The expenses of both regiments were paid by the Chartered Company, though the first force was acting under the Union Government and the second under the War Office. Married men were not allowed to leave, or another two regiments could have been raised. Meantime Northern Rhodesia was helping her Belgian neighbour on the Congo frontier, while the married men and other Britons all over the colony were enrolled and armed to defend the country. It was part of Germany's dream of conquest in Africa that the natives of Northern Rhodesia could be coaxed and bribed to rebellion and so help the Kaiser's troops in East and

South-West Africa to join forces for the triumphant march to the Zambesi and beyond, where treachery, it was hoped, would enable them to sweep the British from South Africa. This dream was shattered by the sterling loyalty of the vast majority of the Boers and the faithfulness of the native tribes.

With splendid confidence the Rhodesians were prepared for all eventualities.

"Up to now", wrote a correspondent from Umtala in the spring of 1915, in a letter quoted in *South Africa*, "Rhodesia remains inviolate by German feet,[1] but there's no knowing how long it will stay so when our forces in German East and German South-West Africa begin to put pressure on. At all events everything is prepared. . . . One youth of just over eighteen stowed himself away in the luggage van of a troop train, travelled there fourteen hours, and, to the intense surprise of everybody, fell into line with the rest at the journey's end. You see, when *every* man wanted to go the authorities could pick and choose, so you can bet our two regiments will take some whacking. I'm busy just now as acting staff officer of reserves, a force raised for town and district defence in case we (the Defence Force) are called out. The reserves are all over thirty-five. Everybody else is in the active force."

Thus was Rhodesia ready to take care of herself and at the same time to spare two regiments of her best for other theatres of war. F. A. M.

CHAPTER VI

EBB AND FLOW ALONG THE FRENCH FRONT

(February–May, 1915)

The February Lull on the French Front—Minor Episodes—The French are sprayed with a Burning Liquid—The Position in March—French Progress at Many Points—President Poincaré in Danger—Generals von Kluck, Maunoury, and de Villaret wounded—The Eighty Bombardments of Pont-à-Mousson—Climatic Difficulties in the Vosges—The Alpine Chasseurs—The Great Struggle for the Hartmannsweiler Peak and others—Fluctuations in Alsace—The French Effort against the Saint Mihiel Salient—General Joffre's Plans—Strategical Importance of the German Positions—The Fighting west of the Salient—French Progress near Saint Mihiel—The Contest south of the Salient—Operations in North-western France—Fall of Notre Dame de Lorette—Capture of Carency and Neuville—A Franco-Belgian Victory on the Yser—A Bogus German Victory in Champagne—Capture of Ablain and the White Road—Captain Sievert's Diary.

IT has been shown in previous chapters that in spite of all the bad weather no little vigour was displayed on both the eastern and the western fronts of the Great War during the last weeks of 1914 and the first weeks of the succeeding year. In the course of February, 1915, how-

[1] There had been, however, a number of German raids in Northern Rhodesia. On March 19 a detachment of the Northern Rhodesian Rifles and Police, under Major Boyd Cunninghame, attacked a patrol of German native troops entrenched in a stockaded village near Fife. Taken by surprise, the enemy was overwhelmed, 18 being killed and 30 taken prisoners. The only British casualty was Lieutenant Irvine, who led the charge and was mortally wounded.

ever, there came, in France at all events, a comparative lull, interrupted occasionally here and there by what might almost be called some spasmodic effort on the part of one or another belligerent. Sniping, it is true, was on both sides almost incessant. Rival positions were frequently cannonaded. Every now and then some trench affair was marked by a hand-to-hand encounter, whilst here and there, along the far-flung French lines, some city or town, and notably Rheims, again became the objective of an intermittent bombardment.

Towards the middle of February the enemy attempted two movements which pointed to serious designs. One of these efforts was made on the Lorraine front north of Pont-à-Mousson. At noon on the 13th a German force drove the French outposts from two positions overlooking the Moselle, one the little village of Norroy, climbing a slope near the north-east corner of some forest-land known as the Priest's Wood, and the other the signalling station of Xon, perched on an isolated hill rising more than 1000 feet above the Seille and Moselle valleys. The French force at these points was a small one, and was greatly outnumbered by the enemy. Severe fighting ensued, however, particularly on the 16th and the 18th of the month, on the first of which dates, when the French artillery had largely destroyed the German trenches near Norroy, the 277th Regiment of the Line profited by the advantage to attack the village, and a sanguinary house-to-house struggle ensued, the confusion being the greater as some heavy German artillery in the rear of

The Track of the Invaders: one of the wrecked bridges on the French railways

Norroy started a bombardment by which many German as well as French soldiers were killed. The 277th fought with the utmost gallantry, but when night fell the village was still in the enemy's possession. Some part of the Xon height had been recovered, however, and on the 18th the French completed their reconquest of that position, as well as that of Norroy, which was carried after several bayonet charges, lasting for more than an hour. At the same time the enemy was driven back through a part of Priest's Wood, and some of the blockhouses which he had erected there were taken. Apart from the menace both to Verdun and to Nancy which the German effort implied there was yet more immediate danger for Pont-à-Mousson, which, although only counting some 13,000 inhabitants, was a locality to be coveted by reason of the important foundries and forges installed there.

On the Alsatian front the enemy's offensive in the middle of February was directed along both banks of the little River Lauch, with the obvious design of driving back the French lines which threatened Mülhausen and Altkirch. As snowstorms had been frequent and were still occurring in this region, both sides were employing outposts and patrols on skis. The French skiers were, however, the more active, and they promptly signalled the approach of the Germans, who, after coming in contact with the main French line, found it necessary to retreat. For a few days the enemy was more successful on another point of the same front, that of the Bonhomme Pass through the Vosges, where they gained a footing on Hill 607. But they were driven from it, and the French, in their turn assuming the offensive, secured positions both north and south of the farm of Sudelle, capturing on these occasions several machine-guns as well as important stores of ammunition and other war material.

The fighting was carried on amidst alternations of rain, snow, and fog which often made the operations very difficult. On February 17, however, the troops near the extreme left of the French line achieved a success at Roclincourt, to the north of Arras, exploding several mines under the enemy's principal trenches there, and taking a number of prisoners. Even more successful was a renewed attack on the German positions north of Beauséjour and Perthes, 3 kilometres of the enemy's trenches being captured by our allies, who also took over 400 prisoners. February 17 was also marked by progress in the Argonne. West of Bagatelle there was a hand-to-hand encounter, which resulted in the retreat of the Germans and a French advance of several hundred yards. In all this fighting the French territorial divisions, consisting of men between thirty-five and forty years of age, constantly gave proof of increasing efficiency.

During the ensuing week the principal engagements were fought at Les Éparges, south-west of Verdun, and on the Alsatian front, the Germans making very considerable efforts to recover the ground which they had lost at those points. No fewer than

After the Victory: Bringing in a captured German Standard to the French Head-quarters

seven successive attacks were made on the French lines near Les Éparges, but they were all repulsed, the enemy losing several thousand men in his attempt, and although some French outposts fell back in Alsace, the Germans were quite unable to make any real headway in that direction. As if in revenge for the fruitlessness of their endeavours, they yet once again bombarded Rheims. During six hours on the night of February 21, and five hours on the 22nd, some 1500 shells fell upon the devoted city. What remained of the cathedral was specially selected as a target for this furious cannonade, and the cathedral's vaulted roof, which had resisted all previous bombardments, was now burst. At the same time a score of houses were set on fire and a like number of civilians were killed. Three days later the French retaliated by an aerial attack on the enemy's positions in the northern part of Champagne, a large number of bombs being thrown successfully on trains, railway stations, store-places, and armoured shelters.

At the end of the month one observed a steady continuance of French successes. At one point there had been incessant trench, redoubt, and blockhouse warfare extending from the little village called Perthes-lez-Hurlus to a farm named Beauséjour. The Germans clung to their positions very stubbornly, and although on three or four occasions the French turned them out of a little redoubt which they had erected on a spur north of Beauséjour, they invariably regained possession of it. The French, however, secured a hill to the west of this redoubt, and retained it in spite of all the efforts made by two regiments of the Prussian Guard to wrest it from them. Fighting patiently, they also dislodged the Germans from some of the little woods; but on one occasion when they did so the enemy's trenches were mined, and the eager Frenchmen were suddenly blown up. Nevertheless our allies could claim real gains in this district when the end of February was reached.

They were successful also along the Meuse heights and in the Meuse valley, that is, on either side of the German wedge projecting westward from points near Verdun and Pont-à-Mousson as far as Saint Mihiel, where the enemy's position became less and less secure. It was in the wood of Malancourt, in this Meuse region, that the Germans first essayed the effect of spraying the French trenches with a burning liquid. Intersecting the wood from west to east, the rival positions were at very short distances from each other. Saps ran out on both sides, and much of the fighting was carried on by exploding mines and throwing hand-grenades. At about noon on February 26 some French soldiers, who were occupying a recently captured German trench, suddenly felt a gust of hot air blowing over their parapet, and immediately afterwards were flooded with a scalding liquid which gave out a thick dark smoke, and seemed to be a preparation of pitch. Jets of this liquid played upon the men as if discharged from powerful syringes, and many of the French were badly burned, whilst under cover of the clouds of smoke the Germans

crept forward, cutting the barbed wire in front of the trench with shears, and then carrying the position by storm. But their success went no further. The French erected strong barricades in the rear, and on the following day delivered a counter-attack by which they regained most of the lost position.

The reader will remember the great length of the lines which our allies were defending. In fairness it must be admitted that the German lines were equally extensive, and it followed, virtually as a matter of course, that, quite apart from all considerations of *moral* and weather, neither side was at this time in a position to take really vigorous action. Had either antagonist depleted any part of his line to any great extent for the purpose of trying to break through at some particular point, the consequences might have been fatal to him. From a military standpoint, during the month of March the first duty on both sides was to keep watch and ward over the positions occupied. At this stage, moreover, it was no longer a part of the German plan to carry the tide of invasion more southward. Paris might wait, and the enemy's main object was still and ever to go farther westward, and seize, if possible, such ports as Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. It thus came to pass that month that the chief endeavours of the Germans were directed against the comparatively short line which the British and the Belgian troops defended. In the end, realizing that the French were holding their own, the British took the offensive and gained, as described elsewhere, the bloody battle of Neuve Chapelle. At the same time our allies had to remain extremely vigilant, and before March ended they made yet farther progress. Already at the outset of the month a little more ground was gained both in northern Champagne and in the Argonne, while on the Vosges or Alsatian front several more German attacks were repulsed. On March 3 the enemy made a fairly energetic effort to regain positions recently taken by the French in northern Champagne, and some regiments of the Prussian Guard suffered severely in this encounter. On the following day a company of that famous force was successfully surrounded by the French. On the 6th our allies made a farther advance towards Notre Dame de Lorette, north of Arras, and yet again threw back the German attacks at various points of their line. Day by day the slow but ever-persistent battle was waged tenaciously in very inclement weather. The daily results were comparatively small, but the outcome of those strenuous hours might at any moment have proved of high importance, though Europe gave them scant attention, more interest attaching to the operations of the Allies in the Dardanelles and to the sudden resignation of the Greek Premier, M. Venizelos, just as it seemed certain that Greece would come into line against the Turks.

Slowly but surely, undismayed by difficulties, the French prosecuted the task of recovering some of their invaded territory. One day some 460 yards would be regained in Champagne, and 200 more would be seized

on the morrow. The casualties were often heavy on both sides, over a thousand men frequently being put out of action on a front of 15 miles in the course of a single brief afternoon. The French estimates of the German losses (50,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners during twenty-five days' fighting in this one region) may have been somewhat exaggerated, but there seemed to be no end to the graves into which their dead were cast side by side, a hundred at a time.

Whenever the Germans endeavoured to regain lost ground our allies almost invariably repulsed them, and then took the offensive and effected yet another short advance. They also gave us valuable support in resisting the German counter-attacks which followed the battle of Neuve Chapelle, bringing not only infantry and machine-guns but also some of their heaviest artillery into action against the enemy. In the middle of March there was considerable activity along the whole of the French line. While the British were engaged at St. Eloi, the troops of General Foch prosecuted their advance towards Notre Dame de Lorette, north of Arras, took a spur there by storm, seized several trenches, and pursued the enemy in the direction of Ablain. Other trenches were taken near Roclincourt, on the road to Lille. The enemy was also repulsed on the Aisne and in the Argonne, our allies making yet more progress in Champagne, and recapturing some positions north-west of Pont-à-Mousson, on the Lorraine front. The unfortunate city of Rheims was now once more bombarded, and this could not be prevented, but to the north of Verdun some gratifying success was achieved in the woods of Consenvoye, a small locality but one of strategical importance, for if the stretch of country between Consenvoye and Dun-sur-Meuse is one of the most vulnerable points of the French north-eastern frontier, it also gives access to the so-called "Gap of Treves", by which the French, operating from their own territory, might the most easily invade Rhenish Prussia. That, however, was not possible at the stage which the Great War had now reached, for the strong forces which, nominally at all events, were commanded by the German Crown Prince zealously guarded the entry to the Prussian dominions,

The North Sea End of the Allies' Line: Belgian Officers reconnoitring on the Sand Dunes

General Maunoury, seriously wounded
(From a photograph by H. Manuel, Paris)

and (whatever the future might have in reserve) the French were not in a position to force a passage. Moreover, General Joffre's plans did not then include any project for an energetic advance. Their one object was still to keep the enemy busy along the whole line, and thereby prevent him from reinforcing his troops in Russian Poland and Galicia.

After the French had stormed a spur south of Notre Dame de Lorette, on March 15, the Germans made repeated efforts to regain it, and on the 20th they certainly recaptured some lost trenches. They renewed their attempts on the 21st and again on the night of the 23rd, but suffered a complete defeat. It was not, however, until the latter part of May that our allies made themselves fully masters of the important Lorette positions. In the Argonne there was incessant sapping and mining warfare during March, interspersed with furious hand-to-hand encounters between small detachments. Nevertheless President Poincaré, after inspecting the lines in Champagne on March 28, next visited the Argonne, and congratulated the troops there on the energy they displayed. During this trip, on which the President was accompanied by General Duparge and Colonel Salignac de Fénelon, two German shrapnel shells burst within 30 feet of the motor-car in which he was travelling. The vehicle was slightly damaged, but luckily none of its occupants received any injury. On the other hand, it was precisely at this time that General von Kluck, who commanded the German lines in the Argonne, was wounded by a French shrapnel bullet while inspecting his positions.

More serious were the injuries incurred a couple of weeks previously by two of the principal French commanders. General Maunoury, Kluck's opponent, who had contributed so powerfully to the victory of the Marne, lost an eye and had his jawbone broken while he was visiting some trenches; and his subordinate, General de Villaret, previously in charge of the French military mission in Greece, was also at the same time seriously wounded. Maunoury's command of the Sixth French Army passed, in consequence of this affair, to General Dubois, who had been hitherto at the head of a large reserve force in central France.

Towards the end of the month

Photographic Service of the French Army

Forest Fighting in the Argonne: Firing one of the 270 heavy French guns

there was no little activity on the more eastern French lines. At Vauquois, between Verdun and Varennes, they were somewhat drawn back, owing to the German fiendishness in spraying our allies with inflammable liquids. At Les Éparges, however—among the heights east of the Meuse, and overlooking the clayey Woëvre plain—the advance made in February was increased. Between March 18 and 20 there was some hard fighting in this direction, and a Bavarian corps opposed to the French was severely handled. At Marcheville, also east of the Meuse, but nearer to Saint Mihiel, our allies at one moment carried a line some 300 yards in length, but had to abandon part of it when the enemy counter-attacked in force, well realizing as he did that any further French success at this point might cut him off from his base at Metz.

Lower down the Lorraine front and going towards the Vosges there had been little change in the respective positions since the French recovered Lunéville early in the war. Between Celles and Senones our allies had regained some positions temporarily wrested from them by violent German attacks; but more southward, near the Schlucht Pass and Münster, they had drawn back their advanced posts at the beginning of the year, in consequence chiefly of the heavy snowstorms and the difficulty of maintain-

ing communications. The snow had now melted, but it had left the ground so soaked that all military operations were extremely difficult in this region. A dozen oxen had to be employed to drag even one "seventy-five" along the roads, which were often little better than morasses. Nevertheless, both sides had accomplished a deal of engineering work during the winter months. Where trenches were impracticable, trees had been felled to serve as barricades, rocks also had been blasted, and tunnels driven through the hill-sides. As the weather improved, fighting was resumed, raging, for instance, round the little village of Stossweier in the Münster valley, and at other points becoming a fierce contest for the possession of such heights as the Reichsacker and Hartmannsweiler peaks. The altitude of the loftiest of the Vosges Mountains, the Ballon de Guebwiller, is less than a third of the altitude of Mont Blanc, but with the many acclivities crowding closely together, and for the most part densely wooded, the region offers serious difficulties for campaigning. The French forces consisted mainly of artillery (including numerous mountain guns carried by mules) and several battalions of the picked infantry known as the Alpine Chasseurs. Reference has been made to these men in previous chapters. It may be added here that the corps was first organized some thirty years ago, after Italy had joined the Triple Alliance, and for the express purpose of defending the Alpine passes against any Italian invasion. Italy, however, having declared her neutrality at the outset of the Great War, it became possible for the French to utilize this corps elsewhere. The Alpine Chasseurs are recruited throughout the mountainous regions stretching from the Lake of Geneva to the old county of Nice.

Their chief feat at the end of March, 1915, was the recapture of the abrupt Hartmannsweiler peak, which is the last height of any consequence among the spurs which the Vosges mountains throw out in the direction of Mülhausen. The altitude is rather more than 3000 feet. The position had been lost in January, when a small party of Chasseurs was surprised there by a superior German force and over-

Photographic Service of the French Army

Entrance to a Sap along the French Front

The mine subsequently exploded in this sap killed a great number of Germans

whelmed. To the enemy the height was of considerable value. It could be held against attacks directed from the rest of the group of hills in the vicinity, and it barred any advance of the French into the plains of Upper Alsace. The Germans strengthened the position in a wonderful manner, hoisting cannon, mortars, machine-guns, and ammunition to the very summit by means of iron cables.

As already indicated, the hill-sides are abrupt. Nevertheless the French attacked them with pick and shovel, and although they were repeatedly repulsed during the earlier stages of this difficult siege they would not be denied, but renewed their efforts after each reverse. At last, on March 22, they captured a first line of German trenches, stuck to it stubbornly, and then took a second line. Late on the 25th some of the Chasseurs, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Tissot (one of the writer's brothers-in-law) rushed the summit, but had to retire after a fierce encounter in the darkness. In the morning, however, when the fighting was resumed, the Germans were completely defeated. They left 700 dead on the slopes and the summit of the height, and, from first to last, some 500 of them, including several officers, surrendered to the French, who also took a number of wounded, as well as the artillery, munitions, and other material which the enemy abandoned. The Germans afterwards clung to a south-eastern slope and attempted to retrieve their loss, but the French remained on the height and refortified it. It gave them command of four roads leading to northern Alsace and of about 8 miles of railway line on which the Germans had relied for their communications. In fact, all the German positions over more than half the way to Mülhausen (only 16 miles distant) were endangered. The enemy's discomfiture was for a time increased by some floods which occurred early in April. The Rivers Ill and Larg were the first to overflow, and the Thur, the Lauch, and the Doller soon afterwards quitted their beds. The German trenches on the lower ground were then rendered useless, and the enemy made frantic efforts to seize other hills, such as the Hirzenstein, which is, however, only half the height of the Hartmannsweiler crest, so that the French dominated and cannonaded it freely. There were various fluctuations in the subsequent fighting, but on the whole the advantage rested with our allies. A crest where the Germans had established their head-quarters was taken by the French, whose prisoners on this occasion included 150 men of the Prussian Guard reserve. At the end of April the enemy lost the Sillacker, Altmann, and Schnepfenrieth crests, and on May 8 the French moved forward as if for decisive action against Münster. But their offensive encountered a strong resistance and stopped halfway. The village of Steinabrück was now recaptured by the Germans, who, not content with this success, gave out that they had also gained a great victory at Altkirch, though no fighting at all had occurred there. Late in May, though the enemy still had some outposts on and near the Hartmannsweiler hill, he experienced great diffi-

culty in keeping in contact with them, for the roads were covered by the fire of numerous French batteries. At this period, indeed, the contest on the Alsatian front resolved itself into interminable artillery duels.

There was some activity in the Aisne, Somme, and Argonne regions early in April, but the most important operations of the French that month were directed against the great German salient projecting west and south of the Woëvre district as far as Saint Mihiel. The enemy had reached that town early in the war, and after seizing the hills on the right bank of the Meuse had crossed the river and formed a bridge-head on its left bank in the outskirts of Chauvoncourt. Various attempts were made to dislodge him by direct attacks delivered from the so-called Roman camp, the wood of Ailly, and the forest of Apremont. These efforts were not successful, however, for the German positions on the wooded heights rising some 1300 feet above the right bank of the Meuse were extremely strong. The French attempts, as described in an earlier chapter, were then directed towards piercing the German lines on other points, so as to compel a withdrawal of his salient. The weather remained extremely bad. Persistent

Photographic Service of the French Army

Where Familiarity Breeds Contempt: French children playing among the ruins of Mont Saint Eloi, within range of the enemy's guns

rain soaked the clayey soil of the Woëvre to a great depth, thereby impeding artillery movements and even preventing shells from exploding. Nevertheless the French advance continued, the village of Fromezey, near Étain, was taken, and steady progress was made from Les Éparges towards

Photographic Service of the French Army

The ruined Church of Mont Saint Eloi

Mont Saint Eloi suffered heavily in the fighting south-west of Lens. The photograph shows the battered church towers—tall, familiar landmarks of eighteenth-century workmanship.

Combres, where the Germans were strongly posted on a plateau. Hereabouts the French found 1000 of the enemy's dead, who had fallen between the 4th and the 8th April, on which latter day some 2 miles had been gained on the particular front (one of 14 or 15 miles) with which we have been dealing. On April 9 there was a farther advance beyond Les Éparges, which was now completely in the possession of our allies, who, while remodelling some 1500 yards of captured trenches in order that the parapets might face the east, repulsed all the enemy's desperate offensives. It may be added that the French found the trenches in question full of German dead and wounded. The enemy's losses at and near Les Éparges during the eight previous weeks were estimated at no less than 30,000 men. During the latter part of April the Germans repeatedly attempted to regain their lost ground in this direction but were invariably checked.

More eastward our allies' offensive was as vigorous as at Les Éparges, the two villages of Regnieville and Fey-en-Haye being captured, and the French lines advancing a distance of 2 miles, while all the German attacks to outflank them, by way of Bois le Prêtre, were vigorously beaten back. The enemy's salient was thus seriously threatened, and had the French been able to reach the railway junction of Thiaucourt—one of the chief links between Metz and Saint Mihiel—the enemy would have found himself in jeopardy. But both the weather and the superior strength of the enemy prevented decisive operations, and the French now had to rest content with gaining some more trenches here and there, and consolidating each newly-acquired position.

While all this fighting was in progress, General von Kluck attempted an advance in north-eastern Champagne, that is on the Perthes-Beauséjour front, but was very vigorously repulsed. Notable operations had previously begun at another point of

the rival lines, being concerted by General Joffre and Sir John French in the hope of bringing about a change in the position in north-western France, that is to say, both north and south of La Bassée, where the Germans still barred the road to Lille. La Bassée, moreover, covered the enemy's line of communications with the Oise and the Aisne. Towards the middle of April the Germans attacked the French at Albert, south of Arras, but were defeated, and a few days later the French, profiting by the British victory at Neuve Chapelle, moved once more towards the strongly-fortified position of Notre Dame de Lorette, south-west of Lens, and carried some acclivities in the vicinity. Extremely violent counter-attacks were delivered by the enemy, but although the French were unable at the time to make any farther progress they retained their gains. The Germans, moreover, soon had their hands full on the Ypres front, where a long battle began on April 20. It was still raging when on May 9 a vigorous French offensive resulted in the capture of a strongly-fortified position between Loos and Vermelles, north-west of Lens, while on the south-west of that town the fortified works of Notre Dame de Lorette, which had so long resisted our allies, were at last taken. German reinforcements were rushed up from Ablain (still more to the south-west) but were driven back, and the French took the offensive, threatened both Souchez and Carency, and wrested the fortified cemetery of Neuville Saint Vaast from the Germans. On the same night,



Map to illustrate the French effort west of Lens, March–May, 1915

Carency, though defended by three battalions of infantry and six companies of pioneers, was also captured together with the northern side of the wooded hill numbered 125. The Germans knew the value of this position and had done their utmost to strengthen it, installing a large number of machine-guns in their well-prepared concreted trenches. The fighting, it should be said, lasted all through the night, and only at dawn was the German resistance broken. The French bayoneted hundreds of their opponents during this fierce contest, and took on this point alone more than a thousand prisoners, including thirty officers. Along the whole front from Loos to the Neuville cemetery the number of prisoners captured in these operations exceeded 3400, and 12 cannon and 60 machine-guns also fell into the hands of the French.

Heavy rain and thick mist supervened, preventing one from seeing a greater distance than 100 yards, and thus impeding a further offensive. The Germans profited by this respite to strengthen their defensive works at Farbus, Vimy, and Lens. Farther south the weather had now improved, and the French finally completed their conquest of the Lorette spurs, notably one on the south side of the position, where the Germans had some field-works stretching across the so-called White Road in the direction of Ablain. Most of that village was also taken by our allies, only the eastern part remaining for a day or two in the enemy's possession. Besides many additional prisoners this operation resulted in the capture of numerous mortars and machine-guns.

A diary subsequently found on a certain Captain Sievert, commanding an infantry battalion which had orders to defend a part of the German lines running from Ablain to Souchez, showed how hard-pressed the enemy was both for men and for munitions during the latter part of the fighting which has just been described. In order to hold his positions, which were important, this officer disposed of only 280 men, and it was in vain that he appealed for reinforcements, hand-grenades, flare-pistols, sand-bags, and other things. The commander of his division was too hard pressed himself to send his subordinate the slightest help, and Captain Sievert was abandoned to his own resources. Many of his men deserted him, and only a handful remained when he fell, fighting, on May 20.

The somewhat desultory fighting of the earlier months of the year had now become, on the French side at all events, much more methodical. There was still no really great effort to advance, but the German lines had been tested from end to end for the purpose of ascertaining what might be their weaker spots, and the French efforts were steadily being concentrated on four distinct points—Alsace, the Woëvre, the Champagne-Argonne country, and the Arras-Lens region. In the last-named direction events of considerable importance were now impending. E. A. V.

CHAPTER VII

THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA

(January–June, 1915)

Misleading the Arab Tribes—Guarding the British Oil Pipe—Preparing for Eventualities—Lord Hardinge at the Front—Two Fights against Odds—Some Minor Engagements—Combined Turkish Attack on Kurnah, Ahwaz, and Shaiba—The Three Days' Battle at Shaiba—Magnificent British Charges—Enemy's Total Rout—King George's Congratulations—River Warfare—British Advance up the Tigris—Capture of Amara—Lord Hardinge and the Garden of Eden.

THOUGH the Turks and Germans preached to deaf ears when they called for a Holy War among the Mohammedans of the British Empire, they met with a certain measure of success among the Arab tribes of Mesopotamia. We have already shown how the head of the Persian Gulf was seized by Britain at the beginning of the war, and how the expeditionary force from India—a force which included the 2nd Norfolks, the 2nd Dorsets, the 1st Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, and three batteries of the Royal Field Artillery—advancing up the Shatt-el-Arab, captured first Basra and then Kurnah, at the confluence of the Euphrates and the Tigris, before the end of 1914.[1] Contrary to many anticipations, it was decided, for the time being, to limit the operations to this advance into Turkish territory, awaiting reinforcements before attempting to proceed farther in the direction of Bagdad. The chief immediate object was to guard the long pipe line of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which the British Admiralty had acquired a predominant interest. This pipe line, 150 miles long, started some 30 miles east of Shuster and ran by way of Ahwaz to the company's refineries at Abadan, on the Shatt-el-Arab, skirting along most of the route a sort of no man's land to the Turkish frontier. With the increasing use of oil fuel in the Royal Navy it was necessary, notwithstanding the immense reserves stored in the United Kingdom, to protect these supplies from probable attack. A British garrison was accordingly sent to Ahwaz, which, though in Persian territory, was governed by the semi-independent Arab Sheikh of Mohammerah, who had always been on special terms of friendship with Britain.

January, 1915, passed without any decisive fighting, though a force of some 5000 Turks, with six guns, having taken up a threatening position near the Mezera camp, on the opposite side of the Tigris to Kurnah, was attacked by a reconnaissance in force and scattered, with fifty casualties on the British side. The Government, as Lord Crewe said in the House of Lords on April 8, 1915, had never been under any illusion as to the probability that the Turks might bring forces of very considerable magnitude to the scene of operations in Meso-

[1] Vol. I, pp. 220–3, 331–2.

potamia. It was true that they had sent many regiments to the Caucasus, where the Russians had soundly beaten them at the beginning of 1915, and to the Suez Canal, where, a month later, they sustained a heavy reverse at the hands of the British, Indians, and Egyptians, but after allowing for these

Lord Hardinge, Viceroy of India
(From a photograph by A. Jenkins, Simla)

troops, and others concentrated about Constantinople and the Dardanelles, it was estimated that from the whole Turkish army a considerable balance was left over at this period for Persian operations. Sooner or later, therefore, an attack in force was anticipated upon our troops in Mesopotamia, and steps were taken to strengthen their position by dispatching reinforcements from India and Egypt. Lord Hardinge, Viceroy of India, the Government of which, under his direction, had charge of the operations, had paid a visit to the front in January and examined the situation for himself at the most advanced outposts. Words are inadequate to express the Empire's indebtedness to India for her unstinted help in this field, as in so many other theatres of war.

"It was no light matter for India", to quote from Lord Crewe's speech in announcing her additional assistance in April, "to send so fine and considerable a force to Europe, to send a force for the defence of Egypt, to send a force to aid as a garrison in East Africa, and in addition to send this large Army Corps, as it now was, to the Persian Gulf."

That their help was sorely needed in Mesopotamia was demonstrated more than a month before this statement was made. Though many of the Arabs expressed themselves as thoroughly dissatisfied with their treatment at the hands of the Turks, it was known that some of the tribes had thrown in their lot with the enemy, having had it dinned into their ears that Islam was being attacked, and having no one to contradict the amazing fables circulated by the Turks and their allies—that the Kaiser had been converted to the Faithful and was now swearing by the beard of the Prophet, and so forth. Little surprise was expressed, therefore, when word reached the British camp in February that several regiments of Turkish troops, together with a force of disaffected tribesmen hostile to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, were collecting west of Ahwaz, obviously with a view to attacking either the garrison there or

the British oil supplies. On March 3 a reconnaissance in force was dispatched from Ahwaz in order to ascertain their numbers and disposition. The enemy, located at Ghadir, had been further reinforced the previous day, and now turned out in immensely superior strength, estimated at 12,000, officer killed and five wounded. Of the Indian rank and file—for the troops concerned were chiefly Indian—55 were killed and 115 wounded. Several casualties also took place in the British rank and file. Serious though these losses were, those of the enemy were heavier still, the first reports received

Fighting the Turks in Mesopotamia: Indian Troops firing from the Trenches

to cut off the reconnoitring-party, which consequently had to fight its way back against heavy odds. Repeated efforts were made by the enemy to cut off the British force, but in the several hand-to-hand encounters which took place the attackers were successfully held at bay while our troops made good their retreat. Many fell in the desperate fighting before Ahwaz was reached, including five British officers killed—all of the 4th and 7th Rajputs—and three wounded, and one Indian estimating the number of casualties at from 200 to 300 killed, and from 500 to 600 wounded. A revised estimate put the number of killed at 600. The fact that all further activity on the Turkish side was stopped for a time also proved that the enemy had received a wholesome lesson.

A cavalry reconnaissance on the same date was also made in the direction of Nakhailah, about 25 miles north-west of Basra. On the return journey the reconnoitrers were fol-

lowed up by a large body of some 1500 hostile horsemen, who were cleverly drawn on to a concealed position occupied by our infantry with machine-guns and field-artillery. Thereupon the enemy fled back to Nakhailah, after suffering heavily. Our own losses were not numerous, but they included four British officers killed and two wounded—all of the 21st and 33rd Cavalry. Two Indian officers were also killed, and four of the rank and file.

After these two fights against odds, no action of any considerable importance took place in Mesopotamia for several weeks, both sides strengthening their positions with considerable reinforcements. Affairs of outposts and punitive attacks against treacherous villagers were occasionally reported. One typical affair of the kind was described in a letter from a medical officer serving with the expedition, quoted in the *Times*. A cavalry patrol having been fired at by some Arabs, a small force was detached to make a night march and attack them at dawn. The doctor, who accompanied the party, described how they crept along silently in the pitch dark across the desert for about 20 miles, marching from 7 p.m. till 4 a.m., until they reached the appointed place.

"The cavalry patrol", he continued, "went off and found no one, so we pushed on to another place 7 miles farther, and there we found a village and fort. Immediately we appeared they hoisted the white flag. The cavalry went nearer, and a few yards off, despite the white flag of surrender, they were fired upon at close range with rifles. The cavalry charged with swords, then retired to make room for us to put a few shells into them, as they were entrenched, which we did; after the third shell the whole village and fort ran like hares away across the desert. We were too tired to pursue, so went into the place and found 40,000 rounds of ammunition, which we blew up, and 20 rifles thrown down. We set fire to a lot of the chief man's houses and blew up his fort with gun-cotton. Our casualties were only one man slightly wounded and one horse shot in the stomach, they were such rotten shots, but two or three fellows had narrow escapes, and one officer had his water-bottle shot off. Yussuf, the head of this tribe, came back afterwards with a white flag to our C.O. and said he was friendly to the British and could not make out why we had destroyed his place! This in spite of his firing on us! He has promised to be friendly now, so was let go."

The following month of April, 1915, showed that though the pipe line of the British oil-supply had been successfully defended, the menace was far from being finally removed. Having been reinforced until his strength all told numbered between 20,000 and 30,000 men, the enemy at length resumed his activity by a combined attack on our positions at Kurnah, Ahwaz, and Shaiba. It was well for the British that the defending forces had been strengthened by the additional troops from India, for the enemy, as Lord Crewe testified in the House of Lords, proved to be well-trained, thoroughly understanding the art of entrenchment, and bearing himself with great determination in battle.

Having concentrated at Nakhailah for the combined attack, the enemy, with a force which included 16,000 regular infantry and 1000 regular cavalry, and 28 guns, together with some 12,000 Kurds and Arabs—the

BLACK SEA
CASPIAN SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Persian Gulf
CONSTANTINOPLE
Bosporus
Sinope
TIFLIS
Batum
Trebizond
Rize
Erzerum
Erzingan
Sivas
Angora
Amasia
Tokat
Kastamuni
Scutari
S. of Marmara
Ismid
Brusa
Eskishehr
Kutayah
Afiun Karahissar
Konia
Iconium
Adalia
Gulf of Adalia
Rhodes
Cyprus
Latakia
Antioch
Aleppo
Mosul
Kirkuk
Sulaimaniyah
Kermanshah
Hamadan
Tabriz
Urumiyah
Lake Urumiyah
Kazvin
Gerus
Sinna
Ardelau
Zohab
Burujird
Khorramabad
Isfahan
Shushtar
Dizful
Susa
Ahwaz
Amara
Basra
Fao
Koweit or Grane
Bushire
Abushehr
Baghdad
Hit
Ramadi
Babylon
Hillah
Kerbela
Najef
Nejef
Nassiriyeh
Lamlun
Samawah
Shamiya
Kut el Amara
Bender Kir
Karun
Hawizah L.
Felej
Mulah
Kubba I.
Legait
Hamadan
Kum
Kashan
Sultanabad
Mahallat
Khonsar
Kuhrud
Kathena
Murchehar
Khurgan
Kala Kuh
Dizful
Shuster
Dehdiz
Ahwaz
Bend i Kir
Karun
Ahwaz
Hawizah
Hamah
Homs
Tripoli
Beirut
Damascus
Jerusalem
Jaffa
Gaza
Hebron
Dead Sea
Jordan
Alexandria
Port Said
Suez
Cairo
Memphis
Gizeh
Heliopolis
Lake Menzaleh
Damietta
Rosetta
Delta of the Nile
Wadi el Arish
Desert of Tih
Sinai
Gebel Tih
Medinet el Fayyum
Beni Suef
Syrian Desert
Hammada (El Hamed)
Euphrates
Tigris
Shatt el Arab
Mesopotamia
Kurdistan
Azer-baijan
Irak Arabi
Irak Ajemi
Luristan
Arabistan
Bakhtiari
Daffir
Abalessran
Jeb. Misma
Jeb. Hamra
Kaf.
Etzery
Petra
Maan
Akabah
Gulf of Akabah
Jensimal
Ashahah
El Asak
Washrah
Gal Wahsa
Mahmigeh
Gulf of Basin
Tell el Fara
Shefarat
El Akabah
El Hakl
El Nakl
El Kantara
Ismailia
Lake Timsah
Port Said
Damietta
Menzaleh
Rosetta
Abukir
Alexandria
Aboukir
Der Macarius
Memphis
Gizeh
Heliopolis
Suez
Cairo
Hebron
Dead Sea
Jordan
Gaza
Jaffa
Caesarea
Nablus
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Hebron
Beersheba
Wadi el Arish
Desert of Tih
Sinai
Gebel Tih
Medinet el Fayyum
Beni Suef
Rayan
Antinoe
St Paulus
Tripoli
Batrun
Beirut
Sidon
Saida
Tyre
Acre
Haifa
Caesarea
Nablus
Jaffa
Lydda
Bethlehem
Hebron
Dead Sea
Jordan
Gaza
Kaf.
Etzery
Jeb. Misma
Jeb. Hamra

whole under the command of Suliman Askeri and Ali Bey, with 12 German State officers and a number of German gunners—opened operations with an ineffective bombardment of Kurnah on the afternoon of April 11, reserving his most determined action for Shaiba on the following day. This engagement began on the 12th at 5 a.m. in the orthodox fashion of the European front, the infantry pressing their attack under cover of the fiercest fire its artillery could bring to bear on the position, and entrenching themselves as soon as the artillery-fire slackened. The morning attack on Shaiba, which lasted three hours, was utterly repulsed, and another attempt in the afternoon was no more successful; but during the night the enemy

Map illustrating
the Operations in the Persian Gulf
showing the British oil pipe guarded against the Turkish attacks and the advance up the Tigris to Amara, January - June 1915.

continued sniping into our lines, varying the annoyance by bursts of heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. Early on the 13th, a cavalry reconnaissance having discovered that the Turks had seized some houses and rising ground about a mile beyond our northern defences, the General Officer Commanding decided to assume the offensive. In this he was completely successful, clearing the enemy out of the positions he had occupied, not only in the north but also in the west. Our cavalry charged magnificently, one charge being described by an officer present as "second only to Balaclava".

Ruins of the Village of Mezera, the scene of the Turkish Camp on the opposite side of the Tigris to Kurnah

The district presented an extraordinary appearance after its evacuation by the Turks, broken earthenware water-tanks and jars of all shapes littering the plain.

Continuing the offensive the next morning, our troops drove the Turks out of their advanced position on a mound 2½ miles south-east of the British camp, and then pushed on to their main line near the Birjisiyeh Wood. Here the enemy's strength was estimated at at least 15,000, including regular battalions and six guns. Holding a series of trenches so well concealed as to be invisible from 40 yards, as the General Officer Commanding at Shaiba reported from personal observation, the Turks were able to offer a stubborn resistance, and direct a heavy rifle and machine-gun fire on our advancing troops. Thanks, however, to the pluck and dash of all ranks, in which British and Indian regiments fought side by side, the position was finally carried by a splendid charge of the whole line at the point of the bayonet at 4.30 p.m. The retreat of the enemy became a rout, motor-cars, large quantities of tents, equipment, and stores being abandoned, together with 700,000 rounds of rifle and 450 boxes of gun ammunition. In this and the previous days' fighting we also captured over 500 prisoners, as well as several guns and a number of standards. Many more prisoners would have been captured but for the difficult nature of the country.

The Victoria Cross was won at Shaiba by Major George G. M. Wheeler, late Hariana Lancers, Indian army, for repeated gallantry in leading his squadron to the attack. His heroism cost him his life. He was last seen on the 13th far ahead of his men riding single-handed straight for the enemy's standards on the north mound.

Meantime the attacks on Kurnah and Ahwaz had fizzled out. The only damage done at Kurnah, where the attack was chiefly confined to artillery-fire, was the destruction of a portion of the bridge across the Tigris, which was struck by a floating mine. No infantry attack was attempted, but a large number of the enemy in native boats were observed by our troops on the 12th, and furnished an excellent target for the guns both on shore and on His Majesty's ship *Odin*. The attack on Ahwaz was of a similar character, confined entirely to artillery-fire, and continuing throughout the 12th. Considerable bodies of cavalry showed themselves to the north-west and south of the camp, but did not attempt to approach within range, evidently awaiting the outcome of the crucial attack on Shaiba. With the stampede of their main army on the 14th all Turkish troops in the district fled to the north-west, molested in their flight by turncoat Arab tribesmen, between whom and their overbearing allies there had been no little dissatisfaction and dissension.

General Sir John Nixon, commanding the Military Operations in Mesopotamia
(From a photograph by Vandyk)

The victory was not won without considerable losses on our side, the total casualties numbering about 700 all ranks, including a long list of British officers. "The Dorsets and the Norfolks were splendid," wrote a British officer present in a letter published in the *Times*, "and the native infantry did wonderful work—not a man hung back." The 2nd Dorsets were the principal sufferers, as in the earlier fighting before Basra, when their gallantry cost them 130 casualties, including Major Mercer, who was with them at Dargai, and two other officers killed. At Shaiba they lost no fewer than eleven of their officers, including Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. Rosher, who was killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel B. St. John Clarkson, wounded. The 2nd Norfolks, with eight of their officers killed or wounded, and the Royal Garrison Artillery, with three, including Major E. E. Edlmann, D.S.O., who died of wounds, also suffered severely. The losses in the Indian army were equally heavy, more than thirty British officers falling with the native troops, among them being Lieutenant-Colonel T. X. Britten, 110th Mahratta Infantry, who died of wounds, and Lieutenant-Colonel S. H. Climo, D.S.O., 24th Punjabis, who was wounded. Six other officers of

the 24th Punjabis were killed or wounded in the same operations.

The total British losses, however, were small by comparison with the enemy casualties, which, from the 12th to the 15th April were estimated at not less than 6000. No effort was spared to make the defeat as complete as possible. The operations which, to paraphrase the words of Lord Crewe in his official statement in the House of Lords at the time, reflected great credit on the Commander-in-Chief and all the officers and men engaged, were largely of an amphibious character. Much of the country throughout this region was flooded, and as there were numerous water-channels on which small armed craft could be moved it was possible to institute something in the nature of a naval blockade with gunboats and armed rafts in conjunction with the military operations. Sir John Nixon, who had succeeded to the command, extended this phase of the pursuit as far as a place called Ghubbashiyaah, beyond which, however, it was found impossible to follow the enemy by water. Ghubbashiyaah itself was deserted, though some groups of soldiery in the neighbourhood were seen by the blockading-force and fired on. On the 17th our advanced cavalry occupied Nakhailah, the enemy having completely abandoned it, though the position had previously been strongly entrenched. Everywhere the Turks were still in disorganized retreat, both by road and river. Within a few days it was officially stated that they had all been driven north of Khamsieh, which is more than 90 miles from Basra. For these sweeping successes General Sir John Nixon received the following message from the King:—

"I wish to express my admiration for the gallant manner in which the naval and military forces co-operating under your command have so successfully overcome the repeated attacks of an enemy superior in numbers. Please convey to all ranks my appreciation of the spirit and endurance they have shown during the past month. At home we all watch with pride and interest the work and progress of your column."

The Turkish offensive on the Euphrates line having been pushed back thus thoroughly, the British and Indian troops next turned their attention to the other two enemy columns on the Tigris and Karun, the latter of which had been threatening Ahwaz and the pipe line of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The enemy's chief camp having been located at Illah on the Kharkheh, our troops advanced against it in force. Unfortunately a rapid rise of this river and a series of severe sandstorms delayed their movements, and before the attack could be delivered the enemy succeeded in making good his retirement towards Amara, pursued by General Gorringe's column. All Persian territory in Arabistan, however, was thus evacuated by the Turks, and it only remained to ensure the safety of the oil-supplies by punishing the local tribes which had been assisting them. Those tribes which offered any resistance were soon overcome, and the rest quickly sued for terms, these taking the form of fines and the surrender of a certain number of rifles. Several strongholds

FROM A PHOTOGRAPH

BY HENRI MANUEL, PARIS

General Joffre

Commander-in-Chief of the French Army.

of the more refractory Arabs were destroyed, together with a good deal of their property.

There now remained to be dealt with only the enemy column on the Tigris. This had taken up its advance position 2 miles north of Kurnah, where a surprise attack by a

Colonel Sir Percy Cox, British Resident and Consul General in the Persian Gulf
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

combined naval and military force was organized against it in the early hours of May 31. Starting at 1.30 a.m., our troops, partly by wading and partly by boats, skilfully executed a turning movement, and in opening the attack soon silenced the enemy's guns with British artillery, the excellent practice made by the naval guns and by a Territorial battery being specially mentioned. By noon the heights held by the Turks were seized, and the enemy fled in disorder, leaving in our hands three 16-pounder guns, complete with ammunition, and nearly 250 prisoners. On the following day the small gunboat flotilla continued the advance, after exploding a number of heavily-charged mines which had been discovered in the river-bed and on land. The discomfited enemy was in no further mood for fighting. The pursuers found his camps at Barhan and Rutta, farther up the Tigris, so hastily evacuated that some of his tents had been left standing. Presently he was observed in full flight in steamers and native boats. All day the naval flotilla continued in hot pursuit, and when daylight fell continued the chase by moonlight. The Turkish steamer *Bulbul* was overtaken and sunk, and the numerous captures included two large lighters — one containing three field-guns, ammunition, and mines, as well as several native craft and some 300 prisoners. Our own casualties only amounted to about twenty all told. That evening the pursuers reached a point 5 miles to the north of Ezra's Tomb and some 33 miles north of Kurnah. All next day the advance continued in the direction of Amara, a military centre of some importance on the Tigris, where that river is joined by the El-Hud, which is crossed by a bridge of boats. On June 3 Amara was occupied without opposition, General Townshend, accompanied by Captain Nunn, R.N., and Colonel Sir Percy Cox — for many years British Resident and Consul-General in the Persian Gulf—with a force which, arriving in the gunboat

Comet and some small launches, was quite insignificant, receiving the surrender of the entire garrison, numbering over 1000, including the Turkish Civil Governor of the town, Halim Bey, the commandant of the column recently opposing the British at Kurnah, and Saif Ullah, commandant of the two fire-brigade battalions. Nothing showed the complete demoralization of the enemy as a result of the operations in Mesopotamia more strikingly than this humiliating surrender. No resistance was offered anywhere, the total captures between May 31 and June 7 including about 80 officers, 2000 men, seven field-guns, six naval guns on the Turkish gunboat *Marmariss* — the gunboat herself being sunk — one transport, three small steamers, and twelve large steel barges. Of six Germans serving with the Turks three were made prisoners, two were killed by Arabs, and the fate of the sixth was unknown.

As it happened, Amara fell just before the arrival of the Turkish forces retiring before General Gorringe's column, which, as already mentioned, was pursuing the enemy in his retreat from Persian territory. The advanced guard entered the town and was promptly captured. The remainder of the force, estimated at about 2000, leaving a heavy gun in our hands, took flight in disorder in the great marshes of the Tigris, where pursuit was impossible.

Thus our gallant little army in Mesopotamia had proved itself not only strong enough to make its strength felt in defence, but also, when necessary, in pursuit. The significant fact about the occupation of Amara was that it had brought the British 150 miles from the Persian Gulf, and therefore nearly half-way to Bagdad. This was part of Britain's answer to the Kaiser's threat to drive a German wedge to the Persian Gulf. The rest of the answer was being simultaneously delivered with sledge-hammer blows on the Gallipoli Peninsula, where Australians, New Zealanders, and Indians were helping the Allies to drive a wedge through the Kaiser's pathway at the other end of Asiatic Turkey.

During his visit to Basra Lord Hardinge received an address of welcome from the inhabitants, who also expressed the hope that the British would remain in permanent occupation of the district. The Viceroy pointed out, however, that though he had come to see local conditions for himself in order the better to judge what measures were necessary, Britain was not engaged single-handed in that great struggle, and that no plans could be laid down for the future without a full exchange of views with other Powers; but that he could hold out the assurance that the future would bring them a more benignant rule. On his return to India Lord Hardinge said that the Province of Basra, which had suffered greatly under the Turkish regime, struck him as one of immense potentialities.

"At a small expense", he declared, "the city of Basra might become a splendid port and a port of exit for all the trade of Mesopotamia and northern Persia. Only the fringes of Shatt-el-Arab have so far been cultivated, but the soil is extremely fertile,

and only most elementary schemes of irrigation are required to extend indefinitely the area under cultivation. The climate is splendid and resembles that of the northern Punjab. I cannot conceive a country more suitable for immigration, and in the future, when a more stable form of Government has been established, that country may really become a Garden of Eden and blossom like the rose."

Carrying the Great World War to "The Garden of Eden": in the Camp Kitchen of the British Expeditionary Force at Kurnah

According to the Arabs, the actual site of the Garden of Eden is Kurnah, though Sir William Willcocks, who began a great work of irrigation in Mesopotamia some years before the war, locates it much farther inland, on the Euphrates, north-west of Bagdad. In any case, the whole of the occupied region belonged to the dawn of history—the Chaldea of the Bible—and under more enlightened rule could once more become the garden of Asia instead of the howling wilderness into which most of it had degenerated under Turkish misrule. F. A. M.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NAVY IN THE DARDANELLES—SECOND PHASE

An Interval of Pause—The Navy and the Transport of Armies—The Attack on the *Manitou*—The Loss of the E 15—A Brilliant "Cutting Out"—Landing of the Army—The Story of the S.S. *Clyde*—The German Submarines—Loss of the *Goliath*, *Triumph*, *Majestic*, and A.E 2—The Counter-blows of E 14 and E 11.

A LONG pause followed the unsuccessful naval attacks on the Turkish fortifications at the Narrows of the Dardanelles in March, 1915. It need not be assumed that these operations demonstrated the incapacity of the Allied Fleet to force the passage. If it had been prepared to pay a very heavy price for the victory, the feat might possibly have been performed; but it would have been barren of results which would have justified the sacrifice. Had the condition been such that the appearance of the war-ships of the Allies before Constantinople could have been trusted to bring the Turkish Government to submission, the venture might have been tried; but there was no likelihood that the desperate men who had committed their country to a struggle which threatens its existence would have capitulated. They could and almost certainly would have transferred their puppet, the Sultan, and the head-quarters of their Government to some place beyond the reach of naval guns. A bombardment of Constantinople would not only have been an act of ferocity as bad as any of the German excesses, but it would have been useless. Enver Pasha and his like would not have been intimidated by the slaughter of any number of the Greeks and Armenians who fill the city, nor the burning of their houses. The war-ships must have remained idle on the Sea of Marmora. In the meantime the Turks, aided by German officers, would have been busy repairing and improving the defence of the Dardanelles. Sooner or later the Allied Fleet must have paid another heavy price in order to escape from the trap into which it had put itself. We must bear in mind that the chief object of these operations was not to punish the Turkish Government but to open the passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean for the export of Russian produce, which must be placed on the market for the relief of its finances. We had also to consider the effect on neutral States and the possibility of establishing a fresh base of operations against Austria-Hungary. Only an army could make the clearance in the Dardanelles. Whether, since this was the case, there can have been sufficient justification for the preliminary operations which lost to the Allies the British *Irresistible* and *Ocean* and the French *Bouvet*—the last with a huge sacrifice of life—is a question we need not discuss here.

This recapitulation of the situation during the last days of March may

serve to explain why five weeks passed before any other movement belonging to the great operations of war can be reported, if we ought not rather to say that the Allies were engaged in preparatory operations. The army was being collected and transported.

The Turkish Port of Smyrna, bombarded by the Allies

Only the outer defences were attacked in the spring of 1915, and the town was not occupied.

How it was brought together and what it did when it was landed are not the subject of this chapter. Our field is limited by the water's edge. The work of the navy was to make the transportation and to bring troops and stores to the beach.

In nearly all the wars waged by Great Britain, or by England in days before the Union, and in some of those of other nations, it has been a main part of the duty of the seaman to protect the passage and the debarkation of the soldier. The ways in which the service can be performed differ according to time and circumstance. The whole combined force can go in a swarm or convoy, in which the flock of transports is shepherded by the war-ships. It was thus, to take a case which is closely akin to the operations in the Dardanelles, that Lord Keith, then commanding in the Mediterranean, carried Sir Ralph Abercromby and his army from Malta to Marmorice Bay, and thence to Egypt, in 1800. Most transportations of armies have been covered thus, and it is the only safe method when the enemy has the command of a naval force which is not so closely watched in port as to be unable to intercept the transports on their way. When he is so confined the carrying ships can pass and repass behind the fleets and out of sight of them, but none the less under their effectual and indispensable protection. It is a form of work from which the navy draws small chance of distinction, but it is vitally necessary. Upon its due execution depends the army's power to act.

In April, 1915, there was no such

hostile naval force at work as would compel the Allies to take the more rigid form of precaution. The entry to the Dardanelles was in their hands. Though the Turks possessed several excellent bases for naval operations on the western coast of Asia Minor once did the enemy succeed in molesting the movements of the Allied Forces at sea.

On April 17 the Admiralty learnt that the transport *Manitou* had been attacked in the Ægean by a Turkish torpedo-boat, the *Dhair Hissar*.



Sunday with the British Fleet off Gallipoli: Divine Service under the guns of the *Queen Elizabeth*
(From an official photograph)

their mobile resources were of the smallest. It availed them little that Smyrna is a fine port lying in a deep bay with well-fortified approaches, and admirably placed to flank the route to the Dardanelles, when they had nothing to send out for the purpose of assailing passing vessels. The outlying defences of Smyrna were bombarded by the Allies, but the town was not occupied. Once and only

There were seven Germans, formerly members of the crew of the *Goeben*, in the torpedo-boat, but it would seem that none of them can have been in command. The *Manitou*—a vessel of 6849 tons, belonging to the Atlantic Transport Company—was carrying soldiers, and was therefore a ship of war. A German officer, or, for that matter, a British officer engaged in warding off an invasion, would have

lost no time in using his torpedoes. The Turks allowed eight minutes' grace for the escape of the soldiers to the boats. While the transfer was being carried out two of the boats capsized, one in the water, one by the breaking of a davit. Twenty-four men, whose bodies were recovered, were drowned, and twenty-seven were reported missing. But before the eight minutes were over the British cruiser *Minerva* and attendant destroyers appeared, and the torpedo-boat fled. She was chased to Chios, which was in the hands of the Greeks, and beached. The crew were interned. The rather curious weakness of the attack may perhaps be accounted for by the fact that the command was—according to the *Times* correspondent in Chios—divided equally between the German Lieutenant von Fritsch and a Turkish officer, Lieutenant Loufit Bey. The incident illustrates forcibly what the dangers of invasion oversea are when the defenders can strike on the water. The solitary *Dhair Hissar* came near delivering a shrewd blow, and failed chiefly by her own vacillation. Those who feared a German invasion across the North Sea were thus reminded that it would necessarily have to be carried out in the face of hundreds of vessels more formidable by far than the Turkish torpedo-boat, and that they would not give any "law" to the transports.

The adventure and escape of the *Manitou* coincided very closely in time with a dashing feat performed in the Dardanelles. It was of a nature to afford an acceptable proof that the conditions of modern naval warfare still allow of a new version of the "cuttings out" and other boat work which shine in the records of former wars. On the night of April 17 submarine E 15, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Theodore S. Brodie, was engaged in a very difficult reconnaissance of the minefield at Kephez.[1] Kephez Point lies on the Asiatic side at the south limit of Sari Siglar Bay. The northern point is Chanak Kalessi, one of the fortifications of the Narrows. The distance from Kephez to Kum Kale, at the entrance to the Dardanelles on the east side, is some 10 miles. The point was protected by Fort 8, which had previously been bombarded and for a time silenced by the Allied Fleet, but had been restored by the Turks. This defence was supported by other guns. The current of the Dardanelles runs strongly round Kephez, and there is a shoal stretching south from it, parallel with the shore, for a mile. There is nowhere more than 10 feet of water on this bank of mud and sand. Rocks crop through it in two places, and their tops are "awash"—i.e. they just reach the surface. It will be obvious that a submarine—or indeed any vessel drawing more than 10 feet—which had to operate in the dark without the guidance of shore lights (they would naturally be extinguished at the time), and subject to the baffling pressure of the current, might be driven on the shoal, however carefully she was navigated. When a vessel of any size is moving in a current it may be carried bodily to one

[1] The position of Kephez in the Dardanelles will be found on the map facing p. 148.

side, or deflected out of its course, and the navigator may be unable to detect the deviation so as to counteract the pressure of the water. The E 15, a modern boat of 1912, and of 910 tons, was one of the best of her kind, but she was engaged in work which, from its very nature, subjected her to peculiar tests. Lieutenant-Commander Brodie was under an obligation to go into dangerous navigation. The E 15 grounded on the shoal under the fire of the Turkish forts with her turret above water, and in this helpless position her crew had no resource but to blow her up and perish with her or to surrender. In normal course of war the devoted and heroic self-sacrifice entailed by adopting the first course is not to be expected from the bravest of men. The crew of the submarine surrendered, as many men of undoubted valour have done in all wars and in less desperate situations. The Turks give the loss of the submarine's crew at three killed and seven wounded. The survivors, of whom Lieutenant-Commander Brodie was one, were sent to Constantinople.

As the E 15 was a new boat, and fitted with our best secrets, there were obvious reasons why it was desirable to prevent the enemy from getting possession of her in a comparatively undamaged state. On the day after the grounding of the submarine attempts were made to destroy her by long-range gun-fire. But they failed to hit so small an object at so great a distance in the right place. The alternative was to send in boats and destroy her on the bank.

In former times the expeditions to capture and bring away, or to fire and destroy hostile vessels lying under the protection of shore batteries, were known as "cuttings out". Some of the most heroic feats of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars were of this kind. The method adopted to prevent the lost E 15 from ever being of use to the enemy was a latter-day version of a cutting out.

The duty was entrusted to the picket-boats of H.M.S. *Triumph* and H.M.S. *Majestic*. The command was given to Lieutenant-Commander Eric Robinson of the *Triumph*, who was supported by Lieutenant A. B. Brooke, R.N.R., and Midshipman John Woolley of the same ship, and by Lieutenant C. Godwin, who commanded the picket-boat of the *Majestic*. Under cover of darkness the two boats dashed at the wrecked submarine. These had the advantage of going at high speed, but they had a far wider danger-zone to pass than had to be crossed by the rowing-boats of old. The stranded E 15 was reached and blown up so as to be rendered completely useless to the Turks. The darkness and the rapidity of the attack could not wholly conceal the movements of the picket-boats from the enemy. The fort and the shore guns outside it opened fire, but in the dark and with small moving targets to aim at they could not make sufficiently good practice to destroy both picket-boats either going or coming. The boat of the *Majestic* was pierced and sank, but her crew was saved. One life only was lost in this very brilliant revival of the finest achievement of personal valour and skill of the old wars.

Lieutenant Eric Robinson was most rightly promoted to commander for his fine feat, and marks of honour were conferred on those who served under him. Such recognitions and rewards cannot be too frankly and generously given, not only because they are deserved honours, but because

Lieutenant-Commander Eric G. Robinson, promoted for the "cutting-out" feat in the Dardanelles, by which the lost submarine E 15 was rendered useless to the enemy
(From a photograph by Russell & Sons, Southsea)

it would be a most deplorable misfortune if naval officers were to have fewer chances of obtaining personal distinctions than their colleagues of the army, simply in consequence of the fact that the very strength of the navy, which is the foundation of our power to act on land, deprives it of the opportunity to fight great battles.

Apart from the affair of the *Manitou*, the work of transporting the army commanded by Sir Ian Hamilton to the scene of operations on both sides of the Dardanelles was carried out without a hitch. The landing was effected on April 25. An unavoidable difficulty presents itself to the narrator of the naval side of one of these combined operations. There is in fact and in action no real break, no true solution of continuity from the moment the soldiers are packed in the boats till they have established themselves on shore, but that part of their work which follows the landing is, after all, fighting ashore. Therefore the present story must stop at the moment the boats touch the beach.

The purely naval part of the whole calls for minute attention to detail, for foresight and exact execution. To the navy falls the duty of selecting the place where the landing is to be effected, subject to certain overruling considerations. The place where it is most convenient to carry out the landing may not be the spot where it can be most profitably executed in view of subsequent operations, or that spot again may be one where the naval work can be done only by incurring exceptional risks. The military historian will explain for what reasons the Allies preferred to land at the southern rather than the northern end of the Gallipoli peninsula. These decisions have to be taken in view of all circumstances, and here it is enough to record that the places actually chosen were from Gaba Tepe to Sedd-el-Bahr on the south-western shore of the peninsula, and at Kum Kale on the Asiatic shore, at the entrance to the straits. The duty of

Protecting the Landings at X Beach: H.M.S. *Implacable*, with a Boatload of Troops passing for the Shore. (From an official photograph)

the navy is to arrange for the transfer of men, guns, and, if necessary, animals to the boats, with the maximum of speed and the minimum of confusion. It must provide the ladders and other apparatus by which the passing of the whole can be carried out at once and from end to end of the transport. Then the seamen must see to the arranging and advance of the boats to the beach so that they shall not come into collision with one another, nor be stopped by natural obstacles, and shall reach their destination together. While this is being done the guns of the warships must beat down the fire of the enemy on the shore and cover their own friends to the utmost of their power. When the soldiers are landed it is the navy's duty to forward reinforcements and supplies, and if the worst comes to the worst, and the troops are driven back to the boats, then to bring off the survivors. The gravest peril to be encountered is that the enemy will be able to bring an effective artillery-fire to bear on the boats before they touch the beach, and this danger must be warded off by judicious choice of place and time, by making the attack as far as may be a surprise by rapidity of movement, and by the covering fire of the ships.

The disembarkation of the army on April 25, and the confirmation of its hold on the land during the two following days, was carried out most brilliantly. The landing at the north-western end of the line—that is to say at Gaba Tepe—was carried out under the direct control of Admiral Robeck himself in the *Queen Elizabeth*. The order to lower the boats was given at 1.20 a.m. The soldiers, who at this point were the Australians and New Zealanders, entered the boats at 2.5,

and the whole force moved forward at 3 a.m. The rowing-boats, so laden with men that their gunwales were down to the water's edge, were towed by steam pinnaces in long strings. Pinnaces and rowing-boats remained astern of the war-ships, and in tow of them, as the whole body advanced till the water began to shallow. Then the heavily-laden boats were cast off and towed towards the shore by the pinnaces till they were close to it, when the rowing-boats were cast off and driven by the sailors on to the beach. The enemy was apparently surprised, and did not open fire till the shore was touched. From that moment the part of the soldiers began, and the navy had to see to it that they were kept well supplied.

The 29th British Division was put ashore at the foot of the peninsula, where the coast is fringed by cliffs of from 50 to 100 feet high, and there is no general foreshore but only occasional stretches of beach. There are five of these places in all. The two known by the letters "Y" and "X" lie north of Tekke Burnu, "W" is between Tekke Burnu and Cape Helles, "V" between Helles and Sedd-el-Bahr, and "S" beyond the last-named place and in Morto Bay. These will also be found on the map facing p. 148.

The landing at "Y" was carried out successfully under the protection of the *Goliath* and the cruisers *Dublin*, *Amethyst*, and *Sapphire*, but as the course of the fighting inland—which is described elsewhere—made it necessary to withdraw the men next day—Monday — the navy had to perform the second of its duties in these operations, to re-embark the soldiers and cover the retreat by its fire. At "X" all went well throughout. The credit for the triumphant execution of the service at this point belongs primarily

The "Ship of Troy" after the Landing on V Beach: the *River Clyde*, with the Lighters forming a Bridge to the Shore

to the navy. The *Swiftsure* and the *Implacable* swept the Turkish field fortifications on the cliffs with so terrible a fire that the enemy was driven out and his trenches were easily seized and held. The *Implacable* advanced to within 500 yards of the shore and to the edge of the 6-fathom line—that is to say, to where the water is 36 feet deep—or as near as a vessel of 15,000 tons could go without incurring too great a risk of stranding. At "W", between Tekke Burnu and Sedd-el-Bahr, the conflict was murderous. The way had not been so well cleared by the preliminary fire of the ships. Yet the actual landing was effected by eight strings or "tows" of boats under protection of the *Euryalus*. The flanking hills were seized, and though our hold was kept at a heavy price it was not relaxed till reinforcements could be brought up. In this case the beach parties of sailors—the crews of the boats landed to keep up the communications—were called on to use their rifles. We may pass over the operations at "V" for a moment to note that at "S", in Morto Bay, 700 soldiers were landed from trawlers, and one company at Camber, just under Sedd-el-Bahr.

Commander Edward Unwin, R.N., awarded the Victoria Cross for Gallantry during the Landing on V Beach

At all these points the operation was carried out on normal lines. Except for the aid given by the steam pinnaces it did not differ from the landing of Sir Ralph Abercromby's army in Egypt by the fleet under Lord Keith in 1800. But a novelty of peculiar interest was introduced into the disembarkation at "V", between Helles and Sedd-el-Bahr. A large transport, the *River Clyde*, was prepared in a peculiar manner. She was protected on the bridge, and to some extent on the sides, by plates. Large ports had been cut in her sides and gangways fitted in order that the soldiers she carried might come out and land from the lighters which were to form a bridge to the shore. She carried 2000 soldiers. As the coast of this part of the Gallipoli peninsula is "steep up"—that is to say, the water is deep to the very edge—it might well appear that it would be possible, or even easy, to make the experiment a success. But the achievement was more hazardous than it looked on paper. Though a coast is "steep up" it need not be everywhere so clear of obstructions under water that a large vessel can come quite close to it at all parts. To do this even

Midshipman George L. Drewry, R.N.R., awarded the Victoria Cross for Gallantry during the Landing on V Beach

in daylight, without a local pilot's minute knowledge, is an undertaking which will succeed only if skill is aided by good fortune. To try it by night, when the landmarks—hills, buildings, and so forth—cannot be clearly seen, would be to add greatly to the chances of failure. The *River Clyde* was steered to the shore after daybreak, and, in the words of Admiral de Robeck's dispatch, "was run ashore under a heavy fire rather towards the eastern end of the beach, where she could form a convenient breakwater during future landing of stores, &c.". The steamer was preceded by boats, towed in the usual way and carrying men who were to serve as a covering-party. As the day had broken, the Turks in the Sedd-el-Bahr had a clear view of the whole, and opened a destructive fire as the first boats touched ground. The men in the boats lost heavily, and the survivors who reached the shore were compelled to take cover under a bank. In several of the boats all were either killed or wounded. One boat contained only two survivors; another entirely disappeared. Meantime the *River Clyde* was run ashore as soon as the first boats reached the beach:

"As the *River Clyde*", again to quote from Admiral de Robeck's dispatch, "grounded, the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore were run out ahead of the collier, but unfortunately they failed to reach their proper stations and a gap was left between two lighters over which it was impossible for men to cross; some attempted to land by jumping from the lighter which was in position into the sea

Midshipman Wilfrid St. A. Malleson, R.N., awarded the Victoria Cross for Gallantry during the Landing on V Beach

and wading ashore; this method proved too costly, the lighter being soon heaped with dead, and the disembarkation was ordered to cease."

In her helpless position the *River Clyde* was subjected to the further danger of a bombardment by howitzers from the Asiatic shore. The fire of the Turks was kept down by the men-of-war. Yet four shells pierced her, and it was a piece of extreme good fortune that none of them exploded in her crowded decks. The landing, as explained in the next article, had to be put off till it could be made under cover of darkness.

The heroism displayed in this costly experiment was rewarded by no fewer than five Victoria Crosses. One was awarded to Commander Edward Unwin, R.N., under whose directions the collier had been specially prepared for the occasion, for conduct officially described as follows:—

"While in *River Clyde*, observing that the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore had broken adrift, Commander Unwin left the ship and under a murderous fire attempted to get the lighters into position. He worked on until, suffering from the effects of cold and immersion, he was obliged to return to the ship, where he was wrapped up in blankets. Having in some degree recovered, he returned to his work against the doctor's order and completed it. He was later again attended by the doctor for three abrasions caused by bullets, after which he once more left the ship, this time in a life-boat, to save some wounded men who were lying in shallow water near the beach. He continued at this heroic labour under continuous fire, until forced to stop through pure physical exhaustion."

Two midshipmen won the same decoration for their gallantry while assisting Commander Unwin under heavy fire—Midshipman George L. Drewry, R.N.R., of H.M.S. *Hussar*, who, though twice wounded in the head, continued his work, and twice subsequently attempted to swim from lighter to lighter with a line; and Midshipman Wilfred St. A. Malleson, R.N., of H.M.S. *Cornwall*, who, when Midshipmen Drewry had failed from exhaustion to get a line from lighter to lighter, swam with it himself and succeeded. This line subsequently broke, and Midshipman Malleson afterwards made two further but unsuccessful attempts at his self-imposed task. The other Victoria Crosses for heroism displayed on this occasion were awarded to Able Seaman William Charles Williams, who held on to a line in the water for over an hour, under heavy fire, until killed; and Seaman George M'Kenzie Samson, who, working on the lighter all day, attending wounded and getting out lines, was eventually dangerously wounded by Maxim fire.

Throughout the whole operation, which occupied three days—April 25, 26, and 27—before it was complete, the navy had to keep ward against interruption by the Turks on the water. None was attempted on any serious scale, which, in view of what was to happen in the weeks next following, would seem to show that the enemy was not then in possession of the necessary torpedo and submarine craft. Turkish transports which were detected in the Narrows were fired at, and one was sunk by the fire of the *Queen Elizabeth*. It was not known whether she was full or empty.

Photo, Stephen Cribb, Southsea

The Australian Submarine A.E 2, sunk by the Turks while entering the Sea of Marmora from the Dardanelles

When the landing was effected the navy took up the duty of assisting with great guns and keeping open the communications. The work proved far more costly than most people had expected. Before the end of May the *Goliath*, *Triumph*, and *Majestic*—battleships of 12,950, 11,800, and 14,900 tons respectively—were lost. All three perished by the torpedo, though the blow was not in all cases given by the same kind of vessel. It must be counted among the pieces of good fortune which attended the transport and landing of the army that certain naval enemies who became very active in May were not at hand in April. They were almost as a matter of course German submarines. Whether these "pests", as a natural irritation provokes us to call them, were sent overland in pieces and put together in the Turkish dockyard or at Pola, or whether they came by "long sea" past Gibraltar, it is certain that they were not only in being but in action round the Dardanelles—too late to render the best service they could have done their side, but not too late to inflict unwelcome loss on the British navy. One of them, the U 23, commanded by Captain Hansen, is credited with the destruction of both the *Triumph* and the *Majestic*, and with having passed the Dardanelles up to Constantinople in spite of our naval watch. The new German submarines had a greatly increased range of movement, and though any one of them which made the voyage from the North Sea to the Levant must have been at the end of her stores by the time she reached her destination, she could be supplied in Turkish ports.

Lieutenant-Commander E. C. Boyle, R.N., awarded the Victoria Cross for his daring achievements in Submarine E 14
(From a photograph by Lankester)

Torpedoed by a German Submarine: the Sinking of H.M.S. *Majestic* off the Gallipoli Peninsula on May 27, 1915
(From an instantaneous photograph)

The loss of the three battleships was briefly recorded in official reports. The *Goliath* was torpedoed in the Dardanelles on May 13, while covering the eastern flank of the Allies. It was claimed by the Turks that she was sunk by one of their destroyers, the *Mauvenet-i-Millet*, a vessel of 610 tons, built in Sichau in Germany, and in all probability handled by some of the officers and men serving under Admiral von Usedom, who had the naval command in the straits. Admiral von Usedom was well known to British naval officers for the part he took in the advance to Peking under Sir. M. Culme Seymour. The *Goliath* being tied down, by the nature of the duty she was performing, to remain stationary or to move very slowly, was exceptionally open to attack by a well-handled destroyer. Five hundred of her crew were lost in the disaster.[1] The *Triumph* was engaged on the same duty, but outside the straits and on the flank held by the Australians and New Zealanders, when she fell, on the 25th, to the attack of a submarine in daylight. The enemy was chased, but escaped. Two days later the *Majestic*, while co-operating with the allied armies in the Dardanelles, was sunk by submarine attack. In these two cases few lives were lost. This made up the list of six battleships—five British, the *Irresistible*, *Ocean*, *Goliath*, *Triumph*, and *Majestic*, and the French *Bouvet*—lost in the course of these operations up to the end of June.

[1] An illustration of the *Goliath* will be found on p. 95 of Vol. II, where some account is given of her share in the earlier operations on the East African coast.

The conditions which aided the U 23 (if it were indeed she) to sink the *Triumph* and *Majestic* also allowed of effective retaliation by the British submarines. Turkish transports were moving about in the Sea of Marmora and the straits to support their troops in the peninsula. And they were open

Lieutenant-Commander Martin E. Nasmith, awarded the Victoria Cross for his Submarine Exploits in the Sea of Marmora
(From a photograph by Russell & Sons, Southsea)

to our submarine attack, which could be just as easily concealed as the German. Counter-attacks were made, and with brilliant success. One of the British submarines — the Australian A.E 2—was sunk by the Turks while coming out of the Straits into the Sea of Marmora. Her three officers, Commander H. G. D. Stoker and Lieutenants G. A. G. Haggard and J. Pitt Carey, together with seventeen out of

twenty-nine men in her crew, were saved. Against this loss we have to set the successes of E 14 and E 11. The E 14, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander E. C. Boyle, carried out a most effective raid during the last days of April and the first of May, 1915. She had to avoid the mines which are floated down stream in the straits, and to pass batteries and submerged torpedo-tubes. While in the Sea of Marmora she sunk one Turkish gunboat of the "Berh-i-Satvet" class of 740 tons, a transport, another gunboat, and then a very large transport full of troops. She also compelled a small steamer to run ashore. The service performed by Lieutenant-Commander Boyle was of vital importance to the campaign. The navy could have no more telling work to perform than to prevent the enemy in the formidable defences of the Gallipoli peninsula from receiving reinforcements. The V.C. which was promptly conferred on him was very abundantly earned by the fine qualities shown and the good work done. The E 14 had a rival of equal prowess in the E 11. Under Lieutenant-Commander Martin E. Nasmith the E 11 not only entered the Sea of Marmora but pushed her attack home to Constantinople itself. She sank one large Turkish gunboat, two transports engaged in carrying troops and ammunition, chased another into Rodosto and torpedoed her, and, when she had safely passed the most difficult part of her homeward journey, returned again to torpedo yet another transport. For this gallant performance Lieutenant-Commander Nasmith also received the Victoria Cross, the other officers and the men, as in the case of the E 14, receiving respectively the Distinguished Service Cross and the Distinguished Service Medal.

D. H.

Official Photograph

A Tribute from the Fleet in the Dardanelles: Cheering the Submarine E 11 on her return from her gallant exploits in the Sea of Marmora

CHAPTER IX

WITH SIR IAN HAMILTON IN GALLIPOLI

(March–May, 1915)

Sir Ian Hamilton's Tribute to the Navy—His Presence at the Naval Attack of March 18, 1915—Reasons for Return of Expeditionary Force to Alexandria—Review of French Troops in Egypt—Return to Lemnos—Strategy of the Landing in Gallipoli—How the Australasians made good near Gaba Tepe—Decorations for Heroic Colonials—The French and British Landings—The Five Beaches on the Foot of Gallipoli—Deeds of the Immortal 29th Division—Victoria Crosses and other Rewards—The French Achievements—Astride the Peninsula—Achi Baba and the Turks' Stubborn Defence—Operations South of Krithia—The Turks' Desperate Counter-attack of May 1—Turco-German Cunning—The Gallant Worcesters again—French Tribute to the Royal Naval Division—Sir Ian Hamilton and General d'Amade—Changes in the French Command—The Importance of Achi Baba—Another Direct Assault by the Allies—Unsatisfactory Progress—The Campaign resolves itself into Siege Warfare—Turks' Furious Onslaught against Australians and New Zealanders—Heroism of the Colonials—Loss of their Commander—Death of A. F. Wilding—Australia's First V.C.—Total Casualties to end of May, 1915.

THE navy's share in overcoming the stupendous difficulties of the landing in Gallipoli—difficulties described by the Commander-in-Chief as without precedent in military history, "except, possibly, in the sinister legends of Xerxes"—has been dealt with in the previous chapter, and acknowledged by Sir Ian Hamilton himself in a memorable passage in his first dispatch describing how the Royal Navy had acted throughout as "a father and mother" to the army:

> "Not one of us but realizes how much he owes to Vice-Admiral de Robeck, to the war-ships—French and British—to the destroyers, mine-sweepers, picket-boats, and to all their dauntless crews, who took no thought of themselves, but risked everything to give their soldier comrades a fair run at the enemy."

Sir Ian Hamilton's dispatch threw light on many aspects of the campaign which hitherto had remained obscure. Leaving London on March 13, 1915, in accordance with Lord Kitchener's instructions, he reached Vice-Admiral de Robeck at Tenedos—a small rocky island in the Ægean, some 10 or 12 miles south of the entrance to the Dardanelles—shortly after noon on the eve of the disastrous naval attack of the 18th, when three battleships of the Allied Fleets were sunk. Reading between the lines of the dispatch, it is obvious that the original intention was to carry out a combined military and naval attack, and doubtless the action would have been postponed for that purpose had it been deemed feasible. The troops were there—British, Australasian, and French—silently conveyed in a fleet of transports from the main base at Alexandria. But a preliminary reconnaissance of the north-western shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula from its isthmus, where it is spanned by the Bulair fortified lines, to Cape Hellas, at its extreme point, had convinced Sir Ian Hamilton that a tentative and piecemeal programme of disembarkation was bound to lead to disaster,

and that the only chance of success—with a fortified coast which resembled nothing so much as Gibraltar on a gigantic scale—was to fling the whole of his available forces ashore at once, and at the same time to threaten to land at other points as well. This scheme, however, meant the complete

General Sir Ian S. M. Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O., Colonel of the Gordon Highlanders, in supreme Command of the Allied Expedition in Gallipoli
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

redistribution of the troops on the transports. "The bulk of the forces at my disposal", wrote Sir Ian Hamilton, "had, perforce, been embarked without its having been possible to pay due attention to the operations upon which I now proposed that they should be launched." Mudros harbour lacking the necessary facilities for such a vast redistribution, it was necessary to send all the transports back to the Egyptian port, save those of the Australian Infantry Brigade and the details encamped on Lemnos Island. All this, of course, meant weeks of delay, and the admirals in conference with Sir Ian Hamilton on his arrival at Tenedos—Vice-Admiral de Robeck, commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet, and Contre-Amiral Guépratte, in command of the French Squadron—with whom was General d'Amade, commanding the French Expeditionary Corps, thereupon decided to make the fresh attempt to force the Narrows on the morrow without military co-operation. Having witnessed this costly battle between the fleets and the land fortresses, Sir Ian Hamilton cabled Lord Kitchener that in his view the whole of the force under his command would be required to enable the fleet effectively to force the Dardanelles.

With the War Minister's approval, therefore, he proceeded on the 24th with the General Staff to Alexandria, where he remained until April 7, personally working out the allocation of troops to transports in minutest detail as a prelude to the forthcoming landing operations. General d'Amade followed suit with the redistribution of the French forces. This mustering of the Allies on the sandy shores of Egypt, for which they had once fought so fiercely against each other, was one of the romantic episodes of the Great World War. Only a dozen miles or so from Alexandria lies Aboukir, in the bay of which the French fleet was annihilated by Nelson in the Battle of the Nile in 1798, and where, three years later, Sir Ralph Abercromby

landed his expedition in the face of the same foes. Now troops from all parts of the French Republic were joining forces with British regulars and the flower of young Australasia in an enterprise far more hazardous than the landing of Abercromby's men, and likely, if successful, to marched past General Sir Ian Hamilton—referred to by General d'Amade as "mon chef". Frenchmen, declared Sir Ian Hamilton at the close of this display, ought to be proud of their nationality, with troops such as those which it was now his privilege to command.

The Mustering of the Allies: French Troops in Egypt—for the first time since Napoleon's day—waiting to march past Sir Ian Hamilton

change the whole course of the European conflict against the outlaws of civilization. Every branch of our Ally's army was represented in the French camp at Alexandria, including some dusky veterans of the Marne. With the dashing regiments of cavalry, the artillery with their famous "75's", the French army presented a magnificent appearance at the historic review in the desert shortly before its re-embarkation in April for the Dardanelles. On that occasion the troops

The redistribution of the forces having been sufficiently advanced by April 7, Sir Ian Hamilton returned with his General Staff to Lemnos, the Turkish island some 40 miles south-west of the Dardanelles, where he completed his plans with Admiral de Robeck for the landing of the troops. How gallantly the navy did its share of the work afloat on April 25 has just been told. It now remains to record the immortal bravery of all ranks after leaving the boats, and to explain why

the main attack was delivered at the very end of the peninsula, leaving the whole length of Gallipoli to be traversed, instead of at Bulair, the peninsula's narrow neck. The reason was that this seemed the only way by which the main army, with all its heavy artillery and other vast impedimenta, could hope to proceed. All along the upper half of the northern coast leading to Bulair the precipitous fall of the cliffs precluded the possibility of a serious disembarkation, the most northerly spots judged to be practicable being at Suvla Bay and Gaba Tepe, where the southern half of the peninsula begins the peculiar shape which Sir Ian Hamilton neatly describes as like a badly-worn boot. "The ankle", writes the Commander-in-Chief, "lies between Gaba Tepe and Kalkmaz Dagh; between the heel lies the cluster of forts at Kilid Bahr, while the toe is that promontory, 5 miles in width, stretching from Tekke Burnu to Sedd-el-Bahr." The only thing to do was to seize this ragged boot at the toe, where simultaneous landings could be made at a number of likely spots, while another firm hold was obtained just where the boot meets at the instep —in other words, above Gaba Tepe.

Organizing the Expeditionary Force under Sir Ian Hamilton: Indian troops about to re-ship the mules at Alexandria

Let us take Gaba Tepe first, not because it was the main landing, for even here it would have been impossible to get the heavy guns and

supplies of the principal army ashore within a reasonable time, but because it was above Gaba Tepe that the Australians and New Zealanders, on the Sunday morning of April 25, 1915, received their baptism of fire on the battlegrounds of Europe, performing prodigies of valour which rank side by side with those of the Canadians at Ypres. It was a proud day for the Empire that, at the very moment when Canadian pluck and tenacity were still saving the situation in the long crisis of the second battle for Calais, the Australians, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, were covering themselves with glory on the rugged heights of Anzac Cove. Sir Ian Hamilton paints a glowing picture of their irresistible dash as their boats touched land in the grey dawn of St. Mark's Day, after running the gauntlet of the enemy's guns from the steep, scrub-clad heights beyond, as well as from the battalion of Turks which had dashed along the beach to intercept the boats and opened fire at point-blank range. "Like lightning," the men of the 3rd Australian Brigade, who led the attack, under Major (temporary Colonel) Sinclair Maclagan, D.S.O., leapt ashore, and without waiting to re-form went straight as their bayonets at the enemy. Before this sudden charge the Turks broke and fled, and the beach was won. It was all over in little more time than it takes to describe. But there still remained the tougher proposition of the cliff, which had to be scaled before the more formidable positions of the enemy could be won. Without a moment's hesitation, save to get rid of their packs and charge their magazines, the Colonials leapt up the steep paths of the cliff wherever foothold could be found in the half-light of daybreak. "So vigorous was the onslaught", writes Sir Ian Hamilton, "that the Turks made no attempt to withstand it, but fled from ridge to ridge pursued by the Australian infantry." The 1st and 2nd Australian Brigades promptly reinforced the 3rd, and were followed by two brigades of the combined New Zealand and Australian Division, with two batteries of Indian mountain artillery.[1] Further artillery was delayed owing to the increasing fire of the enemy's heavy guns, which, opening on the anchorage, forced the transports to stand farther out to sea.

Fully alive to the danger of the situation, the Turks rushed up reinforcements from all directions, until, with a strength of 20,000 men, they made a desperate effort to hurl the invaders back into the sea. In their first impetuous rush some of the Australian units unfortunately went too far, and, losing touch in the brushwood, were cut up.

"The broken ground, the thick scrub, the necessity for sending any formed detach-

[1] This association of the Indian with the Australian troops was a happy and significant idea. The following note on the subject was issued at the time by the Secretary of State for India: "A senior officer of the Indian Army, who is in a position to know, writes to say that he has been much impressed by the *camaraderie* and good feeling existing in the Dardanelles between the Australian troops and the soldiers of the Indian Mountain Batteries. These men fought side by side in the famous landing at Gaba Tepe, and the batteries did so well and gallantly that the Australians have metaphorically taken them to their hearts, and all are the greatest 'pals' imaginable. The political effect of this *entente cordiale* should be good both in India and in Australia."

Keeping Fit for the Landing at Gaba Tepe: a route march of Australians and New Zealanders—preceded by a Greek flag—on one of the islands near the Dardanelles

The above was drawn by Frank Gillett from a sketch by Lieutenant J. L. C. Booth, of the 12th Battalion Australian Imperial Force, who was destined, unfortunately, to fall in action in the subsequent fighting in the Dardanelles. Describing the subject of his sketch he wrote to the *Graphic*: "Our brigade is at present at anchor in the harbour of one of the Greek islands near the mouth of the Straits. When the 12th Battalion first landed for a route march they were met by two boys from the nearest village, one of whom carried a large Greek flag, which he bore proudly at the head of the column. We took it that this was intended as a sign to the inhabitants that we were friendly troops, so that they might not be alarmed by our progress through the island. Any terrors they may have had are now dispelled, and the men are beset at every halt by sellers of figs, eggs, nuts, and 'Turkish Delight', which the wily salesmen have rechristened 'English Delight'. Some of them are making their fortunes."

ments post-haste as they landed to the critical point of the moment, the headlong valour of scattered groups of the men who had pressed far farther into the peninsula than had been intended—all these," writes the Commander-in-Chief, "led to confusion and mixing up of units. Eventually the mixed crowd of fighting-men, some advancing from the beach, others falling back before the oncoming Turkish supports, solidified into a semicircular position with its right about a mile north of Gaba Tepe and its left on the high ground over Fisherman's Hut. During this period parties of the 9th and 10th Battalions charged and put out of action three of the enemy's Krupp guns."

The line was held throughout the rest of the 25th against persistent and determined counter-attacks, the Turks leaving the whole surrounding country strewn with their dead. The Australians and New Zealanders had also suffered severely, but despite their losses, and the fatigue resulting from prolonged attacks over such difficult country, Sir Ian Hamilton bears witness that the following morning found them still in good heart and as full of fight as ever. Clearly the months of waiting and training in the Egyptian desert had not been spent in vain.

"The Australians and New Zealanders," declared Mr. Asquith at the imperial patriotic meeting held in London in the following month, "have shed their blood like water, and have shown skill, courage, and tenacity in circumstances of appalling difficulty which give us a right to say their services have been unsurpassed."

General Birdwood was equally enthusiastic in his praise of the troops under his command. He told Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett that the manner in which his Colonials hung on to the position at Gaba Tepe the first day and night—

"was a magnificent feat, which has seldom, if ever, been surpassed, considering their very heavy losses, the deficiency of water, and the incessant shrapnel fire to which they were exposed without cover, not to mention unceasing attacks of the enemy's infantry. That night they were obliged to retire to a more contracted line, and when that line was reached they set their teeth and refused to budge another foot."

General Birdwood, in his turn, was praised by Sir Ian Hamilton for organizing the success both of this and the subsequent fighting above Gaba Tepe. "The fact", wrote the Commander-in-Chief in his dispatch, "of his having been responsible for the execution of these difficult and hazardous operations — operations which were crowned with a very remarkable success—speaks, I think, for itself."

More than a score of Australian and New Zealand officers were included in the first list of Distinguished Service Orders and Military Crosses awarded for gallantry on this occasion, including Lieutenant-Colonel W. Ramsay M'Nicoll, 6th Australian Infantry Battalion (Victoria), and Lieutenant-Colonel C. Brudenell Bingham White, Royal Australian Garrison Artillery (Staff). The spirit of the whole force was exemplified in the act which won the Military Cross for Sergeant-Major A. W. Porteous, of the 10th (N. Otago) Regiment of the New Zealand Forces. All his officers being killed or wounded—to quote from the official account in the *London*

Major (temporary Colonel) Sinclair Maclagan, D.S.O., who led the landing attack of the Australians on April 25, 1915
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

Gazette—"he organized and led the company, continually exposing himself for four hours, and showing fine military spirit and powers of leadership". Another characteristic incident in this red-letter day in Australasian history was the dauntless assault of a dangerous but most important post, led by Major Robert Rankine, of the 14th Australian Infantry Battalion (Victoria). For this, "and subsequently for holding that position against repeated attacks for five days without relief", Major Rankine deservedly received the D.S.O. Similar decorations to Major Eugene Joseph O'Neil, F.R.C.S., of the New Zealand Medical Corps, and Captain Arthur Graham Butler, of the Australian Army Medical Corps, also bore witness to the fact that the Red Cross was as worthily represented in the Colonial forces as in the British army.

Meantime the British regulars of the 29th Division had proved their mettle at the southernmost point of the peninsula, while French troops were distinguishing themselves on the Asiatic coast of the Dardanelles. The disembarkation of the French troops was effected at Kum Kale under the guns of the French Fleet, and, though merely a temporary measure, it was essential in order to draw the fire of the hostile batteries from the landing of the British in the peninsula. It was decided not to make a serious advance along the Asiatic shore, presumably because, being lower than the opposite side of the Dardanelles,

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, in command of the Australians
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

The Campaign in Gallipoli: a landing force leaving the transports for the shore

it was dominated along almost its entire length by the European coast. To capture Gallipoli, therefore, meant not only the command of the straits, but also the conquest of the Asiatic shore.

Both sides of the Dardanelles appeared to have been specially designed to assist the defence, particularly across what may be termed the toes of the peninsula itself, where precipitous cliffs and a jumble of hills, valleys, watercourses, and ridges covered with prickly scrub—all offering innumerable positions for trenches, traps, and concealed guns—made the task set before the British army at day-dawn of April 25 seem almost a physical impossibility. It was not to be wondered at that the Turks and their German instructors had loudly proclaimed the coast as impregnable. Wolfe's storming of the heights of Abraham had remained almost the crowning achievement of British military daring for more than a century and a half, but Wolfe's great feat offers no parallel to the stern ordeal which faced the heroes of the 29th Brigade. These included such famous regiments as the Royal Fusiliers, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the Dublin Fusiliers, the South Wales Borderers, the Worcesters, the Hampshire Regiment, and, above all, the Lancashire Fusiliers, together with the Plymouth (Marine) Battalion of the Royal Naval Division, specially attached to the 29th for this task.

Before attempting to follow the story of their landing on five beaches, it is advisable to study the map overleaf. Achi Babi, or Tree Peak, dominates at long field-gun range the southern sector of the peninsula to the very end. A peculiarity noted by Sir Ian Hamilton as regards this region is that from Achi Baba to Cape Helles the ground is hollowed out like a spoon, presenting only its outer edges to direct fire from the fleet. "The inside of the spoon

The Gallipoli Campaign. Map illustrating the operations of the Allies under Sir Ian Hamilton from the landing on April 25 to May 30, 1915

appears to be open and undulating, but actually it is full of spurs, nullahs, and confused under-features."

The plan of attack was to make simultaneous landings on the five beaches marked S, V, W, X, and Y. Three of these, at V, W, and X—all at the very tip of the toe—were to be the main landings, the attacks on S and Y, to the right and left respectively, being intended mainly to protect their flanks and to disseminate the forces of the enemy. Thus the plan, taken in conjunction with the operations of the Australasians at Gaba Tepe, and of the French at Kum Kale, was one of feints and surprises, leaving the enemy uncertain exactly where to meet his greatest danger. The secondary landings, at S and Y, were planned to take place at dawn, while the main disembarkations began on the three other beaches at 5.30 a.m., after half an hour's bombardment from the fleet.

As it happened, the landing on S beach, by Eski Hissarlik, was delayed for nearly two hours by the strong current of the Dardanelles, but by 7.30 a.m. it had been successfully effected by the force engaged — the 2nd South Wales Borderers (less one company)—at a cost of some fifty casualties. Lieutenant-Colonel Casson, who was in command, not only succeeded in establishing his small force on the high ground near De Totts Battery, but also in maintaining himself until the 27th, when the general advance brought him into touch with the main body.

The fate of the flanking-party on the opposite side of the peninsula, after landing on beach Y, was less fortunate. The operations at this point were entrusted to the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Marine Battalion, the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Koe. At one time it was proposed to land this force at Y 2, where the cliffs are indented by the mouth of the nullah Saghir Dere, and where, as it afterwards transpired, a formidable force of Turkish regulars were lying in wait, entrenched up to their necks, and supported by Hotchkiss and machine-guns. Luckily Beach Y was chosen instead—a narrow strip of sand at the foot of crumbling cliffs, some 200 feet high, immediately to the west of Krithia, and described by Sir Ian Hamilton as not altogether dissimilar to the heights of Abraham. So impracticable had the climbing of these precipices appeared to the Turks that they had taken no steps to defend them, with the result that both the Marines and the Borderers at first made good their footing with little opposition. Unfortunately they paid dearly during the next twenty-four hours for this unexpected success. Having established themselves on the heights, and hauled up to the top of the cliff their reserves of food, water, and ammunition, they tried at once, in accordance with the plan of operations, to gain touch with the troops landed by that time some 3 or 4 miles on their right, on Beach X. But the Turkish infantry, who had been balked of their prey at Y 2, now had their revenge, interposing themselves between the two British forces, and preventing them from

joining hands. Forced back upon the cliffs above Y later in the day by other large forces of the enemy advancing from Krithia, the Borderers and Marines were compelled to entrench and fight for their lives. Their position soon became desperate. While the Turkish reinforcements were unlimited, and supported by heavy artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Koe's little force was rapidly dwindling, and, owing to the configuration of the ground, which fell inland from the edge of the cliffs, could receive little assistance from the British guns at sea. Lieutenant-Colonel Koe himself was wounded early in the fighting, subsequently dying of his wounds. Other officers and men fell in increasing numbers as the Turks, all through the rest of the day and throughout the night, made one furious assault after another upon the devoted British line. Only about half of the Scottish Borderers remained by 7 a.m. on the 26th to man the entrenchment made for four times their number. "These brave fellows," wrote their Commander-in-Chief, "were absolutely worn-out with continuous fighting", and, as it was doubtful if reinforcements could reach them in time, orders were sent for their withdrawal:

Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Koe, mortally wounded while commanding the Landing Party on Beach Y
(From a photograph by H. Walter Barnett)

"Thanks to H.M.S. *Goliath*, *Dublin*, *Amethyst*, and *Sapphire*, thanks also to the devotion of a small rear-guard of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, which kept off the enemy from lining the cliff, the re-embarkation of the whole of the troops, together with the wounded, stores and ammunition, was safely accomplished, and both battalions were brought round the southern end of the peninsula. Deplorable as the heavy losses[1] had been, and unfortunate as was the tactical failure to make good so much ground at the outset, yet, taking the operation as it stood, there can be no doubt it contributed greatly to the success of the main attack, seeing that the plucky stand made at Y beach had detained heavy columns of the enemy from arriving at the southern end of the peninsula during what it will be seen was a very touch-and-go struggle."

How perilously near it came to disaster was told by Sir Ian Hamilton in his account of the struggle for V beach, between Cape Helles and the fort and castle of Sedd-el-Bahr, where one of the three main landings took

[1] In addition to Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Koe, the 1st Battalion of the Borderers lost during the operations of this and the next few days upwards of twenty other officers in killed and wounded.

place. It was on V beach that the collier *River Clyde*—the ship of Troy as she came to be called—was deliberately run ashore, as described in the chapter on the navy's share in the operations. The *River Clyde* carried between her decks the balance of the

V Beach in British Hands: General view from the "Ship of Troy", *River Clyde*. (From an official photograph)

Dublin Fusiliers — three companies were being towed ashore at the same time—the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of the Hampshire regiment, the West Riding Field Company, and other details. Those of the Dublin Fusiliers who were being towed ashore, and the boats' crews with them, were the first to suffer from the tornado of fire which swept the beach the moment the invading craft touched bottom. Helpless and exposed to hidden fire from all sides, it was little short of a miracle that any escaped. Luckily there was a low escarpment—a steep sandy bank—on the farther side of the beach, and those who jumped ashore and succeeded in reaching this shelter through the inferno clung to it like grim death through all the remaining hours of that dreadful day. None of the boats got off again; they and their crews were destroyed on the beach, where the *River Clyde* remained stranded with her lighters and the rest of the landing-force. Of the 1000 men who, in the first attempt,

had left the collier between 10 and 11 a.m., 500 had already been killed. Those still afloat waited for night before being allowed to reinforce those of their comrades who had joined the Dublin Fusiliers under the shelter of the sand-bank, the machine-guns of the *River Clyde* meantime preventing the enemy from completing their deadly work on the beach. One half-company of the Dublin Fusiliers, which had landed at the camber marked on the map just to the east of Sedd-el-Bahr village, struggled in vain up the steep cliffs to reach the main body on V beach, but when midday came had only twenty-five men left, and had to be withdrawn. To escape annihilation, the rest of that part of the main body which had been intended to land on V beach—apart from the men still on board the *Clyde* and the lighters — were now diverted to W beach, where a landing had already been effected by the Lancashire Fusiliers.

Night brought some relief to the exhausted survivors on V beach in spite of one determined effort to wipe them out. The Turks broke through the line on that occasion, but Lieutenant H. Desmond O'Hara, of the 1st Battalion Dublin Fusiliers, who had taken command of his battalion when all other officers had been killed or wounded, organized a counter-attack and drove them back with heavy loss. For this "great initia-

Overlooking the British Landing on V Beach: the batteries of Sedd-el-Bahr after the naval bombardment
(From an official photograph)

tive and resource" Lieutenant O'Hara was awarded the D.S.O. Those of the British wounded who were able to do so had meantime crept back in the darkness to the collier, from which the remainder of the infantry were now landed, strangely enough almost without a shot from the enemy.

Daybreak on the 26th found ashore at this critical point the survivors of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers and of two companies of the Hampshire Regiment. Brigadier-General Henry E. Napier—a descendant of the 6th Baron Napier and Ettrick—and his brigade major, Captain Costeker, had been mortally wounded. The great majority of the senior officers had also fallen, including Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington Smith, commanding the Hampshires, who was killed, and the adjutants of the Hampshires and the Munster Fusiliers, both of whom were wounded. The survivors still crouched beneath the shelter of the sandy escarpment which, as Sir Ian Hamilton says, had saved so many lives. That they were still able to conquer was largely due to the inspiring example and indomitable courage of two officers of Sir Ian Hamilton's General Staff —Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, who had landed from the *River Clyde*, and now set to work to organize an attack on the hill above the beach.

The daring nature of this adventure can only be appreciated when we look at the surroundings. Like all the landing-places of April 25, the sandy foreshore of V beach faces a semicircle of hills, but it differed from the rest in being overlooked by the forts of Sedd-el-Bahr. These formerly defended the entrance to the straits, and, though sadly battered by our naval guns, still presented, as Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett pointed out, a solid mass of masonry in which sharpshooters and guns could lie concealed. Behind the silenced batteries and the picturesque Old Castle lay what remained after the naval bombardments of the village of Sedd-el-Bahr, the ruins of which provided first-rate cover for sharpshooters, from which the foreshore could be raked.

"Behind the remains of the village", wrote Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett, "the ground rose to a height known as 141, on which the Turks had constructed a perfect maze of trenches and barbed wire, and from which they could dominate the beach at point-blank range. The foreshore and valley leading inland were likewise protected by trenches and wire, and the whole position is indeed one of the most formidable which troops have ever attempted to take, even under normal conditions."

This was the position which the sorely-tried troops on V beach were set to capture after the ordeal of the 25th and forty-eight hours without sleep. By 10 a.m. on the 26th, under cover of a heavy bombardment by the ships, and led by Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Captain G. N. Walford, Brigade-Major Royal Artillery, these gallant men had rushed from their shelter on the beach and gained a footing in the village. One graphic account describes how nobly Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie rallied his men, and how he charged at their head with nothing but a "swagger-cane" in his hand. Captain Walford,

whose conduct was no less heroic, was killed during this advance, together with many of the troops. Undeterred by these losses, and the stubborn resistance offered by the defenders, Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie continued to lead the attack through and on both sides of the shattered village.

"And now," to continue the story from

Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie, who won the Victoria Cross, and was mortally wounded in the heroic charge from V Beach
(From a photograph by C. E. Fry & Son)

Sir Ian Hamilton's dispatch, "when owing so largely to his own inspiring example and intrepid courage the position had almost been gained, he was killed while leading the last assault. But the attack was pushed forward without wavering, and, fighting their way across the open with great dash, the troops gained the summit and occupied the Old Castle and Hill 141 before 2 p.m."

No braver man than Doughty-Wylie, in the words of one of his brother officers, ever lived. Not many years before he had been the means of saving hundreds of lives in the Adana massacre, and was wounded in doing so; and during the Balkan wars he and his wife not only fitted up and maintained at their own expense a hospital for the Turks in Constantinople, but personally superintended its working. It was fitting that, with Captain Walford, he should now head the list of V.C.'s decorated for the land operations in the Dardanelles, "It was mainly due to the initiative, skill, and great gallantry of these two officers", to quote from the official record of the award, "that the attack was a complete success. Both died in the hour of victory." Captain Herbert C. Crozier, of the Dublin Fusiliers, received the Military Cross "for exceptional bravery" in the same assault; and Major A. Thackeray Beckwith, of the Hampshires, the D.S.O. "for brilliant and gallant leading of the troops in the attack". The cost had been and continued to be appalling among the Dublin Fusiliers, alike among the officers and the rank and file. Some twenty of their officers alone figured in the first casualty lists —ten killed or died of wounds, including Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. Rooth, who was killed. The Munsters lost at least nine officers killed or wounded during the same period; and the Hampshires twelve, including Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Smith, killed.

Sedd-el-Bahr presented an amazing spectacle after the Turks had fled. The whole of the batteries, Castle, and village was little but a mass of ruins, immense craters, smashed masonry, and wrecked guns, showing

where our naval shells had played havoc with the defences.

But it is time to leave the scene of these unparalleled achievements for that of Lancashire heroism on W beach, in the small sandy bay just south of Tekke Burnu, enclosed by hills on both sides, but with a number of sand-dunes in the centre affording a more gradual access to the heights overlooking the sea. The Turks, who must have been at work for months in completing their defences at this vulnerable point, had converted the beach into a positive death-trap. Not only were trenches, entanglements, snipers, and machine-guns cunningly placed at every possible point of vantage on land, but a solid hedge of barbed wire had been constructed under the surface of the sea along the whole length of the beach, sea mines as well as land mines also being laid.

"So strong, in fact, were the defences of W beach", wrote Sir Ian Hamilton, "that the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier—or any other soldier—than the storming of those trenches from open boats on the morning of 25th April."

Then came the tribute in the Commander-in-Chief's words to the 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers (Major Bishop), to whom had been entrusted the landing on this fearsome beach: "It was to the complete lack of the senses of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed our astonishing success". Though swept by a hurricane of lead immediately the first boat touched the beach, the Lancashire Fusiliers, gallantly led by their officers, leaped ashore and began hacking at the uncut barbed wire.

After the Landing on V Beach: British troops examining one of the big guns in the batteries of Sedd-el-Bahr, damaged by the guns of the British fleet. (From an official photograph)

Officers and men were at once, in the words of Sir Ian Hamilton's vivid dispatch, "mown down as by a scythe"; but with grim determination the survivors at length broke a way through the entanglements, and, reforming under the cliffs, proceeded immediately to attack the enemy's trenches. We can judge how well the Lancashire Fusiliers fought when we read the official record of the award of the Military Cross to Lieutenant L. Basset Lipscombe Seckham, of the 1st Battalion: "For great gallantry during the first landing operations at Cape Helles in leading and continuing the attack when he himself was wounded and all but ten of his men were killed or wounded".

After the Capture of Sedd-el-Bahr: Turkish prisoners in the courtyard of the fortress. (From an official photograph)

The three companies which had reformed under the cliffs carried everything before them in their advance up Hill 114, three lines of hostile trenches being in our hands by 10 a.m., and our hold on the beach assured. Two hours later a junction had been effected on Hill 114 with the troops who had landed on X beach, where, as will presently be seen, the Royal Fusiliers had made good their landing with little loss. One of many deeds of heroism performed by the Lancashire Fusiliers on this memorable day was that of Captain Richard Haworth, who, although wounded while leading fifty of his men to the wire entanglements of a strongly-held redoubt, refused to be moved until more troops arrived, and continued to command with a bullet through his back. For this gallant act he received the D.S.O.

Brigadier-General S. W. Hare, commanding the 88th Brigade, who had proceeded with one company of the Lancashires to a small ledge of rock immediately under the cliff at Tekke Burnu, where its cross-fire helped the other three companies on the beach, had been wounded early in the day. Colonel Woolly-Dod, of the General Staff of the 29th Division, was accord-

ingly sent ashore to take command of W beach and organize a farther advance. This was begun at 2 p.m., when the 4th Battalion of the Worcesters—the regiment whose 2nd Battalion had won immortal glory at Ypres and elsewhere on the battle-fields of Flanders—advanced to the assault up Hill 138, more infantry having been disembarked once the Lancashires had made good their footing. Though the ground had previously been subjected to a heavy bombardment, murderous entanglements still barred the way; but heroic wire-cutters rushed forward from the Worcesters, and, though some were killed, others succeeded in cutting a path through, with the result that by 4 a.m. both the hill and the redoubt were in our hands.

Part of the Worcesters and Lancashires now made a gallant effort to relieve the situation on V beach by taking in flank the enemy still holding up the British troops sheltering behind the sand-bank there. More entanglements, however, barred the way, and these, with increasing pressure on their own front, and the fire from No. 1 fort growing hotter and hotter, forced them to abandon this attempt and rest content with the solid advance already won. Several strong and determined counter-attacks were made by the enemy during the night, but all were beaten back without loss of ground.

Where everyone excelled it was difficult to award the three Victoria Crosses which His Majesty presented to the 1st Lancashires for their conspicuous gallantry throughout this most hazardous day. It was accordingly left to the officers and men themselves to choose the three recipients who, in their judgment, "performed the most signal acts of bravery and devotion to duty" on that occasion. Precedents for selection by comrades may be found in the annals of the Victoria Cross relating to the Indian Mutiny. In the present instance the three Lancashire V.C.s elected were Captain Richard Raymond Willis, Sergeant Alfred Richards, and Private William Keneally.

Brigadier-General W. R. Marshall, who, though wounded in the landing operations on X Beach, continued in command
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

The story of the landings is completed—so far as the British were concerned—by the account of what happened on X beach, half a mile north of "Lancashire Landing". Here, on a strip of sand not more than 8 yards wide, but some 200 yards

long, at the foot of a low cliff, the 1st Royal Fusiliers were rowed ashore soon after 6 a.m. on the 25th, under the guns of H.M.S. *Implacable*. Thus seconded, the landing at this point was effected with little loss. A beach working-party of the Anson Battalion, attacked from the other side, as already explained, by the Lancashire Fusiliers, who there joined forces with the troops from X beach. These now included two more battalions of the 87th Brigade, under Brigadier-General Marshall, who, although wounded dur-

Happy Warriors for Gallipoli: a boat-load of troops leaving H.M.S. *Nile* for the landing on X Beach
(From an official photograph)

Royal Naval Division, accompanied the Fusiliers, just as another party was found by the same battalion for similar purposes on W beach. Having re-formed on X beach, the Royal Fusiliers advanced on the Turkish positions on Hill 114, between V and W beaches, but, heavily counter-attacked, they were then forced to give ground. The hill was presently ing the day's fighting, continued in command. By evening this force had established itself in an entrenched position extending for half a mile round the landing-place of X beach, and as far south of Hill 114, where the British line was taken up by the Lancashire Fusiliers and carried through Hill 138 to just east of Cape Helles lighthouse.

Successful landings had thus been

made where, by all the precepts of war, not a single soldier should have survived, at four of the five selected beaches round the tongue of Gallipoli. The British were thus astride the peninsula, while the Australians and New Zealanders were resisting every attempt to fling them back from their foothold higher up the coast.

In this triumph we must never forget the brilliant part played by the French in their feint attack on the Asiatic shore. Landing under the guns of their own fleet, our allies occupied Kum Kale, and by drawing the fire of the guns from Morto Bay and V beach, largely contributed to the success of the main operations on the European side of the straits. The French troops were four times strongly counter-attacked, yet they not only retained all their positions, but also captured 500 Turks who were cut off by the fire of the fleet. Having fulfilled their task on the Asiatic shore, they were re-embarked on the following morning (April 26), and joined the British army on the opposite coast, V beach being allotted to them for this purpose.

All the beaches were now becoming congested with stranded boats, rafts, stores, tents, and troops crowded together as though some mighty Armada had been shipwrecked there. Sir Ian Hamilton relieved this pressure by ordering a general advance, which by the evening of the 27th enabled the Allies, with little opposition, to establish themselves on a line some 3 miles long, extending from the mouth of the stream nearly 2 miles north-east of Tekke Burnu to Eski Hissarlik Point. On the left and in the centre were the three brigades of the 29th Division, less two battalions, four French battalions continuing the line on the right, with the South Wales Borderers beyond them again on the extreme right.

The absence of opposition to this advance showed that the enemy had received a staggering blow. A great effort was therefore made on the 28th by Sir Ian Hamilton with the sadly-reduced forces at his disposal to seize the heights of Achi Baba before the Turco-German army had time to recover. Two days later he could have relied on reinforcements in men, artillery, and munitions, but meantime the enemy's reinforcements would also increase, and every hour meant the strengthening of a position which, strong as it was, had to be taken at all costs. Achi Baba, or Tree Peak, dominates the south of the peninsula, and was the first of the main positions to which the enemy retired after failing to prevent the landing of the Allies. Its outer defences stretched practically from shore to shore, and were especially strong at Krithia village, guarding the road from Sedd-el-Bahr.

Just as the Germans, after the turn of the tide at the Marne, retired to stronger positions on the Aisne, so the Turco-German force now entrenched itself among the rugged sides and scrub-covered ravines of Achi Baba and its outer defences, with machine-guns and barbed-wire entanglements established in deadly profusion. Plevna had taught the world what a formidable foe the Turk could be

when fighting behind entrenchments with his back to the wall, and, though the more recent Balkan wars had tarnished his military reputation, he proved himself as redoubtable as ever under the military genius of his German ally. Nearly all the large units were commanded by Prussian officers, who, it transpired, had been arriving with technical experts in a constant stream for months past. Needless to say, they left nothing undone to convince the Turks that they were their only true friends and benefactors by coming to their aid when Britain and France were conspiring, according to the German version, to sell Turkey into the hands of her hereditary enemy, Russia. Behind his breastworks and countless natural defences, therefore, the Turk was readier for the attack on the 28th than Sir Ian Hamilton had hoped.

Turkey's "Holy War": part of one of the wrecked guns in Sedd-el-Bahr, bearing the inscription, "God be with us". (From an official photograph)

The thin line of British and French began the advance at 8 a.m., with the 29th Division on the left, under orders to march on Krithia, and the French corps on the right, with directions to extend their left in conformity with the British movements, while retaining their right on the coast-line south of the river bed known as the Kereves Dere. For a time all went well. The 1st Inniskillings pushed within three-quarters of a mile of Krithia, while some of the French got nearly as far in the face of strong opposition along the western bank of the Kereves Dere; but that was the limit reached by either side. It was during this fighting that Captain Cecil Ridings, of the 1st Inniskillings, won the D.S.O., "for exceptionally gallant and capable leading under difficult conditions, maintaining a forward position in spite of heavy losses at a critical moment, although unsupported on either flank, and being himself severely wounded". All the senior officers of the same battalion became casualties during these operations south of Krithia, the command being taken over by Captain Edward W. Atkinson, who himself

won the D.S.O. a few days later for his gallantry in leading a counter-attack and capturing a Turkish trench 300 yards to his front.

The enemy's stubborn resistance on the 28th—to return to the story of the general attack of the Allies—the dearth of reinforcements, and the lack of adequate artillery support rendered the whole position not a little critical during the afternoon, when ammunition began to give out.

Photo. Chausseau-Flaviens, Paris

Turkey's Reorganized Army: types of Quick-firers in action against the Allies in Gallipoli

"The small amount of transport available", explained Sir Ian Hamilton, "did not suffice to maintain the supply of munitions, and cartridges were running short despite all efforts to push them up from the landing-places. Hopes of getting a footing on Achi Babi had now perforce to be abandoned—at least for this occasion. The best that could be expected was that we should be able to maintain what we had won, and when at 3 p.m. the Turks made a determined counter-attack with the bayonet against the centre and right of our line, even this seemed exceedingly doubtful. Actually a partial retirement did take place. The French were also forced back, and at 6 p.m. orders were issued for our troops to entrench themselves as best they could in the positions they then held, with their right flank thrown back so as to maintain connection with our allies. In this retirement the right flank of the 88th Brigade was temporarily uncovered, and the Worcester Regiment suffered severely."

Though some appreciable gain of ground had been secured it was obvious that no farther advance could be attempted without considerable reinforcements. The French, too, had lost heavily and required time to reorganize. Consequently the end of the month found the Allies consolidating their positions and readjusting their line, which now ran from a point on the coast 3 miles north-west of Tekke Burnu to a point 1 mile north of Eski Hissarlik, whence it was continued south-east to the coast by the French, whose portion was somewhat increased.

Luckily the Turks did not make any serious counter-attack in force until the night of May 1, by which time the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade had been added to our reserve and the whole of the French infantry had been disembarked, as well as all but two of their batteries. From prisoners and documents captured it transpired that large reinforcements had reached

the enemy from Adrianople and Asia Minor, and that Marshal Liman von Sanders, commanding the Turco-German forces on the peninsula—Marshal von Goltz remaining in command of the Turkish 1st Army before Constantinople—was planning a supreme effort to make a clean sweep of the whole invading army. Sir Ian Hamilton quotes the following eloquent hortative addressed to the Turkish rank and file, calling for a mighty effort on this occasion to conquer or die:—

"Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly destroy him! We shall not retire one step; for, if we do, our religion, our country, and our nation will perish! Soldiers! The world is looking at you! Your only hope of salvation is to bring this battle to a successful issue or gloriously to give up your life in the attempt!"

The most elaborate arrangements were planned to make the blow decisive, beginning with the preliminary bombardment at 10 p.m. on May 1, while the infantry crawled up on hands and knees until the moment came to charge. The front rank carried no ammunition, being ordered to rely on the bayonet. Officers had coloured Bengal lights to fire from their pistols —red as a signal to the gunners to lengthen their range; white to indicate that the invaders' front trenches had

The Day's "Bag": Turkish prisoners on the march to the British base through a typical bit of the campaigning ground. (From an official photograph)

been carried; green that their main position had been stormed. The final onslaught was made in close formation in orthodox German fashion, and with no less reckless courage. It fell, unfortunately, upon a section of the 86th Brigade in the Krithia region weakened by the loss of all the officers thereabouts. The line gave under the first overwhelming impact of the Turks, but was instantly straightened out by the 5th Royal Scots—Edinburgh Territorials, "brought in by one of the fortunes of war", as one correspondent expressed it, "to make the 12th Regiment of the immortal 29th Division" —who, in Sir Ian Hamilton's words, "faced to their flank and executed a brilliant bayonet charge against the enemy"; as well as by the 1st Battalion Essex Regiment, detached for the purpose by the officer commanding the 88th Brigade. German ruses were as marked on this front as in the Flanders theatre of war. One account of this critical engagement describes how the Germans, having heard those of the British troops who had been forced out of one of the gullies call out: "Come on, Essex" to the reinforcements, took up the cry to lure the regiment on still farther in the dark. Hearing this decoy call from one of the lost trenches in the gully, Lieutenant-Colonel Godfrey Faussett, D.S.O., stepped forward with Major H. J. Sammut, and both fell at once, mortally wounded.

"Even at this moment", adds Reuter's correspondent, in recording this incident, "it was not realized that the men had bumped right into the Turks—that they were actually only about 10 yards away, and that the voices that had been calling out "Come on, Essex" were not only British, but German as well. Lance-Corporal Ellingham ran to help the colonel, but was shot. Then Private Staunton ran unarmed to the assistance of his colonel. Suddenly he realized the situation, and crawling back on his stomach took a rifle from the hand of a dead comrade and shot a Turk just ahead of the colonel. Unfortunately the magazine of the rifle contained just this one shot, so all Staunton could do was to lie on his stomach quite still and pretend to be dead. His pack the next morning was found to be simply torn to shreds by the passage of bullets."

In the meantime another company of the Essex, under Captain Arthur G. L. Pepys, had approached the gully from another direction, and, attacking the enemy from the left, soon cleared him out. For thus saving the situation at this point, as well as for "conspicuous good work" throughout the operations from the landing on April 25, Captain Pepys was awarded the Military Cross. The rest of the line along the British front during this furious attack on the night of May 1 was held with comparative ease, the danger-zone next passing to the French left, where the Senegalese were vainly struggling against the weight of superior numbers. At one time a portion of their trenches fell into the enemy's hands, but two companies of the Worcesters were sent forward to hold the gap, and, with two British field-artillery brigades and a howitzer battery behind them, the position was maintained for the remainder of the night. It was for this and other excellent work that the 4th Worcesters were singled out for

General D'Amade, in command of the French troops in Gallipoli until invalided home
(From a photograph by H. Manuel, Paris)

praise in the following brigade order:—

"The Brigade Commander wishes to place on record the great gallantry and devotion to duty displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel D. E. Cayley, officers, and men of the 4th Battalion Worcestershire Regiment during the operations since landing was effected on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The battalion has always been well in hand, and not a single straggler has been reported. They are a splendid example to the brigade."

Thus worthily had the 4th Battalion, like the 2nd Battalion in Flanders and northern France, upheld the traditions of a regiment which Wellington, a century before, had described in one of his letters as the best in his army.

The Royal Naval Division also distinguished itself in the crisis of the great Turkish onslaught, when it was sent forward to strengthen the extreme right of the French at 2 a.m. Three hours later a counter-attack was ordered along the whole line, and at first promised complete success. "We had them fairly on the run", reported Sir Ian Hamilton, and but for the machine-guns and barbed wire they would not have stopped short of the crest of Achi Baba. Unluckily, while the British left and centre pushed the enemy back all along their front, and the French gained some ground in conjunction with the British right, the main French line was held fast. Thus, subjected to heavy cross-fire, the British advance lines were compelled to return to their former trenches. The enemy's great attack, however, had failed, leaving 350 prisoners in

Major-General Sir A. G. Hunter-Weston in the Trenches leading to his Dug-out in Gallipoli

Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, C.B., Sir Ian Hamilton's Chief of Staff
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

our hands, and piling the ground in front of the British trenches with dead. Another assault was made during the following night (May 2), this time confined to the French lines, but also repulsed with loss. A similar fate awaited yet another attack on the French troops on the night of May 3–4; but in repeatedly beating back the enemy our Allies had themselves lost so heavily that a portion of their line was taken over by the 2nd Naval Brigade, which for its share of the fighting during the next few days earned the thanks of General d'Amade in the following letter, addressed to Sir Ian Hamilton from the French Head-quarters on May 9:—

"Sedd-el-Bahr.

"At the moment when, in accordance with § 3 of General Order No. 7 of this date, I give back the 2nd Naval Brigade to the Composite Division, it is a pleasant duty to tell you how greatly I have appreciated the brilliant qualities of the three valiant battalions—Anson, Howe, and Hood—of which it is composed.

"It is for me a great honour and a great satisfaction to have had during May 6, 7, 8, and 9 the devoted, active, and ever-ready co-operation of Commodore Backhouse, who has inspired his troops with the noble qualities which have won the respect of every French soldier who has seen them in action.

"I have the honour to be, with respect, mon Général, votre très obéissant subordonné,

"(Signed) D'AMADE."

This generous tribute was reciprocated in Sir Ian Hamilton's testimony, in his dispatch of May 20, to the priceless services rendered by the French Commander and his troops throughout these operations. "During the fighting which followed the landing of the French Division at Sedd-el-Bahr", he wrote, "no troops could have acquitted themselves more creditably under very trying circumstances, and under very heavy losses, than those working under the command of Monsieur le Général d'Amade." Always, said Sir Ian Hamilton in this connection, "M. le Général d'Amade has given me the benefit of his wide experiences of war, and has afforded me the most loyal and energetic support". It must have been a hard blow to the British Commander-in-Chief, therefore, when General d'Amade, almost immediately afterwards, was invalided home. It was reported that he had been ill for some days previously. His successor, appointed on May 10, was General Gouraud, who, from his valiant leader-

ship in the forest campaign against the army of the German Crown Prince, had earned the title of "The Lion of the Argonne". The youngest officer of his rank in the rejuvenated French army—he was only forty-seven—he had spent the best years of his life in the French Colonial army, and knew by heart how to get the best out of the African troops who formed so large a part of the French Expeditionary Forces in the Dardanelles. A few weeks later Vice-Admiral Nicol was sent to the Straits to command the French fleet in place of Rear-Admiral Guépratte, who remained as his second-in-command. Like General Gouraud, Vice-Admiral Nicol was the youngest of his rank in the French service, and enjoyed the reputation of being one of its most brilliant officers.

Of his own right-hand men Sir Ian Hamilton wrote in terms of the highest praise. His tribute to Sir W. R. Birdwood, who was created a K.C.M.G. in the next Birthday Honours List, has already been quoted. Of Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, who received promotion on the same occasion for distinguished service in the field, he wrote that he was "the best Chief of the General Staff it has ever been my fortune to encounter in war". Major-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, though sorely tried not only during the landings but also during the night attacks and counter-attacks which followed, was "untiring, resourceful, and ever more cheerful as the outlook (on occasion) grew darker" and displayed, in Sir Ian Hamilton's opinion, exceptional qualifications as a commander of troops in the field. A few months later, however, Major-General Hunter-Weston was obliged to relinquish his command on account of ill-health. The King acknowledged his services with the Knight-Commandership of the Bath.

While the 2nd Naval Brigade was fighting side by side with the French troops in the operations of May 6–9, referred to by General d'Amade in the letter printed on p. 165, the whole Allied line was making a great effort to storm the heights of Achi Baba—the Spion Kop of the Gallipoli Peninsula, as it has been described. Achi Baba, with its flat summit rising 730 feet above sea-level, commanded the one road from Sedd-el-Bahr to Maidos, on the opposite side of the peninsula to Gaba Tepe, where the Australians had effected their lodgment only some 5 miles away, and were constantly threatening the Turkish communications. The capture of Achi Baba would not by any means solve the whole problem, but it would open the door to a commanding position dominating the group of hills and valleys extending beyond Maidos to Saribair (971 feet) and Khoja Chemen Dagh (950 feet), all of which had to be captured before the shores of the Narrows could be occupied and the safety of the passage ensured for the fleet. These heights overlooked most of the forts which guarded the Narrows. From some of them it was almost possible to look right into the formidable defence works along the shore without the slightest risk of shell-fire, the monster guns of the European redoubts being of necessity so arranged that they could only be directed towards the

The Allies in Gallipoli: Sir Ian Hamilton with General Gouraud—"The Lion of the Argonne"—who succeeded General d'Amade in command of the French troops

Narrows. These hills and valleys had to be captured, one by one, until the European forts and the defence works on the Asiatic shore had all been silenced; but with Achi Baba fallen, the rest would be merely a question of time, and once the fleet was past the Narrows the fate of Constantinople was sealed. Hence the vital importance of capturing Achi Baba at the earliest possible moment.

First, however, it was necessary to obtain possession of the mountainous ground to left and right; for Achi Baba was like the head of some rugged, defiant colossus, who, lying prone along the peninsula, had raised himself on his elbows to face the entrance to the Dardanelles, with arms outstretched on the right towards the Gulf of Saros, and on the left to the shores of the straits. The right arm stretched just above the village of Krithia to the great nullah running towards it from Y 2 beach, a ravine which, honeycombed with Turkish trenches, hedged about with barbed wire, and covered with scrub affording ideal cover for snipers, proved a deadly obstacle to the British advance. This was the pitiless Valley of Death which came to be known as Gully Ravine. Overshadowed by craggy hills, and with all manner of extraordinary twists and turns which no one would suspect from the smooth line marking it on the map, it provided the Turks with ideal conditions for their favourite weapon of war—the spade.

It is necessary to dwell somewhat at length on these landmarks, because they form the chief background of the costly struggle which now raged unceasingly through the ensuing months. The left arm of Achi Baba, it should also be borne in mind, extended towards Te Totts Battery overlooking the Dardanelles, and bordered the river-bed known as Kereves Dere, which largely controlled the operations on the French right. Such was the situation when, reinforced on May 5 by the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade of the East Lancashire Division —placed in reserve behind the British left with a force of Australians and New Zealanders and an Indian Brigade—Sir Ian Hamilton ordered the general advance to begin on the following day. Then opened the three-days' battle in the hope of carrying Krithia, if not Achi Baba itself, by direct assault, the British facing the right arm of the colossus and the French the left, the road to Maidos roughly forming the join in the Allies' line, though some of our troops were across the road supporting the French left. The struggle was one of a series of remarkable Battles of the Nations for a few miles of ground as stubbornly contested as any in the history of the war. The scene was well depicted by Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett in one of his dispatches from the front.

"Side by side in the Anglo-French army there fought English, Scottish, and Irish regiments, Australians and New Zealanders, Sikhs, Punjabis, and Ghurkas, while the navy was represented by the Marines and the Naval Volunteer Division. On the other side of the Krithia road, in the French ranks, were drawn up Frenchmen, Algerians, Zouaves, Goumiers, Senegalese, and the heterogeneous elements of the Foreign Legion. On either flank, out in

the Dardanelles and along the Gulf of Saros, close inshore, lay our battleships and cruisers, with their guns trained to sweep every yard of the enemy's position. Farther off rose the forest of masts and funnels of the immense fleet of transports which had disgorged this mixed host between the forbidding, sombre arms of Achi Baba."

It was fitting that no ordinary host should thus be mustered in the classic region of epic warfare. A new Iliad had opened with the arrival of the Allies so near to the traditional site of ancient Troy. In the Homeric struggle which took place between May 6 and 9 the Allies did everything that mortal man could do against impossible odds, but the fiercest charges and the most stupendous bombardments ever heard by anyone present failed to dislodge the enemy from positions which suited his tactics to perfection. Some trenches were carried both by the French and the British, and a certain amount of ground was gained by the Allies everywhere, but the main object of the attack was not achieved, Achi Baba still hurling maledictions on the invaders, and Krithia remaining equally defiant. The greatest advance was made on the third day, when the New Zealand Brigade moved up from the reserve to pass through the 88th Brigade for the final assault, with the Australian Brigade on their left, who passed through the Naval Brigade for the same purpose, on the left of the Krithia Road.

Behind their own Barbed Wire: Turkish Prisoners in the British Camp. (From an official photograph)

This final assault was preceded by a terrific bombardment from every ship afloat and every battery ashore, the whole ceasing as suddenly as it began as a signal for the infantry to

attack, and carrying the fire immediately afterwards to the higher ground beyond them. Instantly line after line of khaki figures leapt forward to the assault, while the light- and dark-blue columns burst from the French trenches at the same time, the sun glittering on the bayonets of each.

"The New Zealanders", wrote Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett, "hurled themselves forward in a solid phalanx, passing through the 88th Brigade, and many of the gallant men of those regiments, refusing to yield any right of way to them, joined their ranks and rushed forward in their mad charge. The line entered one Turkish trench with a rush, bayoneted all there, and then passed on into broken ground, shooting and stabbing. Men fell amidst the terrible fusillade, but not one turned back. No sooner had one line charged, than another pressed on after it, and then a third."

In like manner the Australians and New Zealanders on the right charged simultaneously, but over ground which provided practically no cover. They plunged into a storm of shot and shell which caused them cruel losses, and was so concentrated that the patter of countless bullets and the bursting of shrapnel in the sandy soil enveloped the whole line in clouds of dust. The manner in which those Dominion troops went forward, said Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett, would never be forgotten by those who witnessed it. Their lines, advancing with the steadiness of the parade-ground, melted away under the merciless fusillade, but were as quickly renewed as reserves and supports unhesitatingly advanced to fill the gap. Every step brought Krithia nearer, but only at frightful cost; and at the end of an hour it was obvious that the attack had spent its force. Yet not a man attempted to return to the trenches. These Australians and New Zealanders, in the words of the same correspondent, "were determined not to budge, and proceeded to entrench themselves where they lay and reply as well as they could to their concealed enemy, not one of whom disclosed his position.

After the Fight: an Australian giving a drink to a wounded Turk. (From an official photograph)

Similar scenes were enacted along the whole line, until darkness at length brought the three-days' battle to a close, leaving the Allies free to consolidate their new positions. If they had gained comparatively little ground, they had at least forced the enemy to disclose his strength and give them the full measure of the task ahead. That task, it was now clear, was

impossible of achievement by direct assault of the classical type. It could only be accomplished by beating the enemy at his own game—the form of trench warfare which developed all the magnificent fighting qualities of the Turks—and bringing up an unlimited supply of munitions, especially of high-explosive shells, to clear the path for the infantry. The lessons learned at Neuve Chapelle and elsewhere along the western front were thus applied with even greater force in Gallipoli, where the difficulties of attack were incomparably greater. Not only was the enemy holding a natural fortress of stupendous strength, but both flanks, stretching down to the water's edge, were incapable of being turned by land, and one of them —the Dardanelles flank—was secure from assault by sea.

At the close of the great attack which ended on May 9, the following "Special Order of the Day" was issued by Brigadier-General E. M. Woodward, Deputy Adjutant-General of the Expeditionary Force:—

"General Head-quarters,
"*May 9th*, 1915.

"Sir Ian Hamilton wishes the troops of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to be informed that in all his past experiences, which include the hard struggles of the Russo-Japanese campaign, he has never seen more devoted gallantry displayed than that which has characterized their efforts during the past three days. He has informed Lord Kitchener by cable of the bravery and endurance displayed by all ranks here, and has asked that the necessary reinforcements be forthwith dispatched. Meanwhile, the remainder of the East Lancashire Division is disembarking and will henceforth be available to help us to make good and improve upon the positions we have so hardly won."

The history of events during the next few weeks largely resembles that of the siege warfare on the Allied front in Flanders. Every effort was strained to make the positions won at such heavy cost as impregnable as possible, progress up to the beginning of June being attempted only by advancing gradually from one *point d'appui* to another.

Waiting in vain for the Allies again to hurl themselves against his deadly entrenchments and redoubts, the enemy himself took the offensive on May 12 against General Cox's Brigade. Beating off the attack with heavy loss, a double company of Gurkhas retaliated on the following day with an advance of over half a mile, and held the new position in the face of repeated counter-attacks. Next it was the turn of the Lancashire Territorial Division, who made considerable progress on the night of May 16, repeating the process on the following night. Then came a successful move by the French army on the right, the 1st Division of which seized and held on May 21 a substantial slice of territory which took them close to the Turkish trenches. In return for this the enemy launched a determined attack on the following day against the left of the Indian Brigade; but, though he succeeded in gaining a temporary foothold, a strong counter-attack, at once organized, drove him back with a loss of over 500 men. Every day during the rest of the month saw improvement in the

Allies' position before Achi Baba, the French in conjunction with the British Naval Division making another considerable advance both on the 24th and the 28th, and the Lancashire Territorials also pushing forward again. For the time being the plan of attack had thus resolved itself into a close adoption of General Joffre's slow but sure policy of nibbling and consolidating, with constant shell-fire and sniping on both sides, and repeated but futile attempts on the part of the Turks to carry out General Liman von Sanders' threat to drive the Allies into the sea.

The most determined effort in this direction was made on May 18–19 against the Australians and New Zealanders north of Gaba Tepe, where they were a perpetual thorn in the enemy's side, holding up a large proportion of his forces to prevent them from cutting right across his lines of communication to the south. Shelling and sniping failed to make any impression on the Colonials' strong position—two semicircles of hills which were now so firmly held that the defenders had reason to regard them as invulnerable. Every sector was self-contained, and every hill, valley, or post named after some phase or hero of the campaign, or after some familiar spot "down under", such as Dead Man's Ridge, Quinn's Post, and Shrapnel Valley. Good roads had been made from the foreshore to the front trenches, and field-guns, howitzers, and Indian mountain batteries had added tremendously to the strength of the whole position. How strong this was the Turks did not realize until May 18–19, when General Liman von

Brigadier-General W. T. Bridges, C.M.G., mortally wounded while commanding the Australians in Gallipoli
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

Sanders delivered what he fondly hoped would be a series of death-blows to these audacious Colonials. He brought up at least 30,000 of his crack troops, massed them against the invaders' positions, and in the early hours of the morning, after furious bombardments, hurled them time after time against various points along the Australasian front. The full force of these desperate attacks was reserved for Quinn's Post and Courtney's Post; but the Colonials' line never budged. These onslaughts in the open gave them the chance they had waited for. Hitherto they had been compelled to fight, since their landing, against heavy odds and usually an invisible foe. Now they had the Turks in the open, and

they made the most of their opportunity. They also had to avenge the death of Brigadier-General W. T. Bridges, C.M.G., commanding the Australian contingent, who died of wounds received in the early stages of the fighting. Brigadier-General Bridges, who first saw active service with the Australians in the South African War, was the first commandant of the Royal Military College in Australia, and in 1914 had been appointed Inspector-General of the Commonwealth Forces, in the organization of which he had rendered invaluable services. "The whole force mourns the death of Brigadier-General Bridges", cabled Sir Ian Hamilton to the Australian Governor-General. "The irreparable loss was brilliantly avenged yesterday by his own troops, who inflicted a loss of 7000 on the enemy, our cost being under 700." Only just before his death the King had conferred a knighthood on the Australian commander "in recognition of the most distinguished service in the field". New Zealand, and the whole world of sport, also suffered a grievous loss this month in the death of Mr. A. F. Wilding, the famous lawn-tennis player. Mr. Wilding had received a commission in the Royal Marines in the month following the outbreak of war, and, after serving through part of the siege of Antwerp, fell in Gallipoli on May 9, by which time he had been promoted to the rank of captain.

Mr. A. F. Wilding, the famous lawn-tennis player, killed in Gallipoli
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

Though the official estimate of the Turkish losses on May 19 was put at 7000 it was afterwards judged from prisoners' reports that not less than a third of the whole attacking army was wiped out. Not a single Turk succeeded in entering a Colonial trench except as a prisoner or on the point of a bayonet, for some of them charged right up to the parapets, only to be shot at close range or bayoneted. After the attack General Birdwood took Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett round the front lines with him, and they found the troops much more contented with themselves and with life generally than they had been for a long time past. The correspondent mentioned that in reply to a question of the General: "How many did you kill?" the answer came: "That I can't say, General, but look out here. There are eight acres of them lying round." Another happy warrior remarked: "You put 'em up for us, General, and

we'll shoot all you want." Two days later the enemy asked for and were granted an armistice to enable them to bury the Turkish dead lying close to the British trenches. Over 3000 Turks were buried in front of these positions—all killed between May 18 and 20. Many more fell at longer range, and the number of wounded must have been enormous.

The first Victoria Cross to fall to the Australians in this war was won in the thick of the fight at Courtney's Post by Lance-Corporal Albert Jacka, 14th Battalion Australian Imperial Forces. While all except himself in his portion of the position were killed or wounded, the trench was rushed and occupied by seven Turks. Nothing daunted, Lance-Corporal Jacka, in the words of the *Gazette* in which his deed is recorded, "at once most gallantly attacked them single-handed, and killed the whole party, five by rifle-fire and two with the bayonet."

The total losses of the Turco-German forces in the peninsula up to this date were estimated at not less than 55,000. Our own casualties—naval as well as military—up to the end of May, 1915, were given on the Prime Minister's authority on July 1 as 38,636. The magnitude of the task confronting Sir Ian Hamilton may be gauged when it is remembered that these figures already exceeded by exactly 480 the corresponding total in killed, wounded, and missing for the whole of the last Boer War.

F. A. M.

Mounted Infantry in Action: an Affair of Outposts

CHAPTER X

THE SUBMARINE BLOCKADE AND THE *LUSITANIA*

(April–June, 1915)

Barbarity at Sea—Torpedoings without Warning—Attacks on Neutrals—The *Emma*, the *Ptarmigan*, the *Katwyk*, and the *Hellespontos*—The Spirit of Admiral Tirpitz—Variations in Submarine Activity—The *Guiflight*—The German Warning to America—The Quality of the *Lusitania*—The German Accusations Lack of Evidence—The Sinking of the *Lusitania*—The Plea of the German Government—Submarine Warfare and Commerce—Germany and the United States—Affairs of Outposts—The *Maori* and Others—The Balance of the Blockade—Changes at the Admiralty—Sir Henry Jackson—Explosion in the *Princess Irene*.

THE course of the German submarine blockade was recorded in Vol. II down to the destruction of the s.s. *Falaba* on March 28, 1915. It might well appear at the time "that the enemy had gone as far as he could in the way of barbarity of method, and would be unable to surpass his own standard as fixed on this occasion". A Board of Trade enquiry, presided over by Lord Mersey, was held on the loss of the vessel. In giving his judgment the President stated that "the captain of the submarine desired and designed not merely to sink the ship, but in doing so also to sacrifice the lives of the passengers". Lord Mersey's finding was amply supported by the evidence. There was an obvious intention to slaughter, not for the purpose of gaining a victory, but in pure hate and in order to terrorize. A horrified onlooker might pardonably ask whether it was in the power of the most unscrupulous foe to go further, and answer his own question in the negative. Yet within six weeks of the sinking of the *Falaba* a German submarine officer showed that an act could be performed which would make the barbarity of March 28 look by comparison humane. The submarine which sank the *Falaba* did at least approach on the surface, showing the British flag in order to deceive her victim, but hoisting her own before she struck, did summon the merchant-ship to surrender, and did make a show of allowing the crew and passengers to escape in the boats. The officer who sent the giant Cunard liner *Lusitania* to the bottom on May 7 omitted even these colourable imitations of open and honest warfare.

The story would be falsified, and the action would not be put in its proper relation, if the sinking of the Cunarder were so told as to leave the impression that it was unprecedented in this war. It is not the mere number of deaths caused which constitutes the barbarity in the conduct of our assailant; it is the animus, the deliberate intention to kill where killing was not necessary in order to carry out a legitimate operation of war. When, for instance, the French s.s. *Emma* was torpedoed on March 31, 12 miles south of Beachy Head, and when the *Ptarmigan* was also tor-

pedoed on her way from Rotterdam to London on April 15, both without warning, with the loss of nineteen lives in the first case and eight in the second, there was "a pang as great as when a giant dies". There was also as much ferocity of spirit as was shown on May 7. The officers who sent these comparatively small steamers—of 1617 and 1000 tons respectively—to the bottom and sacrificed twenty-seven lives would have rejoiced to inflict as fatal and hidden a blow on the *Lusitania*. The opportunity was lacking, not the capacity for ferocity. The menace was undisguised; the ruthlessness was paraded.

Notice was taken in Vol. II (p. 333) of an apparent slackening in the unscrupulous treatment of neutrals by the German submarines towards the end of March, 1915. This show of comparative mildness was perhaps due to accident. It was certainly not visible in April. On the 14th of that month the Dutch steamer *Katwyk* was torpedoed near the North Hinder Light, on the Banks of Flanders, and on the 17th the Greek steamer *Hellespontos* was destroyed in the same way at the same place. These two sorry achievements are to be noted not only because they display the spirit in which the German navy was doing its work, but because the Imperial Government found it advisable to offer apologies and indemnities in both cases. When this fact is taken in connection with a lively domestic dispute of later date, it seems to point to the conclusion that here, as in other fields, the pedantic militarism of the German fighting services was straining to escape the control of their own masters. We have already shown how Admiral von Tirpitz threatened the United States in December, 1914, and quoted the terms of the German Admiralty warning to neutrals on February 4, 1915. He and his spokesman, Count Reventlow, had always argued that because war by its very nature implies the use of violence, therefore the more violently war is conducted the better. If, as we must needs recognize was the case, this was the spirit in which the naval war was conducted, then it follows that only the lack of opportunity could avert the perpetration of any barbarity. A man who avowed the opinions of Admiral von Tirpitz was sure to be quite capable of encouraging all excesses, and of throwing the burden of averting trouble with neutral States on the Foreign Office of his own Government.

When we survey the progress of the submarine warfare in home waters during April, 1915, we can now see that the destruction of the *Lusitania* was led up to. The actual amount of damage done varied from week to week. About the middle and towards the end of the month it sank to a minimum. By the beginning of May the "blockade", so called, seemed to have sunk to a mere form. A single British steamer was destroyed in one week, and the movement of trade showed no diminution. The ebb and flow of commerce-destroying is, however, not always due to the absence of assailants. A submarine like the surface cruisers of former times may have bad fortune in meeting vessels

to attack. It may have been the case that the submarines were called in. The German battleships were known to have been out, presumably only for practice, in the North Sea, and the under-water craft may have been brought back to guard them. The precautions taken by the British Admiralty had no doubt a considerable effect. There was an absence of submarine activity in the Channel after the end of March, 1915, which was significant. The North Sea was more mined. Limitations were, in short, imposed, and the German Admiralty was aware of them. There may have been an interval of watching and of alteration of plans. Yet the submarine warfare never quite ceased. It was felt more or less in waters which could be safely reached—in the North Sea near the German base at Zeebrugge, along the coasts of Scotland, to the South of Ireland, and around the Scilly Isles. There was no abatement of ruthlessness. The torpedoing of the s.s. *Harpalyce* near the North Hinder on April 11 was a signal example. She was engaged in carrying relief to Belgian non-combatants. Yet she was sunk, with the loss of many lives. The attack on the American steamer *Gulflight* was a glaring proof of German disregard of neutrals. She was torpedoed and forced to run on the beach in Crow Sound on May 1. A longish list might be made of Norwegian boats torpedoed or set on fire. A regular campaign of destruction was directed against trawlers. Sixteen were destroyed in the week ending on May 5 alone.

The attack on the *Gulflight* gave point to a document published in American newspapers on the very day on which she was driven on shore in Crow Sound. Taking the form of an advertisement dated April 22, and issued by the German Embassy at Washington, it ran as follows:—

"Travellers intending to embark for an Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that in accordance with the formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or any of her allies are liable to destruction in those waters; and that travellers sailing in the war zone in ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk".

It is difficult to believe that the drafting of this advertisement just before the *Lusitania* was to sail was a mere coincidence. There were at least some intending passengers who took it for a menace to that particular vessel and who thought it more prudent to travel in another.

The exceptional position of the *Lusitania* must be borne in mind, for it gave the German Government an additional motive for bringing about her destruction. She was one of two vessels—the sister ship being the *Mauretania*—which were built by the Cunard Company in pursuance of an arrangement with the Admiralty. Their construction was decided on at a time when there was a loudly-expressed belief that large and swift steamers, meant primarily for trade or to carry passengers, but capable of

being used for warlike purposes, would be of great value. The company undertook to provide two such vessels and to fit them with the means of mounting guns. The Admiralty paid

Captain Turner of the *Lusitania*

a yearly subvention for the right to call on them, and they were allowed to carry the naval-reserve flag. Their names appeared on the Navy List as "Royal Naval Reserved Merchant-cruisers", and it was accurate to say that they belonged in a real sense to the navy. There had always been a doubt in the minds of some critics as to how far ships of such size, rising high above the water, and therefore presenting a huge target of the thin plates used in the construction of merchant-ships, could be of real use in war. The *Lusitania* was 785 feet long, 88 feet broad, and her gross tonnage was 31,550. There was, of course, one way in which she might be made available for Admiralty service. Though she was built as a swift passenger-ship, and a very large proportion of her space was occupied by engines and cabins, and her actual capacity was small in comparison to her tonnage, still she could carry a good deal, and her speed, 26.6 knots at her best, would enable her to escape the pursuit of most cruisers. These qualities would make her valuable as a carrier of ammunition.

When the war broke out the Admiralty did not call on the company to hand the *Lusitania* over to them for service. She continued to be employed as a passenger-ship. The German Government has maintained, and continued to maintain, that the British Admiralty was guilty of what would have been a singularly mean device. It alleged, and went on alleging, that though the *Lusitania* continued to run as a passenger-ship she was loaded with contraband in the form of explosives, that the travellers who crossed the Atlantic in her were simply a blind, and that they were, in fact, allowed to embark in ignorance of the danger they were running, and in the hope that their presence would

save the ship from attack. The Germans quoted the undoubted fact that the *Lusitania* was warned at an earlier stage of the war to hoist the American flag when approaching the coast of Ireland as a proof that she was really in the service of the Admiralty. This assertion was firmly denied both at home and in America, and it was impossible to believe that the German Government possessed evidence of the truth of its charge. If it had, it possessed an easy means of both stopping the *Lusitania* and discrediting the British Admiralty. The laws of the United States forbid the carrying of large quantities of explosives in passenger-ships. Had the German Government held even prima facie evidence that explosives were being smuggled on board contrary to the United States law it would have taken the correct legal steps to call the offenders to account. It had every reason for taking this course, since a demonstration that the British Admiralty was making a gross and most insulting abuse of the hospitality of the port of New York must have produced an impression highly favourable to Germany on public opinion in America. There can be but one explanation of the failure of the German Embassy at Washington to avail itself of so effective a weapon; and it is, of course, that there was no proof of the alleged violation of neutrality and American law. The fact, which was acknowledged in the finding of the court of enquiry presided over by Lord Mersey, that she carried 4200 cases of ammunition did not constitute such an offence.

The *Lusitania* left New York on May 1, 1915—the day on which the warning given above appeared in American papers—and she was off the Old Head of Kinsale on the south coast of Ireland by 2.30 p.m. on the 7th. The leading facts of the shocking disaster which now occurred cannot be better given than in the plain words

The Destruction of the *Lusitania*, off the Old Head of Kinsale, May 7, 1915: Map showing the distance thence to Liverpool.

of her commander, Captain W. T. Turner, at the inquest on the 10th:—

"The weather was clear, and we were going at a speed of 18 knots. I was on the port side, and I heard the second officer Hefford call out: 'Here's a torpedo'. I ran over to the other side and saw clearly the wake of the torpedo. Smoke and steam came up between the last two funnels, and there was a slight shock. Immediately after the first explosion there was another report, but that might possibly have been internal. I at once gave the order to lower the boats down to the rails, and I directed that the women and children should be got

into them. I also gave orders to 'stop ship', but we could not stop her. We found the engines were out of commission. It was not safe to lower boats until speed was off. The vessel did not stop; as a matter of fact there was a perceptible headway on her up to the time she went down. The moment she was struck she listed to starboard.

"I stood on the bridge as she sank and the *Lusitania* went down under me. She floated about eighteen minutes after the torpedo struck her. My watch stopped at 2.36½. I was picked up from among the wreckage, and was afterwards brought aboard a trawler. No war-ship was convoying me. I saw no war-ship; none was reported to me as having been seen. Eighteen knots was not the normal speed of the *Lusitania*. At ordinary times she could make 25 knots, but in war time her speed was reduced to 21 knots. My reason for going 18 knots was that I wanted to arrive at Liverpool Bar without stopping and within two or three hours of high water. Double look-outs were kept for submarines, and we were not going a zigzag course. It was bright weather, and the land was clearly visible. It was quite possible for a submarine to approach without being seen"

One detail must be added. The *Lusitania* carried 1257 passengers, and her crew numbered 700. There were therefore 1957 persons—all non-combatants—in this vessel which was sent to destruction within a few minutes. Many of the passengers who were lost were citizens of the United States. Among them were a member of the Vanderbilt family, and Mr. Frohman, the well-known theatrical manager.

The loss among the passengers is summarized in the finding of the court published on July 18. "Of these 944 were British and Canadian, 159 were American, and the remainder were of seventeen other nationalities. Of the British and Canadians 584 perished, of the American 124 perished, and of the remainder 77 perished. The total number of passengers lost was 785; the total number saved 472. Of 688 males 421 were lost, of 400 females 270 were lost. Of 90 children 59 were lost, and of 39 infants only 4 were saved."

Nothing would be gained by dwelling on the horrors of the scene. They could not differ from those which follow on a suddenly disastrous collision or stranding. The witnesses, even when they are honestly desirous to tell the truth, can only report what they thought they saw. Many do not understand what is passing about them, and they are liable to take their own imaginings, or hasty deductions from things half seen in moments of emergency and agitation, for matters of fact. The complaint made by some of the passengers that the boats were not cleared away with sufficient speed only shows how little they realized the difficulties of the task. Experienced judges know already that the best supply of boats and the smartest handling is of little avail when a ship sinks rapidly, and most of all when she has a list or leans much on one side. It is impossible to lower them on the side which is rising, and very hard to clear them with success on the side which is sinking. In the circumstances it was astonishing that about a third of the passengers and crew were saved. The charges of misconduct brought against the crew by a few of the passengers were dismissed

by the court, and one of the ship's company, Leslie N. Morton, was singled out for particular praise by Lord Mersey. The loss would have been greater but for the aid rendered by a trawler in the neighbourhood.

The rapidity with which the *Lusitania* sank caused surprise. She was built with a double shell and numerous watertight compartments, yet she went down in about twenty minutes. It was but natural that the German Government should avail itself of this instantaneous sinking of the *Lusitania* to affirm and to reiterate the charge that she was carrying ammunition. On May 15 their Admiralty published this official version of the story:—

"The report sent in by the submarine which sank the *Lusitania* contains the following details. The boat sighted the steamer, which was flying no flag, on May 7 in the afternoon, off the south coast of Ireland in fine weather. At three o'clock one torpedo was fired at the *Lusitania*, which struck her on the starboard side about on a line with the bridge. The shot was followed by a loud explosion, and the ship listed to starboard and commenced to sink. The second explosion must have been due to the setting on fire of the huge quantity of ammunition which she carried."

Drawn by Norman Wilkinson

The Sinking of the *Lusitania*, May 7, 1915: Scene as the mammoth liner heeled over after being torpedoed without warning by a German submarine

This position was consistently maintained by the German Government in spite of its own inability to produce any evidence of the explosion of ammunition in the ship. Lord Mersey was convinced that none took place, and dismissed as incredible the testimony of the only witness who asserted the contrary. Many questions were asked in connection with the loss of the *Lusitania*. Some surprise was

caused by the mere fact that she was allowed to make the coast of Ireland unprotected, though another steamer, the *Cayo Romano*, had been attacked in those very waters a few days before. But Mr. Churchill, who was still First Lord of the Admiralty, firmly refused to enter into explanations, which could not be given without revealing facts which it was necessary to conceal. His statement to the House of Commons on May 10 contained a sentence which it is necessary to bear in mind, in view not only of the disaster of the *Lusitania*, but of subsequent events. He said that the resources at the disposal of the Admiralty "will not allow us to supply destroyer escorts for merchant or passenger-ships, more than 200 of which, on an average, arrive and depart every day. While the Admiralty can keep the narrow parts of the North Sea, or the enclosed waters of the Channel, clear, it cannot supply the same or nearly the same protection in the open waters to the south of Ireland or round the Scilly Isles." The court of inquiry held that the captain of the *Lusitania* had made a correct use of his discretion to follow or to depart from the advice given him by the Admiralty.

The diplomatic correspondence between the German and American Governments which followed from the loss of American citizens did not reach any definite conclusion within the period covered by this chapter. No more can properly be given here than a statement of what was the question at issue between the two. Immediately after the destruction of the ship the German Foreign Office volunteered a statement of its case. It defended its policy on four grounds:

"That the British Government, by endeavouring to starve the civilian population of Germany, compelled her to make a retaliation.

"That British merchant-ships were armed, and were encouraged by the promise of rewards to endeavour to ram the submarines, therefore they were to be treated as warships."

"That the British Press had openly admitted that the *Lusitania* had formerly carried large quantities of ammunition.

"That on the present occasion she was carrying 5400 cases of ammunition and other contraband."

The German Government drew the deduction that if American citizens chose to go in British passenger-vessels in such conditions as these they did so at their own risk. The American Government, while denying that the *Lusitania* was laden with ammunition, took the strong general position that the use of submarines for operations against commerce was in itself illegitimate, since the very nature of these craft made their operations inevitably barbarous.

This is a complicated question, which cannot be discussed here. The issue was in debate between the two when June ended. When we leave all matters of detail aside, and look only at the essentials of the event, only one judgment can be passed on the destruction of the *Lusitania*. To sink such a vessel carrying such a multitude of non-combatants of all ages and both sexes was as barbarous an act as ever was committed in the most inhumane of the old wars—even in civil wars of religion, which have

ever been the most ferocious. It marked a distinct retrogression of the civilized world to ancient levels of barbarity. Even if the Germans had been right as to the character of the *Lusitania's* cargo, still they lost morally by the ferocity of the act, and they did not even inspire the panic they hoped to produce. The glee with which the news of the success of their submarine was universally received in Germany was deeply discreditable. The pleas on which the destruction of hundreds of non-combatants was justified would have excused a slaver captain who drowned a whole cargo to conceal the evidence of his own crimes.

The abomination of May 7 marked a revival of German submarine activity. A few operations of war of a normal character took place. The loss of the torpedo-boat destroyer *Maori*, a vessel of 1035 tons and of a new type (Commander B. W. Barrow), on a mine near the Wielingen lightship, at the entrance to the Schelde, on the 7th, was a common incident of war. When the *Crusader*, a vessel of the same type (Commander Thomas R. Maxwell), endeavoured to save the *Maori's* men who had taken to the boats, the shore battery opened fire. It was found necessary to leave the boats, and ninety-five officers and men became prisoners. On May 1 a brisk encounter took place in the North Sea. The *Barbados* (Lieutenant Sir James Domville, R.N.), *Columbia* (Lieutenant-Commander W. H. Hawthorn, R.N.R.), *Miura* (Sub-Lieutenant Kersley, R.N.R.), and *Chirsit* (Sub-Lieutenant Stapleford, R.N.R.), engaged two German torpedo-boats, drove them to flight, and destroyed them. The *Columbia* was lost with all of her crew of sixteen except one.

On June 10 two British torpedo-boats, Nos. 10 and 12, were torpedoed by a submarine on the east coast and sunk. A few days before, the German submarine U 14 was destroyed and her crew taken prisoners. In connection with this success is to be recorded the fact that Mr. Balfour, who was now at the head of the Admiralty, announced in the House of Commons that the exceptional treatment which had for some time been given the crews of these vessels when captured was to cease. The German Government had retaliated by harsh treatment of British officers who were prisoners of war. This was just what might have been foreseen, and a little thought ought to have prevented the adoption of a measure which was certain to have only one result.

Such incidents as the loss of the *Maori* and the other small encounters have necessarily the air of being fragmentary if not meaningless. It must be understood that they were casual encounters of small outposts, such as occur in all war by land or sea when armed forces are facing one another, and will not, or cannot, come to a decisive encounter. The German fleet would not come to sea, and the British fleet could not force it out. The second could only watch, which entailed some loss to its scouts. The first made itself felt only by its submarines.

These last, however, continued suf-

ficiently active. After May 7, as before that date, the submarine war ebbed and flowed. One week was richer in incident than another. Thus in the week ending June 23 only three British merchant-steamers, of an aggregate of 5261 tons, were sunk; and one which was torpedoed succeeded in reaching port. Two fishing-vessels of 240 tons altogether fell to the enemy. In the course of the next week the number rose to five British and three neutrals. Long lists of names could be made up, but the general character of this part of the naval war can be best estimated by the fact that in no week did the loss amount to more than a fraction of 1 per cent of the entrances and clearances. In other words, in spite of all their successes, the submarines failed to diminish the flow of British commerce. Such as these successes were, they were wholly due to the fact that Great Britain had very many ships at sea, while Germany had none.

A disaster which had no necessary connection with the war occurred on May 27 in Sheerness dockyard. The auxiliary ship *Princess Irene* blew up with the loss of all her crew, except three who were absent on leave, and one survivor who was picked up in the water. Seventy-six dockyard workmen who were engaged on her perished in the explosion.

In the course of May the navy had its share in a political change of a novel though not quite unprecedented kind. On the 19th of the month Mr. Asquith announced to the House of Commons that he proposed to reorganize his Government on a broader personal and political basis. The two great political parties were to coalesce to form a national administration. The composition of the new Cabinet was known on the 26th. It affected the government of the navy profoundly. Mr. Winston Churchill resigned the First Lordship and Lord Fisher ceased to be First Sea Lord. Mr. Churchill was succeeded by Mr. Balfour, who was understood to have been for some time unofficially associated with him. There was a good deal of doubt as to what would be the position of Lord Fisher, as to whether or not he had resigned, or, if so, whether his resignation would be final. The uncertainty ceased when it was known on May 28 that a new Board of Admiralty had been formed, with

The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty in succession to the Right Hon. Winston Churchill
(From a photograph by Russell & Sons)

Admiral Sir Henry B. Jackson, First Sea Lord in succession to Lord Fisher
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

Sir Henry Jackson in the place of First Sea Lord. Lord Fisher shortly afterwards became chairman of the Inventions Board, which was then established "to assist the Admiralty in co-ordinating and encouraging scientific effort in its relation to the requirements of the Naval Service". Sir Henry Jackson, who was already entrusted with special duties at the Admiralty, was one of the best-known and most trusted officers of the navy, both by his active service and his scientific attainments. He had served as Lieutenant of the *Active* in the Zulu War of 1878–9, in command of the Sixth Cruiser Squadron and in the Mediterranean when war broke out. He was called home to give his assistance in the Admiralty. Sir Henry had a long previous experience of administrative work and in the application of science to naval warfare. He was Controller of the Navy in 1905. In 1901 he had been nominated Fellow of the Royal Society for his researches in electrical physics. He was Assistant-Director of Torpedoes in 1902, and Admiralty representative at the International Conference on Aerial Navigation in Paris, 1910. He had the chief share in adapting wireless telegraphy to the use of the navy. His faculties as an organizer inspired the utmost confidence.

The new chiefs of the Admiralty had to promote and direct the measures of precaution which were taken to limit the scope of operations of the hostile submarines. Part of these defences was very properly kept secret. Another part was necessarily made public in the sailing directions given to the merchant service. It showed where obstructions were placed on the movements of the underwater craft in narrow waters—the Channel for instance, all estuaries, and in the passage on the north of Ireland. This policy could not produce its full effect till later, but before the end of June it was already beginning to confine the foe to the trade route to Archangel, and the space of open water between Cape Clear and Finisterre.

D. H.

CHAPTER XI

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

(April–May, 1915)

Strategy of the Spring Campaign—Calais still the Key to German World-power—German Plan to invade Britain—The Coming of the Poisonous Gas—Effect of the First Great Gas Attack—Opening of the Second Battle of Ypres—Allies' Positions before the Attack—The Breach in the Line—How the Canadians saved the Situation—Reserves to the Rescue—Counter-attack by the Canadians—Death of Lieutenant-Colonel Birchall—Sir John French's Agreement with General Foch—Victoria Crosses and other Canadian Battle Honours—Colonel Geddes's Mixed Brigade—Canadians withdrawn from St. Julien—Red-letter Days in the Empire's History—The Canadians relieved—The Empire's Congratulations—How the Northumberland Territorials received their Baptism of Fire—Work of the Lahore Division—The First Airman to win the V.C.—Gallant Territorials—The German Onslaught of May 8—The Patricias' Noble Stand—Cavalry relieve the Central Division—The Attack and Counter-attack of May 13—End of the Three-weeks' Battle—French Advances—The Great Gas Attack of May 24—The Cavalry's Ordeal—Death of Captain Grenfell, V.C.—The New Chief of Staff.

A TRUE idea of the operations along the British front during the spring of 1915 can be gained only by bearing in mind the primary objects of the Allies and their foes. On our side it was still a war of attrition — a deliberate policy to bring about the gradual exhaustion of German resources while we built up an overwhelming force of men and munitions, meantime taking the offensive only when necessary to advance for tactical reasons, as at Neuve Chapelle and Hill 60. On the enemy's side the main objective in the west was still Calais, "the key to German world-power and the destruction of the British Empire". Calais was only 30 miles behind the British line. Once in their possession the Germans were confident that they could use it as a base from which to strike a mortal blow at Britain. With their new guns, having, it was claimed, a range of over 26 miles, they boasted of sweeping the British fleet from the Channel and covering the passage of an invading army in small aluminium boats, the triumphant advance on London after the landing being protected by a mighty fleet of German air-craft. Such at least was the plan openly propounded. First, however, it was necessary to take Calais; and having sacrificed the flower of the Prussian army during the autumn of 1914 in vain attempts to hew a path through Ypres, it only remained to add a new horror to the German name by resort to poisonous gas — "this most damnable invention of the German Military Staff"—as the Bishop of Pretoria described it after witnessing the agonies of its victims in a clearing-hospital at the front. German newspapers applauded their new "technical weapons", just as they applauded the poisoning of the wells in German South-West Africa, and the loss of over 1100 innocent lives when the *Lusitania* was torpedoed without warning. It was merely the continuation of the cynical policy which excused the tearing up of sacred

treaties on the grounds of necessity—German necessity knowing no law. The whole German nation, apparently, had been hypnotized by militarism into this belief, that in war-time all the laws of humanity might be broken with impunity if necessary to secure a victory over the enemy. "Eye-witness", in one of his dispatches at

for breath, their lungs filled with fumes:

"He stopped, looked at them, burst out laughing, and, pointing to the prostrate forms, said: 'What do you think of that?' There have been not a few wounded prisoners, also chiefly of the Prussian Guard, defeated in front of Ypres in November, who have behaved in hospital with the ferocity of wild beasts."

Fighting the Gas Poisoners in Flanders: Belgian troops protected against gas attacks

this period, described the savagery which animated the Germans as almost incredible. He mentions, among other instances, the case of a captured Prussian officer whose life was spared in one of the British charges north of Ypres, when our troops might perhaps have been forgiven for showing less mercy in their exasperation at the enemy's new methods of warfare. While being escorted to the rear this prisoner passed some men who were lying in agony on the ground fighting

Not all Germans were so demoralized by the brutalities of war, though the exception in the following case, quoted by the same authority from the diary of a captured officer, serves only to accentuate the rule—among the Prussians and Bavarians at least:—

"The sight of the trenches and the fury—not to say the bestiality—of our men in beating to death the wounded English affected me so much that for the rest of the day I was fit for nothing".

It was obvious that Germany, when

she first launched her asphyxiating gases against the defenders of Ypres on the evening of April 22, 1915, had not entered upon this new phase without long scientific experiments and exhaustive preparations. Asphyxiating shells, also contrary to the terms of the Hague Convention, signed by Germany with the rest of the Powers, had already been used by the enemy on Hill 60 and elsewhere, but the new attack was a kind hitherto unknown, and probably the most dastardly ever invented by human ingenuity. The poisonous gases—apparently they were of various kinds, including chlorine, vapour of formol, nitrous vapours, and sulphurous anhydride—were contained under pressure in steel pipes sunk in the German trenches, with their nozzles projecting over the parapet. The fumes were of so heavy a nature that when emitted from the cylinders they spread along the ground in dense masses, throwing everyone caught in their toils into a dying or comatose condition, bleaching every blade of grass they passed over, and turning the sandbags of the parapets a bright yellow colour. Having completed the apparatus all along the line round the bulging defences of Ypres, it only remained for the Germans to wait for a favourable wind from the north, provide their own men with respirators, and throw the blame on the Allies for being thus forced to resort to foul means where fair means had proved of no avail. With the transparent trickery of so many of their attempts to cast dust in the eyes of neutrals, it was falsely announced a week before their own attack that we were using these gases on the British front—an accusation which Sir John French at once denied. When the Germans found it impossible to maintain the charge that they were only retaliating in kind, they argued that gassing was as merciful a method of killing as the firing of high explosives. The argument was, of course, untenable, apart from the fact that high explosives were legitimate, while the other device was one which Germany, in common with the other signatories of the Hague Convention, had pledged herself not to employ. This barbarous disregard of the accepted usages of war filled Sir John French with horror and surprise, as may be judged from the words of his dispatch of June 15, 1915:

"All the scientific resources of Germany have apparently been brought into play to produce a gas of so virulent and poisonous a nature that any human being brought into contact with it is first paralysed and then meets with a lingering and agonizing death. . . . The brain power and thought which has evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated in its practice shows that the Germans must have harboured these designs for a long time. As a soldier I cannot help expressing the deepest regret and some surprise that an army which hitherto had claimed to be the chief exponent of the chivalry of war should have stooped to employ such devices against brave and gallant foes."

The first great gas attack very nearly succeeded in letting the Germans through. The Allies were prepared for a new offensive along the front north of Ypres, since many significant movements of troops and

transports had been detected behind the enemy's positions for some days before April 22. The fate of Hill 60 was still hanging in the balance in the southern part of the Ypres salient. East of Ypres the trenches occupied by the French had just been taken over by the British at the request of General

Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Plumer, commanding the 2nd Army Corps at the Second Battle of Ypres (From a photograph by Bassano)

Joffre, so that before the battle on the evening of the 22nd the famous salient was held in the following order:—

From Steenstraate in the north to the east of Langemarck, as far as the cross-roads at Poelcappelle, a French division. Thence, in a south-easterly direction toward the Passchendaele-Becelaere Road, the 3rd and 2nd Canadian Brigades, in the order named. Thence the central British, or Eastern, Division, under General Bulfin, took up the line in a southerly direction east of Zonnebeke to a point west of Becelaere, whence another British division continued the line in a south-westerly direction over Hill 60 to the northern limit of the corps on its right. The whole British force belonged to the 2nd Army Corps, now commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Plumer in succession to General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, who figured in the Birthday Honours list in the following June among the new K.C.M.G.'s for services rendered in the field. Sir Herbert Plumer—a son of Devon, like so many other famous soldiers and sailors in British history—had held a long series of high commands after distinguishing himself in South Africa. At the close of 1914 he succeeded to the command of the Fifth Army Corps, greatly adding to his reputation in this post by repeated proofs of his abilities as a leader in the stubborn fighting round Ypres.

Of the 5th Corps, on the evening of April 22, there were four battalions in Divisional Reserve about Ypres; the Canadian Division had one battalion in Divisional Reserve and the 1st Canadian Brigade in Army Reserve. An infantry brigade, which had just been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses on Hill 60, was resting about Vlamertinghe. It is necessary to bear these facts in mind in following the course of the operations.

Where the British joined the French line our Allies' trenches were held by French Colonials under General Putz —Zouaves, Turcos, and the like, who had proved their mettle on many a

hard-fought field in the Great War. They would undoubtedly have rendered the same account of themselves on April 22 had the German attack been delivered in the usual way, but when their retirement is recalled let it be remembered that the enemy was now using asphyxiating gas for the first time, and that the sight of a dense



Map showing approximately the Allies' line round Ypres before the first great gas surprise by the Germans on April 22, 1915

wall of deadly fumes slowly advancing over the ground, poisoning and suffocating everyone it enveloped, was enough to strike terror into the stoutest hearts. It was between five and half-past on the evening of the 22nd that the gas was released, after a heavy bombardment, a favourable north wind then serving the enemy's diabolical purpose only too well, for the French line west from the cross-roads at Poelcappelle faced almost due north. What followed almost baffles description. Sir John French says that the poisonous gases were so virulent that the whole of the line held by our Allies was practically thrown out of action. No one seemed to realize what had happened. Men were placed *hors de combat* by the hundred, while the smoke and fumes blotted everything out of sight. Luckily the Germans, not a little terrified themselves at the close proximity of the deadly gas, and as yet unfamiliar with its use and possibilities, hesitated to follow up their foul success at once. When, however, it seemed clear that the French had fled, and that the fumes had disappeared, they charged in force, and carried everything before them. Within an hour they had captured the entire position, together with fifty guns, including the 2nd London Heavy Battery. This had been attached to the Canadian Division, but was posted behind the French right, and, becoming involved in their retreat, fell into the enemy's hands. In referring to the whole disaster Sir John French warmly repudiated any idea of attaching the least blame to the French Division for its retreat.

"After all the examples our gallant allies have shown of dogged and tenacious courage in the many trying situations in which they have been placed throughout the course of this campaign," he wrote, "it is quite superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident, and I would only express my firm conviction that, if any troops in the world had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and altogether unexpected onslaught, the French Division would have stood firm."

The Canadians on their immediate

right had also received a taste of the poison, but they had not suffered so severely. Yet they were left in a desperately critical position. Holding a line extending roughly 5000 yards in a north-westerly direction, they suddenly found themselves without any left; in other words, their own left was in the air, with a breach 4 miles wide. Every yard of the retreat left led for the most part by amateur officers—it was an ordeal which called for no ordinary courage and resourcefulness. What followed is the record of how the Canadians rose to the occasion as one man, and "made good". Apart from the Patricias, who arrived at the Front in advance of the main Dominion army, and had already splendidly upheld the tradi-

Where the Second Battle of Ypres began: Among the ruins of Langemarck, the scene of the first great gas surprise and the historic stand of the Canadians

The crucifix is seen standing amid the wreckage facing the ruins of the neighbouring mill. The church and castle were also wrecked with the rest of the buildings.

the Canadian rear more and more exposed as the French retired to the Yser Canal, there to re-form on the banks in a new line extending from Boesinghe to Steenstraate. A glance at the map will show what this meant not only for the Canadians but for the whole position round Ypres, and even Ypres itself. It would have been a stern test for the most seasoned troops of the regular army, but for men who, only a few months before, had been tilling the soil or carrying on the business of Canada—amateurs in short, tions of the Empire, it was the first real opportunity given to the Canadian Division to prove that it would render a good account of itself whenever put to the test. At Neuve Chapelle, as stated in an earlier chapter, it played a useful part in holding a section of the line allotted to the First Army, but was not actually engaged in the main battle. Now it held in its hands the fate of all the British troops occupying the salient to the east, and with them the fate of Ypres itself.

The first move fell to the 3rd

Canadian Brigade—under the command of Brigadier-General Turner—which before the battle had the 2nd Canadian Brigade on its right and the French on its left. Here the Canadians, gassed like their Allies with the same poisonous discharge, but not so disabled, strove in vain to rally the stifled and retreating Turcos on their left, but succeeded in beating attack, while other enemy forces not only succeeded in driving the French right back to the Yser Canal, but also established themselves on its west bank, having in the confusion of the gas and smoke captured the bridge at Steenstraate and some works south of Lizerne. Had the Canadians given way the consequences would have been disastrous in the extreme, but

For King and Empire: the Review of the 1st Canadian Division by His Majesty on Salisbury Plain before its departure for the Front

back the two German assaults which followed. Realizing the extreme gravity of the position, Brigadier-General Turner extended his left flank beyond Langemarck and southward towards Pilkem to protect his rear. Even so a gap still existed on his left, beyond the small wood to the west of St. Julien, 2 miles behind the original French lines, in which the 2nd London Heavy Battery, with its four 4.7 guns, had been lost. On the apex of this newly-formed line the Germans concentrated their heaviest they held their ground, as Sir John French bears witness, with a magnificent display of courage and tenacity. Sir W. M. Aitken, the Canadian Record Officer, summarized the narrative of this critical phase of the battle as "the story of how the Canadian Division, enormously outnumbered—for they had in front of them at least four divisions, supported by immensely heavy artillery—with a gap still existing, though reduced, in their lines, and with dispositions made hurriedly under the stimulus of critical danger,



The Gap in the Line after the Great Gas Attack of April 22, 1915

When the French line was forced back beyond the canal the 3rd Canadian Brigade, left in the air, extended its line as indicated. The whole Canadian line then maintained its position until British and Canadian reinforcements arrived and filled the gap.

fought through the day, and through the night, and then through another day and night, fought under their officers until, as happened to so many, those perished gloriously, and then fought from the impulsion of sheer valour because they came from fighting stock".

Meantime the new danger had spread to Ypres itself. The town had been bombarded afresh with great 17-inch shells, which completed much of the earlier work of destruction, and set part of the place ablaze, though the fire was extinguished. As the evening of the 22nd wore away our men in reserve near Ypres, seeing the shells bursting, had gathered in groups, discussing the situation and receiving lurid accounts of the attack in the north from groups of fugitive Turcos who now appeared on the scene. "Suddenly"—to quote from "Eye-Witness's" account—"a staff officer rode up shouting 'Stand to your arms'; and in a few minutes the troops had fallen in and were marching northwards to the scene of the fight." Never was help more sorely needed. The Canadian troops in reserve, the 2nd Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, and the Toronto Regiment Queen's Own, 3rd Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Rennie, both of the 1st Canadian Brigade, reached the gallant 3rd Brigade by midnight, and shared its fortunes and misfortunes throughout the ensuing days and nights, apart from its magnificent charge into the wood to the west of St. Julien to save the

Brigadier-General R. E. Turner, V.C., D.S.O., C.B., in command of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade at the Second Battle of Ypres

(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

Allies in the Trenches: Belgian and British marksmen covering one of the enemy's advanced posts

lost 4.7's. This charge was made in the course of the first night of the battle, when the Canadian left, bent back and weakened by having to extend its line some 4000 yards, but still holding its own against frightful odds, delivered a superb counter-attack under the heaviest machine-gun fire. The heroes of the charge were the Canadian Scottish, 16th Battalion of the 3rd Brigade, and the 10th Battalion of the 2nd Brigade, the battalions being commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Colonel Leckie and Lieutenant-Colonel Russell L. Boyle. Though the enemy fought doggedly there was no gainsaying those irresistible ranks of Canadians, who, sweeping right through the wood, recaptured the battery at the point of the bayonet—only to find that the enemy had already destroyed the guns. It was a bitter disappointment after so much heroic sacrifice, but none the less the deed had shed eternal lustre on Canadian arms, and the British gunners had been avenged. Infuriated by this defeat the Germans now rained shot and shell on the position until the whole wood became a mere death-trap, and was accordingly evacuated.

All through that Thursday night the battle raged with unceasing severity on both sides of the 4-mile breach. Probably nothing but the appalling confusion had prevented the enemy from discovering that his treacherous gas attack had cleared practically an open road to Ypres.

Determined and disastrous though this fierce German offensive had been, it had evidently succeeded beyond even the highest hopes of the enemy, thanks to the dastardly employment of a device which he had pledged himself not to employ. Sir John French named the operations the Second Battle for Calais, but, although there was no doubt of the

German intention to capture Ypres if possible, there was not the same appearance, at all events, of a great effort to break through the line and capture the Channel ports as during the prolonged battle of the autumn of 1914.

As it was, although he failed to rush the Canadian line, some of his troops reached a point barely 2 miles from the town. Here they were met by the British reserves from Ypres and elsewhere, who had stood to arms as soon as they realized what had happened, the officers, on their own initiative, leading them forward to meet the oncoming Germans, and falling on them with the bayonet.

This heterogeneous brigade came under the command of Colonel Geddes of the famous Buffs, the East Kent Regiment providing the backbone of the force with five splendid battalions. The Buffs rushed to the rescue with a dogged pluck which played a large part in stemming the tide at a critical moment, although they had been out all the night before and were retiring, "almost walking in our sleep", as one of them afterwards expressed it, when the order reached them to reinforce the Canadians.[1] With other units, who rushed up in support and were flung into the fight as they arrived, including the Grenadier company of the

[1] Colonel Geddes, unfortunately, was killed on the following Monday, after holding his thin line against successive German onslaughts until the situation had been saved, and his mixed brigade was dispersing to its own battalions.

French Colonial Reinforcements: Turcos lining up with their long bayonets fixed for action

Northumberland Fusiliers and the Territorial 8th Middlesex, they helped to fill the yawning gulf which left the road open to Ypres, and held the trenches they were ordered to occupy for four days until the line was readjusted.

The fierce struggle was continued by moonlight with heavy losses on both sides. When day broke on the Friday morning it was seen that a powerful German attempt was developing to outflank the devoted Canadian left. This was at once forestalled by a bold counter-attack upon the first line of German trenches, carried out by the Ontario 1st and 4th Battalions of the 1st Brigade, under Brigadier-General Mercer, acting in conjunction with a British brigade which had been rushed to the rescue. This counter-attack, though at a terrible cost, undoubtedly saved the situation on this occasion. "Stormed at with shot and shell", it seemed impossible that any of the charging ranks would live to reach the enemy's trenches.

"For a short time", wrote Sir W. M. Aitken, "every other man seemed to fall, but the attack was pressed ever closer and closer. The 4th Canadian Battalion at one moment came under a particularly withering fire. For a moment—not more—it wavered. Its most gallant commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Birchall,[1] carrying, after an old fashion, a light cane, coolly and cheerfully rallied his men, and at the very moment when his example had infected them, fell dead at the head of his battalion. With a hoarse cry of anger they sprang forward (for, indeed, they loved him) as if to avenge his death."

Once the trenches were reached the Germans were no match for such men as these. Those who resisted were promptly bayoneted; the rest were made prisoners; and all attempts to dislodge the victors were fruitless. Holding the trenches against repeated attacks until the following Sunday night, the heroes of the charge—or what remained of them—were then relieved by reinforcements. Sir John French has acknowledged how critical the situation remained during these anxious days, and how difficult to deal with over an area swept by

Brigadier-General M. S. Mercer, C.B., commanding the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Second Battle of Ypres

(From a photograph by Swaine)

[1] Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Birchall was one of the most popular officers in the army and closely identified with the fortunes of the 4th Battalion Royal Fusiliers—which he had joined as a university candidate from Magdalen during the South African War—for ten years before being seconded for service in 1910 with the Royal Canadian Regiment, according to a scheme for the mutual benefit of both services. As at home, he made a host of friends in Canada, where he acted for a short time as aide-de-camp to Lord Grey. When war broke out he wrote a manual on *Rapid Training of a Company for War*, which rapidly went through several editions. He was given command of the 4th Canadian Infantry a few days before it sailed for the front.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Birchall, killed in command of the 4th Canadian Infantry

artillery-fire, which, owing to the loss of so many French guns, it was impossible to keep down. Though connection was established at about 10 a.m. on the Friday morning between the left of the Canadian Division and the French right, some 800 yards east of the canal, this left the British troops in a dangerously exposed position with a much longer line to hold than before. General Foch, however, assuring the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief that he intended to regain the trenches which the French Division had lost, and that reinforcements were on their way for that purpose, desired Sir John French to maintain his present line. Sir John, fully approving the General's plan, agreed to co-operate as desired, but stipulated that in the event of the line not being re-established within a limited period he could not allow the British troops to remain so perilously placed. He had already, it should be added, ordered that some of the reinforcements sent north should be used to support the French under General Putz in preventing any farther advance of the Germans west of the canal.

Poisonous gas was now used against the whole Canadian line, each attack being followed by an onrush of Germans and supported by asphyxiating shells and every other kind of ancient and modern explosive. But the line held fast, such trenches as were momentarily abandoned by troops, who, blinded and choking from the fumes, found them intolerable, being reoccupied almost at once. In the course of the ensuing night the Germans made a fresh and supreme attempt to overwhelm the much-battered left of the 3rd Brigade, and this time succeeded in slipping past between the wood and St. Julien. For a moment it looked as though the Canadians would be cut off from their base. With the situation increasing from bad to worse, peremptory orders were sent for an immediate withdrawal to St. Julien. The heroism of all ranks during these vital moments was typified by the conduct of Major D. R. McCuaig, of the Royal Highlanders of Montreal, who lay seriously wounded when the order came to retire, and, like Captain Oates in the epic tragedy of the Scott Expedition, refused to remain a burden to the retreating troops. No entreaty on the part of his men moved him.

"One thing only he asked of them," writes the Canadian Record Officer, "that

there should be given to him as he lay alone in the trench two loaded Colt revolvers to add to his own, which lay in his right hand as he made his last request. And so, with three revolvers ready to his hand for use, a very brave officer waited to sell his life, wounded and wracked with pain, in an abandoned trench."

13th Canadian Battalion, on April 23, when he was killed in most gallantly covering the retreat of a battery near St. Julien. On each of the succeeding days a Victoria Cross was added to the Canadians' battle honours, the first being won by Colour-Sergeant

With the French Colonial Troops at the Front: Machine-gun Section of Zouaves

Happily the worst fears in this case were not realized, news being afterwards received that the Germans had spared his life and taken him prisoner. For his conspicuous gallantry from the first moment of the great gas attack Major McCuaig received the D.S.O.

The first Victoria Cross earned by the Canadians in this war was, alas! a posthumous award. It was won by Lance-Corporal Frederick Fisher, Frederick William Hall, of the 8th Canadian Battalion, who fell mortally wounded in the act of saving a wounded comrade; and the next by Captain Francis A. Caron Scrimger, of the Canadian Army Medical Service, for displaying "continuously day and night the greatest devotion to his duty among the wounded".

The Germans continued hammering at the Canadian positions and brought up such an immense preponderance

of troops and artillery that the salient was slowly but surely bent back upon St. Julien from the apex near its original alignment with the French. This brings us to the morning of Saturday, April 24, after another heavy discharge of gas. It was soon found that even St. Julien, exposed as it was to a murderous fire both from right and left, would have to be abandoned. The 3rd Canadian Brigade was therefore ordered to move back, and not a moment too soon, contesting every inch of the ground as it did so and making repeated counter-attacks. Unfortunately it was found impossible to withdraw from St. Julien the remnants of the Royal Highlanders of Montreal, 13th Battalion, and of the Royal Montreal Regiment, 14th Battalion. This gallant handful, some 300 strong, could be heard holding out in the village against overwhelming odds until far into the night. "If they died", wrote their official Record Officer, "they died worthy of Canada." None died more worthily in all this fight than the Canadian soldier whose stalwart deeds were recounted by Mr. Asquith at the Imperial patriotic meeting at the Guildhall in the following month.

"This soldier", to quote the Prime Minister's own laconic words, "was fighting a machine-gun. It was destroyed by a shell. He seized another. He fought it too. It was destroyed by a shell. He seized a third. It was also destroyed by a shell. No other machine-gun was ready. He seized a rifle and he is dead to-day upon the field of battle."

Unfortunately the story had to be told without a name, but this will be found enshrined with those of a host of other heroes of the rank and file in the *Gazette* of June 24, 1915, where the posthumous honour of the Distinguished Conduct Medal is conferred for this act upon Lance-Corporal G. W. Allan, of the 10th Canadian Battalion.

That night the line was re-established north of the hamlet of Fortuin, some 700 yards farther back. The Germans all this time were still maintaining their dangerous hold on the west bank of the canal, while the bombardment of Ypres itself and its neighbourhood had redoubled in intensity. The Belgian artillery, however, had broken the bridge behind the enemy at Steenstraate, and the French had recovered a good deal of ground south of Pilkem.

The first Canadian officer to win the V.C. in the Great World War: Captain Francis A. C. Scrimger, of the Canadian Army Medical Service
(From a photograph by Swaine)

When the 3rd Canadian Brigade was at length forced back, the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Currie, was placed in exactly the same position as the other at the time of the French retreat, and repeated the tactical manœuvres of the 3rd Brigade by flinging its left flank round to the south. Brigadier-General Currie, be it remembered, had held his lines practically intact, in the face of poisonous gas and every other devilish invention that the Germans could bring to bear upon them, from Thursday evening until Sunday afternoon—the very Sunday afternoon on which the Australians and New Zealanders were establishing themselves on the heights above Gaba Tepe, although neither side knew at the time that it was sharing with the other the glories of these red-letter days in the Empire's history. Up to the Saturday night, when two British regiments came to fill the gap, the most critical point of the 2nd Canadian Brigade's position on the Grafenstafel Ridge—the extreme left, now "in the air"—had been held most valiantly against all comers by the 90th Winnipeg Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lipsett. Only the resistance of a host of heroes, together with the resource and presence of mind of the leaders on the spot—Major-General Snow and Brigadier-General Hull being specially reported to Sir John French in this connection—prevented the Germans from winning their way to Ypres. St. Julien had no sooner fallen than it was realized that a new and extremely threatening line of advance had been opened up for the Germans. Lieutenant-General Alderson, who was in command of the British reinforcements as well as of the Canadian troops, at once organized a powerful counter-attack under Brigadier-General Hull, which, though it did not succeed in recapturing the village, effectually checked the enemy's advance, and led to the capture of many German prisoners. The attack was thrust through the Canadian left and centre, and Sir W. M. Aitken records how, as the advancing troops swept on, "many of them going to certain death, they paused for an instant, and with deep-throated cheers for Canada, gave the first indication to the Division of the warm admiration which their exertions had excited in the British army".

So far as the Canadians were concerned the counter-attack which had

Lieutenant-Colonel Lipsett, commanding the 90th Winnipeg Rifles, who held the most critical point of the line after the first gas attack
(From a photograph by Swaine)

Brigadier-General Hull, who led the first counter-attack against the Germans at St. Julien
(From a photograph by Bassano)

thus checked the German advance marked the turning-point of the battle. On Sunday afternoon they handed over the line they had guarded so well —now running roughly from Fortuin, south of St. Julien, in a north-easterly direction towards Passchendaele—to two British brigades, and Monday morning found the survivors behind the firing-line. Yet one more effort, however, was demanded of Brigadier-General Currie's sorely-tried men. Attack and counter-attack continued throughout Monday the 26th, and it became necessary, to quote the words of the Canadian Record Officer, to ask Brigadier-General Currie whether he could once more call on his shrunken brigade.

"'The men are tired,' this indomitable soldier replied, 'but they are ready and glad to go again to the trenches.' And so once more, a hero leading heroes, the general marched back the men of the 2nd Brigade, reduced to a quarter of its original strength, to the very apex of the line as it existed at that moment. This position he held all day Monday; on Tuesday he was still occupying reserve trenches, and on Wednesday was relieved and retired to billets in the rear."

The shattered 3rd Brigade had been relieved since Saturday, and on the following Thursday the whole Canadian Division, after a feat of arms which will rank with any in the history of the Empire, was withdrawn from the deadly gas zone.

"Congratulate you most warmly on the splendid and gallant way in which the Canadian Division fought during the last few days north of Ypres", ran the King's message to the Duke of Connaught. "Sir John French says their conduct was mag-

Major-General T. D'Oyly Snow, commended by Sir John French for his services in the Second Battle of Ypres, and afterwards made a K.C.B.
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

nificent throughout. The Dominion will be justly proud.—GEORGE."

All Canada, as well as the whole of the Empire, rang with the story, the full accounts of which more than confirmed the earlier reports of the Canadians' achievement. All the brigade Commanders — Brigadier-General R. E. W. Turner, V.C., D.S.O. (1st Infantry Brigade), Brigadier-General A. W. Currie (2nd), Brigadier-General M. S. Mercer (3rd), and Brigadier-General H. E. Burstall, in command of the Canadian artillery, as well as Colonel G. L. Foster, of the Army Medical Corps—were created by His Majesty Companions of the Order of the Bath in the next Birthday Honours List, among other Canadian recipients being Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. E. Leckie, 16th Canadian Battalion, and Lieutenant-Colonel

Brigadier-General A. W. Currie, C.B., who commanded the Second Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Second Battle of Ypres
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

Lieutenant-Colonel W. Hart McHarg, 7th (Vancouver) Battalion, killed in the Second Battle of Ypres
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

S. F. L. Ford, of the Canadian Army Medical Corps, both of whom received the C.M.G. The official narrative of the battle stated that the Canadian division had withstood the onslaughts of 150,000 Germans—a force ten times its own number. Small wonder that the cost was great, the casualties exceeding 6000. Of these about 230 were officers, including two battalion commanders besides Lieutenant-Colonel Birchall—Lieutenant-Colonel Boyle, of the 10th, and Lieutenant-Colonel W. Hart McHarg, of the 7th, both veterans of the South African War, who were among the killed. Lieutenant-Colonel McHarg was a famous crack shot, representing Canada at Bisley on several occasions,

and winning the Long-Range Championship of the world with army rifle at the international matches in the United States. Among the rank and file the official list gave 705 as killed, 2162 wounded, and 2536 missing. The 48th Canadian Highlanders alone lost in the battle 691 officers and men out of 896. "While mourning the loss of so many brave comrades," said General Sam Hughes, Minister of Canadian Militia, in a special message to the Division rejoicing in its gallantry, "our one great desire is to avenge the loss;" and the wave of enthusiasm which swept over the Dominion from the Atlantic to the Pacific on receipt of the news brought in recruits by the thousand. Before the second battle of Ypres was over, nearly 30,000 fresh troops had sailed from Canadian ports to reinforce the fighting-line, and General Hughes was planning to bring the total number of soldiers raised in the Dominion for active service to more than 150,000.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Boyle, 10th Canadian Infantry, killed in the Second Battle of Ypres
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

The Canadians were the first to acknowledge that their bravery and prowess were equally shared by the British regiments who stood by them shoulder to shoulder and relieved them when their task was done. On the 26th, when the Northumberland Territorials, newly arrived in Flanders for their baptism of fire, and hurried up to co-operate with them, faced their ordeal before St. Julien, their dauntless courage and devotion were acknowledged in the following order, issued by the General Officer Commanding the 1st Canadian Division:—

"HEAD-QUARTERS, 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION.

"The Divisional Commander wishes to congratulate the Northumberland Infantry Brigade on the excellent manner in which they carried out the attack on St. Julien."

So well did these north countrymen fight that they actually succeeded, as Sir John French mentions in his dispatch, in entering, and for a time occupying, the southern portion of that village after suffering the most grievous losses. The continual employment of asphyxiating gas, however, at length drove them back, and they finally occupied a line a short way to the south. "This attack", wrote the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, "was most successfully and gallantly led by Brigadier-General Riddell, who, I regret to say, was killed during the progress of the operation." On the left of General Riddell's Brigade the Lahore Division of the Indian army, under Major-General H. D. Keary,



Map showing, approximately, the Ypres Salient on Sunday, April 25, when the gallant Canadians were relieved by two British Brigades

had also been pushed up into the fighting-line, while a cavalry division was sent in support of the Fifth Corps.

The Lahore Division, ordered to advance on St. Julien as part of the general counter-attack, fared no better than the Northumbrians against the enemy's wire and murderous shell-fire, but helped to check the German advance. The assault began about 2 p.m., and within 300 yards of the start a shell burst in the middle of one of the leading battalions, killing and wounding sixteen men.

"The survivors", reported "Eye-Witness", "did not even break their columns of fours, but simply closed up and marched straight on. They went into action immediately afterwards and advanced across 1200 yards of open ground under a murderous fire, their war-cry swelling louder and louder above the din. One of their British officers was hit four times, but still continued to lead his men until he fell for the last time, riddled by bullets from a machine-gun."

These nameless heroes of the dispatch proved to be the 40th Pathans—familiarly known as "The Forty Thieves"—who had not long arrived at the front from Hong-Kong. In their splendid charge they actually arrived within 70 yards of the enemy, and melted away only when Colonel Rennick and nearly all his officers had been killed or wounded, including Captain J. F. Dalmahoy, who was hit six times, but continued to lead his men until killed.

Colonel Rennick's last thoughts were for his gallant regiment. "Please send two of my Pathans with me", he said, as he was put on the stretcher after receiving his mortal wound. "If

Brigadier-General Riddell, killed while leading the Northumberland Brigade against the Germans at St. Julien
(From a photograph by Bacon & Sons, Newcastle-on-Tyne)

Jemadir Mir Dast, of Coke's Rifles, who won the Victoria Cross in the attack of the Lahore Division on St. Julien

I die on the way to hospital I should like them with me." It was in the same assault of the Lahore Division that the Victoria Cross was won by Jemadar Mir Dast, of Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force)—the fourth Indian soldier to receive this honour. Jemadar Mir Dast's regiment was called on to make a charge which proved as hopeless as that of the 40th Pathans, coming under an absolute tornado of fire of every description, and being finally smothered at short distance by dense clouds of poisonous gas. By this time all the British officers of the regiment had been killed or wounded, and the surviving troops, falling fast from the effects of the gas, and mown down by bombs and machine-gun fire, were forced to retire.

"Jemadar Mir Dast," to quote from the official account, "who already held the Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class, for his services on the North-West Frontier, remained behind in the British trench. Undaunted by the ceaseless fire which was poured upon him, he collected all the men he could find, amongst them many who were slowly recovering from the effects of gas. During his retirement after nightfall he picked up many men who were in each successive line of old trenches and brought them in. This officer had led his platoon with the greatest gallantry throughout the attack, and subsequently assisted in bringing in eight wounded British and Indian officers, although he was exposed in doing so to a very heavy fire, being himself slightly wounded."

Another hero was Jemadar Sucha Singh, of the 47th Sikhs, who took command when all the British officers of his company were killed or wounded, and held the shaken men together, thus earning the Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class. Though sadly reduced in number the men continued to press on, and would undoubtedly have gained their goal—having attained within a few yards of it—but for the enemy's final resort to the poison belt. It was the first experience of the troops of the Lahore Division of anything in the nature of asphyxiating gas. Half-suffocated by these fiendish and unexpected fumes, they yet succeeded in holding the ground they had so dearly won throughout that terrible day. In the meantime the Manchesters on the right, with portions of the Connaught Rangers, 129th Baluchis, and 57th Rifles, had reached a point not more than 80 yards from the enemy's trenches.

Then, as elsewhere, came the sudden burst of poisonous gas, before which the French Colonials and the left of the Ferozepore Brigade were forced to give way, their retirement affecting the greater part of the British line. Some sixty of the Connaught Rangers, under Major Deacon, and about fifty of the Manchesters, under Lieutenant Henderson, held fast a few yards back, this being carried out in the evening with great dash and resolution, the result being a gain of some 300 yards beyond the old British trenches. It was only a partial success, and cost us dear, but it led to a daring and useful reconnaissance that night which yielded more exact knowledge of the German positions than was obtainable before. On the following day, there-

With the Indians in Flanders: on the road to the Front

and there dug themselves in. They were supported by small but equally brave parties of the 40th Pathans, 47th Sikhs, and 129th Baluchis.

At 2.30 p.m. the position on this front was roughly that the French attack on the left had failed, as well as that of the Jullundur Brigade, while the Ferozepore Brigade was held up, although the centre of the Brigade was well advanced. General Keary thereupon prepared a further assault in co-operation with the French on the left of the Ferozepore Brigade, fore, a fresh infantry assault was delivered with more adequate artillery support. Advancing to the attack on this occasion the Sirhind Brigade was suddenly met by a heavy enfilading fire. The 1st Gurkhas swung round towards the north-north-west, in order to face the fire, one company succeeding, in spite of cruel losses, in pushing on to a ruined farm in the valley. Here, under the command of Second-Lieutenant Fry, I.A.R., they held on in the face of continual shell- and rifle-fire until night, when they were withdrawn.

One of the gallant Gurkhas, Rifleman Phalman Guruno, seeing his company commander, Captain Evans, hit during the advance, remained with him, digging a hole, throwing up cover round it, and carrying the officer to it under heavy fire. Thus he saved Captain Evans's life—and won the Indian Distinguished Service Medal.

The 1st Gurkhas were reinforced by the 4th King's Liverpools, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel S. L. Allen. This fine Territorial battalion, to quote the words of an officer in touch with the Lahore Division during these operations "advanced by rushes in the face of a heavy fire, and carried the line forward to a distance of some 300 yards from the Germans, under the leadership of Major E. M. Beall, who has received the D.S.O. for his gallantry on this occasion". Thanks to the farther advance of the 1st Gurkhas, a position was established in front of some of the abandoned French guns, and these were removed during the night. The 1st Battalion Highland Light Infantry and the 15th Sikhs suffered severely in a brave but impossible advance in the face of a terrific fire, the losses of the 15th Sikhs including Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Vivian, who had escaped death so narrowly on many previous occasions that he had seemed to bear a charmed life. It was found impossible to push the attack home on the 27th, though a fresh assault was made at 7 p.m. by the French and the Sirhind Brigade. The French were again driven back by dense clouds of asphyxiating gas, and as this exposed the left flank of the Sirhind Brigade the attack was stopped.

It was on April 26, while the Lahore Division was delivering its first attack, that the first Victoria Cross was awarded to an airman—Second-Lieutenant William Barnard Rhodes-Moorhouse, of the Special Reserve, Royal Flying Corps, who shared in the aerial work behind the hostile lines during the battle, work which meant the keeping of all the area under close observation and bombing such points of strategical importance as the stations of Staden, Thielt, Courtrai, and Roubaix. Second-Lieutenant Rhodes-Moorhouse was one of the most brilliant as well as most daring of our younger airmen, and the magnificent exploit which won the V.C. at the cost of his life will live as one of the finest episodes of the war. Entrusted with the task

Second-Lieutenant Rhodes-Moorhouse, the first airman to win the Victoria Cross—but at the cost of his life
(From a photograph by J. Weston)

of bombing the railway junctions at Courtrai, he made the journey alone, and glided down to a height of 300 feet on arriving over his destination.

"While he did this", recorded "Eye-Witness" a few days later, without, however, mentioning his name, "he was the target of hundreds of rifles, of machine-guns, and of anti-air-craft armament, and was severely wounded in the thigh. Though he might have saved his life by at once coming down in the enemy's lines he decided to save his machine at all costs, and made for the British lines. Descending to a height of only 100 feet in order to increase his speed, he continued to fly and was again wounded, this time mortally. He still flew on, however, and without coming down at the nearest of our aerodromes went all the way back to his own base, where he executed a perfect landing and made his report. He died in hospital not long afterwards."

Days and nights of continuous fighting followed along the whole line round Ypres. The French succeeded in retaking Lizerne and made some progress at Steenstraate and Het Sas, but, no substantial advance having been made by our allies towards the recapture of the original line, Sir John French ordered Sir Herbert Plumer at one o'clock on May 1 to commence his withdrawal to a new line in a less-exposed situation. Throughout the critical period since the beginning of the battle on April 22 all the troops in this area, as Sir John French pointed out, had been subjected to violent bombardment from a large mass of guns with an unlimited supply of ammunition. It was one of the lessons learnt at cruel cost at this period of the war that munitions and still more munitions were the crying need of the hour.

"It proved impossible", to quote from Sir John French's dispatch, "while under so vastly superior fire of artillery to dig efficient trenches, or to properly reorganize the line, after the confusion and demoralization caused by the first great gas surprise and the subsequent almost daily gas attacks."

The retirement from the pronounced salient held by the British round Zonnebeke to the new and shorter line farther to the west—a movement extending along a front of 8 miles while closely engaged with the enemy—was a triumph of organization and staff work. "I am of opinion", wrote Sir John, "that this retirement, carried out deliberately and with scarcely any loss, in face of an enemy in position, reflects the greatest possible credit on Sir Herbert Plumer and those who so efficiently carried out his orders." In the midst of it—on Sunday, May 2—the enemy launched a heavy attack, with the usual gas accompaniment, on St. Julien and the line to the west of it, as well as along the whole front held by the French right; but were everywhere repulsed, many of our supports charging through the wall of vapour and meeting the Germans with the bayonets as they swarmed over the trenches vacated by the retiring troops. The ground now given up to the enemy by the withdrawal to the new line was of little military value. From a tactical point of view, indeed, it had long been a source of weakness. But from another point of view, as "Eye-Witness" pointed out, its value was great.

"The names of the Polygone, Nonne

Bosche, and Veldhoek Woods will be famous in history, for it was against this line that the desperate attacks of the Germans in October and November, 1914, were finally broken. Veldhoek marked the flood-tide of the tremendous assault of October 31, the Nonne Bosche that of the Prussian Guard on November 11; and it

Still useful as a Fortified Stronghold: the ruined houses on both fronts were held to the last and converted into fortified posts

was in the narrow space between the latter and the Polygone that a thin line of gunners, cooks, and other details drove back the last survivors of the Guard. Perhaps the area between the Polygone Wood and the Menin road is the most memorable of all, for there lay a battered line of trenches held day after day by battalions reduced to the strength of platoons."

Many Territorials, besides the Northumberland men and the 4th Liverpools, already referred to, won their spurs in this Second Battle for Calais. The 5th King's Own Royal Lancaster Territorials, who lost heavily in a successful charge with the Canadians, were afterwards complimented on their bravery by Sir John French. The 4th Londons (Royal Fusiliers) also suffered severely in helping to stem the German tide on April 26–7, the spirit prevailing in the battalion being illustrated by the death of Captain C. R. E. Saunders, who, falling mortally wounded while leading the advance of "D" Company, cheered his men on. He fell shouting: "Never

mind me, boys. Push on! Push on!" The Territorial 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, as well as the 9th Argyll and Sutherlands—the Dumbartonshire battalion—proved their mettle both in attack and defence during the ghastly gas attacks and incessant bombardments during the next few days. So did the Territorials from York and Durham, who were in some of the hottest corners of the fight. Needless to say, the regulars were as dauntless as ever. None sold his life more dearly than Private John Lynn, of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, who, when the Germans were advancing behind their wave of asphyxiating gas on May 2, continued to handle his gun with great effect, although almost overcome by the suffocating fumes. When he could no longer see the Germans he moved the gun higher up the parapet, this enabling him to bring even more effective fire to bear, and eventually to check any farther advance. Unfortunately Private John Lynn did not live to receive the Victoria Cross awarded him for this courageous deed, dying the following morning from the effects of the poisonous gas. From first to last the second battle of Ypres was a soldiers' battle, the most critical situations being repeatedly saved solely by the initiative and bull-dog tenacity of the men and their leaders.

The story of this prolonged struggle is the story of heroic deeds on all parts of the extended front. There was the case, for instance, of the splendid defence of a trench held by only four men and an officer, the sole survivors of the original garrison. "They were all suffering terribly from the effects of gas", wrote "Eye-Witness" at the time, "but remained at their posts until reinforcements arrived and thus saved the situation." No names were given, thanks to the relentless rule of the censor in all dispatches of the kind—but it subsequently transpired that the officer in command of this brave little garrison was Lieutenant R. V. Kestell-Cornish, of the 3rd Battalion, but attached to the 1st Battalion, Dorsetshire Regiment, who received the Military Cross for his distinguished gallantry and devotion to duty on this occasion. Still more glorious was the achievement of Private Edward Warner, of the 1st Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment, who entered a trench single-handed when it had been vacated as a result of a gas attack, and was the means of preventing the enemy taking possession, though at the cost of his own life, for, in the words of the official record of his award of the Victoria Cross, "this very gallant soldier died shortly afterwards from the effects of gas poisoning". Both these deeds belong to the story of Hill 60, to which the shifting battle-grounds of Ypres had now extended. A warm tribute was afterwards paid to the 1st Berkshires by the General Commanding the Second Division in congratulating the battalion on its courageous rush across the open ground to the German trenches during the same operations.

"The reputation of the Royal Berks for its hardihood and gallantry", he added, "is well known throughout the whole course of the war, and I can assure you that in no other regiment in the Second Division do I place more confidence than in yours, which at all times acts so thoroughly and courageously."

The Ypres Salient before and after the Second Battle of Ypres, April 22–May 13

The new line round Ypres had no sooner been consolidated than the battle, after an ominous silence, burst forth with renewed intensity in the early hours of Saturday May 8 in a stupendous attack against our line running east and north-east of the town, gradually concentrating on the front of the Eastern Division north and south of Frezenberg. In the words of Sir John French, whose action in reducing the dangerous salient at this point was thus fully justified: "The fire completely obliterated the trenches and caused enormous losses". In the midst of the inevitable confusion of such a holocaust, the Germans succeeded in breaking through our line at different points round Frezenberg with an overpowering infantry attack which pushed along the Poelcappelle road as far as Wieltje. The most sanguinary fighting ensued as the combatants surged to and fro throughout the day and the following night, reinforcements being flung into the struggle as fast as they arrived on each side. This new phase of the battle was, in truth, as trying in its way, and almost as critical, as anything in the history of the long-drawn-out struggle for the coast. To their eternal honour the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, who were entrenched at Bellegarde Lake, east of Ypres, some distance south and west of the line held by the Canadian Division during the first great gas attack, stuck to their post throughout the German onslaught of May 8. Their trenches were all but obliterated by the heavy shelling; men and machine-guns were buried in the debris; gas shells, high explosives, and quick-firers decimated the ranks; but every time the German infantry charged they found these indomitable Canadians ready for them. Major Gault, who had been decorated for his share in the Patricias' achievements at St. Eloi in March, was severely wounded in two places early in the engagement, and the command devolved upon Lieutenant Niven, the next senior officer, who remained unwounded. Men and officers continued to fall throughout this terrible day, but no fewer than three determined attacks were beaten off, with the help of detachments of the Rifle Brigade and the King's Shropshire Light Infantry, sent up as reinforcements. At ten o'clock at night, the company commanders being dead, Lieutenant Niven and Lieutenant Papineau —another of the officers decorated for St. Eloi—took a roll-call. Twenty-four hours before, the roll-call showed the strength of the battalion as 635. Now it could only muster 150 rifles and some stretcher-bearers. Before midnight these heroes were relieved by the King's Royal Rifles, who helped them in the sorrowful task of burying their dead.

"Those who had fallen in the fire trenches", wrote their official Record Officer, "needed no grave, for the obliteration of their shelter had afforded a decent burial to their bodies. Behind the damaged trenches, by the light of the German flares, and amid the unceasing rattle of musketry, relievers and relieved combined in the last service which one soldier can render another. Beside the open graves, with heads uncovered, all that was left of the regiment stood while Lieutenant Niven, holding the colours of Princess Patricia, battered, bloody, but still

intact, tightly in his hand, recalled all he could remember of the Church of England Service for the Dead. Then, led by Lieutenant Papineau, they marched back, 150 strong, to reserve trenches."

Even then their trials were not over, for the situation demanded their presence later in the day (May 9) at another part of the British position, where they lost five more killed and three wounded. Four days later, while the remnants of the regiment were in bivouac at the rear, news arrived that their old comrades-in-arms of the Rifle Brigade were hard pressed, whereupon the Princess Patricias formed a composite battalion with the King's Royal Rifles "and successfully made the last exertion which was asked of them at this period of the war". Lieutenant Niven, who continued to command the battalion with great ability until May 15, was promoted captain and, like Lieutenant Papineau, awarded the D.S.O.

While the Princess Patricias were selling their lives so dearly during the German avalanche of April 8 the 1st Suffolks also held on, but were surrounded and overwhelmed. One of the bravest of the brave in those desperate days was Second-Lieutenant Wilfred Austin Salt, of the Special Reserve, attached to the 1st Battalion Lancashire regiment, who was holding a breastwork north-east of Ypres when he suddenly found, on May 9, that he was being enfiladed from Shell Trap Farm—a stronghold near St. Julien which figured prominently throughout the battle—into which the Germans were penetrating. Throwing back half his men to face the farm, Second-Lieutenant Salt fired over a traverse at the enemy at a range of no more than 30 yards.

"He shot one German," says the *Gazette* in subsequently recording his award of the Military Cross, "and was then wounded in the head, and had two other bullet holes through his cap. A German officer shouted to him to surrender, but for answer he shot him through the head. Second-Lieutenant Salt continued to command his post in spite of his wound until a lull in the attack, when he was ordered by his seniors to hand over his command and go to the dressing-station."

The 3rd Monmouthshires, a Territorial battalion, also did right gallantly, holding the first-line trenches they had been sent to support on May 7 for days and nights on end. "The Monmouths never flinched," wrote one of their number in describing the most furious of the German attacks. "We let them come within hailing distance and then poured death and destruction into them." The enemy faltered, broke, and fled, leaving the Monmouths masters of the trench, though sadly reduced in numbers from the incessant bombardment. Undoubtedly they played a lion's part in retrieving the British fortunes on May 8. Another Territorial battalion, the 12th London, went to their support, and succeeding, though at frightful cost, in reaching the first-line trenches, played havoc with their machine-gun. In the meantime a strong attack was delivered by the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the 1st East Lancashires in the direction of Wieltje, and connected the original trench-line with the ground

previously won by a counter-attack launched earlier in the day by the 1st York and Lancaster Regiment, 3rd Middlesex, 2nd East Surrey, 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and the 1st Royal Warwickshires. The line was consolidated during the night, when two cavalry divisions were also moved and placed at the disposal of the hard-pressed 5th Corps. The next few days were chiefly remarkable for the succession of German bombardments, the enemy's superiority in artillery continuing to give him an immense advantage, varied by local counter-attacks in the course of which trenches were lost and won, and lost and won again, at fearful cost to both sides. This was especially the case along the Menin-Ypres road, where the 2nd Gloucesters, 2nd Cameron Highlanders, 9th Royal Scots, 3rd King's Royal Rifles and 4th Rifle Brigade bore the brunt of the attacks and suffered severely. Yet they kept the Germans at bay. Here and there a little ground was won by the enemy solely by the superior weight and number of his guns, but the ground proved of little use to him, and our own guns, as well as our indomitable infantry, took a heavy toll of his troops. The ebb and flow of the battle was especially violent at Hooge, where, owing to heavy shelling and gas on the 11th, the two companies of the 2nd Camerons were forced to evacuate their trenches. Although his left flank was entirely unprotected, Captain Ralph L. M'Call, together with a junior officer, rallied the men and made three counter-attacks, driving the enemy out of the trenches at the point of the bayonet.

Ready for the Germans: Holding one of the fortified houses along the British Front

He then succeeded in repulsing all further attacks although wounded. In recognition of his gallantry Captain M'Call received the Military Cross.

On the Wednesday (May 12) the highly-tried Eastern Division retired into Army Reserve to rest after weeks of incessant fighting which had sadly reduced its ranks but earned for it the well-won tribute subsequently paid to it by Sir John French, who, in accordance with a practice which did much to inspire the enthusiastic devotion of our men, inspected the troops as soon as possible after they were relieved, and not only thanked them for their services but also explained the real significance of the operations in which they had taken part. He made it clear on this occasion that though they had been fighting a defensive battle all the time, and had to leave most of the attacking to the enemy, they had helped materially to ensure the success of the Allied offensive from the south of Arras—to forestall which, indeed, was one of the enemy's objects in this new phase of the second Battle of Ypres—as well as to improve the international situation in favour of the Allied cause.

"The Germans", he told the battered 80th Brigade, for instance, "wanted to take Ypres so that they could tell the whole of Europe and America that they had taken it. This might have had the effect of keeping neutral nations out of the war; but I can tell you that Italy will to-day declare war on the side of the Allies. By your tenacity you prevented them from taking Ypres, and besides that you drove off German forces attacking you, and so considerably helped the Allied advance from the south at Arras. To remain in the trenches under a heavy artillery bombardment, to keep your heads and your discipline, and to be able to use your rifles at the end of it require far higher qualities of personal bravery than actively to attack the enemy when everybody is on the move and conscious of doing something. I see before me famous old regiments whose battle honours show that they have upheld the British Empire in all parts of the world in many famous battles; but I tell you that the battle you have just fought will rank higher than any that your regiments have to show on your colours."

To the other brigades the Field-Marshal spoke in similar terms; and it needs no stretch of imagination to understand what such words must have meant to men who had suffered and endured so much.

What the losses of this Eastern Division—or Central Division as it is marked on the map—had been may be estimated from the fact that only one lieutenant-colonel was left—Lieutenant-Colonel T. O. Marden of the Welsh Regiment—practically all the other battalions being commanded by captains. Of the Suffolks, who, as already stated, were cut off and overwhelmed, only seven men came out—seven men out of some 500 or 600. The losses of the 1st Yorkshire Light Infantry were only less severe. It was the price nobly and cheerfully paid for answering the urgent summons to "hang on at all costs". When the 1st Welsh were outflanked—refusing to budge when the rest of the centre was driven in—Lieutenant-Colonel Marden sent back message after message assuring the general whenever he asked, that though they were in a hot corner they were doing very well,

and could and would hold out. And they did. For this imperturbable valour on this occasion Lieutenant-Colonel Marden was made a C.M.G. in the next Birthday Honours List, and was also one of the British officers selected by the Tsar for the Russian Order of St. Vladimir for distinguished service in the field.

The Eastern Division's place in the fighting-line was taken on the night of May 12–13 by two cavalry divisions, the artillery and engineers of the "stone-wallers" remaining to form with them what was known as the "Cavalry Force" under the command of General De Lisle. Scarcely had the cavalry taken their unaccustomed place in the infantry's trenches than the heaviest German bombardment yet experienced broke out, beginning at 4.30 a.m. on the Thursday and lasting throughout the day. It required one kind of bravery to mount a horse and charge a foe, but, as Sir John French afterwards remarked, it needed courage of an even higher order to hang on to a position with dogged tenacity under a galling bombardment. The cavalry behaved with almost superhuman gallantry, but part of the line astride the Roulers railway was completely obliterated, burying the 3rd Dragoon Guards and compelling most of the troops to fall back about 800 yards. When the line was broken beyond the right flank of the 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays) Major George Absell Ing, of that regiment, sprang from his trench in the front line, stood on the Menin road in the open under heavy shell-fire, stopped the retreat of forty men of another unit, and turned them into his section of the defence. For this brilliant action, the good results of which were far-reaching, Major Ing was awarded the D.S.O. The Blues and the 10th Hussars hurried up to fill the gap, two or three armoured cars presently rushing up the Menin Road and playing no small part in saving the situation.

Major-General H. de Beauvoir de Lisle, commanding the cavalry force which relieved the Eastern Division before Ypres
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

On the right the North Somerset Yeomanry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Glyn, although also suffering severely — Lieutenant-Colonel Glyn himself being wounded—not only held on to their trenches throughout the day but actually advanced and attacked the enemy with the bayonet. When all his senior officers had been killed or wounded, Lieutenant James A. Garton took command of the regiment and displayed great coolness and excellent judgment throughout, inspir-

ing all ranks by his behaviour. For this he was awarded the Military Cross. Realizing the situation, and acting on their own initiative, when the left squadron of the Cavalry Division, having been reduced to sixteen men, fell back, the 2nd Essex Regiment promptly charged and retook the trench, holding it till relieved by cavalry supports. This was not the only occasion during the same attack on which a lost position was similarly recovered by the 2nd Essex, two of whose officers, Captain Paul Pechell and Lieutenant Noel Mackintosh Stuart Irwin, had already won the Military Cross for conspicuous gallantry and determination in the earlier stages of the battle.

The Essex Yeomanry, too, distinguished themselves in the superb counter-attack—though at heavy cost, including the loss of Colonel Deacon—launched at half-past two on the Thursday of May 13 by two cavalry brigades. Fifty men of the Essex Yeomanry, under Captain Edward Ruggles-Brise, hung on to a position captured during this counter-attack, although completely isolated, until ordered to withdraw at night. For "conspicuous gallantry and ability" in this affair Captain Ruggles-Brise received the Military Cross. The D.S.O. was won on the same occasion by Major Charles Crichton, of the 10th (Prince of Wales's Own Royal) Hussars, for continuous bravery throughout the day. In the counter-attack, though wounded, he continued to direct operations, "giving great encouragement to his men while he lay in the open under heavy shell-fire with his leg shattered". It was one of the most thrilling moments in the battle when these dismounted cavalry charged to recapture the lost trenches. Sir John French, while mourning the loss of an old personal friend in Colonel Shearman, of the 10th Hussars, afterwards described it as one of the finest things done in the war. Charging through a tornado of shrapnel and rifle-fire the cavalry succeeded in recovering the whole original line of trenches, capturing or killing most of the Germans who had taken possession, and in some cases pursuing the remainder some distance back to their own lines. Unfortunately they had no sooner reinstalled themselves than the trenches were again rendered untenable by the devastating storm of heavy shells, the cavalry retiring to an irregular line in rear—chiefly the craters of shell-holes.

Elsewhere along the British front the fighting of the 13th had been almost as severe. The farm at the north-east corner of the line was penetrated by the Germans, but the 1st Rifle Brigade, after a stubborn tussle, expelled them. Of the 1st Hampshires it is recorded by Sir Herbert Plumer that they also repelled an attack, "and killed every German who got within 50 yards of their trenches". The 5th London Regiment too, "despite very heavy casualties, maintained their position unfalteringly". It was on this last occasion that the second Victoria Cross was won by a member of the Territorial Force, Lance-Sergeant Douglas Walter Belcher, of the 5th Londons—the City of London battalion of

Drawn by Frederic Villiers

"'Ware Gas!" Warning British troops in the trenches—with a German shell-case as a tocsin—of an approaching German attack with asphyxiating Gas

the London Rifle Brigade—earning it by a clever game of bluff which saved a highly dangerous situation. Sergeant Belcher was in charge of a portion of an advanced breastwork south of the Wieltje-St. Julien Road, and though this post was repeatedly blown in during the fierce and continuous bombardment he elected to remain with a mere handful of men when the troops near him had been withdrawn. He completely deceived the Germans, who were only some 150 yards distant, as to his strength, opening rapid fire on them whenever he saw them collecting for an attack. "There is little doubt", says the *Gazette*, in recording his award, "that the bold front shown by Lance-Sergeant Belcher prevented the enemy breaking through the Wieltje road, and averted an attack on the flank of one of our divisions." The whole of the 5th Londons distinguished themselves on this occasion, as in the earlier fighting, their total strength being reduced before the end of the day to less than 200 men. For reorganizing the defence of his position when the troops on the right had been compelled to fall back, and thus maintaining the safety of our line, Second Lieutenant (temporary Lieutenant) Charles W. Trevelyan, of the same battalion, was awarded the Military Cross.

May 13 closed, despite all the enemy's mighty and costly exertions, with our line still holding its former position, apart from the short distance lost by our cavalry division. The night was uneventful, and by the Friday morning our line was strengthened in readiness for a renewal of the attack. But no attack came, save an intermittent shelling. For the time being the Germans had had enough. The three weeks' battle, save by the exchange of desultory shell- and rifle-fire, was over, and Ypres was still in our hands. During these critical weeks the French had also made strenuous efforts to recapture their lost ground, loyally backed by the Belgians, who, holding the Yser, the flooded area, and the dunes, had done their full share of the fighting. During the second half of May the French, now strongly reinforced, recovered Steenstraate and the trenches in Het Sas, drove the enemy headlong over the canal, and made farther advances in the same direction, repelling more than one German counter-attack, and making many prisoners. The month was not allowed to close without another great gas attack on the British lines of this vulnerable salient, as if in revenge for our successful advance at Festubert, at the other end of the line, described in our next chapter on the British front. The new attack was delivered on Whit Monday (May 24), and the enemy had evidently made elaborate preparations for it, for the gas poured out from large numbers of cylinders in great volume for some hours, reaching in certain places to a height of many feet. Our troops were now provided with the means of counteracting this dastardly practice of making war—means described by Sir John French as so perfected by experience that they rendered such attacks innocuous — but this fresh attempt was made at 2.45 a.m., when a large proportion of

our men were asleep. The favourable wind for which the enemy had been waiting enveloped them in the deadly fumes without warning and before they could put on their respirators. The 2nd Royal Irish and the Territorial 9th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were overcome by the full force of the attack and forced to withdraw from the farm held in front of the left division. Thereupon the Germans, who had followed up the outburst of gas by a heavy shell-fire and most determined infantry attack, proceeded to hold and fortify the farm, all attempts failing at the time to retake it.

"Throughout the day", wrote Sir John French in his dispatch of June 15, "the whole line was subjected to one of the most violent artillery attacks which it had ever undergone; and the 5th Corps and the Cavalry Divisions engaged had to fight hard to maintain their positions. On the following day, however, the line was consolidated, joining the right of the French at the same place as before, and passing through Wieltje (which was strongly fortified) in a southerly direction on to Hooge, where the cavalry have since strongly occupied the château, and pushed our line farther east."

"Are we down-hearted?" Playing in casualties from the firing line to the doctor, with an improvised band of whistles, mouth-organs, cymbals, and a drum

North of Wieltje, where the most desperate struggle raged on May 24, the 1st Royal Lancasters found themselves and the whole line in a position of extreme peril by the capture of the trenches held by the regiment on their right. It was entirely due to the efforts of Captain Austin Bradford Woodgate and Second-Lieutenant Roger C. Leach, both attached to the 1st Royal Lancasters, together with three men, that the enemy was pre-

vented from working along the trench, and so making possible the retention of the remainder. Although the enemy was in force, and possessed an unlimited supply of hand-grenades, this fearless band not only succeeded in stopping the Germans, but also in capturing a German flag which had been hoisted to mark their position. Both officers had already been mentioned for rendering invaluable services throughout the winter, especially during the underground fight in the mine gallery at Le Touquet. They were now decorated—Captain Woodgate with the Distinguished Service Order, and Second-Lieutenant Leach, who, after fighting till midday, was badly wounded in the legs by a hand-grenade, with the Military Cross.

It was while rallying his men near Wieltje on this occasion that Major George J. Christie, of the 9th (Territorial Battalion) Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, won the D.S.O. for his conspicuous bravery in leading about fifty of them up to the front line through the gas and heavy shell-fire. The D.S.O. was also earned by Captain James Morison Scott, of the 7th (Territorial) Battalion of the same regiment, who was the only officer left of his battalion at the end of this trying day, when his conduct in charge of machine-guns was officially recorded as "marked by the highest ability and courage". Another Military Cross was won near Shell Trap Farm at the same time by Lieutenant Gerald W. Browne Tarleton, of the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, who had felt the full force of the gas attack. Two orderlies had been sent back with a message to battalion head-quarters explaining the position, but both were wounded and unable to get through.

"Lieutenant Tarleton", to quote from the *Gazette*, "had also been wounded, and was suffering from the effects of gas, but volunteered to take back the message, and as he was not fit to command his platoon, owing to his wounds, his Company-Commander allowed him to try. He managed to crawl back, though he was hit again on the way, and on his arrival was unable to speak owing to his wounds and exhaustion, but managed to deliver his message in writing."

All this time the cavalry on the east, holding the Menin road in the neighbourhood of Hooge, were engaged in an equally stern struggle to keep the enemy at bay. The Château of Hooge, which stood about 100 yards north of the Menin highway, encircled by the Bellewaarde Woods, had already been the scene of some of the bloodiest fights in the battle, and long remained a prominent line of reference in the dispatches from Ypres. On this Whit Monday of 1915 fell, among many other gallant officers and men in this centre of the storm, Captain Francis Grenfell, of the 9th Lancers, the first officer in the army to receive the Victoria Cross in the Great World War, and one of the noblest lives laid down in the cause for which the Empire was fighting. He was killed while commanding the left section of a line which had been broken by the Germans in the midst of the gas surprise. The left of the 9th Lancers held, and saved the day; and when the general commanding the cavalry corps visited them that evening he declared that no words of his could

possibly express his admiration of all ranks of that regiment. "Captain Grenfell's bravery and devotion to duty," afterward wrote Major Beale Browne, commanding the 9th, were "an example to all, and, thank God, the example of men like Francis Grenfell lives after them."[1] Another officer of the 9th Lancers who on the same day "set the finest possible example of calmness, coolness, and courage, although suffering from gas and twice slightly wounded", to quote from the *Gazette* of July 3, 1915, was Captain Guy Franklin Reynolds, who thus won the Military Cross. When the head-quarters of the regiment were gassed, Captain Reynolds constantly carried reports from the trenches under very heavy fire and proved invaluable in helping to reorganize the defence throughout the day.

The 15th (the King's) Hussars were also badly gassed near Hooge, but were handled with consummate skill and determination by their officers. Captain Charles J. Leicester Stanhope took forward the remnants of his squadron, and on his own initiative reinforced the front line under very heavy shell-fire. "He remained in action all day," states the *Gazette*, "and when the line on his left gave way he doubled back his flank with great skill and continued with the utmost gallantry to hold the position." For this he received the Military Cross, together with Lieutenant Kenneth Maclaine of Lochbuie, of the same regiment, who had already distinguished himself on several occasions earlier in the month. On the 24th, Lieutenant Maclaine, when ordered up with his squadron to reinforce the line which had given way north of the Menin road, met the dangerous situation with rare coolness and ability, maintaining his position under most critical circumstances until relieved at 2.15 the next morning, thus contributing largely towards maintaining intact the line south of the road.

It was not until months afterwards that it was possible to discover the names of these and other heroes of the stern defence of Ypres during the great gas attacks of the spring of 1915, and to build up what is still an incomplete story from the scattered links of authentic facts. What it will always remain impossible to do, as Mr. Balfour said, after a visit to the front about this period, is to follow the individual courage of countless men whose names will never be known.

"Our gratitude should not go, as I am sure it does not, only to those distinguished soldiers whose names will go down to history as the leaders of our troops in this great fight. It will also go to those unnumbered and nameless heroes on whose work ultimately depends the efficiency of everything we are doing in this country, the efficiency of everything which is done by the Head-quarters Staff in Flanders or in France, and to whom in truth and in reality we shall owe, when the time comes, that freedom from the military nightmare under which Europe and the world at the present moment is groaning."

A few days after the Whit-Monday gas attack the French Commander-in-

[1] Major Browne's letter was read by the Bishop of Pretoria at the memorial service held in London both for Captain Francis Grenfell, V.C., and his twin brother, Captain Riversdale Nonus Grenfell, attached to the same regiment, who was killed in action on September 14, 1914. A portrait of Captain Francis Grenfell, V.C., will be found on p. 117, Vol. I of this work.

General Joffre's Visit to the British Front: the French Commander-in-chief—in the middle of the first row—with Sir John French on his right, and a party of British and French staff officers

Chief, on the invitation of Sir John French, who was desirous, as he says in the same dispatch, that General Joffre should see something of the British troops, inspected a British division on parade. The division chosen for this honour was the 7th, then resting behind the trenches, under the command of Major-General H. de la P. Gough, brother of Brigadier-General John E. Gough, V.C., who was mortally wounded in the trenches of the 4th corps three months before. The visit of the French Generalissimo was highly appreciated by all ranks. General Joffre afterwards wrote to Sir John, expressing his own pleasure, and his appreciation of the fine appearance of the British troops on parade. May was also marked by the ten days' visit to the front of the Moderator of the Church of Scotland, Dr. Wallace Williamson, who made a tour of the Scottish regiments, as the British Field-Marshal bears witness, "with excellent results". This was a fitting sequel to the visit earlier in the spring of 1915 of the Bishop of London, who held several services virtually under shell-fire, "and was with difficulty", added Sir John French, "prevented from carrying on his ministrations under rifle-fire in the trenches". More than once the Field-Marshal had occasion to remark upon the devotion to duty, courage, and contempt of danger displayed by the chaplains of the army throughout the campaign. A considerable increase was made in

the number of chaplains about this period, one Church of England, one Presbyterian or Nonconformist, and one Roman Catholic being allotted to each brigade, and one additional chaplain for the predominating religion in the brigade. A Bishop of "The Front" was also appointed to represent the Chaplain-General there, the Bishop of Khartoum being chosen for that purpose.

At the end of May the army in France was visited by Mr. Asquith on the invitation of the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, who mentioned in his dispatch that the Prime Minister made an exhaustive tour of the front, the hospitals, and all the administrative arrangements made by corps commanders for the health and comfort of the men behind the trenches.

"It was a great encouragement to all ranks to see the Prime Minister among them," added Sir John French, "and the eloquent words which on several occasions he addressed to the troops had a most powerful and beneficial effect."

One other event remains to be recorded before we close this chapter —the appointment of Major-General (temporary Lieutenant-General) Sir William R. Robertson as Chief of the General Staff to the Expeditionary Force, vice Major-General (temporary Lieutenant-General) Sir A. J. Murray. This appointment gave the position of right-hand man to Sir John French to an officer whose remarkable military career had begun in the ranks, and afforded intense satisfaction to the war-worn troops in the trenches. A Lincolnshire man, Sir William Robertson had enlisted in the 16th Lancers, serving several years as a trooper and non-commissioned officer before receiving a Second Lieutenancy in the 3rd Dragoons. Thenceforward his career had been brilliant in the extreme, not so much in the actual command of troops—though he won the D.S.O. in the relief of Chitral, when he was severely wounded, and also distinguished himself in the South African Campaign, as well as in other little wars on the Indian Frontier—as in his successive appointments to important Staff posts at Army Headquarters. He was Assistant Director of Military Operations at the War Office from 1901 to 1907, and Commandant of the Staff College from 1910, becoming, on the outbreak of the Great World War, Quartermaster-General of the army in the field.

Lieutenant-General Sir William Robertson, Chief of the General Staff to the Expeditionary Force
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

F. A. M.

CHAPTER XII

FROM YPRES TO FESTUBERT

(May–June, 1915)

Lost Opportunities—Battles of Rougebanc and Festubert—Joint Offensive with the French—Its Main Object—British Lack of High-explosive Shells at Rougebanc—How the Kensington Territorials distinguished Themselves—Fighting against Hopeless Odds—Some Gallant Deeds and Decorations—Two Victoria Crosses for the Black Watch—The Kensingtons' Vain Sacrifices—Failure to advance South of Neuve Chapelle—More Heroic Deeds—The French Success—British Offensive resumed at Festubert—A Double Attack—The Offensive at Richebourg—How 100 Prisoners were captured by Nine Men—Irresistible Advance of the 7th Division North of Festubert—Magnificent Stand of the Scottish Regiments—The Tragic Romance of "Thomas Hardy"—Grenadiers in their Element—The Epic of the 15th Ludhiana Sikhs—Lieutenant Smyth's Charmed Life—The Canadians at La Quinque Rue—How the 3rd Canadian Brigade took the Orchard—The 2nd Canadian Brigade at Givenchy—The Deadly Struggle for "Bexhill"—With the London Territorials at Givenchy—Their Battle Honours at Festubert—Close of the Battle of Festubert—Work of the 3rd Army Corps—Summer at the Front—Renewed Attacks East of Ypres—The Fighting at Hooge in June—Losses and Honours of the Honourable Artillery Company and Liverpool Scottish—Fine Work by Famous Regiments—Our Renewed Offensive at Festubert—How Lance-Corporal Angus won the V.C.—The Fight for "Stony Mountain"—Dogged Courage of Lancashire Territorials—Capture of "Stony Mountain" by the Canadians—"Dominion Day" at the Front.

THE net result of the fighting on the British front in northern France and Flanders during the first half of 1915 was to leave things, on the whole, very much as they were. Only once—at Neuve Chapelle—did our offensive look like breaking through on a broad enough front to affect the whole German line; only once did the Germans themselves—in their first great gas attack at Ypres, which followed Neuve Chapelle—have a similar chance; and in each case, as already described, the golden opportunity was lost. The story of the fighting on the British front from this point to the end of June is chiefly centred round the two military episodes which developed before the Second Battle of Ypres had subsided—the British offensive between Rougebanc (north-west of Fromelles) and Givenchy, which failed; and the British offensive at Festubert, which succeeded. Both operations carried the tide of battle to the southern end of the British line. There the First Army, under Sir Douglas Haig, joined hands with the French left, and was now co-operating in the general plan of attack which the Allies were conjointly conducting on a line extending from the north of Arras to the south of Armentières. It has been reasonably inferred that it was partly to forestall and frustrate this joint attack that the Second Battle of Ypres was renewed and prolonged by the Germans, who almost invariably replied to the Allies' offensive at one point by a strong local counter-offensive elsewhere.

Sir John French brackets both operations of the First Army on the southern British line, in May, 1915, as one battle, extending from the 9th to the 25th, and explains that it was undertaken in pursuance of his pro-

mise to the French Commander-in-Chief to support the French attack at the same time between the right of the British line and Arras. The main object of the joint offensive was to capture as much as possible of the aggressive salient at La Bassée which



Map showing approximately the Allies' Line and the area of the joint offensive north and south of La Bassée, May–June, 1915

had been found already in the enemy's possession in the early days of the war, when the British army was transferred to the north to guard the road to the coast. Defended as this salient was with its brick-stacks and other ready-made fortresses, as well as by the undulating hills protecting it to the north and south, it had remained a thorn in the Allies' side ever since. Its capture, with that of the commanding heights beyond, would clear the road to the great industrial town of Lille, and deprive the Germans of the network of railways connecting La Bassée, Lille, Lens, and Douai, which made the whole district of immense strategical value to the enemy. Neuve Chapelle had weakened it slightly, but that costly victory had not won for us the firm foothold on the Aubers ridge upon which so much depended.

In accordance with the Allies' plan, Sir John French directed Sir Douglas Haig to launch the First Army on Sunday, May 9—in the midst of the enemy's onslaughts some 20 miles to the north against the new line of the Second Army round Ypres—along the whole front from Bois Grenier, south of Armentières, to Givenchy. The 4th Corps was to attack the German trenches about Rougebanc, to the north-west of Fromelles, and the 1st and Indian Corps the German positions between Neuve Chapelle and Givenchy, thus threatening La Bassée from the north while the French threatened it from the south. The morning was calm and bright as the sun rose on the battle-field before the First Army on this eventful Sunday.

"The scene in front of our line", wrote the official "Eye-Witness", "was the most peaceful imaginable. Away to the right were Cuinchy, with its brickfields, and the ruins of Givenchy; to the north of them lay the low ground where, hidden by the trees and hedgerows, ran the opposing lines which were about to become the scene of conflict; and beyond, in the distance, rose the long ridge of Aubers, the villages crown-

ing it standing out clear cut against the sky."

Punctually at 5 a.m. the bombardment of the enemy's positions began to prepare the way for the infantry, blowing most of the first line of German trenches to ruins. Half an hour later came the signal to charge,

Preparing for the Allies' Offensive: British troops moving to their positions behind the firing-line

the infantry leaping over their parapets the moment the bombardment ceased. It was soon seen, however, that the enemy's main positions were much stronger than had been anticipated—"that a more extensive artillery preparation", in the words of Sir John French's dispatch, "was necessary to crush the resistance offered by his numerous fortified posts". This was the disastrous engagement of which it was alleged at the time that the lack of a sufficient supply of high-explosive shells was directly responsible for our failure, the Ministry of Munitions being subsequently appointed under Mr. Lloyd George to cope with the increasing needs both of our own armies and those of our Allies. Nothing in all the war was more tragic than the splendid but helpless bravery of the First Army against the enemy's main defences, where the German infantry were massed in great force, and equipped with an incredible number of machine-guns. Many of their second- and third-line trenches were the work of months of preparation, reinforced with concrete, and so deep as to lead to subterranean galleries, where the troops were practically immune from shell-fire. Here the bulk of the enemy sheltered during the bombardment, only to emerge unshaken from that ordeal to greet the

oncoming British infantry with a concentrated fire of rifles and massed machine-guns.

Though the 8th Division on the left of the 4th Corps captured the first line of German trenches about Rougebanc, and some detachments seized a few localities beyond this line, the general advance was first stayed and then gradually driven back. It was a day of glorious deeds but unavailing sacrifice. Near Rougebanc the 13th (Kensington) Battalion of the London Regiment succeeded in reaching its objective on the extreme left with a dash which shed fresh lustre on Territorial arms, carrying not only the first, but also the second and third, German trenches, and then digging themselves in. "You have done splendidly", said the Brigadier in a message to the captured position, promising to send reinforcements. Alas! these never reached them; the supports were seen to advance and then to fade away; while the battalions which should have connected up with the Kensingtons in the first case never got through.

The 2nd Sussex and 2nd Northamptons, with the 5th (Territorial) Sussex Regiment, 2nd King's Royal Rifles, and 9th (Territorial) King's Liverpools as second and third lines of attack, came under the most murderous tornado imaginable of rifle-, machine-gun, and shrapnel-fire when within but fifty yards or so of the German lines. Most of the battalions were badly cut up. All behaved with unflinching courage in the face of hopeless odds. Some fought their way through and stormed the German first-line trenches. Others were forced to seek what cover they could and lay there all through the day, unable either to advance or retire until dark. Many of the wounded lay there throughout the succeeding night. Counter-attacks, with hand-to-hand fighting with bayonet, rifle, and hand-grenade, continued all day in the captured trenches, the Germans here losing no less heavily than ourselves in their repeated efforts to drive the captors back. The 2nd Lincolnshires found themselves in one of the tightest corners, where Acting Corporal Charles Sharpe, of that battalion, won the Victoria Cross when in charge of a blocking-party sent forward to take a portion of the German trenches.

"He was the first to reach the enemy's position", says the *Gazette* in recording his award, "and, using bombs with great determination and effect, he himself cleared them out of a trench 50 yards long. By this time all his party had fallen, and he was then joined by four other men, with whom he attacked the enemy again with bombs and captured a further trench 250 yards long."

The desperate nature of the fighting is shown in the record of the act which won the Distinguished Conduct Medal for Private W. Cowling of the same battalion. When the order came to retire, Private Cowling covered the retreat by holding up a number of Germans in a hand-to-hand fight. He killed several of the enemy, and, though at length his rifle was torn from his hands, he succeeded in making good his escape. Another Lincolnshire man, Private E. Kirby, earned the same decoration for his fearless conduct in saving serious loss of life by

Drawn by Frederic Villiers

Throwing Smoke-bombs to mask the Wire-cutters: British forcing their way to the German trenches under cover of the new weapon on the Western Front

The bombs are made of stout cardboard and fuse and slung round the thrower's waist. On explosion they create a dense mass of grey smoke and hide the cutters from the enemy.

throwing a lighted German bomb out of a mine crater, where some 15 wounded and 100 other men were taking cover.

The manner in which the 2nd Royal Berkshires faced the ordeal stands revealed in the record of how Second-Lieutenant (temporary Lieutenant) Nevile West won the Military Cross, and Sergeant B. C. Shea the Distinguished Conduct Medal. When the leading line of his battalion was unable to advance in the face of the terrific fire, all his brother officers having been shot, Lieutenant West rushed forward and attempted to lead the men on. He was almost immediately shot down, but, picking himself up, he went forward again till he was hit a second time. Sergeant Shea, when his officers had fallen, continued to lead his line until he, too, was severely wounded. He managed to keep up for another 20 yards, but then fell. "He tried to crawl forward, but was unable to move, so he continued to cheer his men on from where he lay." Sergeant Grey was another hero of the Royal Berkshires, winning the Distinguished Conduct Medal for "a splendid example of coolness and courage" after all his officers had been killed and wounded.

From the *Gazette* and other sources it is now possible to tell the story of Rougebanc with pages of such stirring deeds, though the official dispatch published at the time dismissed the whole battle in a few lines. When nearly all his company had become casualties, Lieutenant O. K. Parker, of the 2nd Northamptons, collected twenty men, and, seizing a portion of the enemy's trench, held it for over three hours. Driven out at last, he immediately occupied a shell crater just outside the German parapet, and, though heavily bombed, clung on till dark, when he got back with five men. For his gallantry throughout the day he received the Military Cross. The 2nd Rifle Brigade captured a trench at heavy cost, only to sustain a deadly counter-attack until forced to retire.

Private Watkinson of this battalion won the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his courage in catching three of the German bombs in the air and throwing them back among the enemy. The fourth bomb, unfortunately, blew his hand off. Several other men of the same battalion earned the Distinguished Conduct Medal on this occasion, among them Private Windebank, who carried the first message back to the Brigade Report Centre under the enemy's furious fire, subsequently facing the same deadly storm in returning to his post, where he proved of the greatest assistance in helping to mount a captured machine-gun, as well as in collecting bombs in the German trenches for use against the enemy.

Reinforcements for the 2nd Rifle Brigade were sent forward under Second-Lieutenant W. E. Gray, of the same battalion, but only about 25 per cent reached their destination, the remainder being killed or wounded. Second-Lieutenant Gray, who received the Military Cross, proved invaluable to his commanding officer in making good the captured trench and using with great effect the German machine-gun already referred to.

He was the last to retire when the position had to be abandoned.

Later in the day the 1st Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) and 1st Cameronians delivered a fresh assault near Rue du Bois, and it is recorded how some of the men who had been

Ready for the Gas Attack: a Highlander and his Mask

lying out between the lines for twelve hours — including a number of the Sussex Territorials — jumped up as they passed and joined in the charge. The Black Watch lived up to their great reputation by securing two Victoria Crosses on this occasion, as well as a number of minor decorations. The first V.C. was won by Corporal John Ripley, who, leading his section on the right in the assault, was the first man of the 1st Battalion to ascend the enemy's parapet, and from there directed those following him to the gaps in the German wire entanglements. This done, he then led his section through a breach in the parapet to the second line of trench, which had previously been decided upon as the final objective on that part of the line.

"In that position Corporal Ripley, with seven or eight men, established himself, blocking both flanks and arranging a fire position, which he continued to defend until all his men had fallen and he himself had been badly wounded in the head."

The second V.C. fell to Lance-Corporal David Finlay, of the 2nd Battalion, "for most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty" while leading a bombing-party of twelve men in the attack until ten of them had fallen. Ordering the two survivors to crawl back, Lance-Corporal Finlay himself then went to the assistance of one of the wounded, and, quite regardless of his own safety, carried him into cover over a distance of 100 yards of fire-swept ground. Such deeds need no rhetoric to do them justice any more than the bare official record of how the gallant Black Watch piper, Lance-Corporal W. Stuart, who, like Piper Findlater of Dargai, played his company into action after being wounded.

"He started playing the pipes the moment he left our parapet with the second line, and continued playing the whole distance to the German parapet, being severely wounded during the advance."

Lance-Corporal Stuart was rewarded with the Distinguished Conduct Medal, like Private Spink of the same bat-

talion, who, when the signaller with him was wounded, took his place on the top of the German parapet in defiance of the enemy's fire, and continued to signal, sitting down after he had been wounded in the leg. Flag communication with the signallers on the German parapet was established under intense fire by Second-Lieutenant John Millar, also of the 1st Royal Highlanders, who received the Military Cross for this and other heroic work in the course of the same operations. All this bravery, however, proved fruitless against the impregnable defences of the German lines at this point, still undestroyed as they were by our artillery, and the new attack was accordingly withdrawn.

The 5th (Territorial) Battalion of the Black Watch—the Angus and Dundee Battalion—shared in the honours as well as the sacrifices of this sanguinary field. Second-Lieutenant L. A. Elgood received the Military Cross for excellent work while in charge of a working-party of this battalion which for several nights before the attack continued to clear away wire in front of the trenches, although suffering heavy casualties from machine-gun and rifle-fire; and two of the non-commissioned officers, Sergeant M. G. Beverley and Sergeant S. S. B. Milne, were awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for repeated acts of devotion and gallantry on the day of the assault. Sergeant Milne, in particular, went out twice under a heavy shell- and machine-gun fire, and brought in wounded men. Countless acts of heroism were performed in this noble work of rescue, the most conspicuous example being that of Corporal James Upton, of the 1st Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment), who won the Victoria Cross in the following circumstances:—

"During the whole of this day Corporal Upton displayed the greatest courage in rescuing the wounded while exposed to very heavy rifle- and artillery-fire, going close to the enemy's parapet regardless of his own personal safety. One wounded man was killed by a shell while this non-commissioned officer was carrying him. When Corporal Upton was not actually engaged in carrying in the wounded he was engaged in bandaging and dressing the serious cases in front of our parapet, exposed to the enemy's fire."

The 1st Sherwood Foresters passed through a trial which none of the survivors will ever forget, high-explosive shells falling amongst the battalion for fourteen hours on end. It was largely due to the coolness and personal example of Lieutenant Austin T. Miller, who was awarded the Military Cross, that the line was kept intact at the most critical moment.

All this time the Kensington Territorials remained where we left them on p. 228, waiting in vain for reinforcements in the advance position which, to their eternal glory, they had won at the beginning of the day. The 13th had done well at Neuve Chapelle, but their great achievement at Rouge-banc, in the words of General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding the 4th Army Corps, as in the earlier battle, "was a feat of arms surpassed by no battalion in this great war". Of the seventeen company officers who charged from the British position

Admiral Sir John Rushworth Jellicoe, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.

Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet.

that morning eight at the end of the day were killed, four were wounded, and one was missing, and the losses in the rank and file were proportionately heavy. "For conspicuous ability and coolness in leading his company and getting it into position under a heavy fire south of Farm Delangre" for over 400 yards to the enemy's breastwork with a telephone line. Before he reached his destination the line was cut. He crawled on to the Signal Section and started back laying another line, which he eventually got through. He was under a heavy fire the whole time; fourteen men had already been killed and wounded passing over the same ground. He subsequently carried two wounded men to a place of safety under a heavy fire."



Drawn by F. de Haenen

Guarding against the Enemy's Mine-layers: a Listening Patrol at Work

Captain Edmund Gibbs Kimber was awarded the Military Cross. One of the non-commissioned officers, Sergeant F. W. Shepherd, won the rare distinction of a clasp to his Distinguished Conduct Medal—awarded for rescuing a wounded man under fire on November 19, 1914, and other fine work in the war—his conduct throughout the action of May 9 being officially described as "magnificent".

"He made his way from the firing-line

In their first irresistible charge the Kensingtons had swept right through the German positions, and then, as already stated, held on to what they had captured, gradually dwindling in numbers under a pitiless storm of shot and shell, and being slowly encircled as the Germans, mowing down the supports and checking the advance of the

other battalions, crept ever nearer and nearer in force. Ammunition was also running short. Private J. H. Wood, who went across twice between the captured breastwork and the British positions, carrying messages under fire all the way, eventually brought back a party with fresh ammunition. Several of the men were killed on the journey. For his fearlessness throughout the day Private Wood received the Distinguished Conduct Medal, which was also awarded to Acting-Sergeant G. R. Pike, who, after clearing the enemy's trenches for nearly 100 yards when in charge of one of the Kensingtons' bombing-parties, and finding the supply of bombs running short, crossed the open under the heaviest fire and brought up a fresh supply. Another bombing-party on the left, under one of the Kensingtons' officers, kept a horde of Germans at bay for two hours, until they brought up trench mortars. Private V. E. Cohen was at last the sole survivor of the left bombing-party, "and although himself wounded", to quote from the *Gazette's* account of the deed for which he was afterwards decorated—for he, too, received the Distinguished Conduct Medal—"continued to throw bombs with great courage and coolness until too exhausted to move". To save their last cartridges the Kensingtons seized the rifles and ammunition of the dead Germans around them, and shot many of the enemy with their own weapons. The most tragic part of all was the bitter realization, when the order came to retire, that all their efforts, all their sacrifices, had been in vain. Yet not all in vain; for, as Sir Henry Rawlinson afterwards pointed out to the shadow of a battalion which returned to the British trenches, they had succeeded in relieving the pressure on Ypres at a critical moment, and also materially helped the French advance by drawing off German reinforcements which were advancing to the support of their forces south of La Bassée. Of this, however, the valiant 13th were entirely ignorant when at length the order came to retire. The bitterness of that moment has been described by one of the surviving officers in a vivid letter home—published in *The Times*—which also shows the grim nature of their retirement from the front line, fighting their way through the Germans again in order to regain their men. For the enemy in the meantime had gathered in force on their flanks, and practically surrounded them. It was about two o'clock that Sunday afternoon when the order came to retire, and they were groping their way back—

> "for hours above our waists in the mud and foul crawling water of the German communication-trenches, isolated and cut off by an enemy we could not see, but who was steadily reducing our numbers by very excellent sniping. We were four subalterns in command of thirty to forty men. Two of the officers were killed. The other man and myself determined to wait until darkness, and then try to get through the German lines to our own. It was a risk, but everything was a risk that day."

The venture succeeded after a series of almost incredible escapes, but it was not till a quarter past eight that the survivors scrambled over the Bri-

tish parapet into safety. So exhausted was the writer in the last effort that he fell asleep within twenty yards of his goal, having told his men to wait till it was darker before making the final dash over the sandbags into the British lines. It was for his coolness and courage in extricating the remnants of his company, as well as for his gallant leadership in attack, that Captain Kimber, as already mentioned, received the Military Cross. The Kensingtons' commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Lewis, who led the attack, though he had been on the sick list for ten days previously, and had to return to hospital as soon as the survivors were sent back to billets to rest, was created a C.M.G. in the King's Birthday Honours List in the following month.

While the 4th Army Corps was thus attempting the impossible about Rougebanc, the 1st and Indian Divisions were meeting with no greater success south of Neuve Chapelle. Here, as on the northern battle-field, the Germans had brought up reinforcements and strengthened the defences in preparation for the attack. By the morning of the 10th all the units of the 4th Corps which had succeeded in securing a foothold in the enemy's trenches were retired to their original position, the violence of the German machine-gun fire on the flanks rendering it impossible to hold the captured posts. All through that Sunday night, and throughout the following day, heroic efforts were made to bring in the wounded left lying between the British and German lines. Corporal E. Frazier, of the 1st Worcestershire, added a clasp to his Distinguished Conduct Medal—won at Neuve Chapelle—for conspicuous bravery and devotion in this work of rescue. Going out repeatedly in front of our lines, and in face of a continuous fire, he brought in on Monday eleven men of another regiment who had been lying out since Sunday morning. Corporal Frazier then reconnoitred a sap over open ground between the lines and found no fewer than sixty other wounded men. In conjunction with Private J. Williams, of the same battalion, who received the Distinguished Conduct Medal, he thereupon organized a rescue-party of volunteers, and during the afternoon and night they brought in eighty more. Among many other heroes on the stricken field of May 10 was Lance-Corporal W. H. Willis, of the 7th (Territorial) Middlesex Regiment, who won the same decoration near Rougebanc. Seeing four of our wounded lying in the open 20 yards in front of our barbed wire, Lance-Corporal Willis crawled out to them with food and water. He was under rifle-fire the whole time, and one of the wounded was killed even while he was attending him. Later, and under cover of the darkness, he assisted in bringing in the three survivors. Needless to say, the work of the medical services here, as elsewhere, was beyond praise. "At all times", wrote Sir John French in his dispatch covering the operations throughout the month of May, 1915, "the officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and nurses carried out their duties with fearless bravery and great devotion." One of the

Military Crosses for the operations of May 9–10 was bestowed upon Assistant-Surgeon E. B. Messinier, of the Indian Subordinate Medical Department, who went under shell-fire to assist the wounded when X Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, was in action, and though twice wounded continued to perform his duties after having his own wounds dressed. The artillery, though inadequate to crush the resistance offered by the enemy's numerous fortified posts, fought with indomitable pluck and energy throughout, prodigies of valour being recorded both of officers and men. Three of the D.S.O.'s fell to the Royal Field Artillery—Major John Ross Colville, of the 55th Battery, for the great gallantry with which he commanded his battery on both days, directing fire from an isolated tree close behind the trenches, which were being heavily shelled; Captain the Hon. Bertrand Joseph Russell (son of the famous Lord Chief Justice, the late Lord Russell of Killowen), of the 104th Battery, who, though twice wounded early on the first day, continued in command of a section in the trenches, greatly helping the infantry with his guns; and Captain H. G. Lee-Warner, of the 9th Battery, who was also wounded on the 9th, but remained in command of his battery, doing excellent work, till forced to give in ten days later.

French Spoils of War in the Allied Offensive: a batch of German prisoners and their escort of Moroccan troops

In the meantime the French, after a prolonged and overwhelming bombardment, had succeeded brilliantly on the British right, south of La Bassée —as described in our last chapter on the French campaign—carrying the German positions on a front of nearly five miles, and pushing forward from two to three miles. This splendid success, which included the capture of 2000 prisoners and 6 guns, was achieved by our Allies in the course of a few hours. Our lamentable weakness in the preparatory bombardment had prevented us from

making similar headway, but we had at least contributed to that success, as Sir John French and Sir Henry Rawlinson pointed out, by holding the enemy on our front, and weakening his resistance against the French by diverting his reinforcements in our direction.

After the failure of the day attack it was decided that the British offensive should be resumed at night, on the 12th, the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief agreeing to Sir Douglas Haig's proposal to concentrate all our available resources for that purpose on the southern point of attack, between Neuve Chapelle and Givenchy. The 7th Division was accordingly moved round from the 4th Corps to support this fresh assault. May 12, however, proved too dull and misty for effective artillery co-operation, and orders were finally issued for the action to begin on the following Saturday night, the 15th, Sir John French directing Sir Douglas Haig to delay the attack long enough to ensure a powerful and deliberate artillery preparation. "So we let them have it steadily for three whole days", as one of the artillery officers said in a letter home describing the fight. The delay had the advantage of enabling the reinforced Canadian Division to be placed at the disposal of Sir Douglas Haig in the southern section of the line. The Canadians were now themselves again, having recuperated in rest billets since their imperishable achievements in the Second Battle of Ypres, and, with their brigades remade with reinforcements from their base in England, they were ready once more for the fighting line. Their share in the Battle of Festubert, however, did not begin until several days after the renewed attack on the night of May 15.

This fresh effort extended from that portion of the British front which ran south of the Rue du Bois from Richebourg-l'Avoué until it reached the road to La Quinque Rue, and then taking a turn southwards, passed in front of Festubert. The plan of attack was in the nature of a double offensive, preceded, as already mentioned, by days of sustained artillery fire, during which, as subsequently transpired, the enemy suffered severely. The men gathered silently for the attack after dusk on the evening of the 15th, marching to their appointed places with clockwork regularity along column roads marked by signboards. All were keen to wipe out their repulse of the week before. The bombardment, however, had forewarned the Germans of the coming advance, and the first attack, launched from our trenches in front of Richebourg by the Indian Corps and the 2nd Division of the 1st Corps, at 11.30 p.m., found them on the *qui vive* in that quarter. No sooner were our troops over the parapets than the whole sky was illuminated with countless flares which turned night as far as possible into day. Many of our men fell as soon as they left their trenches. The Indians on the left were unable to make any progress. The 2nd Division was more successful, capturing first one line and then a second line of German trenches, the net gain of

The Camera in the Firing-line: a remarkable snapshot of the enemy advancing against the King's (Liverpool) Regiment in the advance trenches

The advancing enemy is seen in the middle distance to the left. The King's Liverpools have their bayonets fixed ready to receive them, and are awaiting the order to fire from the officer, seen midway along the trenches.

ground in this sector amounting by daybreak on the 16th to some 800 yards in frontage and about 600 yards in length.

The 1st Royal Berkshires were again to the fore, two of their junior officers winning the Military Cross for conspicuous gallantry in consolidating the trenches they had captured. It was often harder to hold these trenches than to turn out the Germans, who, man for man, were no match for British infantry when it came to close quarters with cold steel; for no sooner did they retire, hurling their bombs back as they did so, than they turned their artillery on to the spot and did their best to render it untenable. In the assault at Richebourg Second-Lieutenant Carleton S. Searle, attached to the 1st Royal Berkshires from the Indian Army, won his decoration for his coolness and skill in holding one of these captured positions, taking over the command of his company although wounded, and remaining at his post all night and throughout the next day consolidating the trench. Second-Lieutenant Edward L. Jerwood, of the same battalion, earned his Military Cross when in charge of machine-guns, establishing one of his guns in the second captured trench under the enemy's fire, and also, among other intrepid deeds, recovering another gun which had been lost between the first and second German lines. One of the most dashing exploits in this part of the field stands to the credit of the 2nd Oxford and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, a small party of whom, under Second-Lieutenant (temporary Lieutenant) E. Hamilton Whitfield, seized one of the German trenches, and then attacked a detachment still working a machine-gun, killing seven of the enemy, taking three prisoners, and capturing the gun. This, too, after Lieutenant Whitfield, who was awarded the Military Cross for leading the attack, was wounded. In the same district the D.S.O. was won by Captain C. Leathley Armitage, attached to the 2nd Worcestershires from the 6th Battalion, who led the assault on the night of the 15th in the face of the fiercest rifle and machine-gun fire. Though forced back, Captain Armitage withdrew his men with conspicuous coolness and skill, reorganized the attack behind our breastworks, and throughout the night distinguished himself in the work of rescue. Nor must we overlook the gallantry of Private T. Newcombe, of the 2nd Leicesters, who won the D.C.M. in the following circumstances:—

"An officer was severely wounded during a night attack about 20 yards from the German parapet, and at 1.30 a.m. Private Newcombe voluntarily went out under a heavy fire of rifles, machine-guns, shrapnel, and trench mortars to bring him in. The officer was too badly wounded to move, and Private Newcombe remained with him all night, and until he died in the evening of the 16th, doing what he could for him. He crawled back to our lines after dark, exhausted with strain and exposure."

Meantime, while the Germans were concentrating their strength against this new danger at Richebourg, the second British attack was launched. This time it was the 7th Division—moved round, as already stated, from

the 4th Corps area—which advanced to the attack on the right of the 2nd Division, immediately to the north of Festubert, shortly after 3 a.m. The new offensive took the Germans by surprise.

"Our infantry" (wrote "Eye-Witness") "carried the whole of their entrenchments, which were of a most intricate character, without any great difficulty on a front of some 1200 yards, and such was their dash that they pressed on beyond the enemy's third line and rushed one supporting point after another, until at the farthest point they had penetrated 1200 yards behind the German front in the direction of the Rue du Marais. Over one hundred prisoners were taken, including three officers."

Thereby hangs a tale of how Company Sergeant-Major Frederick Barter, attached to the 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers from the special reserve, won the Victoria Cross, and a number of gallant men the Distinguished Conduct Medal. When the first line of German trenches in front of them had been carried by the Welsh Fusiliers at the point of the bayonet, Sergeant-Major Barter called for volunteers to enable him to extend the line. Eight men responded — Welshmen, Scotsmen (8th [Territorial] Royal Scots), and Englishmen, including three of the Royal West Surreys—and it was this intrepid band which succeeded in capturing not only the three German officers and 100 odd men referred to by "Eye-Witness", but also 500 yards of their trenches. Sergeant-Major Barter subsequently found and cut eleven of the German mine leads, situated about 20 yards apart. It was largely due to Captain Clifton Stockwell, of the same battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, that the troops succeeded in establishing the line so far forward. After his company had lost heavily he reorganized it, collected men belonging to other units, and made two further successful advances. For his gallant and capable leading he received the D.S.O. Two of his brother officers won the Military Cross—Second-Lieutenant John B. Savage, for displaying "the greatest bravery in cheering the men forward, although severely wounded near the German parapet"; and Temporary Second-Lieutenant Guy S. Barton, for conspicuous gallantry in bombing attacks on fortified houses held by the enemy. On the 17th Second-Lieutenant Savage was wounded and sent down to the base, but hearing on his way that the grenade company was without an officer, he refused to go any farther and returned to take command. All the Welsh Fusiliers fought splendidly. Sergeant J. Butler, for example, was wounded even before the first assault, but accompanied the battalion in its irresistible charge, bringing his machine-gun into action, and continuing to fire it though wounded a second time. With several other men of the same battalion who displayed equal devotion to duty, he received the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

By seven o'clock on the Sunday morning the gallant 7th Division had stormed and cleared several lines of the enemy's trenches and established themselves on a line running north and south, half-way between their original trenches and La Quinque Rue. A number of the German fortified posts had also been captured, but

others held out, like rocks left by the receding tide, enfilading the further British advance, and remaining a constant source of danger until destroyed. The Indian Corps still finding it impossible to make any progress in face of the enemy's defences at Richebourg-l'Avoué, Sir Douglas Haig ordered the attack of the 7th Division to be suspended at this point—7 a.m. on Sunday morning—and directed the Indian Corps to form a defensive flank. While the British were thus struggling with almost superhuman efforts to consolidate their new positions, and unite the inner flanks of the 7th and 2nd Divisions, which were still separated by trenches and fortresses strongly held by the enemy, the Germans were striving by might and main to make the gap wider and recover their lost ground. By nightfall we had not succeeded in driving them back, though we held most of the positions already won, thanks very largely to the magnificent stand of the Scottish regiments, Regulars and Territorials, who bore the brunt of the counter-attacks. The 2nd Scots Guards, in the advance post of greatest danger, were all but completely surrounded. One company indeed was cut off, and the scene of their last heroic stand, recovered in the later fighting, with their fallen ranks surrounded by heaped-up German dead, showed how they had fought to the last, selling their lives as dearly as did Major Allan Wilson and his immortal handful of men on the Shangani in 1893, or the French Guard at Waterloo. The rest of the battalion suffered heavily. Lance-Corporal E. Hawkins won the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his exceptional gallantry and ability in extricating his party from behind the German counter-attack near Quinque Rue, as well as for subsequently carrying back information under a heavy fire and returning again. A number of other D.C.M.'s were won by the 2nd Scots Guards on this occasion, including Corporal J. B. Wilkinson, who rallied members of various units in the crisis of the engagement, and formed them up to resist the German counter-attack, thus preventing the enemy from getting round our right; and Corporal J. Mills, who, when the German front line had been broken and many wounded were lying between the British and German trenches, repeatedly went out during the day under a heavy shell-fire, which was killing many of the men lying helpless on the field of honour, and carried them back until he was himself wounded. Similar feats were performed by scores of other men on this and the ensuing days. One of the hardest-earned D.C.M.'s was that of Lance-Corporal J. Coleman, of the 2nd Border Regiment, who, with the assistance of another brave Samaritan, brought in no fewer than fifty wounded men during Sunday under a hail of shot and shell, having previously helped to carry in a wounded officer from between the British and German lines. For his share in the work of rescue Sergeant-Major V. H. S. Davenport, of the same battalion, added a clasp to the Distinguished Conduct Medal which he had already won for distinguished gallantry on numerous occasions earlier in the war. The zeal which marked the Border

Regiment was further exemplified by the conduct of Sergeant T. Toner, who received the D.C.M. for his bravery and initiative after the charge in the early hours of the 16th, when, seeing some men in a captured first-line trench without a leader, "he ran forward under fire, took command, and led, with great courage and coolness, a further advance". Another non-commissioned officer earned the proud distinction of a clasp to his D.C.M. for bravery and devotion in these operations—Acting Company Quarter-master Sergeant A. Andrews, of the 2nd Highland Light Infantry, who had previously received the medal for courage, ability, and resource displayed throughout the earlier phases of the war.

It is impossible at present to follow the separate fortunes of the 2nd Gordon Highlanders and other famous Scottish regiments in this critical stage of the battle of Festubert. One gathers some idea of how they fought and suffered in the awards, for instance, of the D.C.M. to Sergeant W. Skidmore, of the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, for assisting his company officer to lead his men after the original company officers had fallen, as well as for subsequently helping to carry back three wounded men under fire; and to Lance-Corporal J. M'Nulty, of the same battalion, who, first taking over the duties of his sergeant, and then those of his wounded platoon officer, held the platoon together, and by his courage and competence successfully conducted their retirement. Lance-Corporal M'Nulty afterwards went forward some 300 yards and attended to his wounded officer under a very heavy fire. Private J. Jones, also of the Scots Fusiliers, died nobly in endeavouring to carry an urgent message to the British trenches. He fell mortally wounded when almost within reach of his destination, but as he lay dying he waved his message high in the air, so that it could not escape the attention of the British in the trenches. It was subsequently taken from his dead body. A Territorial battalion—the 8th—of the Royal Scots (Lothian Regiment) greatly distinguished itself by holding its own in the fire trenches throughout the varying fortunes of the battle, though at heavy cost, including the life of its commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Brook. The 2nd Highland Light Infantry, with a Territorial battalion of the same regiment — the 9th (Glasgow

Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. Bottomley, Queen's (Royal West Surrey) Regiment, killed at Festubert
(From a photograph by Sarony)

Captain Hugh S. Smart, 53rd Sikhs, who enlisted as Private "Thomas Hardy" in the Queen's (Royal West Surrey) Regiment, and was killed at Festubert

Highland Battalion)—shared in the honours of the day near Richebourg.[1] London Territorials were worthily represented by the 7th (City of London) Regiment among others, and Liverpool Territorials by the 5th Liverpool Regiment. One of the Glasgow Territorials, Private G. H. Currie, won the D.C.M. for volunteering to carry three messages up to captured German breastworks under heavy shell- and rifle-fire. In the trenches these messages were passed along from hand to hand, but when Private Currie found that they had not gone beyond the end of the trench he collected them, carried them across 100 yards of open ground, and delivered them—a task calling for courage of no ordinary kind in face of a path strewn with ghastly evidence of the deadly nature of the German attack. The same sort of courage was needed for the achievements of the 2nd Highland (Territorial) Company of the Royal Engineers, to whom, as well as to other heroes of the Royal Engineers themselves, fell their share of the awards at Festubert.

Many other historic regiments lived up to their great reputations in the same field, including the 1st and 2nd Grenadier Guards, 1st Irish Guards, 2nd Royal Warwickshires, 2nd Bedfordshires, 2nd Yorkshires, 2nd Leicestershires, and the Queen's (Royal West Surrey) Regiment. It was in this fight that the Queen's lost Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. Bottomley, as well as, among other officers and men, the gallant private who had enlisted under the name of "Thomas Hardy". Private "Thomas Hardy" proved to be Captain Hugh S. Smart, of the 53rd Sikhs, who, failing in repeated applications to exchange his post on the Afghan frontier for active service on the European front, had risked his rank and reputation to offer his life in the cause of freedom. Efforts to trace him in India and elsewhere having failed, he was formally removed from the service, but this order was cancelled when the secret of his identity was revealed and the heroic manner of his death made known, the *Gazette* of August 6, 1915, giving the full circumstances of the case.

The Grenadier Guards were in their element with bombing work, and several were decorated for their dar-

[1] Lieutenant-Colonel C. C. Murray, of the 9th Glasgow Highland Battalion, Highland Light Infantry, was rewarded with the C.M.G. in the Birthday Honours List of the following month.

ing and resource. One of the Military Crosses was awarded to Lieutenant A. V. L. Corry, of the 2nd Battalion, who, when his company commander had been killed at Rue du Bois, and all the other officers wounded, reorganized and commanded the company with the greatest coolness. Some of the hardest fighting of all fell to the 1st South Staffordshires, who, as at Ypres and Neuve Chapelle, added new glory to a great tradition. "South Staffordshires," said the Brigadier-General a few days later, "you have done splendidly. You went right through the German trenches and took them, and, what is more, made the Germans run. No regiment could have done better." The leading company in the attack on the 16th was commanded by Captain Archibald B. Beauman, who, handling his men with great skill, cleared the trenches to his right with his company and bombers, and after reaching the line allotted to the battalion entrenched himself, and never budged throughout the destructive artillery fire of the ensuing three days. For this he received the D.S.O., which was also awarded to Captain Singleton Bonner, of the same battalion, for his rare display of coolness and bravery throughout, as well as his exceptional power of command. The men, too, as the Brigadier-General said, were splendid. There was the fine example, for instance, of Private C. Farmer, who received the D.C.M. for his imperturbable pluck while in charge of a machine-gun team for three whole days in a most exposed position.

"Most of the team were killed or wounded," runs the official record, "but he remained working his gun with extra men, although on one occasion he was blown into the trench from his position on the bridge by a shell."

The 2nd South Staffordshires were similarly distinguishing themselves during the same period at Rue du Bois, as the following account of one of its D.C.M. deeds—by Private F. Ball—bears witness:—

"After the non-commissioned officer and remainder of his machine-gun team had been killed or wounded, Private Ball, with the greatest courage and coolness, succeeded under a heavy shell fire in bringing his gun into action. He maintained his gun in an exposed place for two days on the left flank of a captured German trench under a heavy fire, and thus prevented the enemy repairing an important communication trench."

In this part of the field some heroic work was being done by the Liverpools under Lieutenant W. M. Hutchinson, attached to the 1st from the 3rd Battalion, who received the Military Cross for leading a party of men across the open under a very heavy machine-gun fire in response to calls for ammunition. Lieutenant Hutchinson succeeded in winning through with most of his men, though the last part of the journey had to be done on hands and knees. On the 18th the same officer organized and conducted a bombing attack, and by his brilliant work with this daring party not only forced the surrender of 200 Germans, but also caused 200 more to retreat in confusion, leaving their arms and equipment behind them.

Fighting was resumed all along the line at daybreak on Monday the 17th.

During the night the Germans had forced us by a violent counter-attack to evacuate the most exposed part of our new line at Festubert, where it formed a pronounced salient defended by a breastwork. All our other gains, however, were maintained, and by 11 o'clock on Monday morning the

Lieutenant J. G. Smyth, 15th Ludhiana Sikhs, who won the Victoria Cross at Festubert on May 18, 1915
(From a photograph by Gillman)

7th Division had again pushed forward, carrying several more of the enemy's trenches, and making considerable advance in the direction of Rue D'Ouvert, Château St. Roch, and Canteleux. The task allotted to the 2nd Division on the left was to push on when the situation permitted towards the Rue du Marais and Violanes, the Indian Division being ordered at the same time to extend its front far enough to keep in touch with the left of the 2nd Division when they advanced.

Both the 2nd and the 7th Division made steady progress, storming the advanced trenches and strongholds which the enemy had hitherto maintained between the two forces, and thus enabling their inner flanks to join hands. By nightfall the area of captured ground had been considerably extended to the right by the still successful operations of the 7th Division, but the following morning, Tuesday the 18th, brought rain and low-hanging clouds, which made effective artillery co-operation extremely difficult. The conflict continued, but although the line was extended before dark to the La Quinque Rue-Béthune Road, progress was not very marked, and further attacks were accordingly postponed.

This was the day which produced the epic of the ten supermen of the 15th Ludhiana Sikhs, of the Indian Corps, led by Lieutenant John George Smyth, a young officer of twenty-one who had already been brought to notice for his dauntless bravery. In the early morning of the 18th a company of the 15th Sikhs under Captain Hyde-Cates, holding a section of a captured German trench known as the "Glory Hole", near the Ferme du Bois, on the right of the Indian Army Corps front, ran desperately short of ammunition. The other section of the "Glory Hole" was still in the hands of the Germans, separated from the Indians only by a barricade, over which they were massing men with the evident intention of launching an overwhelming attack. The trench had originally been captured by a Highland regiment, and had long

been the scene of furious fighting. Now the enemy, bent on making a supreme effort for its recovery, rained bombs on the Indians throughout the morning. Till midday the Sikhs were able to hold their own, but as the supply of ammunition diminished the situation gradually became critical.

News from Home: the Arrival of the Mails for the Troops at the Front

Two brave attempts to relieve them failed, the officers in each case being killed and both parties suffering severely. One more effort was organized among volunteers from the 15th Sikhs, under Lieutenant Smyth. It was a perilous adventure, but therein lay the only hope of saving their comrades in the "Glory Hole". Nothing daunted, the officer and his little party of ten men started at 2 p.m. for what seemed certain death, taking with them two boxes of ninety-six bombs, which might at any moment have exploded. There was absolutely no natural cover on any part of the 250 yards which had to be crossed before they reached their goal—only an old shallow trench, never more than knee-deep, and now described as filled almost to the top in places with the dead bodies of Highland Light Infantry, Worcesters, Indians, and Germans. Truly it was an undertaking to appal the stoutest heart.

"Dropping over our parapet," to continue the officer's graphic narrative, "they wriggled their way through the mud, pulling and pushing the boxes with them, until they reached the scanty shelter of the old trench, where they commenced a progress which, for sheer horror, can seldom have been surpassed. Pagris [or pugrees, the turbans worn by Indians] had been attached to the front of the boxes. By

means of these the men in front pulled the boxes along over and through the dead bodies, while those in rear pushed with all their might, the whole party lying flat. . . . The ground was hissing with the deluge of rifle and machine-gun fire, while the air above them was white with the puffs of shrapnel. To the anxious watchers in the rear it seemed impossible that a single man should win through."

One by one the little band of heroes dwindled, as the enemy's fire took its remorseless toll. There were only six men and Lieutenant Smyth left after merely 20 yards had been covered. Yet the survivors pushed on, struggling to drag their two precious boxes along, which ordinarily took four men to handle apiece. On and on they crawled until only two were left, Lieutenant Smyth and Sepoy Lal Singh—all the rest had been killed or wounded—and there was still some way to go. It was manifestly impossible to take both loads now, so one box had perforce to be abandoned. The last lap was the most dangerous of all, as it brought the British officer and his faithful Sepoy out again in full view of the enemy at close quarters. Still pulling and hauling, they survived this ordeal only to find their passage barred by a stream which was too deep to wade. Crawling on and on they reached a point which was just fordable:

"Across this they struggled with their valuable burden, and in a few yards they were among their friends in our trench, both untouched, although their clothes were perforated with bullet holes. Sad to relate, shortly after reaching the trench the gallant Sepoy Lal Singh was killed."

Lieutenant Smyth was granted the Victoria Cross for this unparalleled act of valour, and all the men who accompanied him the Indian Distinguished Service Medal. This was not Lieutenant Smyth's only narrow escape. It was recorded that besides bullets which passed harmlessly through his clothes shells had previously blown off his cap at least five times, and once, while he was lighting a cigarette, a bullet actually snapped the match out of his fingers. No wonder his men came to believe that he bore a charmed life.

On the following day the 7th and 2nd Divisions were drawn out of the line to well-earned rest after four days and nights of incessant operations, the 7th being relieved by the Canadians, who had been advanced by Sir Douglas Haig towards the firing-line two days before, and the 2nd by the 51st (Highland) Division, which Sir John French had previously ordered to move into the neighbourhood of Estaires to support the operations of the First Army. The Canadian and 51st Divisions, together with the artillery of the 7th and 2nd Divisions, were now placed by Sir Douglas Haig under the command of the Canadians' chief, Lieutenant-General Alderson, whom he directed to conduct the operations hitherto carried on by the General Officer Commanding First Corps.

It was not long before the Canadians, continuing the excellent progress made by the 7th Division, and burning to avenge the dastardly gas attack at Langemarck, won their first trenches from the enemy. This was at the capture of the orchard in front of La Quinque Rue, which, having been

placed in a state of defence by the enemy, was a formidable obstacle to the further advance of our troops. The attack on the orchard was ordered for Thursday night, the 20th, an advance post having been captured the day before by two companies of the 14th Royal Montreal Regiment, under

Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. E. Leckie, C.B., Commanding the Canadian Scottish in the Capture of the Orchard in front of La Quinque Rue on May 20, 1915 (From a photograph by Swaine)

Lieutenant-Colonel Meighan, and two companies of the 16th Canadian Scottish, under Lieutenant-Colonel Leckie, these having then dug themselves in, with the Wiltshires on their right and the Coldstreams on their left. The original companies, having suffered severely in winning the 500 yards represented by their preliminary success, were withdrawn during the night, the two companies of the Canadian Scottish being relieved by two other companies of the same regiment, while the trench occupied by the 14th Royal Montreal companies was taken over by stretching out the Coldstream Guards on one flank and the Canadian Scottish on the other.

The charge of the Canadian Scottish on the following night was consequently carried out under the eyes of a regiment which could boast one of the proudest records in the history of British arms, and not the least reward which their prowess subsequently received was the high praise of the Coldstreams' officers for their remarkable discipline and dash in face of the hurricane of shrapnel and machine-gun and rifle-fire, which awaited them immediately they leapt from their trenches. The attack had been preceded by a heavy bombardment by our artillery, but the bulk of the Germans, in accordance with their usual practice, had avoided this as far as possible by returning to their support trenches in their rear, leaving behind only enough men to work a machine-gun redoubt in the centre until the bombardment ceased. Even these retreated before the Canadians, though the charging troops were faced at the edge of the orchard by a deep ditch, with a wired hedge on the farther side. "Without hesitation, however," wrote the Canadian Record Officer in the report issued some two months later with the authority of the Acting High Commissioner for Canada, "the men plunged through the ditch, in some places up to their necks in water, and made for some previously reconnoitred gap in the hedge." Once through this the

position was theirs, for though the Germans were waiting for them on the far side of the orchard, where they had massed in force, they were in no mood to resist the onrush of these determined men in kilts, three platoons of whom cleared the place. Beating a hasty retreat to their trench, some

Drawn by Ralph Cleaver

A Mutual Surprise: how a Horse unmasked a German Spy

While a British cavalry patrol was passing through a farmstead behind the lines in Flanders, one of the horses snatched a mouthful of hay from a perfectly innocent-looking stack. The surprise on both sides may be imagined when a German officer was found in a cunningly contrived nest telephoning to the enemy all the information he could gather of the British movements. He was believed to have occupied this cramped billet for a month.

50 yards away, the enemy's officers were heard trying in vain to force their men to attack. Nothing would induce the German troops to face the victors, now digging themselves in before another wired ditch at the far side of the orchard. One company ensured the security of the rest by occupying an abandoned German trench to the south-west of the orchard, thus preventing a flank counter-attack. Here the men lost heavily, but held on, and enabled the captured position to be consolidated. Two days later this was handed over in good shape to the 3rd Toronto Regiment of the 2nd Brigade, which relieved the Royal Highlanders. All Canada from the Pacific to Lake Ontario was represented in this glorious little orchard affair, for the 16th Canadian Scottish included detachments from the 72nd Seaforths of Vancouver, the 79th Camerons of Winnipeg, the 50th Gordons of Victoria, and the 91st Highlanders of Hamilton. Lieutenant-Colonel Leckie was made a C.B., and Captain Frank Morison, who commanded the leading company in the attack, received the Distinguished Service Order for "conspicuous gallantry and ability".

While the 3rd Canadian Brigade had thus been distinguishing itself before La Quinque Rue the 2nd Canadian Brigade had been making a brilliant attack about a mile to the south against a strongly fortified redoubt—bristling with machine-guns and defenders behind bomb-proof shelters—known to our intelligence department as "Bexhill". At this point the 7th British Division, just before being relieved, had carried some of the German trenches in the face of heavy fire from "Bexhill" redoubt. The 10th Canadians, taking over these trenches on the night of the 19th, made an attempt on "Bexhill" itself on the following evening. Unfortunately the preliminary bombardment had been quite ineffectual, and as no previous reconnaissance had been possible the attack failed. The next attempt, on the following night, was more thoroughly prepared:

"Our force", to quote from the Canadian Record Officer's account, "consisted of the grenade company of the 1st Canadian Brigade, and two companies of the 10th Canadian Battalion. This attack was met by overwhelming machine-gun fire from 'Bexhill' redoubt, and our force on the left was practically annihilated. On the right the attackers succeeded in reaching the enemy's trench line running south from 'Bexhill', and, preceded by bombers, drove the enemy 400 paces down the trench and erected a barricade to hold what they had won."

It was in these operations that Lieutenant W. D. Sprinks, brigade grenadier officer, won the Military Cross for "maintaining the position gained by continuous bombing for twenty hours". Corporal J. E. Palmer, 10th Canadians, also played a lion's share in the defence, and received the D.C.M. Daybreak brought a devastating storm of shells which, continuing through the Saturday, practically wiped out the trench. Even then the Canadians, though sadly reduced in numbers, clung to the northern end of their captured trench, abandoning the southern end and erecting a second barricade across the portion that remained in their hands. But for the sure shield of their own artillery they, too, would have been wiped out by the enemy's infantry, who massed in force for counter-attacks during the day. These, however, crumbled away, with heavy loss to the attacking infantry, who, caught in the open in a cross-fire from our guns, and then coming under that of our rifles, precipitately retired. During the night the trenches were taken over by detachments of British troops and the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, as well as by King Edward's Horse and Strathcona's Horse, these, like so many others in a war that gave the cavalry little scope for orthodox work, serving, of course, as infantry.

"I had to put you into the trenches the other night," said Lieutenant-General Alderson in visiting the 1st Canadian Brigade on its return to billets a few days later. "Many of you had never been in a trench before, but none of you showed it. I would not have put you there if I had not been able to say to myself: 'Many of these are men with whom I fought side by side in South Africa; and I know them to be all right'. You have had a very trying time. But in spite of all, you carried out your allotted task uncommonly well."

Lieutenant Donald J. Macdonald, of Strathcona's Horse, showed how these men could fight on foot. "Although

wounded in three places", states the *Gazette* in describing the deed for which he was awarded the Military Cross, "he continued to lead his men with great dash in the advance to the attack on the enemy's position, and succeeded in entering their redoubt, accompanied by two men". The next day, Whit-Sunday, was comparatively peaceful, though a fresh counter-attack, backed by the usual bombardment, was developed by the Germans in the same hotly-contested district. This, too, proved a disastrous failure. In return the Canadians celebrated Bank Holiday and Queen Victoria's Birthday on the following day by the capture not only of "Bexhill" but of 130 yards of trenches to the north. The Canadians' first attack was delivered at daybreak, after a thorough reconnaissance of the ground, by two companies of the 5th Battalion, under Major Edgar, supported by a company of the 7th Battalion British Columbia Regiment as working-party. Charging in face of a withering machine-gun fire they captured "Bexhill" at 4.15 a.m., though the redoubt was not at that time entered. Captain S. J. Anderson, who was severely wounded, and Captain J. F. P. Nash, both of the 5th, received the D.S.O. for deeds of exceptional heroism in these as well as other operations. Privates E. H. Hester and J. W. M'Kie, of the same battalion, won the D.C.M. for splendid work throughout. "Bexhill" itself was occupied about an hour and a half later by the 5th Battalion, a company of the 7th Battalion and a squadron of Strathcona's Horse having meantime been sent up to reinforce. Having added to their credit 130 yards of trenches to the north of "Bexhill" the 5th Battalion was ordered to "dig in and hang on", and rest content with their laurels, Major Odlum, commanding the 7th Battalion, now taking charge of the 5th, Colonel Tuxford being ill and Major Edgar wounded.

"All through that morning", wrote the Canadian Record Officer, "the enemy's artillery was exceedingly active, although the Canadian artillery surrounded our troops, who were hanging on in the redoubt, with a saving ring of shrapnel, while our heavy guns distracted the enemy's artillery. Canada had good reason to be proud of her gunners that day. The captured trenches were held at great cost all day. At night the troops of the 2nd Canadian Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, and the Royal Canadian Dragoons were sent in to take them over. The total losses of the brigade amounted to 55 officers and 980 men.

The enemy also suffered heavily in killed and wounded. Batches of prisoners and a number of machine-guns were also captured. On the following day, May 25, Brigadier-General Seely assumed command of the troops holding the position, where they remained until the end of the month, when they were transferred to the extreme south of the British line. Brigadier-General Seely—the former Secretary of State for War—received a handsome tribute from Sir John French shortly afterwards, the Field-Marshal expressing his great appreciation of his fine work on many occasions. "He gave me the most valuable information," added Sir John, in addressing the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, "and never spared himself in any way."



Map illustrating the Operations of the First Army, under Sir Douglas Haig, during May and June, 1915

Meantime, on the 22nd, the 51st (Highland) Division had been attached to the Indian Corps, the General Officer Commanding this then taking charge of the operations at La Quinque Rue, Lieutenant-General Alderson with the Canadians conducting the operations to the north of that place.

While the Canadians were winning their heroic way to "Bexhill" on Whit-Monday, and the Germans were launching their fresh gas attack against our position east of Ypres, as described in our last chapter, the 2nd London Territorials (47th Division) were preparing to continue the ceaseless struggle for points at Givenchy. Here the objective was a length of some 500 yards of the enemy's trench, with an intervening space varying from 100 to 350 yards. The attack had originally been planned for the Sunday night, but for various reasons was postponed until the evening of the 25th (Tuesday). It was the baptism of fire for most of these London Territorials, and though their action occupies but four lines in Sir John French's dispatch of June 15, crowded as it is with battle records extending along the whole British front, their gallant deeds were rewarded with generous recognition in the Honours Lists. In the terse phraseology of the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, the 2nd London Territorials "succeeded in taking some more of the enemy's trenches and making good the ground gained to the east and north". It was only in the later lists of awards for distinguished conduct, and in the personal narratives of those who took part—told by the wounded or written in letters home from the front—that it was possible for long afterwards to fill in the bare outline of that story with the fine work of the London Territorials who shared the honours of that successful attack. One officer of the 23rd Battalion described how the leading troops, punctually at 6.30 p.m., the appointed hour for our artillery bombardment to cease, leapt over the parapet as one man, the 23rd advancing on a two-platoon frontage, with the 24th Battalion (the Queen's) on their right, on a one-platoon frontage. Men fell to right and left as the German machine-guns swept the intervening space with their murderous fire, but there was comparatively little opposition once the trenches themselves were reached. The infantry still holding them had little fight left, and some batches of prisoners were taken. Company Sergeant-Major T. Hammond led one of the platoons of the 23rd, and was the first man in the German trenches, winning the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his coolness and bravery throughout. The hardest part of all was to hold the position won, the British artillery having done its work so well that the trenches had practically vanished in a heap of wreckage. Most of the victorious troops had to seek what shelter they could behind the outer side of the original German parapet. Sand-bags were thrown up as fast as possible—each man having carried two empty bags across for that purpose—but these afforded poor protection against the enfilade fire which the Germans, in accordance with their regular practice, now proceeded to

pour from both flanks upon the men who had thus wrested these trenches from them. In the absence of traverses the losses were naturally heavy, until darkness brought some measure of protection and the necessary work of consolidation could make fair headway. For his ceaseless efforts in this work of consolidation under continuous shell- and rifle-fire Sergeant R. H. Oxman, of the 23rd, won the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

"He exhibited remarkable ability," to quote from the official account of the award in the *Gazette*, "and fearlessly exposed himself throughout the night, no fewer than seven bullets penetrating his clothing and equipment. Twice during the day he crawled into the open under a very heavy fire and assisted the wounded lying between the lines. His fine example gave the greatest encouragement to the men with him."

his extreme gallantry in working these guns under very heavy fire. Though wounded in the knee, he returned to the trench as soon as the wound had been dressed, and, when the guns were ordered to be withdrawn, carried one of them out himself. In doing this he was again wounded.

While these things were happening to the 23rd, the 24th (Queen's) on

A New Recruit in the Armoured-car Section: a Motor Tricycle on the Western Front

Company Sergeant-Major A. C. Heggie, of the same Battalion, when all the officers of his company had been wounded, led it with the greatest courage and ability. He, too, was awarded the D.C.M. for the fine example which he set to his men of devotion to duty.

Before eleven o'clock all the 23rd were established in the newly-consolidated trench, and were pushing ahead to win fresh ground, the machine-guns being sent up under cover of darkness. Lieutenant Leslie S. Clinton won the Military Cross for their right were covering themselves with glory. Having carried the German trenches immediately in front of them, they endeavoured to follow up that success by repeated bomb attacks. Of the seventy-five men who formed the bombing-party fifty-eight became casualties. It was almost a miracle that any survived the storm of shot and shell from the German defences, especially Lance-Corporal Leonard J. Keyworth—a solicitor's clerk before the war—who won the Victoria Cross on this occasion:

"During this very fierce encounter", says the *Gazette*, "Lance-Corporal Keyworth stood fully exposed for two hours on the top of the enemy's parapet and threw about 150 bombs among the Germans, who were only a few yards away."[1]

Repeated rushes with bombs were led by Captain Donald W. Figg, who, when most of the bombers were killed, continued the attack single-handed.

"His extraordinary bravery and disregard of danger", states the *Gazette* in announcing the award of his D.S.O., "enabled the dangerous flank he commanded to hold its own against constant assaults by the German bombers and riflemen. On May 26, when his line was enfiladed by rifle- and very heavy shell-fire, his determination held his men to their ground until relieved four hours later. For seventeen hours his conduct was a brilliant example to the hard-pressed men around him, and more than anyone in the battalion he contributed to the successful retention of the position won."

Another officer of the 24th Battalion, Second Lieutenant Carlton G. Davies, was awarded the Military Cross at the same time for excellent work, not only in these bombing attacks, and in keeping the enemy's bombers at bay at a critical moment, but also in taking a leading part subsequently in capturing twenty Germans in a mine. Among other decorations won by the 24th on this occasion were the D.C.M.'s awarded to Private E. Carr, who was wounded after hurling bombs for three hours with the greatest coolness until his supply was exhausted, and then using his rifle until further supplies arrived; Private N. H. Walters, for gallantry in establishing communication with the captured trench, "when the fire was so heavy that it necessitated his making four separate attempts, the last with a lamp which he had managed to obtain"; and Company-Sergeant-Major H. W. Norris, who repeatedly crossed the fire-swept zone with messages, and displayed extraordinary coolness throughout, taking control of two platoons which were without an officer. Lieutenant Denys M. T. Morland, of the 3rd London Field Company, Territorial Royal Engineers, played a dashing part in the assault, accompanying the infantry, and, finding the entrance to the mine, exploring it alone, thus securing the capture of the batch of Germans who were hiding in it. "Throughout the night", adds the official record of the award of his Military Cross, "he displayed great energy and bravery in endeavouring to consolidate the newly-won position". Nor must we overlook the award of the D.C.M. to Private A. M'Intosh, of that other Battalion of the Queen's, the 22nd, who "held a section of a trench under heavy fire, alone, all the other men in the section having been killed or wounded".

Close by were the men of the 21st (First Surrey Rifles), six platoons of whom were holding the captured trench with the 23rd. They shared the next day in the successful assault on a fortified post which had been giving considerable trouble. An act of devotion was performed by one of their number—Private R. S. Shellard—which stands out conspicuously in

[1] Five months later, unfortunately, Lance-Corporal Keyworth, V.C., died from wounds received in action.

the catalogue of gallant deeds performed in the course of these trying operations. One of the officers being badly wounded, Private Shellard remained outside the lines for three hours endeavouring to shield him, and stayed with him until he died. For this, and for assisting afterwards in carrying in many wounded under a fire which never ceased, he received the D.C.M. The same decoration was won by Lance-Corporal P. R. Dowling and Private T. Hiscock, both of the 19th (St. Pancras), who went out in front of the captured trench and rescued a wounded officer after four men had previously been killed in attempting the same act. A special word of praise is also due to the splendid work of the Territorial Field Ambulances of the R.A.M.C. Some of the heaviest casualties were among the stretcher-bearers. It was for volunteering for this work, when all the stretcher-bearers of the advanced companies had been killed or wounded on the 25th, that the D.C.M. was awarded to Private G. H. Mills, of the 2nd City of London Field Ambulance, and Lance-Sergeant W. A. G. Heather, of the 8th (Post Office Rifles), both of whom remained working under a heavy fire until every wounded man had been dressed. Many other officers and men helped in this noble work. One of two D.C.M.'s which fell to the 6th City of London Battalion for gallantry in these operations was won by Lance-Corporal L. Gordon when acting as a stretcher-bearer. "He was himself wounded by the bursting of a shell," runs the official record, "but continued assisting the wounded until completely exhausted." The 6th, who had already had a month's "blooding" as a battalion in the fire-trenches—having been at Quinchy when the Germans exploded some mines there on April 21—were at this period given the vital part of the line through which the Canadians charged in their attack on "Bexhill", and told to hang on at all costs. They did not budge. Telephonic communication was repeatedly cut between the firing-line and the battalion's headquarters, but this was always re-established and maintained. It was in the dangerous work of relaying this line under a very heavy fire—on one occasion after venturing a considerable distance to obtain the necessary wire—that Private F. J. Burke earned his D.C.M. Another D.C.M. was awarded to Private S. G. W. Smith, of the 20th Battalion (Blackheath and Woolwich) for great bravery in assisting an officer to carry in many wounded across the zone of fire on the 26th, when Blackheath and Woolwich relieved the now sadly-reduced ranks of the 23rd in the captured trenches. The 20th had themselves suffered heavily and fought well, as the following brief account of the award of the D.C.M. to Sergeant G. A. C. Lomas, of that Battalion, testifies:

"When all the men of his platoon, with the exception of seven, had been killed, he held a trench on the right of another battalion, and successfully repelled three counter-attacks by the enemy".

Two days later Captain W. M. L. Escombe, of the same battalion, won the D.S.O. "for conspicuous gallantry

and skill in establishing himself on the crest of the Givenchy bluff", where, for an hour, under heavy fire, he directed his bomb-throwers so successfully that he not only repelled a hostile attack, but secured fresh ground, which was consolidated. Private R. A. F. Carey also distinguished himself in this brilliant piece of work, receiving the D.C.M. for sapping his way along the side of the bluff, and making three dangerous journeys for bomb ammunition.

Grand work was done by some of the 18th (London Irish) near the stronghold known as the Keep at Givenchy, where, with shells bursting in and around it, the telephone wire was repeatedly cut. Three of the London Irish received the Distinguished Conduct Medal for their coolness and daring in repairing the wire while exposed all the time to this heavy shell-fire: Private N. H. Sagar—who also repeatedly ventured across the courtyard of the Keep with urgent messages—Private G. E. Vincent, and Private P. J. Wood.

Some of the bravest bombing of those memorable days was the work of London Civil Servants—men of the 15th (the Prince of Wales's Own) Civil Service Rifles, and the 8th (Post Office Rifles). The 15th, for instance, supplied eight men to another regiment which was short of bombers, and of these four were killed and two wounded. The two who came through unscathed and the two wounded—Privates W. H. Branton, S. Lawrence, S. W. Mills, and H. Harris—all received the D.C.M. Lieutenant-Colonel John Harvey was awarded the D.S.O. for his gallant example and cool leadership while commanding the Post Office Rifles in their successful attack. Then there was the fine performance of Company Sergeant-Major R. J. Peat, of the same battalion, who, when the supply of bombs ran short, collected as many as he could, and carried them, under a terrific fire, to the grenadiers; and, when these had all been killed, threw bombs himself, though without any experience, until he was wounded. This brought him the D.C.M., won at the same time and for similar work by Acting-Sergeant F. C. Morel, also of the 8th.

It was after these engagements that Sir John French testified to the efficiency displayed by the Territorial troops as complete divisional units. "In whatever kind of work these units have been engaged", he wrote, "they have all borne an active and distinguished part, and have proved themselves thoroughly reliable and efficient." The operations at Givenchy brought the prolonged Battle of Festubert to a close.

"I had now reason", wrote Sir John French, "to consider that the battle which was commenced by the First Army on May 9 and renewed on the 16th, having attained for the moment the immediate object I had in view, should not be further actively proceeded with; and I gave orders to Sir Douglas Haig to curtail his artillery attack and to strengthen and consolidate the ground he had won."

The net result had been a considerably greater advance than at Neuve Chapelle, and at less cost, severe though the losses had been.

The actual ground won covered a front of 4 miles at an average depth of 600 yards, the whole of which had been held by an enemy strongly entrenched and fortified. Apart from the German losses in killed and wounded, which were known to have been very heavy, we took all told nearly 800 to General D'Urbal, commanding the 10th Army Corps, "for the valuable and efficient support received throughout the Battle of Festubert from three groups of French 75-centimetre guns." Our own artillery, adds Sir John, did excellent work the whole time. Many instances might be given of magnifi-

French Official Photograph

"Mentioned in Dispatches": French "75's" in action

Sir John French acknowledged "the valuable and efficient support received throughout the Battle of Festubert" from three groups of these famous guns.

prisoners, captured or destroyed twenty-two machine-guns, and a considerable quantity of material and equipment. The British line had been extended during this period, Sir John French incidentally mentioning that his army had taken over trenches occupied by some other French divisions. Reference was also made to the close co-operation existing between the Allies in the tribute paid cent deeds in this field by officers and men alike, but nothing demonstrated their imperturbable courage more clearly than the cool conduct which won the Distinguished Service Order for Captain Charles H. M. Sturges, of the 1st Siege Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery, while acting as observing officer. Captain Sturges had been noted for conspicuous gallantry throughout the campaign, and on this

occasion, after being shelled out of two houses in succession, he proceeded to a third, where, although blown down the ladder by the force of another shell, he still continued to observe and correct the fire of his battery. The British, no less than the Canadians, had reason to be proud of their gunners in that deadly duel for points.

While the First and Second Armies were bearing the brunt of the fighting along the British front during the period under review the 3rd Corps was persistently active in making demonstrations with the object of distracting attention from the Ypres and Festubert fronts. Sir John French also acknowledged the good work done by the 3rd Corps in conducting night reconnaissances, and the courage and resource shown by officers' and other patrols in the conduct of all these minor operations.

The coming of June, 1915, brought a comparative lull along the southern British front until the middle of the month. Nature, taking no heed of man's hideous handiwork, covered the scarred landscape with its summer garb, and bathed it in sunshine. Even the flattest and dreariest parts of the battle-field were smiling, while away from the firing-line the villagers were continuing their agricultural pursuits with a stoic indifference to occasional shells. "The meadows are deep in lush grass", wrote "Eye-witness" in commenting upon this welcome change from the spring and winter mud, "and are ablaze with wild flowers; and what was bare plough land is now covered with wheat or other grain over 3 feet high, or with beet." In grim contrast comes "Eye-witness's" account in the same dispatch of the latest device of frightfulness attributed to the Germans —incendiary rifle ammunition. These bullets were said to be filled with sulphur, which ignited on discharge and continued to burn during flight. The clothes of soldiers lying between the lines had thus been set alight, the severity of any wound caused thereby being inevitably increased.

By this time it was evident that the practice of wearing uniforms taken from our dead, whenever possible, had become habitual among both officers and men of the German army. One of the most flagrant instances of this received its due reward east of Ypres towards the end of May, when a party of about fifty Germans, led by two officers, all clothed in khaki, was observed to enter the stables of the château of Hooge, the scene of some of the most furious fighting described in our last article. Both sides were still struggling for this position just north of the Menin high road. A row of houses on the road itself, outside the grounds of the château, remained in our hands, but the stables were disputed ground. No sooner had the party of khaki-clad Germans entered the stables than preparations were made for teaching them a wholesome lesson with howitzers and machine-guns in co-operation. Our machine-guns having been trained on the doorway, our howitzers opened fire on the building and drove out the invaders, who rushed forth only to be met with a storm of bullets. More than half of them were seen to fall,

and not many of the remainder could have escaped untouched. That was on May 29, and for the next few days the enemy retaliated with fierce bombardments and successive attacks, in the course of which the outbuildings of the château changed hands more than once. Thanks to the stubborn defence by the troops of the 3rd Cavalry Division and the 1st Indian Cavalry Division, our position was maintained throughout. Major Philip G. Mason, of the 3rd (Prince of Wales's) Dragoon Guards, won the D.S.O., while in command of Hooge Fort and the adjoining trenches, for the manner in which he held the village and defence line allotted to him, "notwithstanding a terrific bombardment for several hours every day, in which practically all his trenches and dug-outs were blown in".

This war-wrecked region of Ypres, as well as the southern portions of the British front to the west of La Bassée, was again the scene of activity in the middle of June, when Sir John French resumed the offensive in co-operation with the allies, who were applying steady pressure about Arras. The fighting round Hooge was of a particularly determined character on both sides. The Germans, warned of the approaching onslaught by the preliminary bombardment, made the most formidable preparations to repel the attack, but were no match for the eager troops of the 5th Corps when they leapt to the attack with bayonets and bombing-parties on the Bellewaarde Ridge. Carrying the first line of German trenches in rare style, the troops dashed on and captured part of the second line as well. Some of the Honourable Artillery Company, flushed with success, after waiting for months for this glorious opportunity to come to grips with the enemy, swept on to the third line of trenches. For a time the H.A.C. held part of this in triumph, Second-Lieutenant Lawrence W. M'Arthur here winning the Military Cross.

"When our troops were forced to retire from the third-line of German trenches," to quote from the official account in the *Gazette*, "he rallied part of the retiring troops and reoccupied and held the vacated trench under heavy fire until he was himself forced later to withdraw, owing to retirements on his flanks. He was severely wounded on this occasion."

All the H. A. C. behaved like veterans throughout this strenuous day. Their commanding-officer, Lieutenant-Colonel E. Treffry, fell wounded at the head of his men early in the fight. Major Ward was also wounded, and before the attack and counter-attack had subsided at least a dozen other officers, with a proportionate number of the rank and file, had become casualties. For nearly twenty-four hours they held on to their first two captured trenches under a torrent of shrapnel, high explosives, and machine-gun fire, as well as a taste of asphyxiating gas, and did not retire until relieved at one o'clock the next morning. Company Sergeant-Major E. F. H. Murray won the Distinguished Conduct Medal on this occasion "for conspicuous gallantry and marked ability". He risked his life repeatedly in helping to carry his wounded comrades into safety under

The War-wrecked Region of Ypres: View down one of the ruined streets, showing the tower of the Cloth Hall

fire. Subsequently he organized a party of men belonging to various units, and, leading them forward, occupied positions which had been vacated. Later, when his officer had been wounded, he took command of the trench. Another of the Distinguished Conduct Medals for the H.A.C. fell to Private R. Cutler, who, when one of the signallers had been buried by shell-fire, worked for over an hour without cover in digging him out under the enemy's continuous bombardment. For similar conduct the D.C.M. was won on the same day by one of the Lancashire Territorials—Private J. Eaton, of the 4th South Lancashires — who, in the words of the official record, "remained in a support trench for one hour under heavy fire digging out a comrade who had been buried by shell-fire".

The Liverpool Scottish (10th King's Liverpool Regiment) also fought like Trojans, and lost even more heavily than the H.A.C., including upwards of twenty of their officers—most of them killed or wounded. One of them, reported "missing, believed killed", was the distinguished amateur golfer, Captain John Graham, described as the one really great golfer who never won a championship, though he reached the final of the amateur championship no fewer than five times. Among the daring exploits of the Liverpool Scottish at Hooge on the 16th of June was that of the small party which worked up one of the battered German trenches, killing thirty of the enemy, including a machine-gun detachment, and capturing the gun. Corporal S. Smith, who was one of this heroic handful, and received the D.C.M., subsequently found his way into the fourth line of German trenches, and remained there until ordered to retire, completing a magnificent day's record by repulsing with complete success a counter-attack made by the enemy. Equally fine work was done by officers and men of the Black Watch, Royal Scots, Royal Fusiliers, Northumberland Fusiliers, Wiltshires, Lincolns, and other regiments. The dash and heroism of the younger officers — men straight from the public schools or the 'Varsities for the greater part—was as remarkable a feature at Hooge as elsewhere in this great campaign. Take the case of Second-Lieutenant Hugh Urquhart Scrutton, of the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, who won the Military Cross:



Map showing approximately the Allies' Line round Ypres and the scene of the attacks and counter-attacks at Hooge in June, 1915

Captain John Graham, Liverpool Scottish—the distinguished amateur golfer—reported "missing, believed killed", during the fighting round Hooge in June, 1915

"He led his platoon with great dash under heavy fire against the enemy's line"—we are quoting from the *Gazette*—"and later, though wounded in the head, continued to direct the work of a bombing-party. Although again wounded in the head, knocked down and rendered deaf, he returned to his trench after his wounds had been bound up, and remained at his post till dark."

All ranks of the Northumberland Fusiliers lived up to the noble traditions of this famous regiment on that day. Acting Company Sergeant-Major I. Robinson won the D.C.M. in the captured trenches. "When all his officers had become casualties he took command of the parties of men of various regiments in the trench, and handled them with ability, though himself wounded." Other D.C.M.'s fell to Sergeant J. F. Jordan and Lance-Corporal A. Joynson, of the same battalion, both of whom fought heroically throughout the day. Second-Lieutenant J. H. Vaudrey Barker-Mill, of the 1st Wiltshires, won the Military Cross for similar gallantry and devotion to that displayed by Second-Lieutenant Scrutton. Leading an assault with great dash, he succeeded in capturing some 300 yards of the enemy's trench, as well as many prisoners and two machine-guns; and, although wounded, he remained with his company and consolidated the position gained.

As a result of the day's operations all the German first-line trenches remained in our hands, though we were unable to retain the more-advanced lines occupied during the morning. Two furious counter-attacks were delivered by the Germans with the object of driving us back to our original positions, but we held on to their first-line trenches in spite of every effort of the kind, repulsing each attack with heavy loss.

In the maze of captured trenches and the confusion of the fight the troops inevitably became much mixed up. It was in continually moving up and down the line under heavy fire, from 10 a.m. till midnight, reorganizing units and bringing back their reports, that Captain Lewis Pugh Evans, of the 1st Black Watch, earned the Distinguished Service Order. Another Black Watch officer, it may be added here—Captain Amyas Eden Borton, attached to the Royal Flying Corps—had won the same decoration a few days previously while flying with Captain Anthony Marshall, attached to the Royal Flying Corps

from the 28th Light Cavalry, Indian Army, who also received the D.S.O.

These officers had been on a flying reconnaissance some 20 miles beyond our front at Ypres, and while over the neighbourhood of Staden were attacked by several German aviators. Captain Borton was soon wounded in the head and neck, but, although suffering severely from loss of blood, and momentarily losing control of the aeroplane, he recovered sufficiently to steady the machine, which continued its flight, pursued and fired at by a succession of hostile aeroplanes, and, with the assistance of Captain Marshall, completed the reconnaissance on the prescribed course. Captain Marshall continued his observations in spite of the persistent German pursuit and while rendering all possible aid to the pilot, who was gradually losing consciousness. Eventually the two officers made a good landing at their base, where Captain Borton's dangerous injuries were immediately attended, while Captain Marshall furnished the information which they had been sent out to collect. "The valuable report supplied by this officer", states the *Gazette*, "is as detailed and complete for the last as it is for the first part of the reconnaissance." This thrilling incident, it is worth noting, occurred on June 7, 1915—the very day upon which Flight Sub-Lieutenant Warneford, R.N., won the Victoria Cross for the destruction of a Zeppelin between Ghent and Brussels, and other British airmen blew up the air-ship shed at Evere, north of Brussels, as described on p. 289.

Though the operations in the neighbourhood of Hooge on June 16 only resulted at the time in the capture of the German first-line trenches, they led to greater progress within the next days, our other local successes forcing the enemy on June 18 to abandon his trenches on a front of 250 yards, leaving the British in possession. Our list of captures during the week grew to 213 prisoners—including two officers—three machine-guns, and a full gas cylinder.

Meanwhile, in accordance with the Allies' scheme of co-operation which had accounted for the fresh British offensive east of Ypres on June 16, similar operations were in progress in the Festubert region. The preliminaries to this fresh attack led to one of the bravest deeds in the annals

Captain Anthony Marshall, awarded the D.S.O. for exceptional gallantry in a Flying Reconnaisance with Captain A. E. Borten, D.S.O., June 7, 1915
(From a photograph by Swaine)

Corporal William Angus, 8th (Lanark) Highland Light Infantry, the first Scottish Territorial to win the Victoria Cross

of the British army. On the night of June 12 a small party of British troops was sent out to destroy a German barricade at Givenchy, but in the course of the attack the enemy exploded a mine, and the men were forced to crawl back in the darkness to the safety of the British trenches. Unfortunately Lieutenant Martin, of the Territorial 8th (Lanark) Highland Light Infantry, was missing, and all efforts failed to trace him. Only at daybreak was he seen to be lying wounded within a few yards of the enemy's position. The whole of the officer's company volunteered to attempt his rescue by rushing the enemy's trench, but, as this meant certain destruction to everyone, they were promised permission on condition that they waited till dusk gave them at least some chance of success. Meantime the position of affairs became known to the enemy as well as to the British, and the whole morning resolved itself into a duel of crack shots for Lieutenant Martin's life. None dared to peer above the parapet to take deliberate aim. Every time a German periscope appeared in sight it was shot away by the British marksmen, who were now concentrated within range for the purpose. Unable to endure the suspense after mid-day, volunteers came forward from Lieutenant Martin's battalion for individual attempts at rescue, and the man chosen for the desperate venture was one of the officer's fellow-townsmen, Corporal William Angus.

He was warned that he was facing certain death in making the attempt. "It does not matter much, sir," he is reported to have replied, "whether sooner or later." And at two o'clock he slipped over the parapet, under heavy covering fire of British rifles and machine-guns. How he worked his way on all fours without being hit across the 70 yards which separated the opposing trenches—ground raked up and down with the enemy's shot and shell—seemed little short of a miracle, but he was seen by his comrades to reach the officer and place a brandy-flask to his lips. The Germans were also aware of the attempt, and, not daring to show their heads above their trench, hurled a bomb in what they imagined was the direction of the pair. In the dust and explosion that followed both made a dash for the British lines, Angus supporting the officer as they stumbled along amid a storm of other bombs and shots fired at random through the danger zone. When at last he stag-

gered into safety the gallant corporal was wounded in no fewer than forty places, some of the wounds being very serious. Lieutenant Martin had three wounds. Happily Corporal Angus recovered, to enjoy the proud distinction of being the first Scottish

The Sniper's Lair: a British Marksman's Position in the middle of a Cornfield

The tally shows that he has three "Huns" to his credit for the day's bag.

Territorial to be awarded the Victoria Cross. He received his V.C. from the hand of the King himself, and, later, £1000 from enthusiastic admirers at home, who gave him a welcome to his native town of Carluke which will live in the memory of every inhabitant of the Clyde valley.

Three days after Corporal Angus left the trenches, covered with wounds and glory, the British offensive was reassumed at that part of the line, simultaneously with the new attack near Hooge, already described. After a moderately prolonged bombardment our troops advanced from our old front line to the south of Festubert, and on the east of that place from the fresh line seized in the middle of May, and since consolidated. The main objective was the fortified position in the enemy's trench-line known to our Intelligence Staff as "Stony Mountain", which barred the way to any appreciable progress in that neighbourhood. This was attacked by a British Division, with the 1st Canadian Ontario Regiment, of the 1st Canadian Brigade, directed to secure

the right flank by seizing two lines of German trenches between "Stony Mountain" and another enemy stronghold known as "Dorchester", some 150 yards to the south. As usually happened after the preliminary bombardment of an assault, the first German lines were gained at once over the greater part of the line. The hardest part was in holding what had been won, against successive counter-attacks and a ceaseless hail of shells, especially where the troops succeeded in penetrating the trenches beyond the first line. The distance separating the opposing lines was greater on the left than on the right, and many of the Germans who had retired to the rear trenches during our bombardment had time to race back to their first-line defence before the British infantry arrived, opening a destructive fire upon them as they charged across the ground covered with the remains of wire entanglements and pitted with the craters from innumerable shells. Luckily one of our artillery officers saw this move in time, and our field-guns, reopening fire, gave the returning Germans an unexpected shower of shrapnel and high-explosive shell-fire, causing serious loss. During the evening, however, the enemy brought up reinforcements and maintained a hot artillery fire over the whole of this area. "Fighting continued throughout the night," wrote "Eye-Witness", "strong counter-attacks being made by bombing-parties along the maze of trenches, and our troops were unable to hold the ground gained." Thus, for the time being, the effort in this direction was fruitless, our troops being withdrawn to our original line. The last units to fall back were those on the left, between 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. on the morning of Wednesday, June 16. One of the battalions which suffered severely on this occasion was the 4th (Territorial) Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, which only went over to France at the latter end of the previous month. These Territorials fought that night with the dogged courage of seasoned troops. Private J. Fletcher won the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his heroism in attending wounded under very heavy fire, "continuing at that work after he had been twice wounded, and even after his battalion had been withdrawn". Company Sergeant-Major C. C. Lindsay earned the same decoration in the following gallant circumstances, as recorded in the *Gazette*:—

> "When his battalion was retiring to take up a new position, he observed a machine-gun which had been abandoned by another unit, and immediately brought the gun into action against the enemy, who were then advancing, and continued an effective fire until it became jammed. Company Sergeant-Major Lindsay rendered excellent service with his company in the advance under heavy fire."

While Sergeant-Major Lindsay was thus distinguishing himself with the machine-gun a similar deed, similarly rewarded, was being done not far away by Acting Sergeant J. S. Owen, of another Lancashire Territorial Regiment—the 1st/4th Battalion Royal Lancasters. Sergeant Owen recovered a Maxim gun under terrific shell-fire after it had been buried, and set a fine example of courage and coolness

throughout a very trying ordeal. Another splendid instance of devotion to duty was furnished by Lance-Corporal P. Mahon, of the 8th (Irish Territorial) Liverpool Regiment, who, although twice wounded, pushed forward in the same attack at Rue d'Ouvert, "and by his cheerful example encouraged the men to accompany him through a hurricane of bursting shells towards the enemy's lines". Some miles away, on the 16th, another Liverpool man—Lance-Corporal Joseph Tombs, of the 1st King's—won the Victoria Cross. This was near Rue du Bois.

"On his own initiative", says the *Gazette*, "he crawled out repeatedly under a very heavy shell and machine-gun fire, to bring in wounded men who were lying about 100 yards in front of our trenches. He rescued four men, one of whom he dragged back by means of a rifle-sling placed round his own neck and the man's body. This man was so severely wounded that unless he had been immediately attended to he must have died."

On the right of the British Division south of Festubert—to return to the main operations in this region on June 15–16, 1915—the Canadians were again demonstrating that troops who, before the war, had been described by the enemy's military experts as of wholly negligible account, could drive a wedge into the strongest German positions. This was at Givenchy, where every yard and almost every stone was scarred from previous battles. Here, as already stated, the 1st Canadian Ontario Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hill of the 1st Brigade, was detailed to secure the right flank of the advancing British Division. On the right of the Ontario Regiment were the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Battalions, as far as the La Bassée Canal, with the 3rd Canadian Toronto Regiment in support, working parties of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Brigade being told off to secure the lines of trenches and make the defensive flank. The left of the attacking Ontario Regiment was held by the East Yorks.

The sappers had previously prepared a mine under the hostile defences, but the discovery of water at the vital spot had prevented the tunnel from being carried far enough forward. In order to remedy this as far as possible an unusually heavy charge was used. This was just before six o'clock, when the assault was timed to take place, the Canadians in the meantime having been withdrawn from the original charging-line to avoid the effects of the explosion. Unfortunately this proved powerful enough not only to reach the enemy's lines, but also to involve some of the Canadian positions. We lost a number of valuable lives in this tragic accident, as well as a reserve supply of bombs, which was buried among the ruins. To add to the handicap a chance shell from the Germans blew up another bomb depot about the same time. These misfortunes left the Canadians perilously short of bombs, but there was no counting the cost when the leading company of the 1st Ontario Regiment, under Major C. J. L. Smith, leapt from the trenches at the given signal and charged through the flying smoke and dirt of

the explosion toward the enemy, who met them with gusts of fire from the machine-guns stationed on "Stony Mountain". Those who came directly opposite that fort were all killed or wounded, but the German front trench and the "Dorchester" redoubt were captured with irresistible dash. Bombing-parties had followed the leading company on both flanks, but officers and men alike were, almost without exception, shot down. The second company followed under Captain G. L. Wilkinson, and with the survivors of the leading company stormed the enemy's second line after a hand-to-hand fight with the resisting Germans. Then came the third company under Lieutenant T. C. Sims, his brother officers—Captain F. W. Robinson and Lieutenant P. W. Pick—having been killed in the explosion of the bomb depot by a German shell. The third company's duty was to consolidate the captured first-line trench, but it suffered heavily in the deadly passage across the open ground, and Captain Delamere's company was sent forward in support. What these advances cost may be judged from the following extract from the Canadian Record Officer's account of the fight:—

Major C. J. L. Smith, 1st Ontario Regiment, who led the First Charge in the Battle of "Stony Mountain", June 15–16, 1915
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

"Captain Delamere had been wounded, and the command devolved upon Lieutenant T. C. L. Young, who was wounded at our parapet. Lieutenant Tranter took command, and was killed a moment later. Company Sergeant-Major Owen[1] then assumed command, and led the company with bravery and good sense."

The same undaunted bravery inspired all ranks. One of the finest examples of this was provided by the machine-gun detachment under Lieutenant F. W. Campbell, which had advanced in rear of Captain Wilkinson's company. Of one gun the entire crew was shot down in the advance, but part of the other crew succeeded in reaching the enemy's front trench, thence working its way under a galling fire towards "Stony Mountain". Only Lieutenant Campbell and Private Vincent were now remaining, but they struggled on until at length a barricade across the trench rendered further progress impossible. Even that, however, did not deter these

[1] Awarded the D.C.M. The same decoration was won on this occasion, among others, by Corporal S. G. Hobday, 3rd Canadian Infantry, and Private E. Gledhill, of the 1st.

heroic gunners from getting their rounds home.

"In default of a base", to quote from the Record Officer's narrative, "Lieutenant Campbell set up the machine on the broad back of Private Vincent, and fired continuously. Afterwards, during the retreat, the German bombers entered the trench, and Lieutenant Campbell fell wounded. Private Vincent then cut away the cartridge-belt, and, abandoning the tripod, dragged the gun away to safety, as it was too hot to handle. Lieutenant Campbell crawled out of the enemy trench and was carried into our trench in a dying condition by Company Sergeant-Major Owen. In the words of Kinglake: 'And no man died that night with more glory, yet many died and there was much glory'."[1]

Meantime the men in possession of the captured trenches were running short of ammunition, and the Germans were counter-attacking heavily. Volunteers returned for more bombs, but one after the other fell on the way. Yet others volunteered, and some were successful, though the supplies remained hopelessly inadequate. Private Smith, of Southampton, Ontario, son of a Methodist minister, and a student of nineteen before the war broke out, became almost the only source of replenishment. Young Smith had been buried in the mine explosion which preceded the attack, but, digging himself out, and realizing the urgent need of bombs in the captured trenches, proceeded to supply that demand as far as he could single-handed. So he set out on all fours, festooned with

[1] The posthumous honour of the Victoria Cross was conferred upon Lieutenant F. W. Campbell for this sublime self-sacrifice. Private H. Vincent was awarded the D.C.M.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, Commanding the Canadians at the Battle of "Stony Mountain", June 15-16, 1915
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

bombs from the dead and wounded comrades round him, and reached the trenches, where every bomb he carried was worth its weight in gold.

"He did it five times," wrote Sir W. M. Aitken, the Canadian Record Officer, in his account of this thrilling achievement. "He was not himself a bomb-thrower but a mere middleman. Twice he went up to the trenches and handed his load over to the busy men. Thrice, so hot was the fire, that he had to lie down and toss the bombs (they do not explode until the safety-pin is withdrawn) into the trench to the men who needed them most. His clothes were literally shot into rags and ravels, but he himself was untouched in all his hazardous speculations, and he explains his escape by saying: 'I kept moving'. So through all these hells the spirit of man endured and rejoiced indomitable."

Yet, after all, the supply of bombs ran out. Reinforcements were sent forward from the 3rd Battalion, but step by step our men were gradually forced back by the German bombers, whose supply of ammunition was seemingly inexhaustible. The loss of practically all our officers was another heavy handicap, and finally, at half-past nine, the British division on the left having been held up by "Stony Mountain" and the German line north of that stronghold, it was reluctantly decided to withdraw the remnants of the Canadian battalions to the original line. Thus all the ground that had been gained at such heavy cost had to be abandoned, many other men falling in the cruel moment of withdrawal. Only three officers out of twenty-three came scatheless through that evening's luckless advance—Colonel Hill—"who fought his men to the bitter end with high judgment and courage"—Lieutenant S. A. Creighton, and Lieutenant T. C. Sims.

On the following afternoon, June 16, after a further bombardment, the troops again pushed forward to the east of Festubert, recapturing several of the points from which they had been driven during the previous night. "Judging by the number of dead Germans in the trenches," reported Sir John French at the time, "our artillery-fire was very effective." Again the Germans counter-attacked, the tide of battle ebbing and flowing throughout the afternoon and night. The net gain of ground which remained to us on the 17th, when the struggle for the time being subsided, was an advance from our original position of about 100 yards in depth and some 300 yards in frontage.

Some days later the Canadians were relieved, their head-quarters being shifted to the north, where they took over a trench line from a British division. Here it was, on July 1, 1915, that they celebrated Dominion Day with their own flag decorated with French flowers—hoisted to the intense annoyance of the Germans facing them, who riddled it with bullets—and with national sports and games behind the firing-line. It was a day that will ever be memorable in the history of Canada and Canadian arms, for, as Sir W. M. Aitken pointed out, it was the first Dominion Day that Canada had spent with the red sword in her hand.

F. A. M.

A "Sniperscope" in use in British Trenches within thirty yards of the German Positions

CHAPTER XIII

ITALY AND THE WAR

Italy and the Principle of Nationality—Mazzini and the Mazzinists—Vittorio Emmanuele and Cavour—Garibaldi—United Italy—The Irredentists—Italy and the Triple Alliance—Italy's Interests in the Balkan Peninsula—Austria's Revelation of her Intentions in Serbia in 1913—Baron Sonnino and the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia, 1914—Italy's Declaration of Neutrality, August 3rd, 1914—Negotiations with Austro-Hungary, 1914-5—Italy's Demands and Austro-Hungarian Counter-proposals—Denunciation by Italy of the Alliance and Declaration of War—Opening Phases of Italy's Campaign—The Strategic Problem—Italy's Army and Organization—Three Sections of the Austro-Italian Frontier—The Isonzo Front—Gorizia the Pivot—Tolmino and the Carso Plateau—Fortress Warfare and Siege Operations.

ITALY'S history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is that of the attempt of the Italian people to consolidate the principle of nationality which was awakened in the eighteenth. In the eighteenth century Italy was divided into petty kingdoms and duchies held by Bourbon or Austrian princes. There were the exceptions of the Papal States and the territories of the House of Savoy. In the resettlement and partition of Italy, which took place after the War of the Spanish Succession, the House of Savoy was rewarded for its services to the Allies by the title of King and by the addition of Sicily to its existing territories. Sicily was afterwards forcibly exchanged for Sardinia; but from the House of Savoy were to come the future kings of Italy.

After a period of comparative tranquillity under its numerous princes Italy became permeated by the ideas of liberty and equality of the French Revolution; and the Napoleonic wars served to give some sense of corporate feeling to her many principalities. But in the reconstruction of Europe in 1815 the old conditions were restored, the influence of Austria greatly preponderating. It is true the House of Savoy remained in possession of the kingdom of Sardinia, including Savoy and Piedmont, but the spirit of freedom that had been engendered found vent only in abortive revolutionary outbursts followed by worse tyranny. The time was ripe for a leader, and a leader appeared in Mazzini, who headed the party of Young Italy. It was Mazzini's lifelong ideal to establish a republic. When Carlo Alberti came to the throne, Mazzini called on him to defy Austria, and, failing this, denounced him as a traitor, and organized a feeble rising, easily repulsed and brutally punished.

Meanwhile more statesmanlike ideas for the consolidation of Italy were maturing, and the project of freeing Italy with the aid of the Sardinian kingdom found an advocate in Cavour. In 1846, when the misrule of the Papal States was at its climax, the liberal Pope Pius IX granted a constitution. The example was followed in Tuscany and Piedmont, and the Bourbon Ferdinand II was forced by a revolt in Palermo and Naples to follow suit in the Sicilies.

John Bartholomew & Co., Edinr.

In 1848 the revolution in France strengthened the hands of the Mazzinists, and Sicily was declared independent of the Bourbons, the Austrians were expelled from Milan and Venice, and Republican Governments formed. Carlo Alberti now took his fortunes in his hands and declared

"To begin again." Such was the motto with which Vittorio Emmanuele, Carlo Alberti's son, attempted with the help of Cavour to restore Italy. Cavour sought alliance with Napoleon III, and in 1859 Napoleon declared his intention of liberating Italy and crossed the Alps with an army. He

Italy's Crack Infantry: Bersaglieri on the March

war on Austria, but he was defeated and forced to ask for an armistice. The Pope, taking flight, went to Ferdinand II for refuge, and Rome was declared a republic with Mazzini at the head of the Dictators. Carlo Alberti, making his second attempt against Austria, was overwhelmed at Novara, abdicated, and died broken-hearted. Through the intervention of the Roman Catholic Powers the Pope was restored, the Republic was at an end.

stopped short of Venice, but, in the result, Modena, Tuscany, and Parma joined Sardinia, which also annexed Central Italy. Garibaldi completed the work with his "Thousand", and conquered Sicily and entered Naples. Cavour sent troops to occupy Urbino and Perugia. In 1861 the kingdom of the Sicilies was annexed, and Vittorio Emmanuele was proclaimed king of Italy at Turin.

Only Venice and Rome remained

outside the united kingdom of Italy, and Rome's isolation was supported by Napoleon and a French garrison till 1864, when the French troops were withdrawn. In 1866 came the Austro-Prussian war, in which Italy joined herself to the side of Prussia, and after the Austrian defeat received Venice. Rome, despite the withdrawal of the French garrison, was still independent, and there were sufficient French papal troops to defy Mazzini and Garibaldi. It was not till Sedan and the defeat of Napoleon and the French by Germany that Rome became merged in Italy.

After 1870, with France unable to afford support to the Papal States, and with the other European Powers friendly to Italy, Italy's task was one of domestic reorganization. After 1876 the Progressive party, under Crispi, tided over the two crises of the death of Vittorio Emmanuele and the election of the new Pope, Leo XIII, but in 1879 Crispi left office, and was succeeded by Cairoli and the new party of Irredentists, who sought to recover Trent (in the Trentino) and Trieste from the Austrians. Cairoli's ministry came to an end owing to his acquiescence in the French occupation of Tunis. The French occupation of Tunis, with its disturbance of Italian interests in the Mediterranean, added to increased French activity at the Vatican, produced in 1882 the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy.

In exchange for Italy's support against a possible French *revanche* in Alsace-Lorraine, Italy was guaranteed the assistance of Germany and Austria in case of any interference or resistance by France to Italy's bargains with Great Britain in respect of Egypt. There were various other clauses, notably Article VII, which provided for compensations to Italy in case of disturbance of existing conditions in the Balkan Peninsula or on the borders of the Adriatic. Five years later, in 1887, the Triple Alliance was renewed, and was extended to an equal participation in all defensive interests in Central Europe, no one of the three Powers being bound to take up arms in aid of any aggression by either of the others.

Crispi came back to power in 1890, and busied himself with restoring the damaged finances of his country, but in 1891 he fell again. The Triple Alliance was renewed by Signor Giolitti, who succeeded him. Crispi's intention had been to denounce the Triple Alliance, and he had the hope of making Italy the bond between France and Britain.

THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

Italy's part and place in the European War, apart from the moral responsibility, the force of which was so clearly acknowledged by the Italian people, may be said to be determined by her political interests in the Balkan Peninsula. It was made obvious even by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's speeches during the war that the interests of Germany and Austria lay in the existence of weak and dissevered Balkan States, and of a Turkey stiffened only by German backing. Italy's in-

terests did not lie in the direction of a strong Turkey or of a Germanic Balkan Peninsula.

In November, 1912, Austria had proposed to Italy that they should limit the expansion of Serbia by insisting upon certain compensations and guarantees. But Italy replied emphatically that these guarantees must not be wholly an Austrian monopoly, and that Serbia's independence must not be threatened. A similar encroachment on Montenegro was similarly resisted by Italy, on the ground that the "equilibrium of the Adriatic" would be upset, and the conditions of the Triple Alliance thereby infringed.

In August, 1913, Austria again communicated to Italy her intention of provoking a war with Serbia, as the late Marchese di San Giuliano revealed; and once again Italy protested, and for the moment Serbia was saved.

But in 1914, with Germanic military preparations further advanced, the Serajevo murder gave Austria another and better pretext for the assault on Serbia; and, avoiding any consultation with her Italian ally, she dispatched the ultimatum to Serbia. The announcement of this step reached Italy through a news agency before it was officially communicated through diplomatic channels. Baron Sonnino, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the circular telegram he dispatched to the Italian ambassadors, declared that such a step, taken without consultation with Italy, was a violation of the terms of the treaty of the Triple Alliance. On July 25, 1914, Signor Salandra and the Marchese di San Giuliano pointed out to the German Ambassador that Austria's action was "in direct defiance of the spirit of the Triple Alliance". From this point dated the right of Italy to denounce the Triple Alliance. Under Article VII of that treaty, which guarded the *status quo* of the Balkans, and provided that in the case of its disturbance reciprocal compensations should be granted to Austro-Hungary or to Italy, she at once demanded compensation, raising the question of Italian provinces under Austrian dominion.

On August 3, 1914, Italy declared her neutrality. But in so doing she in no way relinquished the rights which were hers by virtue of Article VII, and Signor Salandra, on assuming the control of Foreign Affairs after the Marchese di San Giuliano's death, declared to the Italian Parliament that Italian neutrality must be "not impotent, but fully armed and ready for every contingency". Austria, however, replied to Italy's representations with procrastination. But through the long and tedious Austro-Italian negotiations—which dragged on from December, 1914, till the end of April, 1915—Italy's policy never varied. In December, 1914, when Belgrade fell into the hands of the Austrians, Baron Sonnino invited Austria to an exchange of ideas as to Italy's rights under Article VII. From this time the negotiations assumed a new determination, and Prince von Bülow was sent from Berlin to Rome on a special mission to the Italian Government. In his first interview, on December 19, he admitted to Baron Sonnino Italy's right to compensation under Article VII.

Austria, however, refused to con-

sider either Italy's or Germany's suggestions as regards compensation, and evaded the discussion of the Austro-Italian provinces. From Italy's demands concerning these Italy did not waver, and finally, on March 9, Baron Burian, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, consented to discuss compensations "on the basis of the cession of territories belonging to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy". After further delay, Austria, on March 27, made concrete proposals. She offered the southern half of the Trentino, but mentioned no definite boundaries, and repeated that the bargain would not be carried into effect till peace had been declared. In return she claimed from Italy heavy financial contributions and complicated indemnities in the ceded territory; and, further, that Italy was to renounce finally all claims to compensation for anything Austria might do in the Balkan Peninsula.

Italy's counter-proposals were a more extended frontier in the Trentino; a new boundary on the Isonzo River with possession of Gradisca and Gorizia; the cession of certain Adriatic islands in the Curzolari group; the withdrawal of Austrian pretensions in Albania; and the acknowledgment of Italy's right to occupy Valona and the Dodecannesus. She reluctantly waived Trieste.

Austria refused even to listen to these suggestions, or to do more than slightly increase her offer in the Trentino. Negotiations were therefore broken off by Italy, and on May 4, 1915, the alliance with Austria was denounced. Prince von Bülow, between May 4 and 24, strove hard to repair

Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy
(From a photograph by Guigoni & Bossi)

the breach which he had not been able to prevent, and a section of Italian politics, led by Signor Giolitti, appeared to favour the policy of continued neutrality. But public feeling was on the side of Signor Salandra and Baron Sonnino, and three days after the Salandra Cabinet came before Parliament, Italy declared war on Austria by the people's will.

OPENING PHASES OF THE CAMPAIGN

Italy's intervention in the war must have been reckoned with by the Germanic allies, though Germany had striven so hard to prevent it, and failing in that effort had discounted it as far as possible. The effect of it was cumulative rather than immediate.

The reasons why it could not have had an immediate effect were that the Italian armies were: (i) obliged to operate against an Austrian front which lent every advantage to the defender, having been selected with that intention in respect of its natural features, and having been sedulously fortified with the object of improving its natural defences; and (ii) the geographical outline of this fortified Austrian frontier was such that no large numbers of Italian troops could be quickly brought to bear on it. The first aim of the Italian Commander-in-Chief, General Cadorna, must have been to secure such positions against or on this frontier that he could deploy the forces under his command.

These forces, though of high efficiency and well organized, were not overwhelming in number, though their numbers, in correspondence with the Italian effort, became continuously greater, and drew increasing numbers of Austrian troops to hold them in check, by this means depleting the Austrian reserves. Italy's pressure in the campaign of the summer months of 1915 was comparable to that which, more than a century before, British armies had exerted in the Spanish peninsula. Such an analogy is only comparative. The Italian army was of a compactness and of dimensions which, when its full strength could be brought into action, made it a formidable weapon.

General Count Louis Cadorna, Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army
(From a photograph by Th. Vaucher)

Italy's national organization for war was such that when the order for mobilization was issued on May 23 there were more than 3,000,000 men who could be called to the colours. About 1,250,000 of these had received two years' training. Another 750,000 had been partially trained. The remaining 1,000,000 were available to begin their training at once as reserves. For the organization of these men there were twelve territorial districts, each district furnishing one first-line army corps of 50,000, and in addition a duplicate corps to be formed as soon as the first-line troops had been sent to their appointed station. This gave a strength of twelve army corps with four cavalry divisions, all first-line troops, and another twelve second-line corps with two cavalry divisions; twenty-four corps in all, and 3000 guns. The first-line army corps were organized in four armies, each of 150,000 men. There were, in addi-

tion, the frontier guard troops, among them the famous Alpini, who did valorously in the war, and who began the good work by seizing the Italian Trentino passes.

The swiftness and ability with which the Italian armies seized and held strategical points which were capable of being used to Austrian advantage were a measure of the immediate pressure they would have exerted had the strategical Austrian frontier not been designed so entirely to frustrate their advance. This frontier was divisible into three sections. The first section was the Trentino, which jutted into Italy like a bricklayer's trowel, jagged at the point and along the edges. Its outline is broken at the point by Lake Garda and the Adige valley; its mountain-barrier sides are pierced on the west by three passes, the Stelvio the most northerly, the Tonale farther south, and a third and easier pass nearer Lake Garda. None of these passes, nor that of the Arco valley from Lake Garda, offered opportunity to an advancing force, and the same disqualification applies to the Val Sugano on the eastern side of the trowel. There remained the valley of the Adige, going up from the point of the trowel to Trent, the chief town of the Trentino. But to march along

The Three Theatres of War on the Austro-Italian Frontier: I, Trentino; II, Carnic Alps; III, Isonzo Front

The positive advantage to the Austrians of holding it was that it was a threat to the Italian flank. Therefore, failing to occupy, the Italian armies had to mask it in such a way as to prevent the irruption of any Austrian offensive from it.

The second section of the front ran roughly eastwards from the easterly side of the trowel to the headwaters of the Isonzo and the Juarli Rivers, and

was nothing less formidable than the wall of the Carnic Alps. This wall is uninterrupted except by the pass near Pontebbo.

The third section, the only one unprotected by mountain ridges, was that which led south from the Carnic Alps along the Juarli and in front of the Isonzo River. This, the Isonzo section, was the only vulnerable one. It was consequently that against which the chief Italian effort was made, and, conversely, that which the Austrians, by fortification, by entrenchment, and ultimately by troops, most strongly defended. Until the Isonzo line was forced and the Austrians decisively defeated no advance could be made northwards to the Drave or southwards to Trieste. The pivot of the Austrian defences was Gorizia, the capture of which by the Italians would cut off Trieste from all but one line of railway. The capture of Trieste would lead on to that of Pola, the Austrian naval base, and would be a decided step towards the destruction of the Austrian navy.

The Italians began with great promptitude in the Trentino sector by seizing the entrances to three easterly passes—the Stelvio, Tonale, and Giudicario—and by similarly blocking or wedging the passes on the easterly side of the trowel. They occupied Cortina during the last week in May, and farther east captured the Sassi Pass and the positio ı of Preikoffel, which dominates the Monte Croce Pass. These operations, though the positions taken were susceptible of improvement, were in the nature of stopping the Austrians' earths. The main advance towards the Isonzo River positions had similar preliminary success. During June and July General Cadorna deployed the whole of the Italian Third Army on the right bank of the Isonzo between Tolmino and Monfalcone. Italian troops crossed the river at five different points—Corparetto, Plava, Castelnuovo, Gradisca, and Monfalcone. Along this 30-mile front the Austrian works were immensely strong. Tolmino, on which the line rested to the north, had been fortified with all the skill which the experience of the war had suggested, and the southern extremity of the line was no less strongly protected by the formidable Carso plateau. Gorizia had also been converted into a 1915 fortress, and the attack of the Italians along the whole of this line was of the nature of siege operations, complicated by mountain fighting on the Carso plateau. This position, in which they gained a footing in July, dominated the rail and carriage road between Monfalcone and Trieste, as well as the Isonzo valley as far as Gorizia. Its complete subjugation was a necessary preliminary to any Italian advance into Istria, or to the attack of Gorizia, the pivot of the Isonzo defences, from the south.

In the attempt to force the Isonzo line the history of the Italian offensive followed that which was manifested in other theatres of the war—a preliminary attempt to take positions by storm or surprise, followed, when the cost of such attacks was realized as being prohibitive, by regular siege operations. The attack on Gorizia

and the fighting in the Carso plateau both exemplified this procedure. On



Scene of the Opening Campaign on the Isonzo Front

July 18 the Italians, who were already in possession of the bridge-head at Sagrado, stormed the trenches on the summit of the plateau, capturing 2000 prisoners and much war material. It was a striking success, and what the Italians gained they held. They obtained a firm footing and occupied the important first-line positions of Potazzo, Vermegliano, and Monte Sei Busi. But thenceforward storming tactics had to be abandoned and siege operations substituted. The Austrians fully realized the importance of the plateau and the danger of allowing the Italians to occupy it, and Italian attacks on July 19 and 25, for the important point of Mt. Michele on the north-west of the plateau, were met by fierce counter-attacks which cost our allies the advantage they had won.

Similarly, the attack in force which the Italians made on July 21 on the Podgara plateau to the west of Gorizia, though made with great determination and after careful preparation, failed to get through; and here also frontal rushes were abandoned in favour of that slower but less costly and surer plan of sapping the enemy's resistance by the accumulation of minute advantages. These observations apply, though not in the same sense, to the brilliant mountain warfare which the Italians conducted, always maintaining their advantage and increasing it, towards the passes and the positions of the Trentino and of the Carnic Alps.

E. S. G.

COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF ITALIAN AND AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN FORCES

I.—ARMIES

	Peace Strength.	War Strength (approximate).
Austria-Hungary ...	435,000	1,820,000

These estimates were pre-war estimates. It was believed that by embodying all classes of the Landsturm 3,500,000 men could be put into the field, and this estimate is probably a just one.

Italy	236,000 men and 13,600 officers	800,000 on mobilization, with an addition of 320,000 mobile militia and 2,200,000 territorial militia. Total war footing, 3,200,000.

II.—NAVIES

	Battleships and Battle Cruisers.	Cruisers and Light Cruisers.	Destroyers.	Torpedo-boats.	Submarines.
Austria-Hungary ...	16 (4 building)	14 (2 building)	18 (6 building)	85 (27 building)	11 (8 building)
	Battleships.				
Italy	15 (6 building)	26 (2 building)	33 (13 building)	94	20 (12 building)

With the Italian Cavalry in the Field: a charge of Lancers through the Artillery lines

CHAPTER XIV

ZEPPELIN RAIDS ON ENGLAND: A YEAR'S RECORD

Air-ships at the beginning of the War—First Raids on England—Later Visits to East Coast—Possibilities and Limitations of Zeppelins—Their Powers of Escape—Flight-Commander Bigsworth and Retreating Zeppelin—Early Raids on Southend and the London Area—Warneford's Historic Feat—The Vulnerable East and North-east Coast—Twelve Months' Casualties.

THOUGH the commencement of the air war, as with the land and sea war, dates from the early days of August, 1914, it was not until January, 1915, that German air-ships attacked our coasts. For five months of this review, in which we shall deal with Zeppelin raids on England during the first year of the war, there is nothing to record but threats from Berlin.

War came too soon for the air-ship, which was in a less advanced stage than the aeroplane. In August, 1914, Germany had about a dozen Zeppelins, only one or two being latest-type machines. Several units of this small fleet were, in the first weeks of the campaign, brought down in France and Russia by hostile gun-fire. Others, overtaken by gales while scouting above land and sea—one of our illustrations showing the wreckage of such a craft — were either damaged or destroyed. Germany was not in a position, during the late summer or autumn of 1914, to make air-ship raids on England with any hope of success. When winter came, with its long hours of darkness, the Zeppelins needed the wind favourable for them, and not too high—or else no wind at all—as well as a moonless or cloudy night. Rarely were these factors in evidence on the same night, and opportunities were therefore few.

The capacity of a Zeppelin to fly to England and back, crossing twice above the North Sea, and travelling a total distance of from, say, 600 to 700 miles, there was—granted suitable weather conditions — no reason to doubt. The problems were: what load of missiles could she carry on such a flight, and what steps could be taken to defend the positions she attacked.

On the night of January 19, 1915, arriving off the east coast at Yarmouth, the time being about 8.30 p.m., air-ships which were not identified as Zeppelins, but seem without doubt to have been craft of this type, dropped a number of bombs, nine of which were accounted for. One, which failed to explode—as did several others—was found to weigh about 100 lbs. Such a missile, as thrown by an air-ship of the Zeppelin type, was small and of low power; and it became evident that, in order to fly high, and minimize risks from land fire or defending air-craft, the Zeppelins had reduced appreciably the weight of bombs which, had each craft been fully loaded, it would have been possible for them to carry. In this raid, as in others, the damage was far less than, on the theoretical power

of these machines, might have been expected. Two people were killed and some houses damaged; while at King's Lynn, visited also by the air-ships—as were other towns and villages in the neighbourhood—there were two more deaths and certain material damage. The air-ships were fired at, but escaped seaward. Defending aeroplanes could not get into touch with them.

Facts which emerged from this raid and had a bearing on subsequent attacks, were—

1. That on a dark night Zeppelins were awkward to combat, making very poor targets for guns, even when these were aided by search-lights, and giving aeroplane pilots so elusive a quarry that it was difficult for them, unless warned in good time of the air-ship's approach, or unless in the air already and at a high altitude, to fly within striking distance.

2. That Zeppelins, though gaining a measure of safety by flying at night, could not drop bombs with accuracy in the darkness; and that their pilots found obvious difficulty, when lights below were obscured, in locating their position above any given town or city.

The disadvantages of night flying, from the point of view of a raider, and also of those attacked, were revealed more fully on April 14, 1915, when a Zeppelin appeared over Blyth, on the north-east coast. Bombs were dropped; then the air-ship moved inland, altering her course. She had, owing to the darkening of the countryside, missed her objective, which was Tynemouth, with its docks and yards. The air-ship, after groping south, dropped bombs at Wallsend and Hebburn, and then made seaward. Aeroplanes ascended in search of the air-ship, but could not bring her to conflict:

After one of the East Coast Raids: Remains of the Zeppelin L 3, wrecked on the coast of Fanoe, Denmark

The L 3 was wrecked in a gale which carried her to Denmark on her way home from the Norfolk and Suffolk coast. The aluminium frame, the value of which was estimated at £2000, was melted down by the Danish Government. The crew were interned until the end of the war.

she was only about half an hour above our coasts.

At 3 a.m. on May 10, 1915, a Zeppelin raided Southend, dropping about 100 small incendiary bombs, the object—which was not attained—being to cause a general outbreak of fire. Four houses were burned, six damaged, and a woman was killed.

The south-east coast was, on the night of May 17, 1915, visited by either one or two Zeppelins. A number of bombs, some evidently of greater size than had been used before, fell on Ramsgate at about 1.30 a.m. One, striking an hotel, penetrated three floors to the basement and caused the death of two visitors. The Zeppelin, flying seaward after this attack, was pursued by aeroplanes from the Eastchurch and Westgate stations, but they could not come up with her, and had to abandon the chase at the West Hinder lightship.

More fortunate were eight of our aviators from Dunkirk. They, rising to intercept this same air-ship as she made for her shed in Belgium, encountered her in daylight off Nieuport; and the action which followed was the first, recorded officially, between aeroplanes and a Zeppelin. The air-ship, seeking to profit by the fact that such a machine can, if she discharges ballast heavily, rise appreciably faster than an aeroplane, began to climb when she sighted her opponents. But the pilots of three of the aeroplanes brought their craft within range of the air-ship, and a machine-gun fire was directed against her. She responded, using machine-guns from her cars. A Zeppelin mounts as many as four such guns, and, granted she can prevent the aeroplanes from rising above her, is well able to defend herself. Those in the aeroplanes, having only a light machine-gun, cannot effect much damage with their fire. Bullets may penetrate the air-ship's hull, but these bullet-holes are so small, and the surface of the Zeppelin so large, that even repeated hits do not affect the air-ship's flight, or cause any gas escape that is appreciable.

The engines in her cars are, as a rule, protected by an armouring that will resist machine-gun bullets. All the airmen can hope to do, if they concentrate a fire on her cars, is to kill or wound members of her crew. Such a result, though of significance, will not put the air-ship out of action or bring the combat to any quick decision; and it must be the aim of the airmen so to damage the Zeppelin, at the very outset of an engagement, that her ascensional power is affected, and she is prevented from climbing out of range. This can be done only by rapidity of attack, and by one or more of the airmen—while their companions engage the air-ship with machine-guns—devoting themselves solely to the task of gaining altitude. If these pilots are flying suitable machines—craft that will climb quickly—and if the aeroplane attack has been swift and bold, it may be possible for one of them, perhaps more, to dart across above the Zeppelin while she is ascending and drop bombs on her hull.

Against such a form of attack the Zeppelin has, in the contests recorded during the period of this review, shown herself helpless. Though the marks-

Drawn by G. H. Davis

A Zeppelin's Climb when Attacked: one of the raiding airships shooting up into the sky on being discovered by search-lights and fired at by anti-aircraft guns

men in her cars with their machine-guns can direct a fire that is effective against an adversary at their own level, or at an angle considerably higher or lower, they lose all power of retaliation when an enemy flies immediately above them—and for the reason that the hull of the air-ship, bulking over their heads, prevents them from discharging their guns upward, or even, in fact, from seeing the air-craft that is above them. The Germans were, before the war, striving to cope with this inherent weakness and provide their Zeppelins with some defence against an attack from overhead. Secret trials were, in 1913, made with an air-ship fitted with a platform on the top of her hull, reached from the cars by a ladder which passed up between two of the gas-containing ballonettes. On the platform was mounted a machine-gun, which it was intended should be fired upward, and keep at a distance any adversary who was flying directly above. This Zeppelin, while under test, caught fire in the air and was destroyed — an accident that was attributed, officially, to an ignition of petrol fumes from the motors in one of the cars. But unofficially it was reported that the top-platform gun, when it was fired, ignited faint escapes of hydrogen which, percolating upward from the gas chambers in the hull, had mingled with the outside air and formed an explosive mixture.

In the encounter we are describing, the antagonists, after a vigorous exchange of machine-gun fire, found that neither side had caused or sustained any damage, and the Zeppelin, which was climbing fast, would have escaped, no doubt, without injury, had it not been for the manœuvre of Flight-Commander Bigsworth, one of the attacking airmen. He contrived to reach, temporarily, an elevation greater than that of the air-ship; then, darting above her at a distance of no more than 200 feet from her hull, he dropped four incendiary bombs.

Flight-Commander Bigsworth, who winged a Zeppelin and won the D.S.O. for destroying a German Submarine
(From a photograph by F. N. Birkett)

One struck the air-ship near the rear of her hull, and smoke was seen to rise from the point of impact. But no outbreak of fire ensued, as might have been expected, and it seems probable that the bomb — being experimental, as are all such missiles—failed in its work. Theoretically, having been risen above and hit, the Zeppelin was out of action; but, as a matter of fact, she continued to ascend, attaining an altitude of 11,000 feet; and at this height, outclimbing the aeroplanes and giving them no chance to repeat Commander Bigsworth's coup, she con-

tinued her flight towards her shed. Unofficially it was stated that, before she could attain this haven, she was obliged to alight and was wrecked; but the Germans declared that she did reach her shed. A month or two later, it may be added here, Commander Bigsworth won the D.S.O. for destroying single-handed a German submarine by bombs dropped from his aeroplane under heavy fire from the German shore batteries, and from the submarine while manœuvring for position.

Southend, on the night of May 26–27, 1915, had another visit from a Zeppelin, which dropped about thirty bombs with small effect; and then on May 31, after ten months' threatening, London was raided on its outskirts. The authorities refrained, quite wisely, from publishing details as to the localities attacked; to have done so would have been to assist the enemy in a future raid. But the official reports issued show that Zeppelins approached the city by way of Brentwood, and that about ninety bombs, most of them incendiary, were dropped rapidly over a fairly small area. A number of fires were started, but were extinguished quickly, three only requiring the attendance of fire engines. The loss of life was small, six persons being killed—one man, one woman, and four children, while a number of people were found to be injured or suffering from shock. Airmen who ascended to combat the Zeppelin, but could not find her, had an awkward and perilous task. People on the ground, looking during the bomb-dropping towards the section of the sky from which they could hear the sound of the Zeppelin's motors, failed to detect any sign of her, and the difficulties may be imagined of the airmen as they drove their machines upward through the darkness; while the dangers they ran from motor failure, in the navigation of their craft by night, were greater almost than those they would have had to face had they encountered the air-ship. It is possible, however, granted suitable organization, to establish such a system of illuminated landing-grounds on the outskirts of a city, that a pilot at night, ascending say 10,000 feet in order to await the approach of a raiding air-ship, can reach without difficulty, even if his motor fails, one or other of these alighting-points.

On June 6 the east coast was visited by Zeppelins, and some of the explosive bombs dropped were of appreciably greater power than those employed in earlier raids. The Germans, obviously, were improving such missiles. One bomb fell on a road between two terraces of small houses. The hole it made was quite 7 feet deep, and the houses on both sides—fourteen in all—were wrecked by the force of the explosion. Luckily these large missiles —of which the Zeppelins carried in this instance one or two apparently, making up the rest of their load with smaller incendiary bombs—cannot be aimed in the darkness with any precision; they are as likely as not to fall into a piece of waste ground, exploding fruitlessly. As a result of this raid, in which more than one Zeppelin took part, twenty-four deaths were reported, while forty people sustained more or less serious injury.

On June 7, to the gratification of

the public, which had been disgusted but not intimidated by these raids—in which nearly all the casualties were among non-combatants—a Zeppelin was encountered and destroyed by one of our naval airmen. The air-ship, returning probably from the raid over England we have described just above,

Sub-Lieutenant R. A. J. Warneford, V.C., who destroyed a Zeppelin on June 7, 1915
(From a photograph by F. N. Birkett)

was passing inland across Belgium, so as to regain her shed, when she was observed by Sub-Lieutenant R. A. J. Warneford, who was flying a monoplane on a reconnaissance between Ghent and Brussels. The time was about 3 a.m. Lieutenant Warneford, assuming at once the offensive, and profiting by the speed and climbing power of his machine, succeeded in gaining the higher altitude. Then, flying in over the air-ship's hull, he dropped incendiary bombs. This time there was no question as to the efficacy of the attack: the Zeppelin—to quote the terse wording of the official report—"exploded, fell to the ground, and burned for a considerable time". She was, in fact, completely wrecked; while, according to unofficial statements, all the members of her crew lost their lives in the fall. This aeroplane attack, in its swiftness and success, will no doubt become historic. In a moment, single-handed, the airman sent the Zeppelin to her doom. She could not retaliate—could not save herself. The encounter was an illustration, dramatic and complete, of the vulnerability of a Zeppelin when assailed from above. No problem of flying had excited a greater interest than this. Advocates of the Zeppelin, while admitting the peril of such a craft from an overhead attack, had held that aeroplane pilots would be prevented, by the manœuvring of an air-ship, from gaining this position immediately above. But Lieutenant Warneford, an officer of no great experience but of marked audacity, proved to the hilt the theory, evolved before the war, that one fast aeroplane, armed suitably and boldly flown, would be sufficient—granted favourable conditions—to put out of action or destroy a Zeppelin. That more Zeppelins have not fallen victims to our aeroplanes is due to the fact that these air-ships have flown only at night. By doing so they have won a certain immunity, but this has been at the expense of their efficiency, both as scouts and as weapons of destruction.

Lieutenant Warneford, given very promptly the Victoria Cross, lived only a short time to enjoy this distinction. On June 17, visiting the aerodrome at Buc, in France, he ascended to test a biplane, carrying with him a passenger. The machine side-slipped when not far from the ground, and Lieutenant Warneford failed to recover it. Falling heavily, it was wrecked, and both pilot and passenger were killed. It is no exaggeration to say that the whole nation mourned Lieutenant Warneford's loss. His feat stirred popular imagination as perhaps nothing in the war had done before. In aviation his name will be recalled, always, as that of the first airman, in any officially-recorded combat, to bring down a Zeppelin while in flight.

On the same morning that Lieutenant Warneford destroyed this Zeppelin, two other naval aviators, Flight-Lieutenants Wilson and Mills, who had accompanied Lieutenant Warneford on a portion of his flight, attacked and wrecked with their bombs, at Evere north of Brussels, a German air-ship shed; and it was stated afterwards, though unofficially, that the air-ship which was housed for the moment in this shed, and suffered destruction with it, was a Zeppelin.

One of the Exploits of British Airmen on June 7, 1915: the wrecked airship shed at Evere

On June 14, 1915, there was a Zeppelin attack on our east and south-east coasts, bombs being dropped over various localities. Little material damage was done, and the casualties were few.

On June 15, 1915, still operating by night, and dropping incendiary and other bombs more or less at random,

a Zeppelin was over our north-east coast. Sixteen people were killed and forty injured. The frequency of the attacks on the east and north-east coasts is explained by the fact that they lie nearest certain of the German air-ship stations; while an advantage for the air-ship pilot of a raid on a coast town, as compared with one inland, is that he can turn quickly, after his bombs are dropped, and make away oversea, minimizing thus the risk of being intercepted by air patrols. Quietly courageous, it should be mentioned, and commendable to a degree, was the behaviour of the general public along this raided coast-line. Lowestoft, for instance, and other towns besides those we have mentioned, had to suffer—and suffered with most admirable coolness—visitations which came upon them owing to their locality.

On June 24, in the House of Commons, it was stated by Mr. Brace, Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Home Office, that the casualties caused by the air raids had, up to that date, amounted to the following totals: Killed, 56 (24 men—all civilians, 21 women, 11 children). Wounded—so far as could be ascertained—138 (86 men, 35 women, 17 children).

During August, 1915—the month that completed a year of war, and with which we shall end this review—there were more Zeppelin raids on the east and north-east coasts. On August 9 several air-ships attacked the east coast, dropping incendiary bombs. Some fires that were caused were extinguished quickly, and the damage was immaterial. One man, eight women, and four children were killed, and four men, six women, and two children injured. One of the aeroplane pilots who ascended in search of the Zeppelins, Flight-Lieutenant R. Lord, was killed while alighting. A Zeppelin was, it is gratifying to note, hit and damaged by our anti-aircraft guns; and next morning it was reported that this machine, in a crippled state, was being towed by the Germans into Ostend. Whereupon some of our naval airmen from the Dunkirk station, flying along the coast to Ostend, dropped bombs on the Zeppelin, despite a heavy land fire, and continued to bombard her till she was destroyed.

On the night of August 12 two Zeppelins were over the east coast, killing four men and two women with their bombs, and injuring three men, eleven women, and nine children. Fourteen houses were damaged seriously. Our aeroplane patrols, ascending promptly, came into touch with the Zeppelins at more than one point, but the air-ships, profiting by the darkness, were able in the end to make good their escape. One, however, was thought to have been damaged by anti-aircraft guns.

The eastern counties were raided once more on August 17, and this time again—as in the previous attack—it was believed that one of the Zeppelins had been hit by our guns. "Air patrols", to quote an official report, "were active, but owing to the difficult atmospheric conditions the Zeppelins were able to escape." A mist or fog, if encountered by aeroplane pilots while in pursuit of air-ships, renders their task almost hopeless. The casualties in this raid were

seven men, two women, and one child killed, and fifteen men, eighteen women, and three children injured.

On August 28 Mr. Balfour, in his capacity as First Lord of the Admiralty, addressed to a correspondent a letter, published in the newspapers, in which he stated that, in a year of Zeppelin raids, "only on one occasion has damage been inflicted which could by any stretch of language be described as of the smallest military importance". Mr. Balfour acknowledged, of course, and with keen regret, that the Zeppelin attacks had "caused much suffering to many innocent people. But even this result," he added, "with all its tragedy, has been magnified out of all proportion by ill-informed rumour. I am assured by the Home Office that during the last twelve months 71 civilian adults and 18 children have been killed, and 189 civilian adults and 31 children have been injured. Judged by numbers, this cumulative result of many successive crimes did not equal the single effort of the submarine which, to the unconcealed pride of Germany and the horror of all the world, sent 1198 unoffending civilians to the bottom in the *Lusitania*. Zeppelin raids", he concluded, "have been brutal, but so far they have not been effective. They have served no hostile purpose, moral or material."

The Zeppelin raids in the London area in September, 1915, taking place as they did in a period beyond the scope of the present review, will be dealt with in a later chapter.

C. G.-W. H. H.

CHAPTER XV

SIEGE WARFARE IN GALLIPOLI

(May–July, 1915)

Anzac's Rôle in Gallipoli—Sir Ian Hamilton's Tribute—The Struggles for Quinn's Post—How the Anzacs hung on—Wily Turks—The Coming of the Maoris—New Zealand and Australian D.C.M.'s—The Life and Soul of Anzac—June 4 Demonstrations—The Battle in the Southern Zone—Disappointed Hopes—The Crumpling of the Allies' Line—How the Naval Brigade suffered—Heroic Stand of the Lancashire Territorials—With the 29th Division—The Day's Bag—Work of the Armoured Cars—Straightening out the Allies' Line—Brilliant Action of South Wales Borderers and Border Regiment—The Splendid Record of the 5th Royal Scots—French Troops recapture the "Haricot" Redoubt—Straightening the British Left—Storming the "Boomerang" Redoubt—Heroism of Scottish Territorials—Losses of the Lowland Brigade—Advance of the 29th Division—Enver Pasha assumes Command—Fruitless Turkish Onslaughts—How three Victoria Crosses were won—Wounding of General Gouraud—Enver Pasha's Assault of July 4—The Allies' Advance on July 12—The Lull before the Suvla Bay Landing.

IT is a far cry from Australia and New Zealand to the inhospitable coast of Gallipoli, but one of the anomalies of the Great World War was that our warriors from the South were called upon, in the summer of 1915, to fight for their own shores, as well as for the safety of the Mother

Country, on the rugged heights above Anzac Cove. Anzac—a word coined from the first letters of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps—was for the time being the advance post of the Australasian defence, and, whatever the fate of the Gallipoli campaign, was destined to remain an imperishable landmark in the history of the sternest struggle the world has ever known. At the stage of the operations reached in the present chapter Anzac's rôle, as already described, was to threaten the very vitals of the enemy's position, thus, by forcing him to keep as large a force as possible on the northern front, lessening the strain at Cape Helles, where the British were fighting foot by foot for the dominating height of Achi Baba. Anzac, in fact, at this period "was cast", as Sir Ian Hamilton expressed it, "to play second fiddle to Cape Helles, a part out of harmony with the dare-devil spirit animating those warriors"; and it surprised none who knew them that their vigorous defensive was always rather in the nature of an attack. What they could do in the way of deliberate offensive they had already proved on the immortal day of the landing on April 25, and in their share of the southern battle for Krithia in the early days of May, when the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Infantry Brigades were withdrawn for the time being to form a Composite Division with the Plymouth and Drake Battalions of the Royal Naval Division.

"The determined valour shown by these two brigades—the New Zealand Brigade, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, and the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General the Hon J. W. M'Cay"—wrote Sir Ian Hamilton, in referring to the work of this division in his dispatch of August 26, "are worthy of particular praise. Their losses were correspondingly heavy, but, in spite of fierce counter-attacks by numerous fresh troops, they stuck to what they had won with admirable tenacity."

Within their own semicircular lines round and above Anzac Cove the Australasians waged ceaseless warfare against the enemy, who, foiled in the furious attempt made on May 18–19 by General Liman von Sanders to hurl them back into the sea, as described in Chapter IX (Vol. III), gave them no rest day or night. The shelling from the Turkish guns was prodigal and incessant. As many as 1400 shells on the beaches and trenches of Anzac were counted on occasion within an hour, ranging in calibre from 11 inches to field-shrapnel. The struggle, both above and below ground, was especially fierce round Quinn's Post, situated as it then was on the circumference of the Anzac semicircle at the farthest point from its diameter. Here the fire-trenches of the Australians and New Zealanders were described by Sir Ian Hamilton as mere ledges on the brink of a sheer precipice falling 200 feet into the valley below. The enemy's trenches were only a few feet distant, and, although repulsed with appalling slaughter in the determined attack of May 18–19, the Turks continued to burrow and bomb and shell with fanatical persistence. It was a tight corner which called for just those qualities of coolness and audacity in which the Aus-

tralians and New Zealanders excelled. One instance of this, leading to the winning of the D.C.M. by two plucky "non-coms." of the 15th Australian Battalion, was typical of many. The heroes of this little affair — Lance-Corporal F. R. Cawley and Corporal R. Tickner—advanced during a sortie past the first line of the enemy's trenches to a tent some distance in the rear. In the words of the official record, "they killed all the occupants, and cut the telephone wires which connected it with the fire trenches, thus preventing communication from the rear".

More and more the fighting tended to concentrate round this exposed position as the month wore away. Time after time the defenders detected mining operations in progress with the obvious intention of blowing them up, and counter-mined themselves, overwhelming the enemy instead. One such gallery, however, was overlooked, with the result that a mine was sprung in or near the centre of Quinn's Post with consequences which for the moment were disastrous. The mine went off at 3.30 a.m. on May 29, and was followed by a combined bomb attack, before which, in the inevitable confusion succeeding the explosion, the defenders' left centre was forced back. This let in a storming-party of Turks,

From an Official Photograph

Behind the Firing Line at Anzac Cove: "Splinter Villa", one of the Australian dug-outs

and isolated the subsection on the left from the two other subsections on the right. The enemy's triumph, however, was short-lived. Two hours later a counter-attack was launched by the 15th Australian Infantry, led by Major Quinn himself, who, unfortunately, was killed in recapturing the post at the point of the bayonet. All ranks fought with the highest courage and tenacity. Not one of the Turks in possession escaped, every occupant being either killed or captured; and when, at half-past six, the enemy again attacked, it was only to meet an invincible foe. Though supported by artillery, rifle, and machine-gun fire, and by showers of bombs from the trenches, the fine shooting of our guns and the steadiness of our infantry enabled us to inflict upon the Turks, in Sir Ian Hamilton's words, "a bloody repulse, demoralizing them to such an extent that the bomb-throwers of their second line flung the missiles into the middle of their own first line". Shortly after 8 a.m. the attack slackened, and before nine had practically ceased. We lost in this affair 2 officers and 31 other ranks killed, and 12 officers and 176 other ranks wounded. Sir Ian Hamilton estimates that the enemy's losses were probably equal to those sustained in the night attack of May 9–10, when the enemy's trenches in front of Quinn's Post were won and lost, and our guns did such execution that two Turkish regiments, as was subsequently discovered from a Turkish officer's diary, alone lost 600 killed and 2000 wounded.

The first assault which had won this 3-mile front of sandy cliffs and treacherous gullies on April 25 was one of the great deeds of the war; but according to Mr. H. W. Nevinson, who visited the spot at the period now dealt with, the persistence with which these Oversea troops had clung to their precarious positions, and organized themselves upon the steep and barren tract of land, displayed perhaps a still more valuable military capacity.

From an Official Photograph

Caught in the Act: a Turkish Sniper, disguised as a bush, captured by "Anzacs"

"Sitting amid dust and flies at the mouth of the neat little cave which has been lent

me upon the face of the cliff," wrote the same correspondent in one of the dispatches published by the *Glasgow Herald*, "I look over miles of blue sea to the precipitous heights of Samothrace, where I have reason to believe that Zeus once dwelt. Up and down the steep and narrow paths around me the gallant Colonials arduously toil like ants bearing burdens for their race. Uniforms are not always of the regulation type. They usually consist of bare skin dyed to a deep reddish copper by the sun, frequent tattoo decorations (a girl, a ship, a dragon), and a covering that can hardly be described as trousers or even 'knickers'. But the 'boys' are practising the art of war with superb fortitude. Every kind of store and arms has to be dragged or carried up these vast ant-hills of the cliffs and deposited at its proper hole or gallery. Food, drink, cartridges, shells, building timber, medical stores—up the tracks all of them must go, and, besides, the wounded must come down."

The spirit of the troops was shown in bomb-throwing competitions at the enemy's trenches, with first, second, and third prizes, and an elaborate set of rules. Any thrower who exposed himself in the act of throwing was at once ruled out of action. It was good training where Turkish marksmen—excellent shots many of them—lurked in every possible nook and cranny of an ideal sniping-ground. Countless cunning devices were adopted by the enemy in this form of warfare. One wily Turk was captured in a tree with his face painted green in order to render it indistinguishable among the leaves. He was also wearing green clothes. Another was so concealed in branches that he was a veritable walking bush, his presence being only betrayed by the sudden disappearance of the bush into a neighbouring trench during a momentary lull in the fighting. The Turks themselves were nonplussed at times by the composition of the multi-coloured British force both here and in the southern zone, their greatest surprise at Anzac being perhaps the war-dance of the Maoris shortly after their arrival to join the New Zealanders. Some of these full-blooded Maoris, whose forbears had ranked among the most chivalrous of Britain's foes in the past, now spoke purer English and were better educated than many a white man, but they all cherished the warlike traditions of their ancestors. The sound of their blood-curdling war-dance, not 100 yards from the Turkish trenches, doubtless confirmed the statement published in the Constantinople Press to the effect that the British forces chiefly consisted of black men from Africa and Australia. "Thus for the first time in all history", declared one of these papers, "the Dardanelles have had to be defended from attack by cannibals!"

The month of May, 1915—to resume our story of active operations—closed with Quinn's Post still holding its own—the storm-centre of the Anzac lines—and the Turks still sapping to secure its second overthrow. Two sap-heads reached within five yards of our fire-trenches before they were discovered and cleared. Shortly afterwards two of the New Zealand Engineers won the Distinguished Conduct Medal for demolishing a Turkish blockhouse which stood within 12 yards of the enemy's trench, and could only be approached over

ground swept by rifle and machine-gun fire—an act which also earned anonymous mention in Sir Ian Hamilton's dispatches. The heroes of this occasion were Lance-Corporal F. J. H. Fear—surely a strange misnomer—and Sapper E. A. Hodges, both of the 1st Field Company, New Zealand Engineers, who volunteered for the perilous work. The men exhibited such skill in approaching the blockhouse under cover of darkness and in placing the charge that they succeeded in completely demolishing the place, though exposed to fire for a full hour. Another dashing deed which deserves to be recorded is that for which Lance-Corporal C. Grimson, of the 1st Australian Light Horse, won the Distinguished Conduct Medal during one of the mine explosions on the night of May 28–29, near Gaba Tepe, officially described as follows:—

"Owing to the explosion of a mine, which destroyed a portion of our parapet, the enemy was enabled to occupy a portion of our trenches, thus dividing the defending force into two. Lance-Corporal Grimson crawled over the broken ground towards the enemy, capturing successively three Turks. He then, with the greatest courage, entered the remaining portion of the trench held by the enemy, about twelve in number, and compelled them all to surrender, thus enabling the defending forces to re-unite."

Lieut. Terence Patrick M'Sharry, of the 2nd Australian Light Horse, organized several daring assaults during the same period, winning the Military Cross "for exceptional bravery and resource on many occasions".



Map showing approximately the semicircular Foothold of the Australians and New Zealanders above Anzac Cove, July, 1915

Two other Australian D.C.M.'s were won about this time, one by Private T. Arnott, of the 1st Australian Infantry (New South Wales), for conspicuous gallantry while serving with a machine-gun section—continuing to serve his gun until badly wounded, though engaged by two hostile guns, which demolished the emplacement;

and the other by Lance-Corporal H. Murray, of the 16th Australian Infantry (South Australia), for distinguished service throughout the operations when attached to the machine-gun section during May, "exhibiting exceptional courage, energy, and skill, and inflicting severe losses on the enemy, he himself being twice wounded". Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood remained in command throughout, though slightly wounded earlier in the month. He was the life and soul of Anzac.

"Not for a single day has he ever quitted his post," wrote Sir Ian Hamilton in his dispatch of August 26, 1915. "Cheery and full of human sympathy, he has spent many hours of each twenty-four inspiring the defenders of the front trenches, and if he does not know every soldier in his force, at least every soldier in the force believes he is known to his Chief."

After sunset on June 4 the warriors of Anzac played an effective part in distracting the enemy while the tide of battle was again breaking through the Turkish defences in the southern zone. Several separate enterprises were carried out with this object, one being a demonstration in the direction of Gaba Tepe, in which the navy co-operated by bombarding the Turkish trenches. The other operations were all in the grim region of Quinn's Post, beginning at 11 p.m. with an unsuccessful sortie towards a trench some 200 yards away. This failure was amply atoned for in the small hours of the following morning, when another storming-party carried the trench, accounted for all the occupants, and, before withdrawing in good order, demolished a machine-gun emplacement which enfiladed Quinn's Post. Meantime another assault from the same position, also launched at 11 p.m. on the 4th, led to the capture of a second trench, in which many Turks were bayoneted and twenty-eight made

From an Official Photograph

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood outside his Dug-out

prisoners. This trench was held until 6.30 the next morning, when a concentrated bomb attack, in which the enemy used a heavier type of bomb than hitherto, rendered it untenable, our troops retiring to their original fire-trench and the bomb-proof in front of its left. Two New Zealanders won the D.C.M. in the critical hours of these minor operations—Sergeant W.

J. Rodger, Canterbury Battalion, who, though seriously wounded by a bayonet thrust, refused to retire, and exhibited the greatest coolness and bravery throughout; and Sergeant R. Tilsley, Auckland Battalion, who was also severely wounded, but, utterly regardless of danger, continued to set a splendid example to all ranks. A fresh sortie from Quinn's Post on June 5 was characteristic of much of the local fighting throughout this period, as well as of the devil-may-care courage to which Sir Ian Hamilton bore witness. The sortie, which is described in the dispatch as follows, was made from Quinn's Post by two officers and a hundred men of the 1st Australian Infantry, the objective being the destruction of a machine-gun which was severely harassing them in a position known as German Officer's Trench:—

"A special party of ten men, with the officer commanding the party (Lieutenant E. E. L. Lloyd, 1st Battalion (New South Wales) Australian Imperial Force), made a dash for the machine-gun. One of the ten men managed to fire three rounds into the gun at a range of five feet, and another three at the same range through a loophole. The darkness of the trench and its overhead cover prevented the use of the bayonet, but some damage was done by shooting down over the parapet. As much of the trench as possible was dismantled. The party suffered some casualties from bombs, and was enfiladed all the time by machine-guns from either flank. The aim of this gallant assault being attained, the party withdrew in good order with their wounded. Casualties in all were thirty-six."

Lieutenant Lloyd, who personally shot two of the Turks with his own pistol, was awarded the Military Cross, and Lance-Corporal C. Davis, of the same gallant band, the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

While the "Anzacs" were thus harrying the enemy before Quinn's Post, and keeping him on tenter-hooks elsewhere, the new battle of the Allies was developing in the larger area of the southern zone. Here the French and British troops had steadily strengthened their line in the trench warfare into which these operations, as described in our last chapter on the subject, had now resolved themselves. Points were lost and won and lost and won again, as along the Allies' front in France and Flanders, but no further general attack was attempted until June 4, when the whole of the enemy's front trenches were assaulted from the west of the Kereves Dere, where the French held the Allies' line to the Straits, to the Ægean Sea on the other side of the peninsula. Though Achi Baba might still prove impregnable it was necessary to enlarge the fighting area in order to bring it less completely within range of the Turco German bombardment. Also, the troops had been gradually sapping their way forward, and creeping nearer and nearer by night assaults, so that the opposing forces had now been brought within rushing distance of each other.

Running in a northerly direction from the west of Kereves Dere[1] the Allies' line of battle was constituted as follows: the French Corps Expé-

[1] The ground on either side of the Peninsula falls away to the sea in ravines or dry watercourses called "deres", every one of which had been fortified by the Turks, and bristled with machine-guns.

ditionnaire, the Royal Naval Division, the 42nd (East Lancashire) Territorial Division, and the war-worn regulars of the 29th Division—to which the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade had now been attached, under the command of Major-General H. V. Cox. Along the British front the length was rather over 4000 yards, and as there were, all told, some 24,000 infantry available, it was possible for General Hunter-Weston, the General Officer Commanding the 8th Army Corps, to form a reserve of 7000 men. A smashing bombardment began at 8 a.m., and was continued, with half an hour's interval at 10.30, until 11.20 a.m., when a feint attack succeeded in drawing heavy fire from the enemy's guns and rifles. Ten minutes later every British and French gun reopened fire, the bombardment gradually increasing in intensity, as the warships on either side joined in the terrific chorus, until the stroke of noon; and then, as the curtain of fire was lifted from the battered first-line trenches of the enemy and carried to the positions beyond, the whole advance line of Allied infantry leapt from their trenches with bayonets fixed and raced across. For a time all went so well that the highest hopes were raised of a crowning success; but here, as on the Western front, one weak spot sufficed to dash these hopes to the ground.

"The assault", to quote from Sir Ian Hamilton's account, "was immediately successful. On the extreme right the French 1st Division carried a line of trench, whilst the French 2nd Division, with the greatest dash and gallantry, captured a strong redoubt called the "Haricot", for which they had already had three desperate contests. Only the extreme left of the French was unable to gain any ground, a feature destined to have an unfortunate effect upon the final issue."

On the left of the Corps Expéditionnaire the 2nd Brigade of the Royal Naval Division—the *Anson*, *Howe*, and *Hood* Battalions—carried all before them in one magnificent rush, the whole Turkish line which formed their first objective being in their hands within fifteen minutes. On their left the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division, under Major-General W. Douglas, advanced with such impetuous dash that they not only seized the advanced line of Turkish trenches within the first few minutes, but within half an hour had also captured the second line, representing a total advance of 600 yards. "The position here", wrote Sir Ian Hamilton, "could not possibly have been better." In front of the 29th Division, on the Manchesters' left, the enemy, less affected by the preliminary bombardment, offered sterner resistance, crossing bayonets with the 88th Brigade as they charged his trenches, and inflicting severe losses upon them. But the 88th, as Sir Ian Hamilton said, were not to be denied. The gallant Worcesters added fresh lustre to their name by capturing the first trenches, the remainder of the 88th Brigade, though at first held up by flanking as well as fronting fire, pushing on doggedly until they too had the whole of the Turkish first line in their possession. Second Lieutenant James Dickens, of

the 4th Worcesters, who had been mentioned for consistent good work since the landing on April 25, now won the Military Cross for leading a gallant and entirely successful bayonet charge against the Turks, who were threatening the left flank of his battalion while the captured trenches were being consolidated. Company Quarter-Master-Sergeant J. J. Leach, of the same battalion, was awarded the D.C.M. for his part in the same dashing affair, as well as for his subsequent conduct in charge of a party of bomb-throwers, when, "by his courage and the fine example he gave to all with him, he was enabled to maintain his position against the hostile attack".

Company Sergeant-Major W. Brameld, 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers, won the D.C.M. on the same occasion for his fearless leadership in the Borderers' attack on the enemy's trenches, which were held at this point in great strength. Charging at the point of the bayonet the Borderers swept the trenches clear, but suffered heavily both then and during the counter-attacks which followed. Captain (temporary Major) George Butler Stoney, who had been attached to the Borderers from the Egyptian army, and had distinguished himself in the previous fighting, held the battalion together "in a most praiseworthy manner", as the *Gazette* has it, and was awarded the D.S.O. for his gallant conduct throughout. Company Sergeant-Major J. Pearce, of the same battalion, received the D.C.M. for displaying the greatest coolness and bravery under the most hazardous conditions, and unfailing devotion to duty at all times. The 2nd Hampshires also distinguished themselves on this occasion. Their first man to enter the enemy's trench, Sergeant F. Fisher, displayed remarkable coolness and contempt of danger in cutting off the Turks who, on the near approach of the British bayonets, proceeded to retire through a communication-trench. He captured several prisoners in this manner, and won the D.C.M. for the fine example and encouragement which he thus gave to all ranks with him. Sergeant J. Milne, of the same battalion, also received the D.C.M. for conspicuous bravery and ability throughout, Sergeant H. Hannan being similarly decorated for his daring skill in handling the battalion's machine-guns, by means of which he materially assisted in repelling the enemy's counter-attacks on the captured trenches.

It was only on the extreme left, where the Indian troops carried the British line to the cliffs overlooking the Ægean Sea, that the British advance was seriously held up on June 4. Here the enemy's trenches were so protected by the lie of the land that they had escaped our shells, and, with barbed-wire entanglements, remained intact. The result was the same as at Neuve Chapelle and elsewhere along the Western front, where Indians as well as British suffered countless losses through insufficient artillery bombardment. The 14th Sikhs, on the right flank, pushed on in spite of losses amounting to three-fourths of their effectives, while the 6th Gurkhas—who, under Lieutenant-Colonel the

Hon. C. G. Bruce, M.V.O.,[1] had distinguished themselves in the preceding month by capturing the Turkish bastion on the steep heights overlooking "Y" beach, hereafter known as Gurkha Bluff—were skilfully led along the cliff until they actually forced a way into the enemy's trench. Major Manners R. W. Nightingale, 1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas, won the Distinguished Service Order for a superb display of heroism in leading his men up a difficult spur after he had been wounded.

"He reached the crest", to quote the oracular words of the *Gazette*, "and was again wounded, but coming back a few yards rallied his men, and again led them on. He was then wounded a third time, but still endeavoured to advance until he fainted."

Unfortunately the rest of the brigade could make no headway, and the Gurkhas were as skilfully withdrawn under fire, to prevent isolation, while reinforcements were sent to organize a fresh attack.

Such was the position of affairs when the weak spot on the French left began to have disastrous effects upon the whole operations. Here the Turks, in a powerful counter-attack, had not only recaptured the "Haricot" redoubt won by the French 2nd Division in the morning, but, in forcing our Allies back, had also uncovered the right flank of our Royal Naval Division. The right flank, though fighting with the utmost bravery, crumpled up beneath the deadly fire now poured upon it in its captured trenches. The Turks pushed their advantage with alarming rapidity, rolling up the new British line with masses of men and an enfilade fire which placed the Naval Brigade com-

From an Official Photograph

With our Indian Troops in Gallipoli: Bringing up fodder for their mules

[1] Half-brother of Lord Aberdare. He was wounded in the fighting at the end of the month.

pletely at their mercy. The right having been forced to retire with very heavy loss, the *Howe* and *Hood* Battalions were successively exposed in their turn, and similarly compelled to withdraw to their original position to prevent annihilation. Thus the whole of the position so valiantly won in the morning was again in the enemy's hands by 1.30 p.m., the *Collingwood* Battalion having been practically destroyed in a vain endeavour to save the situation.

The naval honours of the Gallipoli campaign included a number of well-earned Conspicuous Gallantry Medals awarded to petty-officers and men of the Royal Naval Division for great courage and presence of mind in the face of this desperate crisis. Leading-seaman Arthur R. Blore, of the *Anson* Battalion, for example, who was one of the recipients, was engaged in digging communication-trenches in rear of the captured position when the line began rolling up. His officer being shot, he took command of a party of twenty-two who advanced to cover the inevitable retirement. Shooting two of the crew of a Turkish machine-gun enfilading the trench, he kept up a steady fire and displayed rare powers of leadership in checking the on-coming enemy. Similar courage won the medal for A.B. William J. Pearce, of the *Howe* Battalion, who remained in the enemy's trench and continued firing, although wounded, to cover the retirement of other wounded men, and finally carried another wounded man under fire. Chief Petty-Officer Richard Homer—afterwards promoted Sub-Lieutenant—of the same battalion, was awarded the medal for his coolness and resource in advancing to a position from which he succeeded greatly in diminishing the fire of another Turkish machine-gun commanding the ground held by the Royal Naval Division. Chief Petty-Officer Frederick W. Stear—also promoted Sub-Lieutenant—of the *Anson* Battalion, was similarly decorated for rallying the men of the support line of the *Collingwood* Battalion, who had lost most of their officers, and in gallantly leading them to the assault of the Turkish trenches.

In those critical moments it looked as though nothing could prevent the rolling up of the newly captured line until the whole of our gains would be wiped out.

"For now", wrote Sir Ian Hamilton in a passage which brings the whole scene vividly before us, "the enfilade fire of the Turks began to fall upon the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division, which was firmly consolidating the farthest distant line of trenches it had so brilliantly won. After 1.30 p.m. it became increasingly difficult for this gallant brigade to hold its ground. Heavy casualties occurred; the Brigadier and many other officers were wounded or killed; yet it continued to hold out with the greatest tenacity and grit. Every effort was made to sustain the brigade in its position. Its right flank was thrown back to make face against the enfilade fire, and reinforcements were sent to try to fill the diagonal gap between it and the Royal Naval Division. But, ere long, it became clear that unless the right of our line could advance again it would be impossible for the Manchesters to maintain the very pronounced salient in which they now found themselves. Orders were issued, therefore, that the Royal Naval Division should co-operate with the French Corps

in a fresh attack, and reinforcements were dispatched to this end. The attack, timed for 3 p.m., was twice postponed at the request of General Gouraud, who finally reported that he would be unable to advance again that day with any prospect of success. By 6.30 p.m., therefore, the 42nd Division had to be extricated with loss from the second-line Turkish trenches, and had to content themselves with consolidating on the first line, which they had captured within five minutes of commencing the attack. Such was the spirit displayed by this brigade that there was great difficulty in persuading the men to fall back. Had their flanks been covered, nothing would have made them loosen their grip."

The honours lists also bore eloquent testimony to the supreme courage of the Lancashire Territorials on that memorable 4th of June south of Krithia. One of the Military Crosses was awarded to Lieutenant (temporary Captain) Henry A. Hammick, of the 6th Manchesters, who was the senior surviving officer of his battalion after the attack, and for three days and nights held a section of the forward position with indomitable coolness and skill. The Manchesters and the Lancashire Fusiliers alone accounted for a score or so of Distinguished Conduct Medals won on that occasion by the non-commissioned officers and men. The frightful losses among the officers only served to bring out the individual courage and initiative of the rank and file. Take the official record, for example, of the gallant conduct of Company Sergeant-Major F. Hay, of the 1/6th Battalion, Manchester Regiment:

"Owing to casualties he was left in command of his company, and held the advanced line until compelled to fall back owing to flank retirement. He then brought his company back in good order. He was twice wounded in the arm and later received a third slight wound, but still continued to do duty."

Or the record of Company Sergeant-Major J. Hurdley, of the same battalion, who was "wounded in the head and partly paralysed, but refused to be taken to the rear, and continued to give orders and rally scattered parties in the Krithia nullah". It was largely due to his brave conduct, adds the *Gazette*, that the advanced line was held at that time. Then there was Lance-Corporal W. A. Senior, also of the 1/6th Manchesters, whose bravery, coolness, and resource in leading a party fighting from traverse to traverse resulted in the capture of a Turkish officer and some sixty other prisoners; and Privates G. R. Culter and R. Hashim, of the same intrepid battalion, both of whom remained under heavy fire digging a shelter for an officer who was dangerously wounded, and then rejoined the firing-line.

The 5th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Territorial Battalions of the Manchester Regiment all shared in the distribution of these D.C.M.'s for June 4, 1915. Nothing was finer in its way than the grit displayed by Private M. Richardson, of the 1/7th Battalion, "in holding alone a trench against the enemy who were in the same trench, and continuing to keep them at bay until wounded on the evening of the 5th". His tenacity alone saved this portion of the trench from falling into the enemy's hands. Much more could be written

of the Manchester's magnificent courage throughout that trying day, but two further examples must unfortunately suffice—the superb coolness of Private S. Stockton, of the 1/5th Battalion, in attacking single-handed and capturing four Turks, including an officer; and the prowess of Private W. Stanton, of the 1/8th (Ardwick) Battalion, who "advanced across the open under heavy fire with a rope to one of the enemy's abandoned machine-guns, which was by this means dragged in and captured." Well done, Manchester!

The Territorials of the 6th Lancashire Fusiliers, harking from the neighbouring town of Rochdale, also proved worthy of the regulars of the famous 1st Battalion, whose immortal feat of arms on the morning of April 25 had not only made "Lancashire Landing" famous, but had also fired every Lancashire man with the force of a great example. The pluck of Private R. Allen, of the 6th Battalion, was a case in point. Noticing movements in the scrub during the stern fighting on June 4, he went boldly into it on his own initiative, under heavy fire. It was like walking into an absolute death-trap. But, finding a Turkish machine-gun with an officer in the scrub, he coolly took the revolver from the officer, and, though wounded in the struggle, brought in the machine-gun. On the same day two men of the 7th Battalion, under an officer, charged and captured one of the Turkish redoubts, continuing to hold it after the officer was killed. When their own ammunition was exhausted they continued to fire with Turkish rifles and ammunition until reinforced. These first-rate fighting-men were Privates W. Prince and W. Downton.

From an Official Photograph

Dug-outs for the Armoured Cars in Gallipoli

Like the other soldiers whose deeds have just been recorded, they both received the D.C.M. All ranks were inspired by the same splendid courage. As an instance of the officers' spirit may be mentioned the act which won the Military Cross for Lieutenant Oscar Taunton, of the 1st East Lancashire Field Company, Royal Engineers, Territorial Force.

"He held back the enemy from advancing along a trench on the left flank, which was much exposed. By means of bombs and hand-grenades he personally held his position for over two hours. He picked

up several of the enemy's bombs and threw them back before they exploded."

All this time the 29th Division, under General de Lisle — the 88th Brigade on the left of the Lancashires, and the Indian Brigade on the extreme left — had been able to make little further headway. At four o'clock in the afternoon, while the Lancashires were still struggling for possession of the captured second line, the Royal Fusiliers succeeded in pushing forward beyond their first line of captured trenches, "but", in the words of Sir Ian Hamilton, "the fact that the left flank was held back made the attempt to hold any isolated position in advance inadvisable". The reserves, too, had already been largely depleted in response to demands from various parts of the line, and as the enemy, on the other hand, was known to be receiving strong reinforcements, orders were issued for the troops to consolidate the line then held.

The day's bag included the largest capture of Turkish prisoners we had yet secured in Gallipoli—chiefly captures made by the 42nd Division. All told, the prisoners numbered about 400, including five Germans, the remains of a volunteer machine-gun detachment from the ex-German battleship *Goeben*. Fate had not dealt kindly with this detachment. Its commanding officer had been killed, its machine-gun had been destroyed, and the survivors probably counted themselves fortunate in saving their skins. Our gains in territory had been less than we had hoped, but the net result of the day's operations was still, in Sir Ian Hamilton's opinion, "considerable", representing an advance of 200 to 400 yards along the whole of our centre, a front of nearly three miles.

"That the enemy", adds the Commander-in-Chief, "suffered severely was indicated, not only by subsequent information, but by the fact of his attempting no counter-attack during the night, except upon the trench captured by the French 1st Division on the extreme right. Here two counter-attacks were repulsed with loss."

One of the features of the day's operations, described by Reuter's special correspondent, was the charge of the armoured turret motor-cars of the Royal Naval Air Service along the only tolerable tracks leading from Sedd-el-Bahr and Cape Helles to Krithia. These moving fortresses, dashing up to the firing-line, four on each road, timed their attack to coincide with that of the infantry.

"Crossing our trenches on bridges laid across for them", writes this correspondent, "they went on jolting and rocking over the pitfalls sown in the ground and so clean up to the enemy's trenches. Here the cars halted and opened fire with the Maxim carried in the turret on the Turks fleeing from the first trenches to the rear. On the right road a parapet almost as high as the turret made it difficult for the men to bring their Maxims into play. Soon bullets began to ping against the armoured sides of the cars, and shells began to fall round them. Being unable to advance farther, and our men being now well forward, the cars withdrew, shells falling between them as they drove back along the roads. One car was hit and the top of its turret knocked off, but nobody was killed. The total loss was a few men wounded. All the cars were brought back, only two being damaged."

Having driven the British salient into the Turkish centre, plans were laid by the Allies for the straightening out of the line. The Turks, on the other hand, after their comparatively quiet night, redoubled their efforts. On the following day only the personal bravery and presence of mind of a junior officer—Second-Lieutenant George R. D. Moor, of the 3rd Hampshire Regiment—saved a dangerous situation at one critical point south of Krithia.

"When a detachment of a battalion on his left, which had lost all its officers, was rapidly retiring before a heavy Turkish attack," says the *Gazette*, "Second-Lieutenant Moor, immediately grasping the danger to the remainder of the line, dashed back some 200 yards, stemmed the retirement, led back the men, and recaptured the lost trench."

This young officer, who only joined the army in October, 1914, thus won the Victoria Cross.

Thenceforward for several weeks the campaign resolved itself into a ceaseless struggle for points, with attacks and counter-attacks which filled the daily newspapers at home with appalling columns of casualties, but left the Allies very much where they were. "The situation is favourable to our forces," said one of the official telegrams at the time, "but is necessarily slow on account of the difficulties of the ground." Several of the daily encounters would have formed the subject of a separate dispatch in Sir Ian Hamilton's earlier campaigns, as he pointed out on August 26, but were so overshadowed by the greater events that they could not so much as be referred to on that occasion. Mention should, however, be made of the brilliant little action of the Border Regiment and South Wales Borderers on the night of June 11–12, when, making an attack on an advanced Turkish trench, in which the enemy was constructing a sap, they captured the position and succeeded in maintaining their hold. This was after two heroic efforts had been made under the leadership of two brothers in the South Wales Borderers, Lieutenant R. C. Inglis and Second-Lieutenant Harold J. Inglis. Crawling over the open ground with their men, these officers had reached the enemy's sap, some 90 yards distant, and proceeded to advance down it in single file. The sap was about 5 feet deep, increasing to 7 or 8 feet, and in its deepest part the invaders were checked by fierce machine-gun fire and bombs and forced to retire. Lieutenant R. C. Inglis was wounded—subsequently dying of his wounds—but his brother made a second attempt, and again seized the sap-head. He advanced along the sap, however, only to be wounded, and was eventually forced back by very heavy rifle-fire. "He showed great skill and gallantry in a difficult position", stated the *Gazette* in announcing, some three months later, that the King had conferred the Military Cross upon him. The success on the night of June 11–12 was mainly due to the personal bravery and gallant leading of Second-Lieutenant Thomas Wallace, of the 3rd Border Regiment, who had volunteered to lead another party in this dangerous enterprise.

"He advanced under a heavy fire," to quote from the *Gazette's* account of his

award of the Military Cross, "and rushed the position at the head of his men, bayoneting some and driving the remainder away. He afterwards led his men down the communication-trench, showing great coolness, and remaining there until the enemy evacuated it."

The D.C.M. was awarded for the same brilliant little affair to Lance-Sergeant A. Friend, of the 1st Border Regiment, whose vigour and resource throughout had a great deal to do with the success. "He was always to the front," states the official record, which also mentions his splendid work in keeping the enemy back with rifle-fire until bombs could be brought up.

On the morning of June 13 came the inevitable counter-attack. The Turks rushed forward with bombs, but, coming under the fire of the naval machine-gun squadron, were annihilated. Undeterred by this experience they returned to the attack on the night of the 15th, this time in stronger force and led by a German officer. Most of those who made for the trenches of the 88th Brigade fell before reaching them, and the rest were forced back, both the German leader and his Turkish subordinate being found among the dead. The attack on the Turkish trench captured on the night of the 11–12th, however, preceded as it was by strong bombing parties, forced the sadly-thinned ranks

Naval Co-operation in the Gallipoli Campaign: Admiral Nicholson leaving the Naval Observation Station through the Trenches to Cape Helles

of the gallant troops in possession to retire some 30 yards and dig themselves in till daybreak. Then the vacated trench was enfiladed by our machine-guns from right and left, the Dublin Fusiliers finishing the work with a glorious charge at the point of the bayonet. When the trench was reoccupied it was found to contain no fewer than 200 dead Turks. Twelve prisoners were also taken. Our casualties on this sanguinary occasion were slight.

No history of the campaign at this period, crowded as it is with stirring deeds, would be complete without some further mention of the distinguished part played by the 5th Royal Scots, the "Queen's Edinburgh"—the only Territorial unit which landed with the immortal 29th Division. Fully conscious of the honour attaching to that association, the 5th, sharing in all the operations from the beginning, made a great name for themselves. In the early operations of this month the D.C.M. had been well earned by Lance-Corporal W. D. Borthwick both for daring reconnaissance work and heroism in rescuing the wounded, the same decoration being awarded to Company Quartermaster-Sergeant J. Laidlaw for his readiness to undertake any work, however dangerous, at all times; while on June 19 the whole battalion won a special telegram from Lord Kitchener himself to Lord-Provost Innes for their "gallantry and determination" in recapturing with the Worcesters the Turkish trench which the enemy had wrested from our grasp on the preceding night. It was for this achievement that the King, on the recommendation of Sir Ian Hamilton, bestowed the D.S.O. upon Lieutenant-Colonel J. T. R. Wilson, commanding the "Queen's", in recognition of the initiative and fine powers of leadership displayed by him that morning. "This is an honour", wrote Lieutenant-General Hunter-Weston in announcing the award to Major-General de Lisle, commanding the 29th Division, "both to the whole of the 5th Royal Scots and the company of the Worcester Regiment who participated in the counter-attack under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson's command." Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, a J.P. and prominent citizen of Edinburgh, as well as a gallant soldier, was wounded in the first engagement after the landing in Gallipoli, lying for nineteen hours behind the Turkish positions before crawling back to the British lines, where he had been given up for dead.

Second-Lieutenant Arthur W. Roberts, of the 4th Worcesters, who led his men in the successful attack with the "Queen's Edinburgh" on the night June 18–19, received the Military Cross "for gallantry and coolness", the Distinguished Conduct Medal being won on the same occasion by Sergeant J. Chalmers, who had charge of one of the "Queens'" machine-gun sections, and "invariably", as the *Gazette* bore witness, "gave a fine exhibition of bravery and devotion to duty". Another thrilling exploit on this night of June 18–19—one of many such deeds equally worthy to be rescued from the *London Gazette*, in which they lie in danger of being

undeservedly forgotten — was the counter-attack, led by Captain Hugh G. C. Fowler, 2nd South Wales Borderers, on a trench which had been captured by the enemy. This officer himself threw about thirty bombs, some of them enemy bombs, which he picked up and hurled back at great personal risk, but with the result that the position was eventually won.

Some of the 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers similarly distinguished themselves in the final counter-attack, which re-established the line on the same occasion. Sergeant-Major G. E. Framingham, who had already been noted for excellent work since the historic landing, now earned the Military Cross for a fine exhibition of the highest courage in bomb-throwing

Our Allies in Gallipoli: French troops practising an advance at Mudros

Captain Fowler was awarded the D.S.O. for his leading share in this success, two plucky privates of the same battalion—E. Matthews and T. Woods—receiving the D.C.M. When the South Wales Borderers were ordered to retake this lost position, Matthews and Woods volunteered to precede the bombing-party. Matthews, in the words of the official record, "entered the trench, clearing the way with his bayonet, while his companion kept down the enemy's enfilading fire, both men showing the greatest coolness and bravery, exposing themselves absolutely regardless of danger".

and in driving out the enemy, and Sergeant J. E. Pullen the D.C.M. Sergeant Pullen, who was wounded early in the night, with admirable self-sacrifice refused to retire, and continued to command his platoon until severely wounded in the head.

In one of these daily encounters in June, 1915, two Australian gunners deserve to be remembered for what was officially and truly described as "a most gallant adventure", and one which showed a fine spirit of self-sacrifice. When a company of our infantry south-west of Krithia had been forced by enfilade fire to vacate

a trench, it was reported that one of our wounded had been left behind. The trench was now absolutely commanded by the enemy's fire, but Gunner G. G. Finlay, 2nd Battery, 1st Australian Field Artillery Brigade, and Gunner A. M'Kinlay, 3rd Battery, 1st Australian Field Artillery Brigade, volunteered to bring him in, and succeeded in doing so. They were both rewarded with the D.C.M. Nor must we overlook the equally noble conduct of two privates of the Australian Army Medical Corps, attached to the 6th Australian Battalion in the earlier operations in this southern war zone—A. A. Morath and E. P. Hitchcock, both of whom, in assisting the wounded under constant heavy fire, exhibited a heroism beyond praise. Not only were they thus instrumental in saving many lives, but their inspiring example of devotion to duty gave the greatest encouragement to all ranks.

On June 21 General Gouraud began to straighten out the line on our right flank by attacking the formidable defence-works commanding the Kereves Dere, or Ravine of Death as the French soldiers had named it. The Kereves Dere was the equivalent of the Gully Ravine, which was the Turks' chief defence on the opposite side of the peninsula—a sort of mighty trench dug in the rock, with all its sinuous length fortified with the latest devices of military science, including subterranean communications and concrete shelters for quick-firing guns. The natural defences were completed by a rivulet that had cut a narrow path through the rock, alongside which the Turks had entrenched themselves so securely that the French shells could not touch them. It took our allies a month to carry the first line of trenches, and from that point they had ever since been held up by the formidable

From an Official Photograph

Preparing for the Infantry Attack: one of the British Batteries in action in Gallipoli

Turkish defences. On June 21 General Gouraud brought into play the destructive *crapouillots*, which at length succeeded in smashing and overthrowing these works. This new attack began at 4.30 a.m., and was followed by a triumphant bayonet charge in which the French 2nd Division captured and held all the first- and second-line trenches opposite their front, as well as the redoubtable "Haricot" stronghold, with its subsidiary maze of entanglements and communication-trenches. On their right, however, the 1st Division, though fighting desperately hard, and succeeding at first in winning the first line of trenches, were driven back in a sweeping counter-attack, and it looked as though the deadly rolling-up process of June 4 would begin all over again. Fresh troops were launched to recapture the positions, and succeeded, only to be forced back before they had time to consolidate. The rest of this battle of the longest day of the year is best summarized in Sir Ian Hamilton's words:

"At 2.45 p.m. General Gouraud issued an order that full use must be made of the remaining five hours of daylight, and that before dark these trenches must be taken and held, otherwise the gains of the 2nd Division would be sacrificed. At 6 p.m. the third assault succeeded: 600 yards of trenches remained in our hands, despite all the heavy counter-attacks made through the night by the enemy. In this attack the striplings belonging to the latest French drafts specially distinguished themselves by their forwardness and contempt of danger. Fifty prisoners were taken, and the enemy's casualties (mostly incurred during counter-attacks) were estimated at 7000. The losses of the Corps Expéditionnaire were 2500."

Despite further counter-attacks these gains were maintained, and the right of the line at length commanded the fatal Kereves Dere. It remained for the British left to begin straightening itself out in similar fashion. Here, on the Ægean coast, the Turkish right had rooted itself, as the Commander-in-Chief said, with special tenacity. Exactly a week later than the French advance on the other side these roots were dug up after a bombardment in which the deadly fire from His Majesty's ships *Talbot*, *Wolverine*, and *Scorpion* played a vigilant and an extremely accurate part, especially in shelling the enemy's positions near the sea.

The centre of the struggle was the deep, winding Saghir Dere, or Gully Ravine, running up from the sea for several miles until it passed Krithia to the west of Achi Baba, to lose itself there in a number of smaller gullies. Although after leaving the coast it takes a general direction towards the north-east, running parallel to the sea and rarely more than half a mile from the shore, it twists and turns in an extraordinary manner. At one point", wrote Mr. Ashmead Bartlett on July 4, "you may walk in perfect security behind a bluff, while at another you may catch a stream of bullets from the Turkish trenches in front." No effort was made to advance farther up the Saghir Dere itself, which was commanded by the trenches on either side, the main weight of the attack on June 28 being directed against the high narrow plateau on the seaward side of the gully.

The plan of operations was to throw forward the left of the line south-west of Krithia, pivoting on a point about 1 mile from the sea, and, after advancing on the extreme left for about half a mile, to establish a new line facing east on the ground thus gained, instead of, as previously, north-east. This scheme entailed the capture in succession of two lines of the Turkish trenches east of Saghir Dere, and five lines of trenches west of it, the ground to be seized obviously lessening as our line drew back from the sea towards its fixed or pivoted right. The Australians and New Zealanders were ordered to continue their rôle as second fiddle by making another simultaneous demonstration in the northern zone.

While the main Turkish positions were being heavily bombarded in the southern zone a small advance-work in the Saghir Dere was carried in rare style by part of the Border Regiment. This work, known as the Boomerang Redoubt, very strongly situated and protected by extra strong wire entanglements, had long been a source of trouble. A special bombardment by trench mortar had been reserved for it, and immediately this ceased, and while the bombardment of the surrounding trenches was at its height, the Borderers, to quote from the official telegram at the time, "leapt from their trenches as one man, like a pack of hounds, and pouring out of cover raced across and took the work most brilliantly". Precisely at 11 a.m., when the artillery range was lengthened, the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R. Marshall, advanced with the greatest dash, carrying three lines of Turkish trenches with comparatively little opposition. The trenches were nearly full of dead Turks, and 100 prisoners were taken in them. On their right, east of the Saghir Dere, the Lowland regiments of the 156th Scottish Rifle Brigade sacrificed themselves with magnificent courage. The 4th and 7th Royal Scots, following worthily in the footsteps of the heroic 5th, leapt over their parapets with a cheer and a wild rush which carried them right into the Turkish first line, and then into the second. The 7th, under Lieutenant-Colonel W. Carmichael Peebles, only mustered two companies, owing to the frightful railway disaster at Gretna Green, which cut them to pieces when they were southward bound on the Caledonian Railway just five short weeks before. Their losses with the 4th in the torrent of shrapnel and machine-gun fire which now faced them in Gallipoli were again appalling, but they succeeded in reaching the objective assigned to them. "The Scotch Terriers are fair devils", declared some of their comrades among the Regulars, who relieved them at midnight.

"During the afternoon", wrote one of the officers in a letter home, quoted in the *Scotsman* shortly afterwards, "the Turks endeavoured to mass and get forward with a counter-attack, but what with rapid fire and machine-guns we simply mowed them down in hundreds. Their losses must have been enormous. Through the ravine on our immediate left their dead bodies were lying piled in thick and confused heaps. Our advance had driven them out of two elaborate trenches and out of this ravine, which looks as if it had been a kind of head-quarters for them."

The cost of these two trenches, as already mentioned, had been appallingly high, the 4th Royal Scots, Edinburgh's senior Territorial unit, alone losing twenty-two officers in killed, wounded, and missing, including Lieutenant-Colonel S. R. Dunn, who, like Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson

Brigadier-General W. Scott-Moncrieff, killed while commanding the 156th Brigade in Gallipoli
(From a photograph by Amy Cassels)

of the 5th, had risen to the command from the ranks of his own regiment; Major James Gray, who was second in command; Major James W. Henderson; and five of the company commanders. On the right of the 7th Royal Scots, who also suffered severely, though not to the same extent as the 4th, the 8th Scottish Rifles—the old Cameronian volunteers of Glasgow—were held up by concealed trenches which had suffered little, if at all, from our artillery-fire. Their fate was that of all infantry charging in the open against quick-firers and modern defences inadequately dealt with in preliminary bombardment. Though admirably led by their officers, as Major-General E. Egerton testified in his letter describing the action to Colonel R. C. Mackenzie, C.B., chairman of the Glasgow Territorial Force Association, the 8th Cameronians suffered from a terrible enfilade fire, and could only reach a portion of their objective.

"Nothing", added Major-General Egerton, "could have exceeded the gallantry and devotion of these three battalions, and they proved themselves worthy of Scotland and of the historic cities which gave them birth. They were well supported by the 7th Scottish Rifles, who have also, I am sorry to say, suffered severely."

The officer losses among the 8th Scottish Rifles were heavier even than those of the 4th Royal Scots, no fewer than twenty-three being included in the official casualty list, bracketed with some fourteen officers, killed, wounded, or missing, of the 7th Battalion. Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. Wilson was among the missing of the 7th. The 8th were gallantly led into action by Major J. M. Findlay, who had succeeded to the command on the death of Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Hannan. Major Findlay fell severely wounded, and lay all day on the field of honour, narrowly escaping death a score of times, but eventually crawling back with a wounded private to the safety of the British lines. Of Major Findlay's whole battalion only some 200 men remained at the end of that cruel experience. They could not

achieve the impossible in that hopeless charge against intact trenches bristling with rifles and machine-guns, but they knew how to die, these Lowland Territorials.

It was while trying to get support for the Scottish Rifles that Brigadier-General William Scott-Moncrieff, of Fossaway, Kinross-shire, who commanded the 156th Brigade in this its first real battle, was instantly killed by a bullet through the head. Brigadier-General Scott-Moncrieff was an old "Die-hard", having served with the Middlesex Regiment through the Zulu war of 1878, and commanded it in the last South African campaign. Though not completely successful, the superb attack of the 156th Brigade won the congratulations of Sir Ian Hamilton, and, in his own words, "brought great distinction on their brigade and division".

Half an hour after the first assault, east of the Saghir Dere, the second phase of the grand attack began west of the ravine, where the Royal Fusiliers led their brigade through the trenches already taken and on through the open. Advancing with great steadiness and resolution, the brigade reached their objective by taking two more lines of trenches, the Lancashire Fusiliers inclining half-right and forming line to connect up with our new position east of the ravine. The 2nd Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment) had suffered severely, but had added a stirring page to their illustrious history. When all the officers of his detachment had been killed or wounded in the successful attack on the Turkish trenches, Lance-Sergeant W. Rolfe assumed the command, repulsing repeated counter-attacks with fine powers of leadership, and sending accurate and valuable reports on the situation to the commanding officer. Similarly, when the officer commanding his section had been killed, Company Quartermaster-Sergeant A. G. Smith at once assumed control, "and by his courage and ability in handling the situation successfully conducted the defence of his position"—as recorded in the official account in the award of the D.C.M to both these non-commissioned officers. For equal bravery and initiative on the same and other occasions the D.C.M. was also conferred upon Company Sergeant-Major J. Gilbert and Sergeant W. H. Matthews of the same famous regiment.

The 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers also, as usual, rose to the occasion. A small detachment of them was called upon to face a furious attack at a critical moment in the fight. The defence fell to acting Company Sergeant-Major J. Sheehan, who won the D.C.M. for the high courage and sound leadership which he displayed throughout, "thus enabling the trench to be successfully held in spite of the severity of the attack and the smallness of the defending force". Corporal F. M'Namara, of the 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers, also won the D.C.M.

"A machine-gun having fallen into the enemy's hands, Corporal M'Namara collected a party of sixteen men, and led them in a charge against largely superior numbers, driving them back with loss and recapturing the gun. His bravery and devotion to duty were conspicuous."

About the biggest haul was made through the dogged advance of the 1st Border Regiment. In the course of the attack a reinforcing-party of this battalion was led into the enemy's trench by Lance-Sergeant J. M. Wood, who gallantly cleared the position until, pushing on, he joined up with the unit on his flank. The section thus captured was strongly held by the enemy, sixty-four of whom surrendered. For this success Lance-Sergeant Wood received the D.C.M., which was also conferred upon two privates of the same battalion — J. Berry, who, accompanied by the sergeant, was the first man to enter the trench, driving the enemy back with the bayonet and behaving all through with a total disregard for his own safety; and J. Bewsher, who helped to clear the trench with hand-to-hand fighting, and later in the day volunteered to carry a message over open ground swept by heavy fire. Private Bewsher did not get through without being wounded, but he successfully struggled back and delivered the answer.

Five lines along the coast had thus been won, but the Indian brigade improved upon this success, the Gurkhas pressing on under the cliffs and capturing an important spur still farther forward, running from the west of the farthest captured trench to the sea, actually due west of Krithia. This success was largely due to the daring and well-executed reconnaissance work previously carried out by Captain Denis G. J. Ryan, of the 1st Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles, for which he was awarded the D.S.O. His brother officer, Captain Frank B. Abbott, won the same decoration in the advance itself on June 28, and in the hot struggle which followed before the position was finally secured. Displaying exceptionally fine leadership, dash, and resource—to paraphrase the official record—he advanced single-handed in the thick of the fighting and cleared the Turks out of one-third of a trench which had been recaptured by them, also organizing bombing attacks with the same object in view. For the third time during the war he was then wounded while leading a bayonet charge after the bombs were exhausted. Was it to be wondered at that these warriors from the Indian hills idolized their British officers? In describing the furious fighting at this period Sir Ian Hamilton wrote:

> "An officer of the Gurkhas being wounded —not dangerously, as it turned out—the men became infuriated, flung all their bombs at the enemy, and then, charging down out of the trench, used their kukris for the first time, and with excellent effect".

Eventually the newly-won positions were put into a state of defence and held, making our total gain on the extreme left precisely 1000 yards. Save for the small portion of trenches which still remained uncaptured on the right, all and more than was hoped for had been gained. "All engaged did well," reported Sir Ian Hamilton, "but certainly the chief factor in the success was the splendid attack carried out by the 29th Division, whose conduct on this, as on previous occasions, was beyond praise." A glowing tribute was paid to the 29th, on the day following this advance, in a Special Force Order issued by Sir

Ian Hamilton through Major-General Braithwaite, his Chief of Staff, and published in the *Egyptian Gazette.*

"General Head-quarters,
"*June 29, 1915*

"The General Officer Commanding feels sure that he voices the sentiments of every soldier serving with this army when he congratulates the incomparable 29th Division upon yesterday's splendid attack, carried out as it was in a manner more than upholding the best traditions of the distinguished regiments of which it is composed. The 29th suffered cruel losses at the first landing. Since then they have never been made up to strength, and they have remained under fire every hour of the night and day for two months on end. Opposed to them were fresh troops, holding line upon line of entrenchments, flanked by redoubts and machine-guns.

"But when, yesterday, the 29th Division were called upon to advance, they dashed forward as eagerly as if this were only their baptism of fire. Through the entanglements they swept northwards, clearing our left of the enemy for a full 1000 yards. Heavily counter-attacked at night, they killed or captured every Turk who had penetrated their incomplete defences, and to-day stand possessed of every yard they had so hardly gained. Therefore it is that Sir Ian Hamilton is confident he carries with him all ranks of his force when he congratulutes Generals Hunter-Weston and De Lisle, the Staff, and each officer, N.C.O., and man in this Division, whose sustained efforts have added fresh lustre to British arms all the world over."

The 29th had landed under General Hunter-Weston, and had since been commanded by General de Lisle, save for occasional intervals when, in General de Lisle's absence, the division was led by Brigadier-General Marshall. It was a division in which England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales alike had the honour of being represented.

From an Official Photograph

General Hunter-Weston outside his Dug-out

One of the most thrilling moments on June 28 occurred when the heavy guns from the Asiatic shore suddenly enfiladed the 97th Battery Royal Field Artillery. One gun was immediately hit, the whole gun detachment killed or wounded, and an ammunition-wagon set on fire. A grave disaster was averted only by the rare bravery and presence of mind of three men—Sergeants A. H. Hilton and W. Paramor, both of the 97th Battery, and Corporal C. Rodger, of the 4th (Territorial) Highland Mountain Brigade, Royal Garrison Artillery — who, regardless of danger, rushed to the burning wagon and succeeded in extinguishing the fire. Several rounds exploded,

but the remainder of the ammunition was saved without further loss of life.

Valuable help had been rendered by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps in these operations by the demonstration organized in order, as already mentioned, to prevent the enemy in the northern zone, where, apprehensive of his communications, he had gathered in great force, from detaching troops to the southern area. The demonstration, made along the Saribair ridgeway towards the Maidos-Krithia road, succeeded in its object, the naval guns joining in and giving great assistance. Part of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade and 3rd Infantry Brigade advanced some 700 yards and kept the enemy busy the whole afternoon, easily repulsing his attacks until the appointed time for the retirement, the last of the troops, covered by rifle, machine-gun, and artillery fire, being back in their trenches between 4.30 and 5.30 p.m. Further successful demonstrations were carried out after dark with flares, star shells, and destroyer bombardment.

Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, commanding the Anzac troops who repulsed the Turkish onslaught of June 29–30, 1915
(From a photograph by Bassano)

Alarmed by the British advance in the southern zone, Enver Pasha now rushed post-haste from Constantinople and assumed command of the troops defending the peninsula. It was also reported that Liman von Sanders had been wounded by disaffected Turkish soldiers. Whatever truth there may have been in this, the first effect of Enver Pasha's arrival was the countermanding of Liman von Sanders's instructions to the Turks to remain on the defensive in the northern zone, a determined attempt being made in force on the night of June 29–30 to drive our Oversea forces from their positions. First came a furious bombardment from midnight till 1.30, when the Turks came right on with bombs and bayonets. The attack, principally launched on that portion of the line on our right flank under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, was at once crumpled up by the musketry and machine-guns of the 7th and 8th Light Horse, the few who succeeded in reaching our saps being instantly killed. Following this crushing defeat another attack took place at 3 a.m. on our left and left centre, only to meet with a similar fate. Some thirty men managed to surmount the parapets in front of the right of Quinn's Post; but these, as the official report tersely put it, "were duly polished off". So heavy were the enemy's casualties in this ill-starred

offensive that, in areas directly exposed to view, between 400 and 500 Turks were actually seen to fall.

Foiled in this region, Enver Pasha, in honour of whose arrival a great banner was now hoisted on Achi Baba, ordered a general counter-attack in the southern zone on July 4, with the object of recovering the ground recently lost, their piecemeal attempts in the intervening days having failed to make any permanent impression.

One glorious incident which occurred during these isolated efforts stands out among the confused accounts of the fighting south-west of Krithia. This happened on the night of July 1–2, when a portion of a trench had been recaptured by the Turks and it was essential that it should be regained. Captain Gerald R. O'Sullivan, of the 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, though not belonging to the troops at this point, volunteered to lead a party of bomb-throwers to effect the recapture. On the night of June 18–19 Captain O'Sullivan had saved another critical situation in the same locality by his great personal gallantry and good leading. On the second occasion, to quote from the *Gazette*:

"He advanced in the open under a very heavy fire, and, in order to throw his bombs with greater effect, got up on the parapet, where he was completely exposed to the fire of the enemy occupying the trench. He was finally wounded, but not before his inspiring example had led on his party to make further efforts, which resulted in the recapture of the trench."

For this and his earlier act of heroism Captain O'Sullivan[1] received the Victoria Cross, which was also awarded to Sergeant James Somers, of the same battalion, who similarly distinguished himself on that eventful summer night. When some of our troops were forced from their sap by hostile bombing, Sergeant Somers, who had been wounded in Flanders before volunteering for the Dardanelles, remained alone in his angle, and held the position until reinforcements brought up bombs. He then climbed over the trench and bombed the Turks with great effect. Later, he advanced into the open under heavy fire, stopping repeated rushes by throwing bombs into the enemy's flank, until a barricade had been established. There is no doubt that this splendid combination of coolness and intrepid courage saved the position. Besides recommending Somers for the V.C., Sir Ian Hamilton made him King's Sergeant on the field. Three of his comrades received the D.C.M. for their share in the same redoubtable deed—Company Quartermaster-Sergeant H. H. Waugh and Private J. M'Niece, who were the sole survivors in the sap at one period, but held on, and so saved it from falling into the enemy's hands, and Sergeant H. Kearney, who led one of the bombing parties with splendid nerve and distinguished himself throughout.

On the following day the Victoria Cross was also won for a similar act by Second-Lieutenant Herbert James, of the 4th Worcestershires, in the same locality. Though exposed throughout to a murderous fire, Second-Lieuten-

[1] Captain O'Sullivan took part with the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in the subsequent operations in Suvla Bay, and, unhappily, was reported missing on August 21, and believed to have been killed at that date during the attack on Hill 70.

ant James headed a party of bomb-throwers up a Turkish communication-trench. After nearly all his bomb-throwers had been killed or wounded he remained alone at the head of the trench and kept back the enemy single-handed till a barrier had been built behind him and the trench secured. This was not his only act of conspicuous bravery during these operations, recorded by the *Gazette*.

"On June 28, 1915, when a portion of a regiment had been checked owing to all the officers being put out of action, Second-Lieutenant James, who belonged to a neighbouring unit, entirely on his own initiative gathered together a body of men and led them forward under heavy shell and rifle fire. He then returned, organized a second party, and again advanced. His gallant example put fresh life into the attack."

For his good work and unfailing courage throughout those operations Company Sergeant-Major J. P. Alexander received the D.C.M. This was also awarded to Lance-Corporal R. Reece for his heroic share in the exploit on June 4 which won the V.C. for Second-Lieutenant James, Reece playing a lion's part in repelling repeated rushes of the enemy during the building of the barrier already referred to.

The French Command in Gallipoli: General Gouraud (standing) with General Bailloud, his second in command, among the ruins of the Turkish fort of Sedd-el-Bahr—a photograph taken the day before General Gouraud was wounded

One other event remains to be recorded before resuming the narrative of the operations in July. On the evening of June 30 General Gouraud, who had taken over the command of the French Expeditionary Corps from General d'Amade only six weeks previously, was grievously wounded by a shell. With "this calamity, for I count

it nothing less", wrote Sir Ian Hamilton, the French command devolved upon General Bailloud until the appointment of General Sarrail in the following August as Commander-in-Chief of the French army in the Near East. On his return to Paris General Gouraud, who lost his right arm and suffered other serious injuries as a result of his wounds, was decorated by President Poincaré with the supreme honour of the French army, the Military Medal, and by King George with the K.C.M.G. When His Majesty sent a message of sympathy on hearing of his wounds the gallant Frenchman replied: "I consider it a great honour to have been able to appreciate on the field of battle the valour of my British friends".

The total casualties of the Turks between June 28 and July 2 were estimated by Sir Ian Hamilton at 5150 killed and 15,000 wounded. The total amount of Turkish arms and ammunition collected was 516 rifles, 51 bayonets, 200 sets of equipment, 126,400 rounds of ammunition, and 100 bombs.

Enver Pasha's grand assault of July 4, 1915, in the southern zone—to gather up the main thread of our story—began at 4 a.m. with the most violent bombardment the British had yet experienced in Gallipoli, at least 5000 rounds of artillery ammunition being expended by the Turks. Reserving their principal effort for the junction of the Royal Naval Division Section with that of the French, and charging in overwhelming strength at 7.30 a.m., the enemy for the moment succeeded. Driving back our advanced troops, some fifty Turks gained a footing in our trench, where, however, some stalwarts of the Royal Naval Division held on. It was not long before the enemy lost his precarious foothold. Our supports, and the men who had retired, immediately counter-attacked and hurled the Turks out of the trench again. Another attack was delivered on the right of the 29th Division Section, but this was practically wiped out by rifle and machine-gun fire. Other attempts were made on our left with the object of recovering the lost ground of the Gully Ravine. Here the enemy massed in the twists and turns of the nullah north-east of our new positions, but none of the assaults which followed succeeded in getting home, owing to the steadiness of our troops and the effective artillery support. Not only was the result of this general attack, therefore, a complete failure, but, in the words of Sir Ian Hamilton's report, "while our losses were negligible and no impression was made on our line, the enemy added a large number to his recent very heavy casualties". Throughout the action the Turkish batteries maintained an incessant fire from the Asiatic coast, a Turkish battleship cruising between Maidos and Chanak, as well as a number of enemy aeroplanes, armed with bombs, also taking part in the affair. The day closed with a triumphal flight of fifteen Allied aeroplanes over the Turkish aerodrome at Chanak, where several bombs were dropped, including a large shell which struck the principal shed.

A week later the swing of the pendulum in this deadly, ding-dong struggle carried the offensive to the Allies, who

gained another 200 to 400 yards after a bitter hand-to-hand conflict, in the course of which positions were won, lost, and won again, with the same stubborn spirit as before. It was stern bludgeon work, "brutal and unattractive", as Mr. Ashmead Bartlett described it in his dispatch of

From an Official Photograph

Royal Irish Fusiliers in the Trenches in Gallipoli

July 14, and offered practically no scope for skill in tactics or strategy. Here, as elsewhere in Gallipoli, it became a question of endurance, to see which side could hold out the longer. The enemy at this time seemed to have little difficulty in maintaining supplies either of men or munitions, doubtless profiting by the impressive success of the German and Austrian armies in Galicia and Poland. That mighty offensive on the Eastern front, which changed the whole aspect of the war at this critical period, made it comparatively safe for Turkey to withdraw the pick of her troops from Armenia—having first massacred the Christian population to prevent them from helping the Russians—and concentrate the flower of her army in Gallipoli. Every day, too, served to increase the strength of the Turks' defences as they gained in experience and learned the lessons taught them by indefatigable German experts. Only those who knew the ground could have any conception of the frightful odds faced by our heroic infantry in gaining even a few yards of this blood-drenched soil. Since the landing on April 25 the Turks, Mr. Ashmead Bartlett pointed out on July 14, had constructed a perfect network of trenches and small redoubts, all protected by barbed wire and connected by saps and communicating-trenches of the most approved pattern.

"They have now realized that no infantry can withstand these tremendous bombardments with high-explosive shells concentrated on a small section of the defence. Therefore they withdraw most of their men down the communicating-trenches whilst the bombardment lasts, and our infantry are thus able to occupy two or three lines with but small loss, but the majority of our casualties occur in holding the trenches after they have been won. For the enemy, knowing the ground and the plan of their trenches better than our men, attack them with bombs through the saps, and the fighting takes place at close quarters. Parties of men get too far forward and are frequently lost for hours, whilst it is no uncommon occurrence for our men to gain possession of an advanced trench whilst

the Turks are still holding sections of those behind them."[1]

The fresh advance of the Allies on July 12 began at daybreak, when, after a preliminary hammering by the artillery, a brilliant attack was delivered tured the first two lines of Turkish trenches, and after heavy and confused fighting reached a third, where, however, they were driven out by a violent counter-attack. The first phase having thus far succeeded, the second phase of the operations was begun—



The Operations in the Southern Area of Gallipoli: Map showing approximately the Allies' Line at the close of the fighting in July, 1915

by the right of the British troops and the French Expeditionary Corps. The whole of the first line facing the French Corps was carried in this attack, and the second at the close of the day by a magnificent charge of the Foreign Legion and the Zouaves. On their left the attacking British brigade cap-

an attack on the trenches and a formidable rectangular redoubt on the enemy's right overlooking the Gully Ravine. This took place exactly at 5 p.m. as our guns lengthened their fuses after preparing the way for the assault, the infantry instantly surging forward towards the maze of saps and trenches in the neighbourhood of the great redoubt. The scene was de-

[1] *Ashmead Bartlett's Dispatches from the Dardanelles.* Newnes, 1915.

scribed as like some picture from the Inferno, the guns, now shelling the enemy's reserve trenches, forming a dim and misty background of earth and smoke. According to Mr. Ashmead Bartlett:

"The ground resembled a gigantic steaming cauldron, into whose thick vapours the gallant brigade poured without once hesitating or looking back. Individuals soon became swallowed up in the mist, and all you could see were black dots rushing about or jumping into the trenches with bayonets flashing in the shrouded sun amidst a continuous roar of musketry, which showed that the Turks were resisting valiantly. But when the smoke lifted somewhat our men were everywhere in possession of the enemy's trenches. For a few minutes it looked as if the redoubt might give some trouble, but the Scots never gave the Turks a chance, swarming up the escarpment on all sides, and jumping in on top to settle the argument with the bayonet."[1]

The glory of the advance was shared by the Scottish Territorials, Highlanders and Lowlanders alike, though a heavy price had to be paid for every yard won, as well as for maintaining possession of the captured trenches. The 4th and 5th Royal Scots Fusiliers again suffered severely, the 4th alone losing some fifteen of their officers in the course of the fighting. The 5th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders lost practically the same number, including Lieutenant-Colonel D. Darroch, who was wounded, the 5th, 6th, and 7th Highland Light Infantry, and the 4th and 5th King's Own Scottish Borderers suffering almost as heavily in their officer casualties. Among the missing was Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. M'Neile, of the 4th King's Own Scottish Borderers. The Cameronians were again to the front, further toll in officers and men being taken of the sadly-shrunken ranks of the 7th; but with the other Scottish Territorials they earned the personal thanks of General Egerton when the action was over. "Certainly the men deserved that at least", wrote Lieutenant-Colonel Peebles, commanding the 7th, to Colonel Sir J. M. Clark at the time; "they did magnificently." The Manchesters and other Territorials of the East Lancashire Brigade, on the right, had also forged ahead regardless of cost.

Among the Scottish Territorials who distinguished themselves on the 12th was Sergeant Carlin, 4th Royal Scots Fusiliers, who, having charged ahead of his men, found himself single-handed facing thirteen Turks, one of whom was about to shoot a wounded man. He killed that Turk in the nick of time, and then disarmed ten others before they could escape or do any further mischief. For this fine performance Sergeant Carlin received the Distinguished Conduct Medal, which was also won by Sergeant A. Y. Patin, of the 6th (City of Glasgow) Battalion Highland Light Infantry, for his fearless behaviour throughout the engagement. Although wounded in the shoulder on the 12th, he brought back a message for ammunition from his commander, and after assisting to carry it back remained at his post all day; and on the 13th led out a party under fire and brought in a wounded officer, as well as the body of another

[1] *Ashmead Bartlett's Dispatches from the Dardanelles.* 1915.

who had been killed. Two gallant Territorials of another battalion of the Highland Light Infantry—the 7th (Blythswood)—were awarded the same decoration for self-sacrificing work among the wounded all through the critical night of July 12–13. These were Privates J. H. Cowan and T. Crichton, both of whom searched the ground up to the firing-line, and brought in under fire over fifty wounded men. One other instance may be mentioned of the kind of pluck and devotion which inspired these Scottish Territorials. It is given briefly and baldly enough in the official account of the conduct for which the D.C.M. was awarded to Sergeant A. M'Laughlin, 5th (Renfrewshire) Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders:

"During the advance he assisted to clear the hostile trench, killing four of the enemy himself, and afterwards rendered valuable aid in consolidating and holding it. He then advanced with his party to an isolated trench and held it until relieved. He had been thirty hours in action and had set a fine example to his men."

In the course of the night (12th–13th) the Turks, who displayed a strong partiality for fighting in the dark, brought up tremendous reinforcements, and counter-attacked against our exhausted troops. These fought with the utmost gallantry, but on the right, where the advance had been pressed too far, they were forced to withdraw from a section of the captured trenches. As this position was vital to the safety of the rest of the line, a further attack was organized, the British troops, worn out by the twenty-four hours' fighting, being withdrawn from the front trenches and a brigade of the Royal Naval Division, supported by the French artillery, being sent forward. These, with the help of the "75's", retook the two Turkish trenches on the right, but could make no further headway against the storm of shells and rifle-fire poured upon them at this point, where they were opposed to some of the best Turkish regiments. On the left, however, our infantry attained the whole of their original objective, getting the Turks fairly on the run, so that by sunset on the 13th they were in full flight from this direction towards the foot of Achi Baba.

Meanwhile the French had pushed their extreme right down to the mouth of the River Kereves Dere, where it runs into the sea, maintaining this position against counter-attacks during the night, and pushing their advantage still farther the next day. In these Allied operations 422 prisoners were captured, some 200 of whom were taken by the French in their first attack. Another counter-attack by the Turks was subsequently repulsed in the southern area, where a small redoubt was presently captured by the British with insignificant loss; but for the rest of July, 1915, though the artillery remained active on both sides, and every opportunity was taken to drive the offensive home at particular points, comparative calm reigned on the Franco-British front. Enver Pasha, who had vowed that Gallipoli should be the grave of the Entente Powers, now apparently decided that the defensive, after all, was the sounder policy against such stubborn fighters, while

Sir Ian Hamilton, for the time being, was too busy organizing his surprise attack with new British forces in Suvla Bay, to embark on further aggressive operations on a grand scale in the southern zone. F. A. M.

CHAPTER XVI

THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN TO THE FALL OF WARSAW

(June–August, 1915)

The Main Germanic Effort of 1915—The Salients of Przemysl and of Warsaw—Importance of Jaroslav—Russian Forces stripped from the Carpathians—Double Attack north and south of Przemysl—Contemporaneous Attacks on the whole Russian Front—Przemysl only a Stage in the Advance—Operations north and south of the Przemysl-Lemberg Line—General Linsingen and Pflanzer on the Dniester and the Pruth—The German Defeat at Zurawno—Swinging back the Russian Door in Galicia—Capture of the Grodek Position and Evacuation of Lemberg—New Straightening of the Russian Line—Fresh Russian Positions on the Zlota Lipa—Second Phase of the German Strategic Plan—Mackensen turns north—Movement towards the Lublin-Cholm Railway—Archduke Josef Ferdinand's Check at Krasnik—New Thrust by Mackensen and Von Woyrsch co-operating with Hindenburg's Movements in the North—The Double Encircling Movement—Warsaw the New Salient—Von Bülow's Capture of Kovno—Advance on the Blonie Lines—Germans cross the Narew—Warsaw sacrificed.

THE attack on the Russian armies of Galicia and Poland was the Germanic summer campaign of 1915. It was substituted for that attempt to break through the western lines which had been predicted with a good deal of confidence as the blow which German hopes, no less than German strategy, would prompt them to deal, and its measure of success was due to its direction along the lines of least resistance. It absorbed the flower of Germany's reserves and the greater accumulation of ammunition; it employed her best generals. It occupied—and perhaps this is not the least important factor—the five months of May, June, July, August, and September, and at the end of them left the task unfinished. But judged by what it did, and not by what it left undone, it was a piece of work which needed and received a power of organization and a sustentation of effort worthy of the highest admiration. In those five months the Russians were manœuvred out of their hard-won positions in the Carpathians, were driven by direct attack or by the threat of outflanking from Galicia, and were compelled to withdraw their whole line from its most favourable position, the river front of the Vistula, losing towns, fortresses, and territory in the withdrawal. Such is a summary of the Germanic success. Where, stopping short of success, it sowed the seeds of failure is a matter for future consideration. The present summary of its chief features begins with the fall of Przemysl and ends with that of Warsaw.

The evacuation of either stronghold was deliberate and was not accom-

panied by circumstances of disaster, but both fell because the pressure of the enemy would have made any attempt to retain them a serious blunder. Each was converted into the apex of a salient, a loop which the enemy was pressing both north and south. If the Russians had remained

The Summer Campaign on the Eastern Front: Russian troops passing through a Galician village

within the loop of Przemysl, which we may figure as the letter C, the Germans would have closed the open jaws of the letter, converting it into the letter O, with the Russians inside. This simile many times repeated would illustrate many of the episodes and most of the Germanic strategy of the summer campaign. The Germans between Warsaw and the Carpathians employed their five armies of German, or of German and Austrian, troops in continued attempts to outflank on two wings this or that group of Russian forces. Their attack, pushed vigorously on the wings while the centre held the enemy as tightly as possible, would create a C-shaped salient and would compel the retreat of the Russians from the territory it enclosed. This manœuvre was continually successful in compelling retreat; its success was incomplete in that the Russians were always able to retreat, and often at their leisure. This was due to the twin facts that the Russians fought rear-guard actions with unexampled devotion and tenacity, and that the Germanic advance, though it owed so much to its overpowering weight of

artillery, suffered from the defect of this advantage, which was that it made the movements of its vanguards slow. The Russians held the Germanic wings, or brushed them aside; the Germanic main bodies moved too slowly to hold the Russians down to a position which the wings could surround.

Przemysl was lost when the German advance, which had successively occupied the lines of the Rivers Dunajec and Biala, the Wisloka and the Wislok, stormed the heights west of Jaroslav on the San. All these rivers are like roots spreading out from the trunk of the Vistula, the San for the purposes of this comparison being the topmost. The Germanic advance was shearing through the roots, compelling the Russian armies to fall back before the scythe till they were right back on the tap-root of the San. The San runs roughly north-west from Przemysl through Jaroslav to the Vistula, but between Przemysl and the Carpathians executes an exaggerated westerly loop which renders it useless as a defensive line. The Germans had not much difficulty in continually advancing south of Przemysl. When once the Dunajec and Biala lines had been shattered, the whole Russian forces between there and the Carpathians were compelled to fall back with the greatest speed compatible with safety; and in one instance a division had to cut its way through to safety, not without severe losses. As the successive defensive positions on the rivers running from the Carpathians to the Vistula were ceded to the momentum of the Germanic advance, the whole Russian line "came away" from the Carpathians as a label is stripped from a book, the point of contact with the Carpathians continually receding farther east, till at last the Russian armies no longer touched the mountains at all. Between them and the Carpathians the Austrians interposed—on the east, occupying the Dniester plain, while on the west the Germans, pushing strongly eastwards, linked themselves with Austrian armies that now began to pour down over passes no longer contested. Early in June, 1915, all the Russian forces had fallen back to the plains of Galicia north of the mountains, and in the west they were so disposed that south of Przemysl they were no longer a north-to-south barrier but a west-to-east guard of the Przemysl railway.

Considered thus the Russian line, in order to be of strategic strength, should have gone westwards or north-westwards past Przemysl to the Vistula in a straight line, or flexed only at a very obtuse angle. But while on the south the German and Austrian forces, having crossed the loop of the San, taking Krasno and Sanok in their stride, were pressing the Russians hard at Hussakow, which is east as well as south of Przemysl, a still harder blow was struck at Jaroslav, 20 miles north of the town. When that was carried the evacuation of Przemysl was only a question of time, for the conditions of a loop about the town had been created by the Germans. The question of time had a precise significance. It was important to the Germans to take the town as quickly as possible. It was more important to the Russians to clear away from it without loss of

men than to attempt to hold on to it too long. There was not, from the first, any possibility of retaining it.

The Germanic-Austrian attack followed the prescribed model of a vigorous outflanking manœuvre, which had ample material in men and guns at its disposal. That is to say, the attack was fiercely pressed on both wings—to the north at Jaroslav and Radymno, whence they began to push down the right or eastern bank of the San; and to the south at Hussakow—while the centre west of Przemysl was firmly held and hammered by the heavy artillery. The Russians fought with desperation on both wings, and in these soldiers' battles the men could always be depended on for counter-attacks, so that every rood of the German advance cost the enemy dear.

But the Germanic assault on Przemysl was only part of a greater plan long prepared and carefully co-ordinated, so that while it was in progress contemporaneous attacks on the whole line from the Baltic to the Dniester engaged the Russian armies and prevented the movement of reinforcements to the chief foci of action in the south-eastern theatre. Thus a vigorous attack was pressed in the Schawli-Augustow region north of Warsaw, the middle Vistula region from the Bzura to the Pilitza was threatened, and a determined thrust was made on the Russian armies in the plain of the Dniester in the direction of the junction of Stryj. These wide-spreading operations could have but one end. The only success possible to the Russians was to delay the end and make it as costly in its attainment as possible. They delayed it in a manner that was a remarkable tribute to their fighting ability in the face of a foe greatly outnumbering them and incomparably superior in guns, shells, and aeroplanes. Though the difficulties which the Germans experienced in bringing up their heavy guns hampered the advance, yet it was thoroughly equipped on the engineering side. After a preparation lasting from May 27 to May 30 the Germans came on to the assault of Przemysl on its western and north-western forts. On the 31st three of the forts were carried and the result was no longer in doubt. The Russians resisted still, and took prisoners 23 officers and 600 men who had reached Fort No. 7. But the resistance had no other hope or expectation than that of delaying the inevitable, and after another forty-eight hours' fighting, during which the stores and the munitions were removed from the fortress, the Russians retired from Przemysl, leaving its shattered forts and dismantled guns in the hands of the Germans, and leaving little else.

The loss of Przemysl was a misfortune from any point of view, political, sentimental, or strategical, but its seriousness was lost sight of in the consolation that its capture had cost the Germans a great deal more than its spoils seemed to be worth. This valuation was a false one, for Przemysl was only the first step in the German design, or, as regarded by them from a politico-strategical point of view, a token that the Russian campaign in the Carpathians was now at an end. Their losses in men must have been anticipated by them; the loss of time

in achieving the capture could not at that time have seriously impaired their time-table. The Russian line had now got rid of its hump, or salient, and stretched from the Vistula behind the San and Przemysl to the Dniester. It had been swung a little farther eastwards, as one might swing back a pendulum. The Germans proceeded to attempt to swing it farther back still, till it should have been swung clean out of Galicia, and perhaps broken somewhere at the points where pressure was applied.

Photo, Vereenigde Fotobureau, Amsterdam

The Germanic Advance beyond Przemysl: Marshal von Mackensen fording a stream

General Mackensen's army pushed on, therefore, through Przemysl and north of it, having to fight hard at Medyka and farther east. South of Przemysl General Boehm-Ermolli's army at length broke through the Russian defences in the neighbourhood of Hussakow and pushed on to Mosciska, on the railway. Meanwhile, in the Dniester plain, much farther to the east, General von Linsingen's army denoted the future intentions of the German plan of campaign by pressing forward towards the north. Still farther east the Russians attempted a counter-attack on General Pflanzer's army, which was stationed on the line of the Pruth, near Delatyn and Kolomea. As the operations developed, the German armies of Mackensen and Boehm-Ermolli and that of Linsingen became separated by the marsh of the Dniester, and this obstacle served the Russians very well, for though the imposing forces of men and guns which had captured Przemysl could, and did,

push the Russians solidly if slowly backwards, Von Linsingen had to thrust northwards in isolation; and, having less preponderance in artillery and engineers, his task was always one of great difficulty, and was subjected to continual and costly set-backs. One such set-back, which occurred on June 7–10, drove back the Germans, who had crossed the Dniester near Zurawno, and inflicted on them losses estimated at 17 guns, 78 machine-guns, 348 officers, and about 15,000 rank and file. But while Linsingen's army was trying to establish itself on the northern bank of the Dniester at the crossings, Zurawno, Zurawkow, Zydaczow, with a view to the seizure of railways leading to Lemberg, the armies of Generals Pflanzer and Baltin were pushing northwards through Obertyn from the Bukovina and the line of the Pruth, and were at the same time edging westwards to join hands with Linsingen. Kolomea, Stanislau, and Halicz fell into their hands in the first or second week of June.

The effect of the unfaltering Russian resistance was to hamper and delay the German plan, which was to do at Lemberg what it had failed to do at Przemysl, namely to strike on the flank of retreating forces. If Linsingen could have won a swift victory on the Dniester he would have been able to make a dash for the Przemysl-Lemberg main railway line, and the more slowly the Russians retreated eastwards along it the more perilous would their positions have become. But Linsingen's progress northwards was continually too slow, and the Russian line remained unsevered, though under pressure it still continued a diagonal retirement towards the north-east. This eastwards-swinging diagonal, which had less the appearance of a pendulum movement than that of an immensely heavy door pressed open on its hinges—the hinges being the positions on the middle Vistula—when pressed far enough must uncover Lemberg; and that is what took place. Mackensen and Boehm-Ermolli continued to push the hinge and middle panels of the door, "fighting heavily", as the German *communiqués* admitted, on both sides of the railway, while Linsingen strove to give an impetus to the panel nearest the door-knob. The first sign of movement came from the middle panel, where, about June 20, one of Mackensen's armies, under General von Arz, captured the Grodek position near the railway; and General Boehm-Ermolli stormed the Russian positions on both sides of the Lemberg road. The Russians began to retreat towards Lemberg, while farther east and farther south their armies began to conform to the retreat. On June 22 the Russians evacuated Lemberg. Their line had swung farther east of it, their main army was being pressed out of Galicia. Only farther south could they, and did they, still obstinately resist Linsingen and Pflanzer.

Collating the official accounts of both sides, it is evident that the Russians were able to offer a punishing resistance on some parts of the railway which runs in a wavy north-and-south line from Lemberg past Zolkiew, as late as Midsummer Day; but when their line was pierced at Zolkiew, and still farther south on the road leading

westwards from Lemberg to Janow, they were obliged to retreat. The works on the north and north-west of Lemberg were stormed after furious fighting, and General Boehm-Ermolli's troops crossed the road between Lemberg and Mikolajov, which is 15 miles to the south-east. It will be observed that the Russians never allowed themselves to be held in a salient at Lemberg, but retired behind it in echelon, fighting all the way. Their retreat compelled their more northerly units, joining them to the San and the Vistula, to conform to the same movement, so that, just as their line had been stripped from its touch with the Carpathians, it now began to come away from the Vistula, the angle between the line and the river being continually forced to widen.

This movement continued during the rest of June, the Russians slowly giving way in a line drawn from Kielce to the north of Lemberg, while suffering a still fiercer resistance south and south-east of Lemberg on the Dniester front. General von Linsingen was never able to compass what would have been the decisive blow of breaking through these more southerly Russian armies which continually counter-attacked and could not be driven north-eastwards over the very difficult country except at a pace selected by General Ivanoff, their commander. They ceded the line of the Dniester as far east as Halicz with extreme deliberation, and fell back on the lines of the Rivers Gnila Lipa and Zlota Lipa, with an unchanging programme of counter-attacks and of rear-guard actions which inflicted no less loss than they sustained. Four months later they were still holding their own.

When the German forces were in possession of Lemberg, and had, except in the south-eastern corner of Galicia, cleared the Russian armies before them, the second part of their programme began to unfold itself.



Map showing approximately the position of the Germanic line in contact with the Russians at the end of June, 1915

The Russian line touching the Vistula had been swung back till it was almost at right angles to the river. The Germans now ceased to push its extremity farther east, and swung the main part of their forces to the north in what appeared at first to be an effort to sever the connection between the Russian Lemberg group and the Russian armies on the Vistula. The movement was, however, too slow, the distances to be covered in a difficult country too great, for the success of

Preparing for the Evacuation of Warsaw: Removing church bells and other metal objects—capable of being melted for munition purposes—to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Germans

any such plan when operating against the stubborn Russian infantry; and it is fair to assume that the German Head-quarters Staff scarcely expected such a consummation. Considered, however, as part of a larger and subsequent plan, namely the advance on Warsaw, the movement was admirably conceived and executed. While Mackensen's armies faced north and began to push into Russia from Galicia, taking Tomaszov on Monday, June 28, a new attack was developed on the western side of the Vistula at Zawichost, where the San joins the larger river. The Russians were pushed back, or fell back, to the Sienno-Josefow line before the army of General von Woyrsch.

The new German advance proceeded slowly, and with checks and losses; but, though these checks were sometimes severe, there was too much weight behind the push and too little artillery opposing it for the Russians to arrest it. It was, moreover, a movement of a very dangerous character, and the Germans were willing to stake a great deal on its success. The Russian armies of the north and those of the south had as their lateral line of railway communication the Lublin-Cholm-Kovel-Rovno railway, which runs to Ivangorod on the west, and thence to Warsaw, and has branches leading from Cholm to Brest-Litovsk on the River Bug and from Lublin to Siedlice. Its capture was of the highest moment, because it involved, in the first place, that severance of the Russian army groups which it was a primary object of German strategy to bring about, and in the

second place it opened a new way to Warsaw from the south.

The advance on the east side of the Vistula made quicker progress than that on the west or left bank, and the Germans quickly advanced through the valley of the Bug till they reached Zamosc, on the River Wieprz, and Krasnik, on the Wyznica, a river which runs almost due west from Krasnik to Josefow on the Vistula. Zamosc may be regarded as the jumping-off place for an attack on Cholm and Krasnik for the advance on Lublin. Here for a fortnight the attack was prosecuted with fluctuating success. The most desperate fighting was in the neighbourhood of Krasnik, where, on July 7 and 8 the German-Austrians under the Archduke Josef Ferdinand received a severe repulse, losing 15,000 prisoners. The character of the fighting for the Lublin-Cholm line and railway may be gauged from the circumstance that even this defeat, added to the holding up of Von Woyrsch on the Josefow-Sienno line west of the Vistula, did no more than postpone the inevitable. The Archduke's army was strengthened by its reserves and assumed a defensive position, while at Zamosc, opposite Cholm, Von Mackensen steadily accumulated guns and men. The Russians continued to attack the Archduke and added to their capture of prisoners, but there was never any question of forcing the Austro-German armies from their positions, or of compelling them to relinquish their offensive.

On July 18 renewed attacks were begun by General von Woyrsch and General von Mackensen, and it soon became evident that this attack was backed by new reserves both of men and shell. On this day also were observed the first symptoms of the third phase in the German plan of campaign, namely, the simultaneous attack north and south of Warsaw. While the phalanx under Mackensen had been ploughing its slow way through Galicia, and having accom-

The Evacuation of Warsaw: the Great Road Bridge over the Vistula wrecked by the Russians before the German occupation

plished the first part of its mission had wheeled north to undertake the second, far to the north the armies of Von Hindenburg, so long in a state of restrained activity, were preparing to complete the third stage of the German designs. Troops under Von Scholz and Von Gallwitz began to press the Russian lines near the combined rivers fall into the Vistula, at the fortress of Novo Georgievsk. It was the natural Russian line of defence against an attack on Warsaw from the north, and was strengthened by forts at Pultusk (nearest Novo Georgievsk), Rozhan, Ostrolenka-Lomza. It was this long sector of the Narew front against which Von

The Last Trench: Scene at the final retreat of the Russian troops defending Warsaw at the beginning of August, 1915

Pissa, and in the neighbourhood of Przasnysz, and another army under General von Bülow advanced over the Windawa.

The Russian Head-quarters Staff was quite aware of the significance of these movements, though no hint of their knowledge appeared for a long time in their courageous *communiqués*. The German design was to encircle Warsaw in a salient in the same way that Przemysl had been encircled, and pressing on the north on the line of the River Narew. The Narew, flowing from the north-east to the south-west, joins the Bug just before the Hindenburg's armies were launched. But still farther north another Russian sector was attacked, with the double object of keeping it from sending reinforcements farther south and of breaking through it if, or where, possible. This sector extended from the Baltic, westwards of Riga, to the fortress of Kovno, on the River Niemen. Westwards of Kovno the Niemen was not a defensive line. Eastwards of the fortress its tributaries and itself spread out fan-wise, one of them going to Vilna, another to Grodno. Between Grodno and the Narew was the fortress of Ossowiec, which had held out so long.

This most northerly or Courland sector was attacked by forces under Von Bülow. Hindenburg and Mackensen's armies were the strong segments of the pincers closing about Warsaw; Von Bülow's army strengthened Hindenburg's grip. If his army should be held up too long by the Russians, the Russian defensive might be made precarious by a threat of outflanking from Von Buelow farther north. That in effect was what did happen. The Russians made a defence of the Narew line sufficiently determined to have given pause to Von Hindenburg had he not possessed another weapon. That weapon, Von Bülow's attack in Courland, eventually decided the issue. It took the fortress of Kovno, a great prize, at a great sacrifice, and by so doing imperilled all the Russian defences on the Narew. But that was only after nearly two months' heavy fighting on the Narew front, Kovno falling on August 17, the day on which Mackensen cut the Lublin-Cholm line.

Long before that it had become evident to the Grand Duke Nicholas that if he would save his armies he must sacrifice Warsaw. The German advance, prodigal of men, undeterred by the heaviest losses, had advanced over the Narew to the north, close to the Lublin-Cholm railway on the south, and directly eastwards through Blonie towards Warsaw. The line of the Rawka, which had been so ably defended in the earlier stages of the war, was abandoned in the second week of July, and on July 18 the Russians had retreated to the Blonie defences in front of Warsaw. It was becoming evident to unprejudiced onlookers that this could only be a temporary expedient. On July 20 the Germans farther north continued to press their attack on the fortified lines in front of Rozhan, Pultusk, and Novo Georgievsk, and three days later were across the Narew between



Map showing approximately the salient about Warsaw created by Mackensen at Lublin and Cholm, and Hindenburg on the Narew

the two more northerly of these fortresses. On July 26 it seemed as if their advance might be held up; but the check would be of little use except as a delaying manœuvre if they could break through at any other point of the vast loop their armies made round about Warsaw. Two days later saw the beginning of the end so far as the Russian retention of Warsaw was concerned. The Germans, in spite of

severe losses, crossed the Vistula between Warsaw and Ivangorod, and on the next day Mackensen to the south bored his way up at last to artillery range of the Lublin-Cholm railway. By the first of August the Russians had evacuated Lublin; the Germans under Prince Leopold of Bavaria were attacking the Blonie line in front of Warsaw and enlarging their holding on the Narew. The loop was being pressed on three sides, north, south, and west. It was time for the Russians to go if they would not be caught inside. So once again they followed the Przemysl plan—held back the north and south assailants while their middle force in Warsaw fell back in good order to the east. The loop straightened, the ancient capital of Poland fell to the Germans on August 4, but the Russian forces which had defended it were flown, taking everything that could be of value to the enemy with them.

E. S. G.

How the Germans entered Warsaw on August 4, 1915: Playing in the regiments with the inevitable brass band—headed by a "jingling Johnnie"

"Jingling Johnnies" were at one time a feature of our own Guards' bands, adopted from the Prussians after Waterloo. The Prussians themselves introduced the idea from the Turks in the time of Frederick the Great. The instrument is mounted in brass, with horse-tails attached to the centre-piece, and crescent-shaped pieces of tinkling glass attached to the centre pole.